diff options
author | Ladislav Michl <Ladislav.Michl@seznam.cz> | 2010-06-27 05:23:31 +0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com> | 2010-06-27 05:23:31 +0400 |
commit | a73b87e9343df2a6f14e328a977e7b70eb3ed707 (patch) | |
tree | 564869bde93c870b20f6d4d8a3da71e42b629f2e | |
parent | 1b14cdb27ca5e8104a824424731be430c8592dd6 (diff) |
*: s/"/bin/sh"/DEFAULT_SHELL, run_shell() API fix, remove unneeded strdup
function old new delta
run_shell 157 166 +9
su_main 477 470 -7
sulogin_main 515 503 -12
Signed-off-by: Ladislav Michl <Ladislav.Michl@seznam.cz>
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>
-rw-r--r-- | archival/libunarchive/data_extract_to_command.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | include/libbb.h | 7 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | libbb/run_shell.c | 18 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | libbb/setup_environment.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | loginutils/login.c | 12 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | loginutils/su.c | 57 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | loginutils/sulogin.c | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | runit/svlogd.c | 2 |
8 files changed, 58 insertions, 54 deletions
diff --git a/archival/libunarchive/data_extract_to_command.c b/archival/libunarchive/data_extract_to_command.c index 53a7217c2..eb09439bc 100644 --- a/archival/libunarchive/data_extract_to_command.c +++ b/archival/libunarchive/data_extract_to_command.c @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ void FAST_FUNC data_extract_to_command(archive_handle_t *archive_handle) close(p[1]); xdup2(p[0], STDIN_FILENO); signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL); - execl("/bin/sh", "/bin/sh" + 5, "-c", archive_handle->tar__to_command, NULL); - bb_perror_msg_and_die("can't execute '%s'", "/bin/sh"); + execl(DEFAULT_SHELL, DEFAULT_SHELL_SHORT_NAME, "-c", archive_handle->tar__to_command, NULL); + bb_perror_msg_and_die("can't execute '%s'", DEFAULT_SHELL); } close(p[0]); /* Our caller is expected to do signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN) diff --git a/include/libbb.h b/include/libbb.h index 58719a85b..53b768d88 100644 --- a/include/libbb.h +++ b/include/libbb.h @@ -1157,7 +1157,6 @@ char *bb_simplify_abs_path_inplace(char *path) FAST_FUNC; extern void bb_do_delay(int seconds) FAST_FUNC; extern void change_identity(const struct passwd *pw) FAST_FUNC; extern void run_shell(const char *shell, int loginshell, const char *command, const char **additional_args) NORETURN FAST_FUNC; -extern void run_shell(const char *shell, int loginshell, const char *command, const char **additional_args) FAST_FUNC; #if ENABLE_SELINUX extern void renew_current_security_context(void) FAST_FUNC; extern void set_current_security_context(security_context_t sid) FAST_FUNC; @@ -1593,12 +1592,12 @@ extern struct globals *const ptr_to_globals; * use bb_default_login_shell and following defines. * If you change LIBBB_DEFAULT_LOGIN_SHELL, * don't forget to change increment constant. */ -#define LIBBB_DEFAULT_LOGIN_SHELL "-/bin/sh" +#define LIBBB_DEFAULT_LOGIN_SHELL "-/bin/sh" extern const char bb_default_login_shell[]; /* "/bin/sh" */ -#define DEFAULT_SHELL (bb_default_login_shell+1) +#define DEFAULT_SHELL (bb_default_login_shell+1) /* "sh" */ -#define DEFAULT_SHELL_SHORT_NAME (bb_default_login_shell+6) +#define DEFAULT_SHELL_SHORT_NAME (bb_default_login_shell+6) #if ENABLE_FEATURE_DEVFS # define CURRENT_VC "/dev/vc/0" diff --git a/libbb/run_shell.c b/libbb/run_shell.c index 4608a24a9..4d92c3caa 100644 --- a/libbb/run_shell.c +++ b/libbb/run_shell.c @@ -49,15 +49,14 @@ void FAST_FUNC set_current_security_context(security_context_t sid) #endif -/* Run SHELL, or DEFAULT_SHELL if SHELL is empty. - If COMMAND is nonzero, pass it to the shell with the -c option. - If ADDITIONAL_ARGS is nonzero, pass it to the shell as more - arguments. */ - +/* Run SHELL, or DEFAULT_SHELL if SHELL is "" or NULL. + * If COMMAND is nonzero, pass it to the shell with the -c option. + * If ADDITIONAL_ARGS is nonzero, pass it to the shell as more + * arguments. */ void FAST_FUNC run_shell(const char *shell, int loginshell, const char *command, const char **additional_args) { const char **args; - int argno = 1; + int argno; int additional_args_cnt = 0; for (args = additional_args; args && *args; args++) @@ -65,11 +64,13 @@ void FAST_FUNC run_shell(const char *shell, int loginshell, const char *command, args = xmalloc(sizeof(char*) * (4 + additional_args_cnt)); - args[0] = bb_get_last_path_component_nostrip(xstrdup(shell)); + if (!shell || !shell[0]) + shell = DEFAULT_SHELL; + args[0] = bb_get_last_path_component_nostrip(shell); if (loginshell) args[0] = xasprintf("-%s", args[0]); - + argno = 1; if (command) { args[argno++] = "-c"; args[argno++] = command; @@ -79,6 +80,7 @@ void FAST_FUNC run_shell(const char *shell, int loginshell, const char *command, args[argno++] = *additional_args; } args[argno] = NULL; + #if ENABLE_SELINUX if (current_sid) setexeccon(current_sid); diff --git a/libbb/setup_environment.c b/libbb/setup_environment.c index 13e60d8e4..a95fbc5bf 100644 --- a/libbb/setup_environment.c +++ b/libbb/setup_environment.c @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ void FAST_FUNC setup_environment(const char *shell, int flags, const struct pass const char *term; /* Leave TERM unchanged. Set HOME, SHELL, USER, LOGNAME, PATH. - Unset all other environment variables. */ + * Unset all other environment variables. */ term = getenv("TERM"); clearenv(); if (term) @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ void FAST_FUNC setup_environment(const char *shell, int flags, const struct pass //xsetenv("SHELL", shell); } else if (flags & SETUP_ENV_CHANGEENV) { /* Set HOME, SHELL, and if not becoming a super-user, - USER and LOGNAME. */ + * USER and LOGNAME. */ if (pw->pw_uid) { shortcut: xsetenv("USER", pw->pw_name); diff --git a/loginutils/login.c b/loginutils/login.c index 078cd68ed..88ed0af78 100644 --- a/loginutils/login.c +++ b/loginutils/login.c @@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ int login_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv) }; char *fromhost; char username[USERNAME_SIZE]; - const char *tmp; + const char *shell; int run_by_root; unsigned opt; int count = 0; @@ -389,10 +389,10 @@ int login_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv) run_login_script(pw, full_tty); change_identity(pw); - tmp = pw->pw_shell; - if (!tmp || !*tmp) - tmp = DEFAULT_SHELL; - setup_environment(tmp, + shell = pw->pw_shell; + if (!shell || !shell[0]) + shell = DEFAULT_SHELL; + setup_environment(shell, (!(opt & LOGIN_OPT_p) * SETUP_ENV_CLEARENV) + SETUP_ENV_CHANGEENV, pw); @@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ int login_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv) signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL); /* Exec login shell with no additional parameters */ - run_shell(tmp, 1, NULL, NULL); + run_shell(shell, 1, NULL, NULL); /* return EXIT_FAILURE; - not reached */ } diff --git a/loginutils/su.c b/loginutils/su.c index af25655fd..9bae37551 100644 --- a/loginutils/su.c +++ b/loginutils/su.c @@ -10,23 +10,27 @@ #if ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_CHECKS_SHELLS /* Return 1 if SHELL is a restricted shell (one not returned by - getusershell), else 0, meaning it is a standard shell. */ + * getusershell), else 0, meaning it is a standard shell. */ static int restricted_shell(const char *shell) { char *line; + int result = 1; /*setusershell(); - getusershell does it itself*/ while ((line = getusershell()) != NULL) { - if (/* *line != '#' && */ strcmp(line, shell) == 0) - return 0; + if (/* *line != '#' && */ strcmp(line, shell) == 0) { + result = 0; + break; + } } - endusershell(); - return 1; + if (ENABLE_FEATURE_CLEAN_UP) + endusershell(); + return result; } #endif #define SU_OPT_mp (3) -#define SU_OPT_l (4) +#define SU_OPT_l (4) int su_main(int argc, char **argv) MAIN_EXTERNALLY_VISIBLE; int su_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv) @@ -38,7 +42,8 @@ int su_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv) struct passwd *pw; uid_t cur_uid = getuid(); const char *tty; - char *old_user; + char user_buf[64]; + const char *old_user; flags = getopt32(argv, "mplc:s:", &opt_command, &opt_shell); //argc -= optind; @@ -56,21 +61,18 @@ int su_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv) } if (ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_SYSLOG) { - /* The utmp entry (via getlogin) is probably the best way to identify - * the user, especially if someone su's from a su-shell. + /* The utmp entry (via getlogin) is probably the best way to + * identify the user, especially if someone su's from a su-shell. * But getlogin can fail -- usually due to lack of utmp entry. * in this case resort to getpwuid. */ - const char *user; #if ENABLE_FEATURE_UTMP - char user_buf[64]; - user = user_buf; + old_user = user_buf; if (getlogin_r(user_buf, sizeof(user_buf)) != 0) #endif { pw = getpwuid(cur_uid); - user = pw ? pw->pw_name : ""; + old_user = pw ? xstrdup(pw->pw_name) : ""; } - old_user = xstrdup(user); tty = xmalloc_ttyname(2); if (!tty) { tty = "none"; @@ -80,13 +82,7 @@ int su_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv) pw = xgetpwnam(opt_username); - /* Make sure pw->pw_shell is non-NULL. It may be NULL when NEW_USER - is a username that is retrieved via NIS (YP), but that doesn't have - a default shell listed. */ - if (!pw->pw_shell || !pw->pw_shell[0]) - pw->pw_shell = (char *)DEFAULT_SHELL; - - if ((cur_uid == 0) || correct_password(pw)) { + if (cur_uid == 0 || correct_password(pw)) { if (ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_SYSLOG) syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "%c %s %s:%s", '+', tty, old_user, opt_username); @@ -99,21 +95,30 @@ int su_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv) if (ENABLE_FEATURE_CLEAN_UP && ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_SYSLOG) { closelog(); - free(old_user); } - if (!opt_shell && (flags & SU_OPT_mp)) + if (!opt_shell && (flags & SU_OPT_mp)) { + /* -s SHELL is not given, but "preserve env" opt is */ opt_shell = getenv("SHELL"); + } + + /* Make sure pw->pw_shell is non-NULL. It may be NULL when NEW_USER + * is a username that is retrieved via NIS (YP), that doesn't have + * a default shell listed. */ + if (!pw->pw_shell || !pw->pw_shell[0]) + pw->pw_shell = (char *)DEFAULT_SHELL; #if ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_CHECKS_SHELLS if (opt_shell && cur_uid != 0 && restricted_shell(pw->pw_shell)) { /* The user being su'd to has a nonstandard shell, and so is - probably a uucp account or has restricted access. Don't - compromise the account by allowing access with a standard - shell. */ + * probably a uucp account or has restricted access. Don't + * compromise the account by allowing access with a standard + * shell. */ bb_error_msg("using restricted shell"); opt_shell = NULL; } + /* else: user can run whatever he wants via "su -s PROG USER". + * This is safe since PROG is run under user's uid/gid. */ #endif if (!opt_shell) opt_shell = pw->pw_shell; diff --git a/loginutils/sulogin.c b/loginutils/sulogin.c index 6e3d3b019..3516013f1 100644 --- a/loginutils/sulogin.c +++ b/loginutils/sulogin.c @@ -101,11 +101,9 @@ int sulogin_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv) shell = getenv("SUSHELL"); if (!shell) shell = getenv("sushell"); - if (!shell) { - shell = "/bin/sh"; - if (pwd->pw_shell[0]) - shell = pwd->pw_shell; - } + if (!shell) + shell = pwd->pw_shell; + /* Exec login shell with no additional parameters. Never returns. */ run_shell(shell, 1, NULL, NULL); diff --git a/runit/svlogd.c b/runit/svlogd.c index fc8b4abb9..9fe81b900 100644 --- a/runit/svlogd.c +++ b/runit/svlogd.c @@ -354,7 +354,7 @@ static void processorstart(struct logdir *ld) xmove_fd(fd, 5); // getenv("SHELL")? - execl("/bin/sh", "/bin/sh" + 5, "-c", ld->processor, (char*) NULL); + execl(DEFAULT_SHELL, DEFAULT_SHELL_SHORT_NAME, "-c", ld->processor, (char*) NULL); bb_perror_msg_and_die(FATAL"can't %s processor %s", "run", ld->name); } ld->fnsave[26] = sv_ch; /* ...restore */ |