Cygwin: Reorganize cygwin source dir

Create subdirs and move files accordingly:

- DevDocs:  doc files
- fhandler: fhandler sources, split fhandler.cc into base.cc and null.cc
- local_includes: local include files
- scripts:  scripts called during build
- sec:      security sources

Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <corinna@vinschen.de>

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 748 deletions

diff --git a/winsup/cygwin/security.cc b/winsup/cygwin/security.cc
deleted file mode 100644
index 04e777852..000000000
--- a/winsup/cygwin/security.cc
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,748 +0,0 @@
-/* security.cc: NT file access control functions
-
-   Originaly written by Gunther Ebert, gunther.ebert@ixos-leipzig.de
-   Completely rewritten by Corinna Vinschen <corinna@vinschen.de>
-
-This file is part of Cygwin.
-
-This software is a copyrighted work licensed under the terms of the
-Cygwin license.  Please consult the file "CYGWIN_LICENSE" for
-details. */
-
-#include "winsup.h"
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <cygwin/acl.h>
-#include "cygerrno.h"
-#include "security.h"
-#include "path.h"
-#include "fhandler.h"
-#include "dtable.h"
-#include "pinfo.h"
-#include "cygheap.h"
-#include "ntdll.h"
-#include "tls_pbuf.h"
-#include <aclapi.h>
-
-#define ALL_SECURITY_INFORMATION (DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION \
-				  | GROUP_SECURITY_INFORMATION \
-				  | OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION)
-
-static GENERIC_MAPPING NO_COPY_RO file_mapping = { FILE_GENERIC_READ,
-						   FILE_GENERIC_WRITE,
-						   FILE_GENERIC_EXECUTE,
-						   FILE_ALL_ACCESS };
-LONG
-get_file_sd (HANDLE fh, path_conv &pc, security_descriptor &sd,
-	     bool justcreated)
-{
-  NTSTATUS status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
-  OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES attr;
-  IO_STATUS_BLOCK io;
-  ULONG len = SD_MAXIMUM_SIZE, rlen;
-
-  /* Allocate space for the security descriptor. */
-  if (!sd.malloc (len))
-    {
-      set_errno (ENOMEM);
-      return -1;
-    }
-  /* Try to fetch the security descriptor if the handle is valid. */
-  if (fh)
-    {
-      status = NtQuerySecurityObject (fh, ALL_SECURITY_INFORMATION,
-				      sd, len, &rlen);
-      if (!NT_SUCCESS (status))
-	debug_printf ("NtQuerySecurityObject (%S), status %y",
-		      pc.get_nt_native_path (), status);
-    }
-  /* If the handle was NULL, or fetching with the original handle didn't work,
-     try to reopen the file with READ_CONTROL and fetch the security descriptor
-     using that handle. */
-  if (!fh || !NT_SUCCESS (status))
-    {
-      status = NtOpenFile (&fh, READ_CONTROL,
-			   fh ? pc.init_reopen_attr (attr, fh)
-			      : pc.get_object_attr (attr, sec_none_nih),
-			   &io, FILE_SHARE_VALID_FLAGS,
-			   FILE_OPEN_FOR_BACKUP_INTENT
-			   | pc.is_known_reparse_point ()
-			   ? FILE_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT : 0);
-      if (!NT_SUCCESS (status))
-	{
-	  sd.free ();
-	  __seterrno_from_nt_status (status);
-	  return -1;
-	}
-      status = NtQuerySecurityObject (fh, ALL_SECURITY_INFORMATION,
-				      sd, len, &rlen);
-      NtClose (fh);
-      if (!NT_SUCCESS (status))
-	{
-	  sd.free ();
-	  __seterrno_from_nt_status (status);
-	  return -1;
-	}
-    }
-  /* We have a security descriptor now.  Unfortunately, if you want to know
-     if an ACE is inherited from the parent object, this isn't sufficient.
-
-     In the simple case, the SDs control word contains one of the
-     SE_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED or SE_DACL_PROTECTED flags, or at least one of
-     the ACEs has the INHERITED_ACE flag set.  In all of these cases we
-     know the DACL has been inherited.
-
-     If none of these flags is set in the SD, the information whether
-     or not an ACE has been inherited is not available in the DACL of the
-     object.  In this case GetSecurityInfo fetches the SD from the parent
-     directory and tests if the object's SD contains inherited ACEs from the
-     parent.
-
-     Note that we're not testing the SE_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED and
-     SE_DACL_PROTECTED flags here because we know the state the file's SD
-     is in.  Since we're creating all files with a NULL descriptor, the DACL
-     is either inherited from the parent, or it's the default DACL.  In
-     neither case, one of these flags is set.
-
-     For speed, we're not calling RtlConvertToAutoInheritSecurityObject
-     anymore (but keep the code here for reference).  Rather we just test
-     if one of the parent's ACEs is inheritable.  If so, we know we inherited
-     it and set the SE_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED flag.  If not, we may assume our
-     object's DACL is the default DACL.
-
-     This functionality is slow and the extra information is only required
-     when the file has been created and the permissions are about to be set
-     to POSIX permissions.  Therefore we only use it in case the file just
-     got created. */
-  if (justcreated)
-    {
-      PACL dacl;
-      BOOLEAN exists, def;
-      ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE *ace;
-      UNICODE_STRING dirname;
-      PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR psd;
-      tmp_pathbuf tp;
-
-      /* Open the parent directory with READ_CONTROL... */
-      RtlSplitUnicodePath (pc.get_nt_native_path (), &dirname, NULL);
-      InitializeObjectAttributes (&attr, &dirname, pc.objcaseinsensitive (),
-				  NULL, NULL);
-      status = NtOpenFile (&fh, READ_CONTROL, &attr, &io,
-			   FILE_SHARE_VALID_FLAGS,
-			   FILE_OPEN_FOR_BACKUP_INTENT
-			   | FILE_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT);
-      if (!NT_SUCCESS (status))
-	{
-	  debug_printf ("NtOpenFile (%S), status %y", &dirname, status);
-	  return 0;
-	}
-      /* ... fetch the parent's security descriptor ... */
-      psd = (PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR) tp.w_get ();
-      status = NtQuerySecurityObject (fh, ALL_SECURITY_INFORMATION,
-				      psd, len, &rlen);
-      NtClose (fh);
-      if (!NT_SUCCESS (status))
-	{
-	  debug_printf ("NtQuerySecurityObject (%S), status %y",
-			&dirname, status);
-	  return 0;
-	}
-#if 0
-      /* ... and create a new security descriptor in which all inherited ACEs
-	 are marked with the INHERITED_ACE flag.  For a description of the
-	 undocumented RtlConvertToAutoInheritSecurityObject function from
-	 ntdll.dll see the MSDN man page for the advapi32 function
-	 ConvertToAutoInheritPrivateObjectSecurity.  Fortunately the latter
-	 is just a shim. */
-      PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR nsd;
-      status = RtlConvertToAutoInheritSecurityObject (psd, sd, &nsd, NULL,
-						      pc.isdir (),
-						      &file_mapping);
-      if (!NT_SUCCESS (status))
-	{
-	  debug_printf ("RtlConvertToAutoInheritSecurityObject (%S), status %y",
-			&dirname, status);
-	  return 0;
-	}
-      /* Eventually copy the new security descriptor into sd and delete the
-	 original one created by RtlConvertToAutoInheritSecurityObject from
-	 the heap. */
-      len = RtlLengthSecurityDescriptor (nsd);
-      memcpy ((PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR) sd, nsd, len);
-      RtlDeleteSecurityObject (&nsd);
-#else
-      /* ... and check the parent descriptor for inheritable ACEs matching
-	 our current object type (file/dir).  The simple truth in our case
-	 is, either the parent dir had inheritable ACEs and all our ACEs are
-	 inherited, or the parent dir didn't have inheritable ACEs and all
-	 our ACEs are taken from the default DACL. */
-      bool inherited = false;
-      BYTE search_flags = pc.isdir () ? SUB_CONTAINERS_AND_OBJECTS_INHERIT
-				      : SUB_OBJECTS_ONLY_INHERIT;
-      if (NT_SUCCESS (RtlGetDaclSecurityDescriptor (psd, &exists, &dacl, &def))
-	  && exists && dacl)
-	for (ULONG idx = 0; idx < dacl->AceCount; ++idx)
-	  if (NT_SUCCESS (RtlGetAce (dacl, idx, (PVOID *) &ace))
-	      && (ace->Header.AceFlags & search_flags))
-	    {
-	      inherited = true;
-	      break;
-	    }
-      /* Then, if the parent descriptor contained inheritable ACEs, we mark
-	 the SD as SE_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED.  Note that this requires the
-	 matching check in get_posix_access.  If we ever revert to
-	 RtlConvertToAutoInheritSecurityObject, the check in get_posix_access
-	 has to test every single ACE for the INHERITED_ACE flag again. */
-      if (inherited
-	  && NT_SUCCESS (RtlGetDaclSecurityDescriptor (sd, &exists, &dacl,
-						       &def))
-	  && exists && dacl)
-	RtlSetControlSecurityDescriptor (sd, SE_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED,
-					     SE_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED);
-#endif
-    }
-  return 0;
-}
-
-LONG
-set_file_sd (HANDLE fh, path_conv &pc, security_descriptor &sd, bool is_chown)
-{
-  NTSTATUS status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
-  int retry = 0;
-  int res = -1;
-
-  for (; retry < 2; ++retry)
-    {
-      if (fh)
-	{
-	  status = NtSetSecurityObject (fh,
-					is_chown ? ALL_SECURITY_INFORMATION
-						 : DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION,
-					sd);
-	  if (NT_SUCCESS (status))
-	    {
-	      res = 0;
-	      break;
-	    }
-	}
-      if (!retry)
-	{
-	  OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES attr;
-	  IO_STATUS_BLOCK io;
-	  status = NtOpenFile (&fh, (is_chown ? WRITE_OWNER  : 0) | WRITE_DAC,
-			       fh ? pc.init_reopen_attr (attr, fh)
-				  : pc.get_object_attr (attr, sec_none_nih),
-			       &io,
-			       FILE_SHARE_VALID_FLAGS,
-			       FILE_OPEN_FOR_BACKUP_INTENT
-			       | pc.is_known_reparse_point ()
-			       ? FILE_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT : 0);
-	  if (!NT_SUCCESS (status))
-	    {
-	      fh = NULL;
-	      break;
-	    }
-	}
-    }
-  if (retry && fh)
-    NtClose (fh);
-  if (!NT_SUCCESS (status))
-    __seterrno_from_nt_status (status);
-  return res;
-}
-
-static int
-get_reg_sd (HANDLE handle, security_descriptor &sd_ret)
-{
-  LONG ret;
-  DWORD len = 0;
-
-  ret = RegGetKeySecurity ((HKEY) handle, ALL_SECURITY_INFORMATION,
-			   sd_ret, &len);
-  if (ret == ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER)
-    {
-      if (!sd_ret.malloc (len))
-	set_errno (ENOMEM);
-      else
-	ret = RegGetKeySecurity ((HKEY) handle, ALL_SECURITY_INFORMATION,
-				 sd_ret, &len);
-    }
-  if (ret != ERROR_SUCCESS)
-    {
-      __seterrno ();
-      return -1;
-    }
-  return 0;
-}
-
-int
-get_reg_attribute (HKEY hkey, mode_t *attribute, uid_t *uidret,
-		   gid_t *gidret)
-{
-  security_descriptor sd;
-
-  if (!get_reg_sd (hkey, sd))
-    {
-      get_posix_access (sd, attribute, uidret, gidret, NULL, 0);
-      return 0;
-    }
-  /* The entries are already set to default values */
-  return -1;
-}
-
-int
-get_file_attribute (HANDLE handle, path_conv &pc,
-		    mode_t *attribute, uid_t *uidret, gid_t *gidret)
-{
-  if (pc.has_acls ())
-    {
-      security_descriptor sd;
-
-      if (!get_file_sd (handle, pc, sd, false))
-	{
-	  get_posix_access (sd, attribute, uidret, gidret, NULL, 0);
-	  return 0;
-	}
-      /* ENOSYS is returned by get_file_sd if fetching the DACL from a remote
-	 share returns STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE, which in turn is
-	 converted to ERROR_BAD_NET_RESP.  This potentially occurs when trying
-	 to fetch DACLs from a NT4 machine which is not part of the domain of
-	 the requesting machine. */
-      else if (get_errno () != ENOSYS)
-	{
-	  if (uidret)
-	    *uidret = ILLEGAL_UID;
-	  if (gidret)
-	    *gidret = ILLEGAL_GID;
-
-	  return -1;
-	}
-    }
-
-  if (uidret)
-    *uidret = myself->uid;
-  if (gidret)
-    *gidret = myself->gid;
-
-  return -1;
-}
-
-bool
-add_access_allowed_ace (PACL acl, DWORD attributes, PSID sid, size_t &len_add,
-			DWORD inherit)
-{
-  NTSTATUS status = RtlAddAccessAllowedAceEx (acl, ACL_REVISION, inherit,
-					      attributes, sid);
-  if (!NT_SUCCESS (status))
-    {
-      __seterrno_from_nt_status (status);
-      return false;
-    }
-  len_add += sizeof (ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE) - sizeof (DWORD) + RtlLengthSid (sid);
-  return true;
-}
-
-bool
-add_access_denied_ace (PACL acl, DWORD attributes, PSID sid, size_t &len_add,
-		       DWORD inherit)
-{
-  NTSTATUS status = RtlAddAccessDeniedAceEx (acl, ACL_REVISION, inherit,
-					     attributes, sid);
-  if (!NT_SUCCESS (status))
-    {
-      __seterrno_from_nt_status (status);
-      return false;
-    }
-  len_add += sizeof (ACCESS_DENIED_ACE) - sizeof (DWORD) + RtlLengthSid (sid);
-  return true;
-}
-
-void
-set_security_attribute (path_conv &pc, int attribute, PSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES psa,
-			security_descriptor &sd)
-{
-  psa->lpSecurityDescriptor = sd.malloc (SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_MIN_LENGTH);
-  RtlCreateSecurityDescriptor ((PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR) psa->lpSecurityDescriptor,
-				SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_REVISION);
-  psa->lpSecurityDescriptor = set_posix_access (attribute, geteuid (),
-						getegid (), NULL, 0,
-						sd, false);
-}
-
-int
-get_object_sd (HANDLE handle, security_descriptor &sd)
-{
-  ULONG len = 0;
-  NTSTATUS status;
-
-  status = NtQuerySecurityObject (handle, ALL_SECURITY_INFORMATION,
-				  sd, len, &len);
-  if (status != STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL)
-    {
-      __seterrno_from_nt_status (status);
-      return -1;
-    }
-  if (!sd.malloc (len))
-    {
-      set_errno (ENOMEM);
-      return -1;
-    }
-  status = NtQuerySecurityObject (handle, ALL_SECURITY_INFORMATION,
-				  sd, len, &len);
-  if (!NT_SUCCESS (status))
-    {
-      __seterrno_from_nt_status (status);
-      return -1;
-    }
-  return 0;
-}
-
-int
-get_object_attribute (HANDLE handle, uid_t *uidret, gid_t *gidret,
-		      mode_t *attribute)
-{
-  security_descriptor sd;
-
-  if (get_object_sd (handle, sd))
-    return -1;
-  return get_posix_access (sd, attribute, uidret, gidret, NULL, 0)
-	 >= 0 ? 0 : -1;
-}
-
-int
-create_object_sd_from_attribute (uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t attribute,
-				 security_descriptor &sd)
-{
-  return set_posix_access (attribute, uid, gid, NULL, 0, sd, false)
-	 ? 0 : -1;
-}
-
-int
-set_object_sd (HANDLE handle, security_descriptor &sd, bool chown)
-{
-  NTSTATUS status;
-  status = NtSetSecurityObject (handle, chown ? ALL_SECURITY_INFORMATION
-					      : DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION, sd);
-  if (!NT_SUCCESS (status))
-    {
-      __seterrno_from_nt_status (status);
-      return -1;
-    }
-  return 0;
-}
-
-int
-set_object_attribute (HANDLE handle, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t attribute)
-{
-  security_descriptor sd;
-
-  if (create_object_sd_from_attribute (uid, gid, attribute, sd)
-      || set_object_sd (handle, sd, uid != ILLEGAL_UID || gid != ILLEGAL_GID))
-    return -1;
-  return 0;
-}
-
-int
-set_created_file_access (HANDLE handle, path_conv &pc, mode_t attr)
-{
-  int ret = -1;
-  security_descriptor sd, sd_ret;
-  mode_t attr_rd;
-  uid_t uid;
-  gid_t gid;
-  tmp_pathbuf tp;
-  aclent_t *aclp;
-  int nentries, idx;
-  bool std_acl;
-
-  if (!get_file_sd (handle, pc, sd, true))
-    {
-      attr |= S_JUSTCREATED;
-      if (pc.isdir ())
-	attr |= S_IFDIR;
-      attr_rd = attr;
-      aclp = (aclent_t *) tp.c_get ();
-      if ((nentries = get_posix_access (sd, &attr_rd, &uid, &gid, aclp,
-					MAX_ACL_ENTRIES, &std_acl)) >= 0)
-	{
-	  if (S_ISLNK (attr))
-	    {
-	      /* Symlinks always get the request POSIX perms. */
-	      aclp[0].a_perm = (attr >> 6) & S_IRWXO;
-	      if ((idx = searchace (aclp, nentries, GROUP_OBJ)) >= 0)
-		aclp[idx].a_perm = (attr >> 3) & S_IRWXO;
-	      if ((idx = searchace (aclp, nentries, CLASS_OBJ)) >= 0)
-		aclp[idx].a_perm = (attr >> 3) & S_IRWXO;
-	      if ((idx = searchace (aclp, nentries, OTHER_OBJ)) >= 0)
-		aclp[idx].a_perm = attr & S_IRWXO;
-	    }
-	  else
-	    {
-	      /* Overwrite ACL permissions as required by POSIX 1003.1e
-		 draft 17. */
-	      aclp[0].a_perm &= (attr >> 6) & S_IRWXO;
-	      if ((idx = searchace (aclp, nentries, CLASS_OBJ)) >= 0)
-		aclp[idx].a_perm &= (attr >> 3) & S_IRWXO;
-	      if (std_acl
-		  && (idx = searchace (aclp, nentries, GROUP_OBJ)) >= 0)
-		aclp[idx].a_perm &= (attr >> 3) & S_IRWXO;
-	      if ((idx = searchace (aclp, nentries, OTHER_OBJ)) >= 0)
-		aclp[idx].a_perm &= attr & S_IRWXO;
-	    }
-	  /* Construct appropriate inherit attribute for new directories.
-	     Basically we do this only for the sake of non-Cygwin applications.
-	     Cygwin applications don't need these.  Additionally, if the
-	     S_ISGID bit is set, propagate it. */
-	  if (S_ISDIR (attr))
-	    {
-	      if (searchace (aclp, nentries, DEF_USER_OBJ) < 0)
-		{
-		  aclp[nentries].a_type = DEF_USER_OBJ;
-		  aclp[nentries].a_id = ILLEGAL_UID;
-		  aclp[nentries++].a_perm = (attr >> 6) & S_IRWXO;
-		}
-	      if (searchace (aclp, nentries, DEF_GROUP_OBJ) < 0)
-		{
-		  aclp[nentries].a_type = DEF_GROUP_OBJ;
-		  aclp[nentries].a_id = ILLEGAL_GID;
-		  aclp[nentries++].a_perm = (attr >> 3) & S_IRWXO;
-		}
-	      if (searchace (aclp, nentries, DEF_OTHER_OBJ) < 0)
-		{
-		  aclp[nentries].a_type = DEF_OTHER_OBJ;
-		  aclp[nentries].a_id = ILLEGAL_UID;
-		  aclp[nentries++].a_perm = attr & S_IRWXO;
-		}
-	      if (attr_rd & S_ISGID)
-		attr |= S_ISGID;
-	    }
-	  if (set_posix_access (attr, uid, gid, aclp, nentries, sd_ret,
-				pc.fs_is_samba ()))
-	    ret = set_file_sd (handle, pc, sd_ret, attr_rd & S_ISGID);
-	}
-    }
-  return ret;
-}
-
-static int
-check_access (security_descriptor &sd, GENERIC_MAPPING &mapping,
-	      ACCESS_MASK desired, int flags, bool effective)
-{
-  int ret = -1;
-  NTSTATUS status, allow;
-  ACCESS_MASK granted;
-  DWORD plen = sizeof (PRIVILEGE_SET) + 3 * sizeof (LUID_AND_ATTRIBUTES);
-  PPRIVILEGE_SET pset = (PPRIVILEGE_SET) alloca (plen);
-  HANDLE tok = ((effective && cygheap->user.issetuid ())
-		? cygheap->user.imp_token ()
-		: hProcImpToken);
-
-  if (!tok)
-    {
-      if (!DuplicateTokenEx (hProcToken, MAXIMUM_ALLOWED, NULL,
-			    SecurityImpersonation, TokenImpersonation,
-			    &hProcImpToken))
-	 {
-	    __seterrno ();
-	    return ret;
-	 }
-      tok = hProcImpToken;
-    }
-
-  status = NtAccessCheck (sd, tok, desired, &mapping, pset, &plen, &granted,
-			  &allow);
-  if (!NT_SUCCESS (status))
-    __seterrno ();
-  else if (!NT_SUCCESS (allow))
-    {
-      /* CV, 2006-10-16: Now, that's really weird.  Imagine a user who has no
-	 standard access to a file, but who has backup and restore privileges
-	 and these privileges are enabled in the access token.  One would
-	 expect that the AccessCheck function takes this into consideration
-	 when returning the access status.  Otherwise, why bother with the
-	 pset parameter, right?
-	 But not so.  AccessCheck actually returns a status of "false" here,
-	 even though opening a file with backup resp. restore intent
-	 naturally succeeds for this user.  This definitely spoils the results
-	 of access(2) for administrative users or the SYSTEM account.  So, in
-	 case the access check fails, another check against the user's
-	 backup/restore privileges has to be made.  Sigh. */
-      int granted_flags = 0;
-      BOOLEAN has_priv;
-
-      if (flags & R_OK)
-	{
-	  pset->PrivilegeCount = 1;
-	  pset->Control = 0;
-	  pset->Privilege[0].Luid.HighPart = 0L;
-	  pset->Privilege[0].Luid.LowPart = SE_BACKUP_PRIVILEGE;
-	  pset->Privilege[0].Attributes = 0;
-	  status = NtPrivilegeCheck (tok, pset, &has_priv);
-	  if (NT_SUCCESS (status) && has_priv)
-	    granted_flags |= R_OK;
-	}
-      if (flags & W_OK)
-	{
-	  pset->PrivilegeCount = 1;
-	  pset->Control = 0;
-	  pset->Privilege[0].Luid.HighPart = 0L;
-	  pset->Privilege[0].Luid.LowPart = SE_RESTORE_PRIVILEGE;
-	  pset->Privilege[0].Attributes = 0;
-	  status = NtPrivilegeCheck (tok, pset, &has_priv);
-	  if (NT_SUCCESS (status) && has_priv)
-	    granted_flags |= W_OK;
-	}
-      if (granted_flags == flags)
-	ret = 0;
-      else
-	set_errno (EACCES);
-    }
-  else
-    ret = 0;
-  return ret;
-}
-
-/* Samba override.  Check security descriptor for Samba UNIX user and group
-   accounts and check if we have an RFC 2307 mapping to a Windows account.
-   Create a new security descriptor with all of the UNIX accounts with
-   valid mapping replaced with their Windows counterpart. */
-static void
-convert_samba_sd (security_descriptor &sd_ret)
-{
-  NTSTATUS status;
-  BOOLEAN dummy;
-  PSID sid;
-  cygsid owner;
-  cygsid group;
-  SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR sd;
-  cyg_ldap cldap;
-  tmp_pathbuf tp;
-  PACL acl, oacl;
-  size_t acl_len;
-  PACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE ace;
-
-  if (!NT_SUCCESS (RtlGetOwnerSecurityDescriptor (sd_ret, &sid, &dummy)))
-    return;
-  owner = sid;
-  if (!NT_SUCCESS (RtlGetGroupSecurityDescriptor (sd_ret, &sid, &dummy)))
-    return;
-  group = sid;
-
-  if (sid_id_auth (owner) == 22)
-    {
-      struct passwd *pwd;
-      uid_t uid = owner.get_uid (&cldap);
-      if (uid < UNIX_POSIX_OFFSET && (pwd = internal_getpwuid (uid)))
-	owner.getfrompw (pwd);
-    }
-  if (sid_id_auth (group) == 22)
-    {
-      struct group *grp;
-      gid_t gid = group.get_gid (&cldap);
-      if (gid < UNIX_POSIX_OFFSET && (grp = internal_getgrgid (gid)))
-	group.getfromgr (grp);
-    }
-
-  if (!NT_SUCCESS (RtlGetDaclSecurityDescriptor (sd_ret, &dummy,
-						 &oacl, &dummy)))
-    return;
-  acl = (PACL) tp.w_get ();
-  RtlCreateAcl (acl, ACL_MAXIMUM_SIZE, ACL_REVISION);
-  acl_len = sizeof (ACL);
-
-  for (DWORD i = 0; i < oacl->AceCount; ++i)
-    if (NT_SUCCESS (RtlGetAce (oacl, i, (PVOID *) &ace)))
-      {
-	cygsid ace_sid ((PSID) &ace->SidStart);
-	if (sid_id_auth (ace_sid) == 22)
-	  {
-	    if (sid_sub_auth (ace_sid, 0) == 1) /* user */
-	      {
-		struct passwd *pwd;
-		uid_t uid = ace_sid.get_uid (&cldap);
-		if (uid < UNIX_POSIX_OFFSET && (pwd = internal_getpwuid (uid)))
-		  ace_sid.getfrompw (pwd);
-	      }
-	    else if (sid_sub_auth (ace_sid, 0) == 2) /* group */
-	      {
-		struct group *grp;
-		gid_t gid = ace_sid.get_gid (&cldap);
-		if (gid < UNIX_POSIX_OFFSET && (grp = internal_getgrgid (gid)))
-		  ace_sid.getfromgr (grp);
-	      }
-	  }
-	if (!add_access_allowed_ace (acl, ace->Mask, ace_sid, acl_len,
-				     ace->Header.AceFlags))
-	  return;
-      }
-  acl->AclSize = acl_len;
-
-  RtlCreateSecurityDescriptor (&sd, SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_REVISION);
-  RtlSetControlSecurityDescriptor (&sd, SE_DACL_PROTECTED, SE_DACL_PROTECTED);
-  RtlSetOwnerSecurityDescriptor (&sd, owner, FALSE);
-  RtlSetGroupSecurityDescriptor (&sd, group, FALSE);
-
-  status = RtlSetDaclSecurityDescriptor (&sd, TRUE, acl, FALSE);
-  if (!NT_SUCCESS (status))
-    return;
-  DWORD sd_size = 0;
-  status = RtlAbsoluteToSelfRelativeSD (&sd, sd_ret, &sd_size);
-  if (sd_size > 0 && sd_ret.malloc (sd_size))
-    RtlAbsoluteToSelfRelativeSD (&sd, sd_ret, &sd_size);
-}
-
-int
-check_file_access (path_conv &pc, int flags, bool effective)
-{
-  security_descriptor sd;
-  int ret = -1;
-  ACCESS_MASK desired = 0;
-  if (flags & R_OK)
-    desired |= FILE_READ_DATA;
-  if (flags & W_OK)
-    desired |= FILE_WRITE_DATA;
-  if (flags & X_OK)
-    desired |= FILE_EXECUTE;
-  if (!get_file_sd (pc.handle (), pc, sd, false))
-    {
-      /* Tweak Samba security descriptor as necessary. */
-      if (pc.fs_is_samba ())
-	convert_samba_sd (sd);
-      ret = check_access (sd, file_mapping, desired, flags, effective);
-    }
-  debug_printf ("flags %y, ret %d", flags, ret);
-  return ret;
-}
-
-int
-check_registry_access (HANDLE hdl, int flags, bool effective)
-{
-  security_descriptor sd;
-  int ret = -1;
-  static GENERIC_MAPPING NO_COPY_RO reg_mapping = { KEY_READ,
-						    KEY_WRITE,
-						    KEY_EXECUTE,
-						    KEY_ALL_ACCESS };
-  ACCESS_MASK desired = 0;
-  if (flags & R_OK)
-    desired |= KEY_ENUMERATE_SUB_KEYS;
-  if (flags & W_OK)
-    desired |= KEY_SET_VALUE;
-  if (flags & X_OK)
-    desired |= KEY_QUERY_VALUE;
-
-  if ((HKEY) hdl == HKEY_PERFORMANCE_DATA)
-    /* RegGetKeySecurity() always fails with ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE.  */
-    ret = 0;
-  else if (!get_reg_sd (hdl, sd))
-    ret = check_access (sd, reg_mapping, desired, flags, effective);
-
-  /* As long as we can't write the registry... */
-  if (flags & W_OK)
-    {
-      set_errno (EROFS);
-      ret = -1;
-    }
-  debug_printf ("flags %y, ret %d", flags, ret);
-  return ret;
-}