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author | Glen Choo <chooglen@google.com> | 2022-07-15 00:28:01 +0300 |
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committer | Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 2022-07-15 01:08:29 +0300 |
commit | 8d1a7448206e11cdea657c35b04cc49db39be933 (patch) | |
tree | adb883132f48ef4f809f7ed2fd4b633850998ee9 /t/t0035-safe-bare-repository.sh | |
parent | 6061601d9f1f1c95da5f9304c319218f7cc3ec75 (diff) |
setup.c: create `safe.bareRepository`
There is a known social engineering attack that takes advantage of the
fact that a working tree can include an entire bare repository,
including a config file. A user could run a Git command inside the bare
repository thinking that the config file of the 'outer' repository would
be used, but in reality, the bare repository's config file (which is
attacker-controlled) is used, which may result in arbitrary code
execution. See [1] for a fuller description and deeper discussion.
A simple mitigation is to forbid bare repositories unless specified via
`--git-dir` or `GIT_DIR`. In environments that don't use bare
repositories, this would be minimally disruptive.
Create a config variable, `safe.bareRepository`, that tells Git whether
or not to die() when working with a bare repository. This config is an
enum of:
- "all": allow all bare repositories (this is the default)
- "explicit": only allow bare repositories specified via --git-dir
or GIT_DIR.
If we want to protect users from such attacks by default, neither value
will suffice - "all" provides no protection, but "explicit" is
impractical for bare repository users. A more usable default would be to
allow only non-embedded bare repositories ([2] contains one such
proposal), but detecting if a repository is embedded is potentially
non-trivial, so this work is not implemented in this series.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/git/kl6lsfqpygsj.fsf@chooglen-macbookpro.roam.corp.google.com
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/git/5b969c5e-e802-c447-ad25-6acc0b784582@github.com
Signed-off-by: Glen Choo <chooglen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Diffstat (limited to 't/t0035-safe-bare-repository.sh')
-rwxr-xr-x | t/t0035-safe-bare-repository.sh | 54 |
1 files changed, 54 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/t/t0035-safe-bare-repository.sh b/t/t0035-safe-bare-repository.sh new file mode 100755 index 0000000000..ecbdc8238d --- /dev/null +++ b/t/t0035-safe-bare-repository.sh @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +#!/bin/sh + +test_description='verify safe.bareRepository checks' + +TEST_PASSES_SANITIZE_LEAK=true +. ./test-lib.sh + +pwd="$(pwd)" + +expect_accepted () { + git "$@" rev-parse --git-dir +} + +expect_rejected () { + test_must_fail git "$@" rev-parse --git-dir 2>err && + grep -F "cannot use bare repository" err +} + +test_expect_success 'setup bare repo in worktree' ' + git init outer-repo && + git init --bare outer-repo/bare-repo +' + +test_expect_success 'safe.bareRepository unset' ' + expect_accepted -C outer-repo/bare-repo +' + +test_expect_success 'safe.bareRepository=all' ' + test_config_global safe.bareRepository all && + expect_accepted -C outer-repo/bare-repo +' + +test_expect_success 'safe.bareRepository=explicit' ' + test_config_global safe.bareRepository explicit && + expect_rejected -C outer-repo/bare-repo +' + +test_expect_success 'safe.bareRepository in the repository' ' + # safe.bareRepository must not be "explicit", otherwise + # git config fails with "fatal: not in a git directory" (like + # safe.directory) + test_config -C outer-repo/bare-repo safe.bareRepository \ + all && + test_config_global safe.bareRepository explicit && + expect_rejected -C outer-repo/bare-repo +' + +test_expect_success 'safe.bareRepository on the command line' ' + test_config_global safe.bareRepository explicit && + expect_accepted -C outer-repo/bare-repo \ + -c safe.bareRepository=all +' + +test_done |