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Diffstat (limited to 'node_modules/angular-sanitize/angular-sanitize.js')
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diff --git a/node_modules/angular-sanitize/angular-sanitize.js b/node_modules/angular-sanitize/angular-sanitize.js new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..87d18362e1 --- /dev/null +++ b/node_modules/angular-sanitize/angular-sanitize.js @@ -0,0 +1,913 @@ +/** + * @license AngularJS v1.8.0 + * (c) 2010-2020 Google, Inc. http://angularjs.org + * License: MIT + */ +(function(window, angular) {'use strict'; + +/* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * + * Any commits to this file should be reviewed with security in mind. * + * Changes to this file can potentially create security vulnerabilities. * + * An approval from 2 Core members with history of modifying * + * this file is required. * + * * + * Does the change somehow allow for arbitrary javascript to be executed? * + * Or allows for someone to change the prototype of built-in objects? * + * Or gives undesired access to variables likes document or window? * + * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */ + +var $sanitizeMinErr = angular.$$minErr('$sanitize'); +var bind; +var extend; +var forEach; +var isArray; +var isDefined; +var lowercase; +var noop; +var nodeContains; +var htmlParser; +var htmlSanitizeWriter; + +/** + * @ngdoc module + * @name ngSanitize + * @description + * + * The `ngSanitize` module provides functionality to sanitize HTML. + * + * See {@link ngSanitize.$sanitize `$sanitize`} for usage. + */ + +/** + * @ngdoc service + * @name $sanitize + * @kind function + * + * @description + * Sanitizes an html string by stripping all potentially dangerous tokens. + * + * The input is sanitized by parsing the HTML into tokens. All safe tokens (from a whitelist) are + * then serialized back to a properly escaped HTML string. This means that no unsafe input can make + * it into the returned string. + * + * The whitelist for URL sanitization of attribute values is configured using the functions + * `aHrefSanitizationWhitelist` and `imgSrcSanitizationWhitelist` of {@link $compileProvider}. + * + * The input may also contain SVG markup if this is enabled via {@link $sanitizeProvider}. + * + * @param {string} html HTML input. + * @returns {string} Sanitized HTML. + * + * @example + <example module="sanitizeExample" deps="angular-sanitize.js" name="sanitize-service"> + <file name="index.html"> + <script> + angular.module('sanitizeExample', ['ngSanitize']) + .controller('ExampleController', ['$scope', '$sce', function($scope, $sce) { + $scope.snippet = + '<p style="color:blue">an html\n' + + '<em onmouseover="this.textContent=\'PWN3D!\'">click here</em>\n' + + 'snippet</p>'; + $scope.deliberatelyTrustDangerousSnippet = function() { + return $sce.trustAsHtml($scope.snippet); + }; + }]); + </script> + <div ng-controller="ExampleController"> + Snippet: <textarea ng-model="snippet" cols="60" rows="3"></textarea> + <table> + <tr> + <td>Directive</td> + <td>How</td> + <td>Source</td> + <td>Rendered</td> + </tr> + <tr id="bind-html-with-sanitize"> + <td>ng-bind-html</td> + <td>Automatically uses $sanitize</td> + <td><pre><div ng-bind-html="snippet"><br/></div></pre></td> + <td><div ng-bind-html="snippet"></div></td> + </tr> + <tr id="bind-html-with-trust"> + <td>ng-bind-html</td> + <td>Bypass $sanitize by explicitly trusting the dangerous value</td> + <td> + <pre><div ng-bind-html="deliberatelyTrustDangerousSnippet()"> +</div></pre> + </td> + <td><div ng-bind-html="deliberatelyTrustDangerousSnippet()"></div></td> + </tr> + <tr id="bind-default"> + <td>ng-bind</td> + <td>Automatically escapes</td> + <td><pre><div ng-bind="snippet"><br/></div></pre></td> + <td><div ng-bind="snippet"></div></td> + </tr> + </table> + </div> + </file> + <file name="protractor.js" type="protractor"> + it('should sanitize the html snippet by default', function() { + expect(element(by.css('#bind-html-with-sanitize div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')). + toBe('<p>an html\n<em>click here</em>\nsnippet</p>'); + }); + + it('should inline raw snippet if bound to a trusted value', function() { + expect(element(by.css('#bind-html-with-trust div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')). + toBe("<p style=\"color:blue\">an html\n" + + "<em onmouseover=\"this.textContent='PWN3D!'\">click here</em>\n" + + "snippet</p>"); + }); + + it('should escape snippet without any filter', function() { + expect(element(by.css('#bind-default div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')). + toBe("<p style=\"color:blue\">an html\n" + + "<em onmouseover=\"this.textContent='PWN3D!'\">click here</em>\n" + + "snippet</p>"); + }); + + it('should update', function() { + element(by.model('snippet')).clear(); + element(by.model('snippet')).sendKeys('new <b onclick="alert(1)">text</b>'); + expect(element(by.css('#bind-html-with-sanitize div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')). + toBe('new <b>text</b>'); + expect(element(by.css('#bind-html-with-trust div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')).toBe( + 'new <b onclick="alert(1)">text</b>'); + expect(element(by.css('#bind-default div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')).toBe( + "new <b onclick=\"alert(1)\">text</b>"); + }); + </file> + </example> + */ + + +/** + * @ngdoc provider + * @name $sanitizeProvider + * @this + * + * @description + * Creates and configures {@link $sanitize} instance. + */ +function $SanitizeProvider() { + var hasBeenInstantiated = false; + var svgEnabled = false; + + this.$get = ['$$sanitizeUri', function($$sanitizeUri) { + hasBeenInstantiated = true; + if (svgEnabled) { + extend(validElements, svgElements); + } + return function(html) { + var buf = []; + htmlParser(html, htmlSanitizeWriter(buf, function(uri, isImage) { + return !/^unsafe:/.test($$sanitizeUri(uri, isImage)); + })); + return buf.join(''); + }; + }]; + + + /** + * @ngdoc method + * @name $sanitizeProvider#enableSvg + * @kind function + * + * @description + * Enables a subset of svg to be supported by the sanitizer. + * + * <div class="alert alert-warning"> + * <p>By enabling this setting without taking other precautions, you might expose your + * application to click-hijacking attacks. In these attacks, sanitized svg elements could be positioned + * outside of the containing element and be rendered over other elements on the page (e.g. a login + * link). Such behavior can then result in phishing incidents.</p> + * + * <p>To protect against these, explicitly setup `overflow: hidden` css rule for all potential svg + * tags within the sanitized content:</p> + * + * <br> + * + * <pre><code> + * .rootOfTheIncludedContent svg { + * overflow: hidden !important; + * } + * </code></pre> + * </div> + * + * @param {boolean=} flag Enable or disable SVG support in the sanitizer. + * @returns {boolean|$sanitizeProvider} Returns the currently configured value if called + * without an argument or self for chaining otherwise. + */ + this.enableSvg = function(enableSvg) { + if (isDefined(enableSvg)) { + svgEnabled = enableSvg; + return this; + } else { + return svgEnabled; + } + }; + + + /** + * @ngdoc method + * @name $sanitizeProvider#addValidElements + * @kind function + * + * @description + * Extends the built-in lists of valid HTML/SVG elements, i.e. elements that are considered safe + * and are not stripped off during sanitization. You can extend the following lists of elements: + * + * - `htmlElements`: A list of elements (tag names) to extend the current list of safe HTML + * elements. HTML elements considered safe will not be removed during sanitization. All other + * elements will be stripped off. + * + * - `htmlVoidElements`: This is similar to `htmlElements`, but marks the elements as + * "void elements" (similar to HTML + * [void elements](https://rawgit.com/w3c/html/html5.1-2/single-page.html#void-elements)). These + * elements have no end tag and cannot have content. + * + * - `svgElements`: This is similar to `htmlElements`, but for SVG elements. This list is only + * taken into account if SVG is {@link ngSanitize.$sanitizeProvider#enableSvg enabled} for + * `$sanitize`. + * + * <div class="alert alert-info"> + * This method must be called during the {@link angular.Module#config config} phase. Once the + * `$sanitize` service has been instantiated, this method has no effect. + * </div> + * + * <div class="alert alert-warning"> + * Keep in mind that extending the built-in lists of elements may expose your app to XSS or + * other vulnerabilities. Be very mindful of the elements you add. + * </div> + * + * @param {Array<String>|Object} elements - A list of valid HTML elements or an object with one or + * more of the following properties: + * - **htmlElements** - `{Array<String>}` - A list of elements to extend the current list of + * HTML elements. + * - **htmlVoidElements** - `{Array<String>}` - A list of elements to extend the current list of + * void HTML elements; i.e. elements that do not have an end tag. + * - **svgElements** - `{Array<String>}` - A list of elements to extend the current list of SVG + * elements. The list of SVG elements is only taken into account if SVG is + * {@link ngSanitize.$sanitizeProvider#enableSvg enabled} for `$sanitize`. + * + * Passing an array (`[...]`) is equivalent to passing `{htmlElements: [...]}`. + * + * @return {$sanitizeProvider} Returns self for chaining. + */ + this.addValidElements = function(elements) { + if (!hasBeenInstantiated) { + if (isArray(elements)) { + elements = {htmlElements: elements}; + } + + addElementsTo(svgElements, elements.svgElements); + addElementsTo(voidElements, elements.htmlVoidElements); + addElementsTo(validElements, elements.htmlVoidElements); + addElementsTo(validElements, elements.htmlElements); + } + + return this; + }; + + + /** + * @ngdoc method + * @name $sanitizeProvider#addValidAttrs + * @kind function + * + * @description + * Extends the built-in list of valid attributes, i.e. attributes that are considered safe and are + * not stripped off during sanitization. + * + * **Note**: + * The new attributes will not be treated as URI attributes, which means their values will not be + * sanitized as URIs using `$compileProvider`'s + * {@link ng.$compileProvider#aHrefSanitizationWhitelist aHrefSanitizationWhitelist} and + * {@link ng.$compileProvider#imgSrcSanitizationWhitelist imgSrcSanitizationWhitelist}. + * + * <div class="alert alert-info"> + * This method must be called during the {@link angular.Module#config config} phase. Once the + * `$sanitize` service has been instantiated, this method has no effect. + * </div> + * + * <div class="alert alert-warning"> + * Keep in mind that extending the built-in list of attributes may expose your app to XSS or + * other vulnerabilities. Be very mindful of the attributes you add. + * </div> + * + * @param {Array<String>} attrs - A list of valid attributes. + * + * @returns {$sanitizeProvider} Returns self for chaining. + */ + this.addValidAttrs = function(attrs) { + if (!hasBeenInstantiated) { + extend(validAttrs, arrayToMap(attrs, true)); + } + return this; + }; + + ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// + // Private stuff + ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// + + bind = angular.bind; + extend = angular.extend; + forEach = angular.forEach; + isArray = angular.isArray; + isDefined = angular.isDefined; + lowercase = angular.$$lowercase; + noop = angular.noop; + + htmlParser = htmlParserImpl; + htmlSanitizeWriter = htmlSanitizeWriterImpl; + + nodeContains = window.Node.prototype.contains || /** @this */ function(arg) { + // eslint-disable-next-line no-bitwise + return !!(this.compareDocumentPosition(arg) & 16); + }; + + // Regular Expressions for parsing tags and attributes + var SURROGATE_PAIR_REGEXP = /[\uD800-\uDBFF][\uDC00-\uDFFF]/g, + // Match everything outside of normal chars and " (quote character) + NON_ALPHANUMERIC_REGEXP = /([^#-~ |!])/g; + + + // Good source of info about elements and attributes + // http://dev.w3.org/html5/spec/Overview.html#semantics + // http://simon.html5.org/html-elements + + // Safe Void Elements - HTML5 + // http://dev.w3.org/html5/spec/Overview.html#void-elements + var voidElements = stringToMap('area,br,col,hr,img,wbr'); + + // Elements that you can, intentionally, leave open (and which close themselves) + // http://dev.w3.org/html5/spec/Overview.html#optional-tags + var optionalEndTagBlockElements = stringToMap('colgroup,dd,dt,li,p,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,tr'), + optionalEndTagInlineElements = stringToMap('rp,rt'), + optionalEndTagElements = extend({}, + optionalEndTagInlineElements, + optionalEndTagBlockElements); + + // Safe Block Elements - HTML5 + var blockElements = extend({}, optionalEndTagBlockElements, stringToMap('address,article,' + + 'aside,blockquote,caption,center,del,dir,div,dl,figure,figcaption,footer,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,' + + 'h6,header,hgroup,hr,ins,map,menu,nav,ol,pre,section,table,ul')); + + // Inline Elements - HTML5 + var inlineElements = extend({}, optionalEndTagInlineElements, stringToMap('a,abbr,acronym,b,' + + 'bdi,bdo,big,br,cite,code,del,dfn,em,font,i,img,ins,kbd,label,map,mark,q,ruby,rp,rt,s,' + + 'samp,small,span,strike,strong,sub,sup,time,tt,u,var')); + + // SVG Elements + // https://wiki.whatwg.org/wiki/Sanitization_rules#svg_Elements + // Note: the elements animate,animateColor,animateMotion,animateTransform,set are intentionally omitted. + // They can potentially allow for arbitrary javascript to be executed. See #11290 + var svgElements = stringToMap('circle,defs,desc,ellipse,font-face,font-face-name,font-face-src,g,glyph,' + + 'hkern,image,linearGradient,line,marker,metadata,missing-glyph,mpath,path,polygon,polyline,' + + 'radialGradient,rect,stop,svg,switch,text,title,tspan'); + + // Blocked Elements (will be stripped) + var blockedElements = stringToMap('script,style'); + + var validElements = extend({}, + voidElements, + blockElements, + inlineElements, + optionalEndTagElements); + + //Attributes that have href and hence need to be sanitized + var uriAttrs = stringToMap('background,cite,href,longdesc,src,xlink:href,xml:base'); + + var htmlAttrs = stringToMap('abbr,align,alt,axis,bgcolor,border,cellpadding,cellspacing,class,clear,' + + 'color,cols,colspan,compact,coords,dir,face,headers,height,hreflang,hspace,' + + 'ismap,lang,language,nohref,nowrap,rel,rev,rows,rowspan,rules,' + + 'scope,scrolling,shape,size,span,start,summary,tabindex,target,title,type,' + + 'valign,value,vspace,width'); + + // SVG attributes (without "id" and "name" attributes) + // https://wiki.whatwg.org/wiki/Sanitization_rules#svg_Attributes + var svgAttrs = stringToMap('accent-height,accumulate,additive,alphabetic,arabic-form,ascent,' + + 'baseProfile,bbox,begin,by,calcMode,cap-height,class,color,color-rendering,content,' + + 'cx,cy,d,dx,dy,descent,display,dur,end,fill,fill-rule,font-family,font-size,font-stretch,' + + 'font-style,font-variant,font-weight,from,fx,fy,g1,g2,glyph-name,gradientUnits,hanging,' + + 'height,horiz-adv-x,horiz-origin-x,ideographic,k,keyPoints,keySplines,keyTimes,lang,' + + 'marker-end,marker-mid,marker-start,markerHeight,markerUnits,markerWidth,mathematical,' + + 'max,min,offset,opacity,orient,origin,overline-position,overline-thickness,panose-1,' + + 'path,pathLength,points,preserveAspectRatio,r,refX,refY,repeatCount,repeatDur,' + + 'requiredExtensions,requiredFeatures,restart,rotate,rx,ry,slope,stemh,stemv,stop-color,' + + 'stop-opacity,strikethrough-position,strikethrough-thickness,stroke,stroke-dasharray,' + + 'stroke-dashoffset,stroke-linecap,stroke-linejoin,stroke-miterlimit,stroke-opacity,' + + 'stroke-width,systemLanguage,target,text-anchor,to,transform,type,u1,u2,underline-position,' + + 'underline-thickness,unicode,unicode-range,units-per-em,values,version,viewBox,visibility,' + + 'width,widths,x,x-height,x1,x2,xlink:actuate,xlink:arcrole,xlink:role,xlink:show,xlink:title,' + + 'xlink:type,xml:base,xml:lang,xml:space,xmlns,xmlns:xlink,y,y1,y2,zoomAndPan', true); + + var validAttrs = extend({}, + uriAttrs, + svgAttrs, + htmlAttrs); + + function stringToMap(str, lowercaseKeys) { + return arrayToMap(str.split(','), lowercaseKeys); + } + + function arrayToMap(items, lowercaseKeys) { + var obj = {}, i; + for (i = 0; i < items.length; i++) { + obj[lowercaseKeys ? lowercase(items[i]) : items[i]] = true; + } + return obj; + } + + function addElementsTo(elementsMap, newElements) { + if (newElements && newElements.length) { + extend(elementsMap, arrayToMap(newElements)); + } + } + + /** + * Create an inert document that contains the dirty HTML that needs sanitizing + * Depending upon browser support we use one of three strategies for doing this. + * Support: Safari 10.x -> XHR strategy + * Support: Firefox -> DomParser strategy + */ + var getInertBodyElement /* function(html: string): HTMLBodyElement */ = (function(window, document) { + var inertDocument; + if (document && document.implementation) { + inertDocument = document.implementation.createHTMLDocument('inert'); + } else { + throw $sanitizeMinErr('noinert', 'Can\'t create an inert html document'); + } + var inertBodyElement = (inertDocument.documentElement || inertDocument.getDocumentElement()).querySelector('body'); + + // Check for the Safari 10.1 bug - which allows JS to run inside the SVG G element + inertBodyElement.innerHTML = '<svg><g onload="this.parentNode.remove()"></g></svg>'; + if (!inertBodyElement.querySelector('svg')) { + return getInertBodyElement_XHR; + } else { + // Check for the Firefox bug - which prevents the inner img JS from being sanitized + inertBodyElement.innerHTML = '<svg><p><style><img src="</style><img src=x onerror=alert(1)//">'; + if (inertBodyElement.querySelector('svg img')) { + return getInertBodyElement_DOMParser; + } else { + return getInertBodyElement_InertDocument; + } + } + + function getInertBodyElement_XHR(html) { + // We add this dummy element to ensure that the rest of the content is parsed as expected + // e.g. leading whitespace is maintained and tags like `<meta>` do not get hoisted to the `<head>` tag. + html = '<remove></remove>' + html; + try { + html = encodeURI(html); + } catch (e) { + return undefined; + } + var xhr = new window.XMLHttpRequest(); + xhr.responseType = 'document'; + xhr.open('GET', 'data:text/html;charset=utf-8,' + html, false); + xhr.send(null); + var body = xhr.response.body; + body.firstChild.remove(); + return body; + } + + function getInertBodyElement_DOMParser(html) { + // We add this dummy element to ensure that the rest of the content is parsed as expected + // e.g. leading whitespace is maintained and tags like `<meta>` do not get hoisted to the `<head>` tag. + html = '<remove></remove>' + html; + try { + var body = new window.DOMParser().parseFromString(html, 'text/html').body; + body.firstChild.remove(); + return body; + } catch (e) { + return undefined; + } + } + + function getInertBodyElement_InertDocument(html) { + inertBodyElement.innerHTML = html; + + // Support: IE 9-11 only + // strip custom-namespaced attributes on IE<=11 + if (document.documentMode) { + stripCustomNsAttrs(inertBodyElement); + } + + return inertBodyElement; + } + })(window, window.document); + + /** + * @example + * htmlParser(htmlString, { + * start: function(tag, attrs) {}, + * end: function(tag) {}, + * chars: function(text) {}, + * comment: function(text) {} + * }); + * + * @param {string} html string + * @param {object} handler + */ + function htmlParserImpl(html, handler) { + if (html === null || html === undefined) { + html = ''; + } else if (typeof html !== 'string') { + html = '' + html; + } + + var inertBodyElement = getInertBodyElement(html); + if (!inertBodyElement) return ''; + + //mXSS protection + var mXSSAttempts = 5; + do { + if (mXSSAttempts === 0) { + throw $sanitizeMinErr('uinput', 'Failed to sanitize html because the input is unstable'); + } + mXSSAttempts--; + + // trigger mXSS if it is going to happen by reading and writing the innerHTML + html = inertBodyElement.innerHTML; + inertBodyElement = getInertBodyElement(html); + } while (html !== inertBodyElement.innerHTML); + + var node = inertBodyElement.firstChild; + while (node) { + switch (node.nodeType) { + case 1: // ELEMENT_NODE + handler.start(node.nodeName.toLowerCase(), attrToMap(node.attributes)); + break; + case 3: // TEXT NODE + handler.chars(node.textContent); + break; + } + + var nextNode; + if (!(nextNode = node.firstChild)) { + if (node.nodeType === 1) { + handler.end(node.nodeName.toLowerCase()); + } + nextNode = getNonDescendant('nextSibling', node); + if (!nextNode) { + while (nextNode == null) { + node = getNonDescendant('parentNode', node); + if (node === inertBodyElement) break; + nextNode = getNonDescendant('nextSibling', node); + if (node.nodeType === 1) { + handler.end(node.nodeName.toLowerCase()); + } + } + } + } + node = nextNode; + } + + while ((node = inertBodyElement.firstChild)) { + inertBodyElement.removeChild(node); + } + } + + function attrToMap(attrs) { + var map = {}; + for (var i = 0, ii = attrs.length; i < ii; i++) { + var attr = attrs[i]; + map[attr.name] = attr.value; + } + return map; + } + + + /** + * Escapes all potentially dangerous characters, so that the + * resulting string can be safely inserted into attribute or + * element text. + * @param value + * @returns {string} escaped text + */ + function encodeEntities(value) { + return value. + replace(/&/g, '&'). + replace(SURROGATE_PAIR_REGEXP, function(value) { + var hi = value.charCodeAt(0); + var low = value.charCodeAt(1); + return '&#' + (((hi - 0xD800) * 0x400) + (low - 0xDC00) + 0x10000) + ';'; + }). + replace(NON_ALPHANUMERIC_REGEXP, function(value) { + return '&#' + value.charCodeAt(0) + ';'; + }). + replace(/</g, '<'). + replace(/>/g, '>'); + } + + /** + * create an HTML/XML writer which writes to buffer + * @param {Array} buf use buf.join('') to get out sanitized html string + * @returns {object} in the form of { + * start: function(tag, attrs) {}, + * end: function(tag) {}, + * chars: function(text) {}, + * comment: function(text) {} + * } + */ + function htmlSanitizeWriterImpl(buf, uriValidator) { + var ignoreCurrentElement = false; + var out = bind(buf, buf.push); + return { + start: function(tag, attrs) { + tag = lowercase(tag); + if (!ignoreCurrentElement && blockedElements[tag]) { + ignoreCurrentElement = tag; + } + if (!ignoreCurrentElement && validElements[tag] === true) { + out('<'); + out(tag); + forEach(attrs, function(value, key) { + var lkey = lowercase(key); + var isImage = (tag === 'img' && lkey === 'src') || (lkey === 'background'); + if (validAttrs[lkey] === true && + (uriAttrs[lkey] !== true || uriValidator(value, isImage))) { + out(' '); + out(key); + out('="'); + out(encodeEntities(value)); + out('"'); + } + }); + out('>'); + } + }, + end: function(tag) { + tag = lowercase(tag); + if (!ignoreCurrentElement && validElements[tag] === true && voidElements[tag] !== true) { + out('</'); + out(tag); + out('>'); + } + // eslint-disable-next-line eqeqeq + if (tag == ignoreCurrentElement) { + ignoreCurrentElement = false; + } + }, + chars: function(chars) { + if (!ignoreCurrentElement) { + out(encodeEntities(chars)); + } + } + }; + } + + + /** + * When IE9-11 comes across an unknown namespaced attribute e.g. 'xlink:foo' it adds 'xmlns:ns1' attribute to declare + * ns1 namespace and prefixes the attribute with 'ns1' (e.g. 'ns1:xlink:foo'). This is undesirable since we don't want + * to allow any of these custom attributes. This method strips them all. + * + * @param node Root element to process + */ + function stripCustomNsAttrs(node) { + while (node) { + if (node.nodeType === window.Node.ELEMENT_NODE) { + var attrs = node.attributes; + for (var i = 0, l = attrs.length; i < l; i++) { + var attrNode = attrs[i]; + var attrName = attrNode.name.toLowerCase(); + if (attrName === 'xmlns:ns1' || attrName.lastIndexOf('ns1:', 0) === 0) { + node.removeAttributeNode(attrNode); + i--; + l--; + } + } + } + + var nextNode = node.firstChild; + if (nextNode) { + stripCustomNsAttrs(nextNode); + } + + node = getNonDescendant('nextSibling', node); + } + } + + function getNonDescendant(propName, node) { + // An element is clobbered if its `propName` property points to one of its descendants + var nextNode = node[propName]; + if (nextNode && nodeContains.call(node, nextNode)) { + throw $sanitizeMinErr('elclob', 'Failed to sanitize html because the element is clobbered: {0}', node.outerHTML || node.outerText); + } + return nextNode; + } +} + +function sanitizeText(chars) { + var buf = []; + var writer = htmlSanitizeWriter(buf, noop); + writer.chars(chars); + return buf.join(''); +} + + +// define ngSanitize module and register $sanitize service +angular.module('ngSanitize', []) + .provider('$sanitize', $SanitizeProvider) + .info({ angularVersion: '1.8.0' }); + +/** + * @ngdoc filter + * @name linky + * @kind function + * + * @description + * Finds links in text input and turns them into html links. Supports `http/https/ftp/sftp/mailto` and + * plain email address links. + * + * Requires the {@link ngSanitize `ngSanitize`} module to be installed. + * + * @param {string} text Input text. + * @param {string} [target] Window (`_blank|_self|_parent|_top`) or named frame to open links in. + * @param {object|function(url)} [attributes] Add custom attributes to the link element. + * + * Can be one of: + * + * - `object`: A map of attributes + * - `function`: Takes the url as a parameter and returns a map of attributes + * + * If the map of attributes contains a value for `target`, it overrides the value of + * the target parameter. + * + * + * @returns {string} Html-linkified and {@link $sanitize sanitized} text. + * + * @usage + <span ng-bind-html="linky_expression | linky"></span> + * + * @example + <example module="linkyExample" deps="angular-sanitize.js" name="linky-filter"> + <file name="index.html"> + <div ng-controller="ExampleController"> + Snippet: <textarea ng-model="snippet" cols="60" rows="3"></textarea> + <table> + <tr> + <th>Filter</th> + <th>Source</th> + <th>Rendered</th> + </tr> + <tr id="linky-filter"> + <td>linky filter</td> + <td> + <pre><div ng-bind-html="snippet | linky"><br></div></pre> + </td> + <td> + <div ng-bind-html="snippet | linky"></div> + </td> + </tr> + <tr id="linky-target"> + <td>linky target</td> + <td> + <pre><div ng-bind-html="snippetWithSingleURL | linky:'_blank'"><br></div></pre> + </td> + <td> + <div ng-bind-html="snippetWithSingleURL | linky:'_blank'"></div> + </td> + </tr> + <tr id="linky-custom-attributes"> + <td>linky custom attributes</td> + <td> + <pre><div ng-bind-html="snippetWithSingleURL | linky:'_self':{rel: 'nofollow'}"><br></div></pre> + </td> + <td> + <div ng-bind-html="snippetWithSingleURL | linky:'_self':{rel: 'nofollow'}"></div> + </td> + </tr> + <tr id="escaped-html"> + <td>no filter</td> + <td><pre><div ng-bind="snippet"><br></div></pre></td> + <td><div ng-bind="snippet"></div></td> + </tr> + </table> + </file> + <file name="script.js"> + angular.module('linkyExample', ['ngSanitize']) + .controller('ExampleController', ['$scope', function($scope) { + $scope.snippet = + 'Pretty text with some links:\n' + + 'http://angularjs.org/,\n' + + 'mailto:us@somewhere.org,\n' + + 'another@somewhere.org,\n' + + 'and one more: ftp://127.0.0.1/.'; + $scope.snippetWithSingleURL = 'http://angularjs.org/'; + }]); + </file> + <file name="protractor.js" type="protractor"> + it('should linkify the snippet with urls', function() { + expect(element(by.id('linky-filter')).element(by.binding('snippet | linky')).getText()). + toBe('Pretty text with some links: http://angularjs.org/, us@somewhere.org, ' + + 'another@somewhere.org, and one more: ftp://127.0.0.1/.'); + expect(element.all(by.css('#linky-filter a')).count()).toEqual(4); + }); + + it('should not linkify snippet without the linky filter', function() { + expect(element(by.id('escaped-html')).element(by.binding('snippet')).getText()). + toBe('Pretty text with some links: http://angularjs.org/, mailto:us@somewhere.org, ' + + 'another@somewhere.org, and one more: ftp://127.0.0.1/.'); + expect(element.all(by.css('#escaped-html a')).count()).toEqual(0); + }); + + it('should update', function() { + element(by.model('snippet')).clear(); + element(by.model('snippet')).sendKeys('new http://link.'); + expect(element(by.id('linky-filter')).element(by.binding('snippet | linky')).getText()). + toBe('new http://link.'); + expect(element.all(by.css('#linky-filter a')).count()).toEqual(1); + expect(element(by.id('escaped-html')).element(by.binding('snippet')).getText()) + .toBe('new http://link.'); + }); + + it('should work with the target property', function() { + expect(element(by.id('linky-target')). + element(by.binding("snippetWithSingleURL | linky:'_blank'")).getText()). + toBe('http://angularjs.org/'); + expect(element(by.css('#linky-target a')).getAttribute('target')).toEqual('_blank'); + }); + + it('should optionally add custom attributes', function() { + expect(element(by.id('linky-custom-attributes')). + element(by.binding("snippetWithSingleURL | linky:'_self':{rel: 'nofollow'}")).getText()). + toBe('http://angularjs.org/'); + expect(element(by.css('#linky-custom-attributes a')).getAttribute('rel')).toEqual('nofollow'); + }); + </file> + </example> + */ +angular.module('ngSanitize').filter('linky', ['$sanitize', function($sanitize) { + var LINKY_URL_REGEXP = + /((s?ftp|https?):\/\/|(www\.)|(mailto:)?[A-Za-z0-9._%+-]+@)\S*[^\s.;,(){}<>"\u201d\u2019]/i, + MAILTO_REGEXP = /^mailto:/i; + + var linkyMinErr = angular.$$minErr('linky'); + var isDefined = angular.isDefined; + var isFunction = angular.isFunction; + var isObject = angular.isObject; + var isString = angular.isString; + + return function(text, target, attributes) { + if (text == null || text === '') return text; + if (!isString(text)) throw linkyMinErr('notstring', 'Expected string but received: {0}', text); + + var attributesFn = + isFunction(attributes) ? attributes : + isObject(attributes) ? function getAttributesObject() {return attributes;} : + function getEmptyAttributesObject() {return {};}; + + var match; + var raw = text; + var html = []; + var url; + var i; + while ((match = raw.match(LINKY_URL_REGEXP))) { + // We can not end in these as they are sometimes found at the end of the sentence + url = match[0]; + // if we did not match ftp/http/www/mailto then assume mailto + if (!match[2] && !match[4]) { + url = (match[3] ? 'http://' : 'mailto:') + url; + } + i = match.index; + addText(raw.substr(0, i)); + addLink(url, match[0].replace(MAILTO_REGEXP, '')); + raw = raw.substring(i + match[0].length); + } + addText(raw); + return $sanitize(html.join('')); + + function addText(text) { + if (!text) { + return; + } + html.push(sanitizeText(text)); + } + + function addLink(url, text) { + var key, linkAttributes = attributesFn(url); + html.push('<a '); + + for (key in linkAttributes) { + html.push(key + '="' + linkAttributes[key] + '" '); + } + + if (isDefined(target) && !('target' in linkAttributes)) { + html.push('target="', + target, + '" '); + } + html.push('href="', + url.replace(/"/g, '"'), + '">'); + addText(text); + html.push('</a>'); + } + }; +}]); + + +})(window, window.angular); |