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Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
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Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
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Move the "check-name" helper to a test-tool, since
a6226fd772b (submodule--helper: convert the bulk of cmd_add() to C,
2021-08-10) it has only been used by this test, not git-submodule.sh.
As noted with its introduction in 0383bbb9015 (submodule-config:
verify submodule names as paths, 2018-04-30) the intent of
t7450-bad-git-dotfiles.sh has always been to unit test the
check_submodule_name() function.
Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Glen Choo <chooglen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Various test and documentation updates about .gitsomething paths
that are symlinks.
* jk/symlinked-dotgitx-cleanup:
docs: document symlink restrictions for dot-files
fsck: warn about symlinked dotfiles we'll open with O_NOFOLLOW
t0060: test ntfs/hfs-obscured dotfiles
t7450: test .gitmodules symlink matching against obscured names
t7450: test verify_path() handling of gitmodules
t7415: rename to expand scope
fsck_tree(): wrap some long lines
fsck_tree(): fix shadowed variable
t7415: remove out-dated comment about translation
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In the commits merged in via 204333b015 (Merge branch
'jk/open-dotgitx-with-nofollow', 2021-03-22), we stopped following
symbolic links for .gitattributes, .gitignore, and .mailmap files.
Let's teach fsck to warn that these symlinks are not going to do
anything. Note that this is just a warning, and won't block the objects
via transfer.fsckObjects, since there are reported to be cases of this
in the wild (and even once fixed, they will continue to exist in the
commit history of those projects, but are not particularly dangerous).
Note that we won't add these to the existing gitmodules block in the
fsck code. The logic for gitmodules is a bit more complicated, as we
also check the content of non-symlink instances we find. But for these
new files, there is no content check; we're just looking at the name and
mode of the tree entry (and we can avoid even the complicated name
checks in the common case that the mode doesn't indicate a symlink).
We can reuse the test helper function we defined for .gitmodules, though
(it needs some slight adjustments for the fsck error code, and because
we don't block these symlinks via verify_path()).
Note that I didn't explicitly test the transfer.fsckObjects case here
(nor does the existing .gitmodules test that it blocks a push). The
translation of fsck severities to outcomes is covered in general in
t5504.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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In t7450 we check that both verify_path() and fsck catch malformed
.gitmodules entries in trees. However, we don't check that we catch
filesystem-equivalent forms of these (e.g., ".GITMOD~1" on Windows).
Our name-matching functions are exercised well in t0060, but there's
nothing to test that we correctly call the matching functions from the
actual fsck and verify_path() code.
So instead of testing just .gitmodules, let's repeat our tests for a few
basic cases. We don't need to be exhaustive here (t0060 handles that),
but just make sure we hit one name of each type.
Besides pushing the tests into a function that takes the path as a
parameter, we'll need to do a few things:
- adjust the directory name to accommodate the tests running multiple
times
- set core.protecthfs for index checks. Fsck always protects all types
by default, but we want to be able to exercise the HFS routines on
every system. Note that core.protectntfs is already the default
these days, but it doesn't hurt to explicitly label our need for it.
- we'll also take the filename ("gitmodules") as a parameter. All
calls use the same name for now, but a future patch will extend this
to handle other .gitfoo files. Note that our fake-content symlink
destination is somewhat .gitmodules specific. But it isn't necessary
for other files (which don't do a content check). And it happens to
be a valid attribute and ignore file anyway.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Commit 10ecfa7649 (verify_path: disallow symlinks in .gitmodules,
2018-05-04) made it impossible to load a symlink .gitmodules file into
the index. However, there are no tests of this behavior. Let's make sure
this case is covered. We can easily reuse the test setup created by
the matching b7b1fca175 (fsck: complain when .gitmodules is a symlink,
2018-05-04).
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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This script has already expanded beyond its original intent of ".. in
submodule names" to include other malicious submodule bits. Let's update
the name and description to reflect that, as well as the fact that we'll
soon be adding similar tests for other dotfiles (.gitattributes, etc).
We'll also renumber it to move it out of the group of submodule-specific
tests.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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