diff options
author | Jeff King <peff@peff.net> | 2018-04-30 10:25:25 +0300 |
---|---|---|
committer | Jeff King <peff@peff.net> | 2018-05-22 06:50:11 +0300 |
commit | 0383bbb9015898cbc79abd7b64316484d7713b44 (patch) | |
tree | 9dea4e74b490a09d29c653b5c29f7fb40589c4d8 /builtin | |
parent | 42e6fde5c28150206956ea4be490d886c4ecbd68 (diff) |
submodule-config: verify submodule names as paths
Submodule "names" come from the untrusted .gitmodules file,
but we blindly append them to $GIT_DIR/modules to create our
on-disk repo paths. This means you can do bad things by
putting "../" into the name (among other things).
Let's sanity-check these names to avoid building a path that
can be exploited. There are two main decisions:
1. What should the allowed syntax be?
It's tempting to reuse verify_path(), since submodule
names typically come from in-repo paths. But there are
two reasons not to:
a. It's technically more strict than what we need, as
we really care only about breaking out of the
$GIT_DIR/modules/ hierarchy. E.g., having a
submodule named "foo/.git" isn't actually
dangerous, and it's possible that somebody has
manually given such a funny name.
b. Since we'll eventually use this checking logic in
fsck to prevent downstream repositories, it should
be consistent across platforms. Because
verify_path() relies on is_dir_sep(), it wouldn't
block "foo\..\bar" on a non-Windows machine.
2. Where should we enforce it? These days most of the
.gitmodules reads go through submodule-config.c, so
I've put it there in the reading step. That should
cover all of the C code.
We also construct the name for "git submodule add"
inside the git-submodule.sh script. This is probably
not a big deal for security since the name is coming
from the user anyway, but it would be polite to remind
them if the name they pick is invalid (and we need to
expose the name-checker to the shell anyway for our
test scripts).
This patch issues a warning when reading .gitmodules
and just ignores the related config entry completely.
This will generally end up producing a sensible error,
as it works the same as a .gitmodules file which is
missing a submodule entry (so "submodule update" will
barf, but "git clone --recurse-submodules" will print
an error but not abort the clone.
There is one minor oddity, which is that we print the
warning once per malformed config key (since that's how
the config subsystem gives us the entries). So in the
new test, for example, the user would see three
warnings. That's OK, since the intent is that this case
should never come up outside of malicious repositories
(and then it might even benefit the user to see the
message multiple times).
Credit for finding this vulnerability and the proof of
concept from which the test script was adapted goes to
Etienne Stalmans.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'builtin')
-rw-r--r-- | builtin/submodule--helper.c | 24 |
1 files changed, 24 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/builtin/submodule--helper.c b/builtin/submodule--helper.c index cbb17a9021..b4b4d29d82 100644 --- a/builtin/submodule--helper.c +++ b/builtin/submodule--helper.c @@ -1195,6 +1195,29 @@ static int is_active(int argc, const char **argv, const char *prefix) return !is_submodule_initialized(argv[1]); } +/* + * Exit non-zero if any of the submodule names given on the command line is + * invalid. If no names are given, filter stdin to print only valid names + * (which is primarily intended for testing). + */ +static int check_name(int argc, const char **argv, const char *prefix) +{ + if (argc > 1) { + while (*++argv) { + if (check_submodule_name(*argv) < 0) + return 1; + } + } else { + struct strbuf buf = STRBUF_INIT; + while (strbuf_getline(&buf, stdin) != EOF) { + if (!check_submodule_name(buf.buf)) + printf("%s\n", buf.buf); + } + strbuf_release(&buf); + } + return 0; +} + #define SUPPORT_SUPER_PREFIX (1<<0) struct cmd_struct { @@ -1216,6 +1239,7 @@ static struct cmd_struct commands[] = { {"push-check", push_check, 0}, {"absorb-git-dirs", absorb_git_dirs, SUPPORT_SUPER_PREFIX}, {"is-active", is_active, 0}, + {"check-name", check_name, 0}, }; int cmd_submodule__helper(int argc, const char **argv, const char *prefix) |