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Diffstat (limited to 'libs/bower_components/angular-sanitize/angular-sanitize.js')
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diff --git a/libs/bower_components/angular-sanitize/angular-sanitize.js b/libs/bower_components/angular-sanitize/angular-sanitize.js deleted file mode 100644 index e8bdd99620..0000000000 --- a/libs/bower_components/angular-sanitize/angular-sanitize.js +++ /dev/null @@ -1,806 +0,0 @@ -/** - * @license AngularJS v1.6.5 - * (c) 2010-2017 Google, Inc. http://angularjs.org - * License: MIT - */ -(function(window, angular) {'use strict'; - -/* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * - * Any commits to this file should be reviewed with security in mind. * - * Changes to this file can potentially create security vulnerabilities. * - * An approval from 2 Core members with history of modifying * - * this file is required. * - * * - * Does the change somehow allow for arbitrary javascript to be executed? * - * Or allows for someone to change the prototype of built-in objects? * - * Or gives undesired access to variables likes document or window? * - * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */ - -var $sanitizeMinErr = angular.$$minErr('$sanitize'); -var bind; -var extend; -var forEach; -var isDefined; -var lowercase; -var noop; -var nodeContains; -var htmlParser; -var htmlSanitizeWriter; - -/** - * @ngdoc module - * @name ngSanitize - * @description - * - * # ngSanitize - * - * The `ngSanitize` module provides functionality to sanitize HTML. - * - * - * <div doc-module-components="ngSanitize"></div> - * - * See {@link ngSanitize.$sanitize `$sanitize`} for usage. - */ - -/** - * @ngdoc service - * @name $sanitize - * @kind function - * - * @description - * Sanitizes an html string by stripping all potentially dangerous tokens. - * - * The input is sanitized by parsing the HTML into tokens. All safe tokens (from a whitelist) are - * then serialized back to properly escaped html string. This means that no unsafe input can make - * it into the returned string. - * - * The whitelist for URL sanitization of attribute values is configured using the functions - * `aHrefSanitizationWhitelist` and `imgSrcSanitizationWhitelist` of {@link ng.$compileProvider - * `$compileProvider`}. - * - * The input may also contain SVG markup if this is enabled via {@link $sanitizeProvider}. - * - * @param {string} html HTML input. - * @returns {string} Sanitized HTML. - * - * @example - <example module="sanitizeExample" deps="angular-sanitize.js" name="sanitize-service"> - <file name="index.html"> - <script> - angular.module('sanitizeExample', ['ngSanitize']) - .controller('ExampleController', ['$scope', '$sce', function($scope, $sce) { - $scope.snippet = - '<p style="color:blue">an html\n' + - '<em onmouseover="this.textContent=\'PWN3D!\'">click here</em>\n' + - 'snippet</p>'; - $scope.deliberatelyTrustDangerousSnippet = function() { - return $sce.trustAsHtml($scope.snippet); - }; - }]); - </script> - <div ng-controller="ExampleController"> - Snippet: <textarea ng-model="snippet" cols="60" rows="3"></textarea> - <table> - <tr> - <td>Directive</td> - <td>How</td> - <td>Source</td> - <td>Rendered</td> - </tr> - <tr id="bind-html-with-sanitize"> - <td>ng-bind-html</td> - <td>Automatically uses $sanitize</td> - <td><pre><div ng-bind-html="snippet"><br/></div></pre></td> - <td><div ng-bind-html="snippet"></div></td> - </tr> - <tr id="bind-html-with-trust"> - <td>ng-bind-html</td> - <td>Bypass $sanitize by explicitly trusting the dangerous value</td> - <td> - <pre><div ng-bind-html="deliberatelyTrustDangerousSnippet()"> -</div></pre> - </td> - <td><div ng-bind-html="deliberatelyTrustDangerousSnippet()"></div></td> - </tr> - <tr id="bind-default"> - <td>ng-bind</td> - <td>Automatically escapes</td> - <td><pre><div ng-bind="snippet"><br/></div></pre></td> - <td><div ng-bind="snippet"></div></td> - </tr> - </table> - </div> - </file> - <file name="protractor.js" type="protractor"> - it('should sanitize the html snippet by default', function() { - expect(element(by.css('#bind-html-with-sanitize div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')). - toBe('<p>an html\n<em>click here</em>\nsnippet</p>'); - }); - - it('should inline raw snippet if bound to a trusted value', function() { - expect(element(by.css('#bind-html-with-trust div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')). - toBe("<p style=\"color:blue\">an html\n" + - "<em onmouseover=\"this.textContent='PWN3D!'\">click here</em>\n" + - "snippet</p>"); - }); - - it('should escape snippet without any filter', function() { - expect(element(by.css('#bind-default div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')). - toBe("<p style=\"color:blue\">an html\n" + - "<em onmouseover=\"this.textContent='PWN3D!'\">click here</em>\n" + - "snippet</p>"); - }); - - it('should update', function() { - element(by.model('snippet')).clear(); - element(by.model('snippet')).sendKeys('new <b onclick="alert(1)">text</b>'); - expect(element(by.css('#bind-html-with-sanitize div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')). - toBe('new <b>text</b>'); - expect(element(by.css('#bind-html-with-trust div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')).toBe( - 'new <b onclick="alert(1)">text</b>'); - expect(element(by.css('#bind-default div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')).toBe( - "new <b onclick=\"alert(1)\">text</b>"); - }); - </file> - </example> - */ - - -/** - * @ngdoc provider - * @name $sanitizeProvider - * @this - * - * @description - * Creates and configures {@link $sanitize} instance. - */ -function $SanitizeProvider() { - var svgEnabled = false; - - this.$get = ['$$sanitizeUri', function($$sanitizeUri) { - if (svgEnabled) { - extend(validElements, svgElements); - } - return function(html) { - var buf = []; - htmlParser(html, htmlSanitizeWriter(buf, function(uri, isImage) { - return !/^unsafe:/.test($$sanitizeUri(uri, isImage)); - })); - return buf.join(''); - }; - }]; - - - /** - * @ngdoc method - * @name $sanitizeProvider#enableSvg - * @kind function - * - * @description - * Enables a subset of svg to be supported by the sanitizer. - * - * <div class="alert alert-warning"> - * <p>By enabling this setting without taking other precautions, you might expose your - * application to click-hijacking attacks. In these attacks, sanitized svg elements could be positioned - * outside of the containing element and be rendered over other elements on the page (e.g. a login - * link). Such behavior can then result in phishing incidents.</p> - * - * <p>To protect against these, explicitly setup `overflow: hidden` css rule for all potential svg - * tags within the sanitized content:</p> - * - * <br> - * - * <pre><code> - * .rootOfTheIncludedContent svg { - * overflow: hidden !important; - * } - * </code></pre> - * </div> - * - * @param {boolean=} flag Enable or disable SVG support in the sanitizer. - * @returns {boolean|ng.$sanitizeProvider} Returns the currently configured value if called - * without an argument or self for chaining otherwise. - */ - this.enableSvg = function(enableSvg) { - if (isDefined(enableSvg)) { - svgEnabled = enableSvg; - return this; - } else { - return svgEnabled; - } - }; - - ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// - // Private stuff - ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// - - bind = angular.bind; - extend = angular.extend; - forEach = angular.forEach; - isDefined = angular.isDefined; - lowercase = angular.lowercase; - noop = angular.noop; - - htmlParser = htmlParserImpl; - htmlSanitizeWriter = htmlSanitizeWriterImpl; - - nodeContains = window.Node.prototype.contains || /** @this */ function(arg) { - // eslint-disable-next-line no-bitwise - return !!(this.compareDocumentPosition(arg) & 16); - }; - - // Regular Expressions for parsing tags and attributes - var SURROGATE_PAIR_REGEXP = /[\uD800-\uDBFF][\uDC00-\uDFFF]/g, - // Match everything outside of normal chars and " (quote character) - NON_ALPHANUMERIC_REGEXP = /([^#-~ |!])/g; - - - // Good source of info about elements and attributes - // http://dev.w3.org/html5/spec/Overview.html#semantics - // http://simon.html5.org/html-elements - - // Safe Void Elements - HTML5 - // http://dev.w3.org/html5/spec/Overview.html#void-elements - var voidElements = toMap('area,br,col,hr,img,wbr'); - - // Elements that you can, intentionally, leave open (and which close themselves) - // http://dev.w3.org/html5/spec/Overview.html#optional-tags - var optionalEndTagBlockElements = toMap('colgroup,dd,dt,li,p,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,tr'), - optionalEndTagInlineElements = toMap('rp,rt'), - optionalEndTagElements = extend({}, - optionalEndTagInlineElements, - optionalEndTagBlockElements); - - // Safe Block Elements - HTML5 - var blockElements = extend({}, optionalEndTagBlockElements, toMap('address,article,' + - 'aside,blockquote,caption,center,del,dir,div,dl,figure,figcaption,footer,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,' + - 'h6,header,hgroup,hr,ins,map,menu,nav,ol,pre,section,table,ul')); - - // Inline Elements - HTML5 - var inlineElements = extend({}, optionalEndTagInlineElements, toMap('a,abbr,acronym,b,' + - 'bdi,bdo,big,br,cite,code,del,dfn,em,font,i,img,ins,kbd,label,map,mark,q,ruby,rp,rt,s,' + - 'samp,small,span,strike,strong,sub,sup,time,tt,u,var')); - - // SVG Elements - // https://wiki.whatwg.org/wiki/Sanitization_rules#svg_Elements - // Note: the elements animate,animateColor,animateMotion,animateTransform,set are intentionally omitted. - // They can potentially allow for arbitrary javascript to be executed. See #11290 - var svgElements = toMap('circle,defs,desc,ellipse,font-face,font-face-name,font-face-src,g,glyph,' + - 'hkern,image,linearGradient,line,marker,metadata,missing-glyph,mpath,path,polygon,polyline,' + - 'radialGradient,rect,stop,svg,switch,text,title,tspan'); - - // Blocked Elements (will be stripped) - var blockedElements = toMap('script,style'); - - var validElements = extend({}, - voidElements, - blockElements, - inlineElements, - optionalEndTagElements); - - //Attributes that have href and hence need to be sanitized - var uriAttrs = toMap('background,cite,href,longdesc,src,xlink:href'); - - var htmlAttrs = toMap('abbr,align,alt,axis,bgcolor,border,cellpadding,cellspacing,class,clear,' + - 'color,cols,colspan,compact,coords,dir,face,headers,height,hreflang,hspace,' + - 'ismap,lang,language,nohref,nowrap,rel,rev,rows,rowspan,rules,' + - 'scope,scrolling,shape,size,span,start,summary,tabindex,target,title,type,' + - 'valign,value,vspace,width'); - - // SVG attributes (without "id" and "name" attributes) - // https://wiki.whatwg.org/wiki/Sanitization_rules#svg_Attributes - var svgAttrs = toMap('accent-height,accumulate,additive,alphabetic,arabic-form,ascent,' + - 'baseProfile,bbox,begin,by,calcMode,cap-height,class,color,color-rendering,content,' + - 'cx,cy,d,dx,dy,descent,display,dur,end,fill,fill-rule,font-family,font-size,font-stretch,' + - 'font-style,font-variant,font-weight,from,fx,fy,g1,g2,glyph-name,gradientUnits,hanging,' + - 'height,horiz-adv-x,horiz-origin-x,ideographic,k,keyPoints,keySplines,keyTimes,lang,' + - 'marker-end,marker-mid,marker-start,markerHeight,markerUnits,markerWidth,mathematical,' + - 'max,min,offset,opacity,orient,origin,overline-position,overline-thickness,panose-1,' + - 'path,pathLength,points,preserveAspectRatio,r,refX,refY,repeatCount,repeatDur,' + - 'requiredExtensions,requiredFeatures,restart,rotate,rx,ry,slope,stemh,stemv,stop-color,' + - 'stop-opacity,strikethrough-position,strikethrough-thickness,stroke,stroke-dasharray,' + - 'stroke-dashoffset,stroke-linecap,stroke-linejoin,stroke-miterlimit,stroke-opacity,' + - 'stroke-width,systemLanguage,target,text-anchor,to,transform,type,u1,u2,underline-position,' + - 'underline-thickness,unicode,unicode-range,units-per-em,values,version,viewBox,visibility,' + - 'width,widths,x,x-height,x1,x2,xlink:actuate,xlink:arcrole,xlink:role,xlink:show,xlink:title,' + - 'xlink:type,xml:base,xml:lang,xml:space,xmlns,xmlns:xlink,y,y1,y2,zoomAndPan', true); - - var validAttrs = extend({}, - uriAttrs, - svgAttrs, - htmlAttrs); - - function toMap(str, lowercaseKeys) { - var obj = {}, items = str.split(','), i; - for (i = 0; i < items.length; i++) { - obj[lowercaseKeys ? lowercase(items[i]) : items[i]] = true; - } - return obj; - } - - /** - * Create an inert document that contains the dirty HTML that needs sanitizing - * Depending upon browser support we use one of three strategies for doing this. - * Support: Safari 10.x -> XHR strategy - * Support: Firefox -> DomParser strategy - */ - var getInertBodyElement /* function(html: string): HTMLBodyElement */ = (function(window, document) { - var inertDocument; - if (document && document.implementation) { - inertDocument = document.implementation.createHTMLDocument('inert'); - } else { - throw $sanitizeMinErr('noinert', 'Can\'t create an inert html document'); - } - var inertBodyElement = (inertDocument.documentElement || inertDocument.getDocumentElement()).querySelector('body'); - - // Check for the Safari 10.1 bug - which allows JS to run inside the SVG G element - inertBodyElement.innerHTML = '<svg><g onload="this.parentNode.remove()"></g></svg>'; - if (!inertBodyElement.querySelector('svg')) { - return getInertBodyElement_XHR; - } else { - // Check for the Firefox bug - which prevents the inner img JS from being sanitized - inertBodyElement.innerHTML = '<svg><p><style><img src="</style><img src=x onerror=alert(1)//">'; - if (inertBodyElement.querySelector('svg img')) { - return getInertBodyElement_DOMParser; - } else { - return getInertBodyElement_InertDocument; - } - } - - function getInertBodyElement_XHR(html) { - // We add this dummy element to ensure that the rest of the content is parsed as expected - // e.g. leading whitespace is maintained and tags like `<meta>` do not get hoisted to the `<head>` tag. - html = '<remove></remove>' + html; - try { - html = encodeURI(html); - } catch (e) { - return undefined; - } - var xhr = new window.XMLHttpRequest(); - xhr.responseType = 'document'; - xhr.open('GET', 'data:text/html;charset=utf-8,' + html, false); - xhr.send(null); - var body = xhr.response.body; - body.firstChild.remove(); - return body; - } - - function getInertBodyElement_DOMParser(html) { - // We add this dummy element to ensure that the rest of the content is parsed as expected - // e.g. leading whitespace is maintained and tags like `<meta>` do not get hoisted to the `<head>` tag. - html = '<remove></remove>' + html; - try { - var body = new window.DOMParser().parseFromString(html, 'text/html').body; - body.firstChild.remove(); - return body; - } catch (e) { - return undefined; - } - } - - function getInertBodyElement_InertDocument(html) { - inertBodyElement.innerHTML = html; - - // Support: IE 9-11 only - // strip custom-namespaced attributes on IE<=11 - if (document.documentMode) { - stripCustomNsAttrs(inertBodyElement); - } - - return inertBodyElement; - } - })(window, window.document); - - /** - * @example - * htmlParser(htmlString, { - * start: function(tag, attrs) {}, - * end: function(tag) {}, - * chars: function(text) {}, - * comment: function(text) {} - * }); - * - * @param {string} html string - * @param {object} handler - */ - function htmlParserImpl(html, handler) { - if (html === null || html === undefined) { - html = ''; - } else if (typeof html !== 'string') { - html = '' + html; - } - - var inertBodyElement = getInertBodyElement(html); - if (!inertBodyElement) return ''; - - //mXSS protection - var mXSSAttempts = 5; - do { - if (mXSSAttempts === 0) { - throw $sanitizeMinErr('uinput', 'Failed to sanitize html because the input is unstable'); - } - mXSSAttempts--; - - // trigger mXSS if it is going to happen by reading and writing the innerHTML - html = inertBodyElement.innerHTML; - inertBodyElement = getInertBodyElement(html); - } while (html !== inertBodyElement.innerHTML); - - var node = inertBodyElement.firstChild; - while (node) { - switch (node.nodeType) { - case 1: // ELEMENT_NODE - handler.start(node.nodeName.toLowerCase(), attrToMap(node.attributes)); - break; - case 3: // TEXT NODE - handler.chars(node.textContent); - break; - } - - var nextNode; - if (!(nextNode = node.firstChild)) { - if (node.nodeType === 1) { - handler.end(node.nodeName.toLowerCase()); - } - nextNode = getNonDescendant('nextSibling', node); - if (!nextNode) { - while (nextNode == null) { - node = getNonDescendant('parentNode', node); - if (node === inertBodyElement) break; - nextNode = getNonDescendant('nextSibling', node); - if (node.nodeType === 1) { - handler.end(node.nodeName.toLowerCase()); - } - } - } - } - node = nextNode; - } - - while ((node = inertBodyElement.firstChild)) { - inertBodyElement.removeChild(node); - } - } - - function attrToMap(attrs) { - var map = {}; - for (var i = 0, ii = attrs.length; i < ii; i++) { - var attr = attrs[i]; - map[attr.name] = attr.value; - } - return map; - } - - - /** - * Escapes all potentially dangerous characters, so that the - * resulting string can be safely inserted into attribute or - * element text. - * @param value - * @returns {string} escaped text - */ - function encodeEntities(value) { - return value. - replace(/&/g, '&'). - replace(SURROGATE_PAIR_REGEXP, function(value) { - var hi = value.charCodeAt(0); - var low = value.charCodeAt(1); - return '&#' + (((hi - 0xD800) * 0x400) + (low - 0xDC00) + 0x10000) + ';'; - }). - replace(NON_ALPHANUMERIC_REGEXP, function(value) { - return '&#' + value.charCodeAt(0) + ';'; - }). - replace(/</g, '<'). - replace(/>/g, '>'); - } - - /** - * create an HTML/XML writer which writes to buffer - * @param {Array} buf use buf.join('') to get out sanitized html string - * @returns {object} in the form of { - * start: function(tag, attrs) {}, - * end: function(tag) {}, - * chars: function(text) {}, - * comment: function(text) {} - * } - */ - function htmlSanitizeWriterImpl(buf, uriValidator) { - var ignoreCurrentElement = false; - var out = bind(buf, buf.push); - return { - start: function(tag, attrs) { - tag = lowercase(tag); - if (!ignoreCurrentElement && blockedElements[tag]) { - ignoreCurrentElement = tag; - } - if (!ignoreCurrentElement && validElements[tag] === true) { - out('<'); - out(tag); - forEach(attrs, function(value, key) { - var lkey = lowercase(key); - var isImage = (tag === 'img' && lkey === 'src') || (lkey === 'background'); - if (validAttrs[lkey] === true && - (uriAttrs[lkey] !== true || uriValidator(value, isImage))) { - out(' '); - out(key); - out('="'); - out(encodeEntities(value)); - out('"'); - } - }); - out('>'); - } - }, - end: function(tag) { - tag = lowercase(tag); - if (!ignoreCurrentElement && validElements[tag] === true && voidElements[tag] !== true) { - out('</'); - out(tag); - out('>'); - } - // eslint-disable-next-line eqeqeq - if (tag == ignoreCurrentElement) { - ignoreCurrentElement = false; - } - }, - chars: function(chars) { - if (!ignoreCurrentElement) { - out(encodeEntities(chars)); - } - } - }; - } - - - /** - * When IE9-11 comes across an unknown namespaced attribute e.g. 'xlink:foo' it adds 'xmlns:ns1' attribute to declare - * ns1 namespace and prefixes the attribute with 'ns1' (e.g. 'ns1:xlink:foo'). This is undesirable since we don't want - * to allow any of these custom attributes. This method strips them all. - * - * @param node Root element to process - */ - function stripCustomNsAttrs(node) { - while (node) { - if (node.nodeType === window.Node.ELEMENT_NODE) { - var attrs = node.attributes; - for (var i = 0, l = attrs.length; i < l; i++) { - var attrNode = attrs[i]; - var attrName = attrNode.name.toLowerCase(); - if (attrName === 'xmlns:ns1' || attrName.lastIndexOf('ns1:', 0) === 0) { - node.removeAttributeNode(attrNode); - i--; - l--; - } - } - } - - var nextNode = node.firstChild; - if (nextNode) { - stripCustomNsAttrs(nextNode); - } - - node = getNonDescendant('nextSibling', node); - } - } - - function getNonDescendant(propName, node) { - // An element is clobbered if its `propName` property points to one of its descendants - var nextNode = node[propName]; - if (nextNode && nodeContains.call(node, nextNode)) { - throw $sanitizeMinErr('elclob', 'Failed to sanitize html because the element is clobbered: {0}', node.outerHTML || node.outerText); - } - return nextNode; - } -} - -function sanitizeText(chars) { - var buf = []; - var writer = htmlSanitizeWriter(buf, noop); - writer.chars(chars); - return buf.join(''); -} - - -// define ngSanitize module and register $sanitize service -angular.module('ngSanitize', []) - .provider('$sanitize', $SanitizeProvider) - .info({ angularVersion: '1.6.5' }); - -/** - * @ngdoc filter - * @name linky - * @kind function - * - * @description - * Finds links in text input and turns them into html links. Supports `http/https/ftp/mailto` and - * plain email address links. - * - * Requires the {@link ngSanitize `ngSanitize`} module to be installed. - * - * @param {string} text Input text. - * @param {string} target Window (`_blank|_self|_parent|_top`) or named frame to open links in. - * @param {object|function(url)} [attributes] Add custom attributes to the link element. - * - * Can be one of: - * - * - `object`: A map of attributes - * - `function`: Takes the url as a parameter and returns a map of attributes - * - * If the map of attributes contains a value for `target`, it overrides the value of - * the target parameter. - * - * - * @returns {string} Html-linkified and {@link $sanitize sanitized} text. - * - * @usage - <span ng-bind-html="linky_expression | linky"></span> - * - * @example - <example module="linkyExample" deps="angular-sanitize.js" name="linky-filter"> - <file name="index.html"> - <div ng-controller="ExampleController"> - Snippet: <textarea ng-model="snippet" cols="60" rows="3"></textarea> - <table> - <tr> - <th>Filter</th> - <th>Source</th> - <th>Rendered</th> - </tr> - <tr id="linky-filter"> - <td>linky filter</td> - <td> - <pre><div ng-bind-html="snippet | linky"><br></div></pre> - </td> - <td> - <div ng-bind-html="snippet | linky"></div> - </td> - </tr> - <tr id="linky-target"> - <td>linky target</td> - <td> - <pre><div ng-bind-html="snippetWithSingleURL | linky:'_blank'"><br></div></pre> - </td> - <td> - <div ng-bind-html="snippetWithSingleURL | linky:'_blank'"></div> - </td> - </tr> - <tr id="linky-custom-attributes"> - <td>linky custom attributes</td> - <td> - <pre><div ng-bind-html="snippetWithSingleURL | linky:'_self':{rel: 'nofollow'}"><br></div></pre> - </td> - <td> - <div ng-bind-html="snippetWithSingleURL | linky:'_self':{rel: 'nofollow'}"></div> - </td> - </tr> - <tr id="escaped-html"> - <td>no filter</td> - <td><pre><div ng-bind="snippet"><br></div></pre></td> - <td><div ng-bind="snippet"></div></td> - </tr> - </table> - </file> - <file name="script.js"> - angular.module('linkyExample', ['ngSanitize']) - .controller('ExampleController', ['$scope', function($scope) { - $scope.snippet = - 'Pretty text with some links:\n' + - 'http://angularjs.org/,\n' + - 'mailto:us@somewhere.org,\n' + - 'another@somewhere.org,\n' + - 'and one more: ftp://127.0.0.1/.'; - $scope.snippetWithSingleURL = 'http://angularjs.org/'; - }]); - </file> - <file name="protractor.js" type="protractor"> - it('should linkify the snippet with urls', function() { - expect(element(by.id('linky-filter')).element(by.binding('snippet | linky')).getText()). - toBe('Pretty text with some links: http://angularjs.org/, us@somewhere.org, ' + - 'another@somewhere.org, and one more: ftp://127.0.0.1/.'); - expect(element.all(by.css('#linky-filter a')).count()).toEqual(4); - }); - - it('should not linkify snippet without the linky filter', function() { - expect(element(by.id('escaped-html')).element(by.binding('snippet')).getText()). - toBe('Pretty text with some links: http://angularjs.org/, mailto:us@somewhere.org, ' + - 'another@somewhere.org, and one more: ftp://127.0.0.1/.'); - expect(element.all(by.css('#escaped-html a')).count()).toEqual(0); - }); - - it('should update', function() { - element(by.model('snippet')).clear(); - element(by.model('snippet')).sendKeys('new http://link.'); - expect(element(by.id('linky-filter')).element(by.binding('snippet | linky')).getText()). - toBe('new http://link.'); - expect(element.all(by.css('#linky-filter a')).count()).toEqual(1); - expect(element(by.id('escaped-html')).element(by.binding('snippet')).getText()) - .toBe('new http://link.'); - }); - - it('should work with the target property', function() { - expect(element(by.id('linky-target')). - element(by.binding("snippetWithSingleURL | linky:'_blank'")).getText()). - toBe('http://angularjs.org/'); - expect(element(by.css('#linky-target a')).getAttribute('target')).toEqual('_blank'); - }); - - it('should optionally add custom attributes', function() { - expect(element(by.id('linky-custom-attributes')). - element(by.binding("snippetWithSingleURL | linky:'_self':{rel: 'nofollow'}")).getText()). - toBe('http://angularjs.org/'); - expect(element(by.css('#linky-custom-attributes a')).getAttribute('rel')).toEqual('nofollow'); - }); - </file> - </example> - */ -angular.module('ngSanitize').filter('linky', ['$sanitize', function($sanitize) { - var LINKY_URL_REGEXP = - /((ftp|https?):\/\/|(www\.)|(mailto:)?[A-Za-z0-9._%+-]+@)\S*[^\s.;,(){}<>"\u201d\u2019]/i, - MAILTO_REGEXP = /^mailto:/i; - - var linkyMinErr = angular.$$minErr('linky'); - var isDefined = angular.isDefined; - var isFunction = angular.isFunction; - var isObject = angular.isObject; - var isString = angular.isString; - - return function(text, target, attributes) { - if (text == null || text === '') return text; - if (!isString(text)) throw linkyMinErr('notstring', 'Expected string but received: {0}', text); - - var attributesFn = - isFunction(attributes) ? attributes : - isObject(attributes) ? function getAttributesObject() {return attributes;} : - function getEmptyAttributesObject() {return {};}; - - var match; - var raw = text; - var html = []; - var url; - var i; - while ((match = raw.match(LINKY_URL_REGEXP))) { - // We can not end in these as they are sometimes found at the end of the sentence - url = match[0]; - // if we did not match ftp/http/www/mailto then assume mailto - if (!match[2] && !match[4]) { - url = (match[3] ? 'http://' : 'mailto:') + url; - } - i = match.index; - addText(raw.substr(0, i)); - addLink(url, match[0].replace(MAILTO_REGEXP, '')); - raw = raw.substring(i + match[0].length); - } - addText(raw); - return $sanitize(html.join('')); - - function addText(text) { - if (!text) { - return; - } - html.push(sanitizeText(text)); - } - - function addLink(url, text) { - var key, linkAttributes = attributesFn(url); - html.push('<a '); - - for (key in linkAttributes) { - html.push(key + '="' + linkAttributes[key] + '" '); - } - - if (isDefined(target) && !('target' in linkAttributes)) { - html.push('target="', - target, - '" '); - } - html.push('href="', - url.replace(/"/g, '"'), - '">'); - addText(text); - html.push('</a>'); - } - }; -}]); - - -})(window, window.angular); |