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authorDavid Benjamin <davidben@google.com>2016-09-09 06:47:48 +0300
committerCQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>2016-09-22 00:18:34 +0300
commitc8b6b4fe4afbcd31b61007b1288de380c7f51b4c (patch)
treee5e09d3975f8e21763ca50c50387f6a40c9eef0b /crypto
parentaf56fbd62aa4e60b9085a9b390b9db30af5ebd1e (diff)
Only predict X25519 in TLS 1.3.
We'd previously been assuming we'd want to predict P-256 and X25519 but, on reflection, that's nonsense. Although, today, P-256 is widespread and X25519 is less so, that's not the right question to ask. Those servers are all 1.2. The right question is whether we believe enough servers will get to TLS 1.3 before X25519 to justify wasting 64 bytes on all other connections. Given that OpenSSL has already shipped X25519 and Microsoft was doing interop testing on X25519 around when we were shipping it, I think the answer is no. Moreover, if we are wrong, it will be easier to go from predicting one group to two rather than the inverse (provided we send a fake one with GREASE). I anticipate prediction-miss HelloRetryRequest logic across the TLS/TCP ecosystem will be largely untested (no one wants to pay an RTT), so taking a group out of the predicted set will likely be a risky operation. Only predicting one group also makes things a bit simpler. I haven't done this here, but we'll be able to fold the 1.2 and 1.3 ecdh_ctx's together, even. Change-Id: Ie7e42d3105aca48eb9d97e2e05a16c5379aa66a3 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10960 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto')
-rw-r--r--crypto/err/ssl.errordata1
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/err/ssl.errordata b/crypto/err/ssl.errordata
index f94156f7..e19b347b 100644
--- a/crypto/err/ssl.errordata
+++ b/crypto/err/ssl.errordata
@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ SSL,262,NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED
SSL,177,NO_CIPHER_MATCH
SSL,253,NO_COMMON_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS
SSL,178,NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
+SSL,265,NO_GROUPS_SPECIFIED
SSL,179,NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED
SSL,180,NO_P256_SUPPORT
SSL,181,NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED