From 3de1e966b4c4113fd901f9ecd00cf59a3759e745 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: matt335672 <30179339+matt335672@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Wed, 12 Jan 2022 11:41:26 +0000
Subject: Support imlib2 on RHEL 7

---
 configure.ac | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 44ac95a6..a7a10bf6 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ case "$with_imlib2" in
         use_imlib2=no
         ;;
     yes)
-        PKG_CHECK_MODULES([IMLIB2], [imlib2 >= 1.4.10],
+        PKG_CHECK_MODULES([IMLIB2], [imlib2 >= 1.4.5],
             [use_imlib2=yes],
             [AC_MSG_ERROR([please install libimlib2-dev or imlib2-devel])])
         ;;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 69ea4064406699da105bcf0936586b10bba0657b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kentaro Hayashi <hayashi@clear-code.com>
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2021 14:04:09 +0900
Subject: Add g_str_to_bitmask utility function

It should be used for comma separated configuration to bitmask.

e.g. RestrictOutboundClipboard = text, file, image
---
 common/string_calls.c            |  69 ++++++++
 common/string_calls.h            |  14 ++
 tests/common/test_string_calls.c | 345 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 428 insertions(+)

diff --git a/common/string_calls.c b/common/string_calls.c
index 9950fd09..18f54512 100644
--- a/common/string_calls.c
+++ b/common/string_calls.c
@@ -986,3 +986,72 @@ g_bitmask_to_str(int bitmask, const struct bitmask_string bitdefs[],
 
     return rlen;
 }
+
+int
+g_str_to_bitmask(const char *str, const struct bitmask_string bitdefs[],
+                 const char *delim, char *unrecognised, int unrecognised_len)
+{
+    char *properties = NULL;
+    char *p = NULL;
+    int mask = 0;
+
+    if (unrecognised_len < 1)
+    {
+        /* No space left to tell unrecognised tokens */
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (!unrecognised)
+    {
+        return 0;
+    }
+    /* ensure not to return with uninitialized buffer */
+    unrecognised[0] = '\0';
+    if (!str || !bitdefs || !delim)
+    {
+        return 0;
+    }
+    properties = g_strdup(str);
+    if (!properties)
+    {
+        return 0;
+    }
+    p = strtok(properties, delim);
+    while (p != NULL)
+    {
+        g_strtrim(p, 3);
+        const struct bitmask_string *b;
+        int found = 0;
+        for (b = &bitdefs[0] ; b->str != NULL; ++b)
+        {
+            if (0 == g_strcasecmp(p, b->str))
+            {
+                mask |= b->mask;
+                found = 1;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        if (found == 0)
+        {
+            int length = g_strlen(unrecognised);
+            if (length > 0)
+            {
+                /* adding ",property" */
+                if (length + g_strlen(p) + 1 < unrecognised_len)
+                {
+                    unrecognised[length] = delim[0];
+                    length += 1;
+                    g_strcpy(unrecognised + length, p);
+                }
+            }
+            else if (g_strlen(p) < unrecognised_len)
+            {
+                g_strcpy(unrecognised, p);
+            }
+        }
+        p = strtok(NULL, delim);
+    }
+
+    g_free(properties);
+    return mask;
+}
+
diff --git a/common/string_calls.h b/common/string_calls.h
index 990a98e6..87888c18 100644
--- a/common/string_calls.h
+++ b/common/string_calls.h
@@ -174,6 +174,20 @@ int
 g_bitmask_to_str(int bitmask, const struct bitmask_string[],
                  char delim, char *buff, int bufflen);
 
+/***
+ * Converts a string containing a series of tokens to a bitmask.
+ * @param str Input string
+ * @param bitmask_string Array mapping tokens to bitmask values
+ * @param delim Delimiter for tokens in str
+ * @param[out] unrecognised Buffer for any unrecognised tokens
+ * @param unrecognised_len Length of unrecognised including '\0';
+ * @return bitmask value for recognised tokens
+ */
+int
+g_str_to_bitmask(const char *str, const struct bitmask_string[],
+                 const char *delim, char *unrecognised,
+                 int unrecognised_len);
+
 int      g_strlen(const char *text);
 char    *g_strchr(const char *text, int c);
 char    *g_strrchr(const char *text, int c);
diff --git a/tests/common/test_string_calls.c b/tests/common/test_string_calls.c
index cd15c72f..58dcaea0 100644
--- a/tests/common/test_string_calls.c
+++ b/tests/common/test_string_calls.c
@@ -323,6 +323,331 @@ START_TEST(test_bm2str__overflow_some_bits_undefined)
 }
 END_TEST
 
+START_TEST(test_str2bm__null_string)
+{
+    int rv;
+    char buff[16] = { 'd', 'u', 'm', 'm', 'y' };
+
+    static const struct bitmask_string bits[] =
+    {
+        {1 << 0, "BIT_0"},
+        BITMASK_STRING_END_OF_LIST
+    };
+
+    rv = g_str_to_bitmask(NULL, bits, ",", buff, sizeof(buff));
+
+    ck_assert_str_eq(buff, "");
+    ck_assert_int_eq(rv, 0);
+}
+END_TEST
+
+START_TEST(test_str2bm__empty_string)
+{
+    int rv;
+    char buff[16] = { 'd', 'u', 'm', 'm', 'y' };
+
+    static const struct bitmask_string bits[] =
+    {
+        {1 << 0, "BIT_0"},
+        BITMASK_STRING_END_OF_LIST
+    };
+
+    rv = g_str_to_bitmask("", bits, ",", buff, sizeof(buff));
+
+    ck_assert_str_eq(buff, "");
+    ck_assert_int_eq(rv, 0);
+}
+END_TEST
+
+START_TEST(test_str2bm__null_bitdefs)
+{
+    int rv;
+    char buff[16] = { 'd', 'u', 'm', 'm', 'y' };
+
+    rv = g_str_to_bitmask("BIT_0", NULL, ",", buff, sizeof(buff));
+
+    ck_assert_str_eq(buff, "");
+    ck_assert_int_eq(rv, 0);
+}
+END_TEST
+
+START_TEST(test_str2bm__null_delim)
+{
+    int rv;
+    char buff[16] = { 'd', 'u', 'm', 'm', 'y' };
+
+    static const struct bitmask_string bits[] =
+    {
+        {1 << 0, "BIT_0"},
+        BITMASK_STRING_END_OF_LIST
+    };
+
+    rv = g_str_to_bitmask("BIT_0", bits, NULL, buff, sizeof(buff));
+
+    ck_assert_str_eq(buff, "");
+    ck_assert_int_eq(rv, 0);
+}
+END_TEST
+
+START_TEST(test_str2bm__null_buffer)
+{
+    int rv;
+    char buff[16] = { 'd', 'u', 'm', 'm', 'y' };
+
+    static const struct bitmask_string bits[] =
+    {
+        {1 << 0, "BIT_0"},
+        BITMASK_STRING_END_OF_LIST
+    };
+
+    rv = g_str_to_bitmask("BIT_0", bits, ",", NULL, sizeof(buff));
+
+    ck_assert_str_eq(buff, "dummy");
+    ck_assert_int_eq(rv, 0);
+}
+END_TEST
+
+START_TEST(test_str2bm__zero_buffer)
+{
+    int rv;
+    char buff[1];
+
+    static const struct bitmask_string bits[] =
+    {
+        {1 << 0, "BIT_0"},
+        BITMASK_STRING_END_OF_LIST
+    };
+
+    rv = g_str_to_bitmask("BIT_0", bits, ",", buff, 0);
+
+    ck_assert_int_eq(rv, 0);
+}
+END_TEST
+
+START_TEST(test_str2bm__zero_mask)
+{
+    int rv;
+    char buff[16] = { 'd', 'u', 'm', 'm', 'y' };
+
+    static const struct bitmask_string bits[] =
+    {
+        {0,      "ZERO MASK"}, /* mask 0 should not be detected as end of list */
+        {1 << 0, "BIT_0"},
+        BITMASK_STRING_END_OF_LIST
+    };
+
+    int bitmask = 1 << 0;
+    rv = g_str_to_bitmask("BIT_0", bits, ",", buff, sizeof(buff));
+
+    ck_assert_str_eq(buff, "");
+    ck_assert_int_eq(rv, bitmask);
+}
+END_TEST
+
+START_TEST(test_str2bm__all_defined)
+{
+    int rv;
+    char buff[16] = { 'd', 'u', 'm', 'm', 'y' };
+
+    static const struct bitmask_string bits[] =
+    {
+        {1 << 0, "BIT_0"},
+        {1 << 1, "BIT_1"},
+        BITMASK_STRING_END_OF_LIST
+    };
+
+    int bitmask = 1 << 0 | 1 << 1;
+    rv = g_str_to_bitmask("BIT_0,BIT_1", bits, ",", buff, sizeof(buff));
+
+    ck_assert_str_eq(buff, "");
+    ck_assert_int_eq(rv, bitmask);
+}
+END_TEST
+
+START_TEST(test_str2bm__no_defined)
+{
+    int rv;
+    char buff[16] = { 'd', 'u', 'm', 'm', 'y' };
+
+    static const struct bitmask_string bits[] =
+    {
+        {1 << 0, "BIT_0"},
+        {1 << 1, "BIT_1"},
+        BITMASK_STRING_END_OF_LIST
+    };
+
+    int bitmask = 0;
+    rv = g_str_to_bitmask("BIT_2,BIT_3", bits, ",", buff, sizeof(buff));
+
+    ck_assert_str_eq(buff, "BIT_2,BIT_3");
+    ck_assert_int_eq(rv, bitmask);
+}
+END_TEST
+
+START_TEST(test_str2bm__some_defined)
+{
+    int rv;
+    char buff[16] = { 'd', 'u', 'm', 'm', 'y' };
+
+    static const struct bitmask_string bits[] =
+    {
+        {1 << 0, "BIT_0"},
+        {1 << 1, "BIT_1"},
+        {1 << 2, "BIT_2"},
+        BITMASK_STRING_END_OF_LIST
+    };
+
+    int bitmask = 1 << 1;
+    rv = g_str_to_bitmask("a,BIT_1,b", bits, ",", buff, sizeof(buff));
+
+    ck_assert_str_eq(buff, "a,b");
+    ck_assert_int_eq(rv, bitmask);
+}
+END_TEST
+
+START_TEST(test_str2bm__trim_space)
+{
+    int rv;
+    char buff[16] = { 'd', 'u', 'm', 'm', 'y' };
+
+    static const struct bitmask_string bits[] =
+    {
+        {1 << 0, "BIT_0"},
+        {1 << 1, "BIT_1"},
+        {1 << 2, "BIT_2"},
+        BITMASK_STRING_END_OF_LIST
+    };
+
+    int bitmask = 1 << 0 | 1 << 1 | 1 << 2;
+    rv = g_str_to_bitmask("BIT_0 , BIT_1 , BIT_2", bits, ",", buff, sizeof(buff));
+
+    ck_assert_str_eq(buff, "");
+    ck_assert_int_eq(rv, bitmask);
+}
+END_TEST
+
+START_TEST(test_str2bm__overflow_undefined)
+{
+    int rv;
+    char buff[16] = { 'd', 'u', 'm', 'm', 'y' };
+
+    static const struct bitmask_string bits[] =
+    {
+        {1 << 0, "BIT_0"},
+        {1 << 1, "BIT_1"},
+        {1 << 2, "BIT_2"},
+        BITMASK_STRING_END_OF_LIST
+    };
+
+    int bitmask = 1 << 1;
+    rv = g_str_to_bitmask("123456789,BIT_1,abcdef", bits, ",", buff, sizeof(buff));
+
+    /* abcdef is not filled */
+    ck_assert_str_eq(buff, "123456789");
+    ck_assert_int_eq(rv, bitmask);
+}
+END_TEST
+
+START_TEST(test_str2bm__delim_slash)
+{
+    int rv;
+    char buff[16] = { 'd', 'u', 'm', 'm', 'y' };
+
+    static const struct bitmask_string bits[] =
+    {
+        {1 << 0, "BIT_0"},
+        {1 << 1, "BIT_1"},
+        {1 << 2, "BIT_2"},
+        BITMASK_STRING_END_OF_LIST
+    };
+
+    int bitmask = 1 << 0 | 1 << 1 | 1 << 2;
+    rv = g_str_to_bitmask("BIT_0/BIT_1/BIT_2", bits, "/", buff, sizeof(buff));
+
+    ck_assert_str_eq(buff, "");
+    ck_assert_int_eq(rv, bitmask);
+}
+END_TEST
+
+START_TEST(test_str2bm__no_delim)
+{
+    int rv;
+    char buff[16] = { 'd', 'u', 'm', 'm', 'y' };
+
+    static const struct bitmask_string bits[] =
+    {
+        {1 << 0, "BIT_0"},
+        {1 << 1, "BIT_1"},
+        BITMASK_STRING_END_OF_LIST
+    };
+
+    rv = g_str_to_bitmask("BIT_0,BIT_1", bits, "", buff, sizeof(buff));
+
+    ck_assert_str_eq(buff, "BIT_0,BIT_1");
+    ck_assert_int_eq(rv, 0);
+}
+END_TEST
+
+START_TEST(test_str2bm__multiple_delim)
+{
+    int rv;
+    char buff[16] = { 'd', 'u', 'm', 'm', 'y' };
+
+    static const struct bitmask_string bits[] =
+    {
+        {1 << 0, "BIT_0"},
+        {1 << 1, "BIT_1"},
+        {1 << 2, "BIT_2"},
+        BITMASK_STRING_END_OF_LIST
+    };
+
+    int bitmask = 1 << 0 | 1 << 1 | 1 << 2;
+    rv = g_str_to_bitmask("BIT_0/BIT_1,BIT_2", bits, ",/", buff, sizeof(buff));
+
+    ck_assert_str_eq(buff, "");
+    ck_assert_int_eq(rv, bitmask);
+}
+END_TEST
+
+START_TEST(test_str2bm__first_delim_is_semicolon)
+{
+    int rv;
+    char buff[16] = { 'd', 'u', 'm', 'm', 'y' };
+
+    static const struct bitmask_string bits[] =
+    {
+        {1 << 0, "BIT_0"},
+        {1 << 1, "BIT_1"},
+        BITMASK_STRING_END_OF_LIST
+    };
+
+    int bitmask = 1 << 1;
+    rv = g_str_to_bitmask("a;b;BIT_1;c", bits, ";,", buff, sizeof(buff));
+
+    ck_assert_str_eq(buff, "a;b;c");
+    ck_assert_int_eq(rv, bitmask);
+}
+END_TEST
+
+START_TEST(test_str2bm__empty_token)
+{
+    int rv;
+    char buff[16] = { 'd', 'u', 'm', 'm', 'y' };
+
+    static const struct bitmask_string bits[] =
+    {
+        {1 << 0, "BIT_0"},
+        BITMASK_STRING_END_OF_LIST
+    };
+
+    int bitmask = 1 << 0;
+    rv = g_str_to_bitmask(",BIT_0, ,", bits, ",", buff, sizeof(buff));
+
+    ck_assert_str_eq(buff, "");
+    ck_assert_int_eq(rv, bitmask);
+}
+END_TEST
+
 /******************************************************************************/
 
 START_TEST(test_strtrim__trim_left)
@@ -385,6 +710,7 @@ make_suite_test_string(void)
     Suite *s;
     TCase *tc_strnjoin;
     TCase *tc_bm2str;
+    TCase *tc_str2bm;
     TCase *tc_strtrim;
 
     s = suite_create("String");
@@ -410,6 +736,25 @@ make_suite_test_string(void)
     tcase_add_test(tc_bm2str, test_bm2str__some_bits_undefined);
     tcase_add_test(tc_bm2str, test_bm2str__overflow_all_bits_defined);
     tcase_add_test(tc_bm2str, test_bm2str__overflow_some_bits_undefined);
+    tc_str2bm = tcase_create("str2bm");
+    suite_add_tcase(s, tc_str2bm);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_str2bm, test_str2bm__null_string);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_str2bm, test_str2bm__empty_string);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_str2bm, test_str2bm__null_bitdefs);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_str2bm, test_str2bm__null_delim);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_str2bm, test_str2bm__null_buffer);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_str2bm, test_str2bm__zero_buffer);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_str2bm, test_str2bm__zero_mask);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_str2bm, test_str2bm__all_defined);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_str2bm, test_str2bm__no_defined);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_str2bm, test_str2bm__some_defined);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_str2bm, test_str2bm__trim_space);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_str2bm, test_str2bm__overflow_undefined);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_str2bm, test_str2bm__no_delim);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_str2bm, test_str2bm__delim_slash);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_str2bm, test_str2bm__multiple_delim);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_str2bm, test_str2bm__first_delim_is_semicolon);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_str2bm, test_str2bm__empty_token);
 
     tc_strtrim = tcase_create("strtrim");
     suite_add_tcase(s, tc_strtrim);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From bd820845057f41f135ac4406ab87732db9c868e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kentaro Hayashi <hayashi@clear-code.com>
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2021 14:35:50 +0900
Subject: Extend In/Outbound text,file,image restriction respectively

It supports the extended configurations for sesman.ini:

Before:

  [Security]
  RestrictOutboundClipboard=true or false

After:

  [Security]
  RestrictInboundClipboard=[true or false | text or file or image | comma separated list]
  RestrictOutboundClipboard=[true or false | text or file or image | comma separated list]

Above configuration is disabled by default (false)
And it can be specified comma separated list like this:.

  RestrictInboundClipboard=file, image
  RestrictOutboundClipboard=text, file, image

Note that if RestrictOutboundClipboard=true,file is set,
file is ignored and it is treated as RestrictOutboundClipboard=true

It is same for RestrictInboundClipboard.
---
 sesman/chansrv/chansrv_common.h |  7 ++++
 sesman/chansrv/chansrv_config.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 sesman/chansrv/chansrv_config.h |  2 +
 sesman/config.c                 | 89 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 sesman/config.h                 |  7 ++++
 5 files changed, 168 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/sesman/chansrv/chansrv_common.h b/sesman/chansrv/chansrv_common.h
index d15c8da7..656e608f 100644
--- a/sesman/chansrv/chansrv_common.h
+++ b/sesman/chansrv/chansrv_common.h
@@ -22,6 +22,13 @@
 #include "parse.h"
 #include "os_calls.h"
 
+/* Define bitmask values for restricting the clipboard */
+#define CLIP_RESTRICT_NONE 0
+#define CLIP_RESTRICT_TEXT (1<<0)
+#define CLIP_RESTRICT_FILE (1<<1)
+#define CLIP_RESTRICT_IMAGE (1<<2)
+#define CLIP_RESTRICT_ALL 0x7fffffff
+
 int read_entire_packet(struct stream *src, struct stream **dest, int chan_flags, int length, int total_length);
 
 #endif
diff --git a/sesman/chansrv/chansrv_config.c b/sesman/chansrv/chansrv_config.c
index adbecb5e..64297bcd 100644
--- a/sesman/chansrv/chansrv_config.c
+++ b/sesman/chansrv/chansrv_config.c
@@ -30,12 +30,14 @@
 #include "file.h"
 #include "os_calls.h"
 
+#include "chansrv_common.h"
 #include "chansrv_config.h"
 #include "string_calls.h"
 
 /* Default settings */
 #define DEFAULT_USE_UNIX_SOCKET             0
 #define DEFAULT_RESTRICT_OUTBOUND_CLIPBOARD 0
+#define DEFAULT_RESTRICT_INBOUND_CLIPBOARD  0
 #define DEFAULT_ENABLE_FUSE_MOUNT           1
 #define DEFAULT_FUSE_MOUNT_NAME             "xrdp-client"
 #define DEFAULT_FILE_UMASK                  077
@@ -48,6 +50,21 @@ printflike(2, 3)
 enum logReturns (*log_func_t)(const enum logLevels lvl,
                               const char *msg, ...);
 
+/* Map clipboard strings into bitmask values */
+static const struct bitmask_string clip_restrict_map[] =
+{
+    { CLIP_RESTRICT_TEXT, "text"},
+    { CLIP_RESTRICT_FILE, "file"},
+    { CLIP_RESTRICT_IMAGE, "image"},
+    { CLIP_RESTRICT_ALL, "all"},
+    { CLIP_RESTRICT_NONE, "none"},
+    /* Compatibility values */
+    { CLIP_RESTRICT_ALL, "true"},
+    { CLIP_RESTRICT_ALL, "yes"},
+    { CLIP_RESTRICT_NONE, "false"},
+    BITMASK_STRING_END_OF_LIST
+};
+
 /***************************************************************************//**
  * @brief Error logging function to use to log to stdout
  *
@@ -125,9 +142,30 @@ read_config_security(log_func_t logmsg,
         const char *name = (const char *)list_get_item(names, index);
         const char *value = (const char *)list_get_item(values, index);
 
+        char unrecognised[256];
         if (g_strcasecmp(name, "RestrictOutboundClipboard") == 0)
         {
-            cfg->restrict_outbound_clipboard = g_text2bool(value);
+            cfg->restrict_outbound_clipboard =
+                g_str_to_bitmask(value, clip_restrict_map, ",",
+                                 unrecognised, sizeof(unrecognised));
+            if (unrecognised[0] != '\0')
+            {
+                LOG(LOG_LEVEL_WARNING,
+                    "Unrecognised tokens parsing 'RestrictOutboundClipboard' %s",
+                    unrecognised);
+            }
+        }
+        if (g_strcasecmp(name, "RestrictInboundClipboard") == 0)
+        {
+            cfg->restrict_inbound_clipboard =
+                g_str_to_bitmask(value, clip_restrict_map, ",",
+                                 unrecognised, sizeof(unrecognised));
+            if (unrecognised[0] != '\0')
+            {
+                LOG(LOG_LEVEL_WARNING,
+                    "Unrecognised tokens parsing 'RestrictInboundClipboard' %s",
+                    unrecognised);
+            }
         }
     }
 
@@ -208,6 +246,7 @@ new_config(void)
         cfg->use_unix_socket = DEFAULT_USE_UNIX_SOCKET;
         cfg->enable_fuse_mount = DEFAULT_ENABLE_FUSE_MOUNT;
         cfg->restrict_outbound_clipboard = DEFAULT_RESTRICT_OUTBOUND_CLIPBOARD;
+        cfg->restrict_inbound_clipboard = DEFAULT_RESTRICT_INBOUND_CLIPBOARD;
         cfg->fuse_mount_name = fuse_mount_name;
         cfg->file_umask = DEFAULT_FILE_UMASK;
         cfg->use_nautilus3_flist_format = DEFAULT_USE_NAUTILUS3_FLIST_FORMAT;
@@ -286,10 +325,37 @@ config_dump(struct config_chansrv *config)
     g_writeln("    UseUnixSocket (derived):   %s",
               g_bool2text(config->use_unix_socket));
 
+    char buf[256];
     g_writeln("\nSecurity configuration:");
-    g_writeln("    RestrictOutboundClipboard: %s",
-              g_bool2text(config->restrict_outbound_clipboard));
-
+    if (config->restrict_outbound_clipboard == CLIP_RESTRICT_NONE)
+    {
+        g_writeln("    RestrictOutboundClipboard: %s", "none");
+    }
+    else if (config->restrict_outbound_clipboard == CLIP_RESTRICT_ALL)
+    {
+        g_writeln("    RestrictOutboundClipboard: %s", "all");
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        g_bitmask_to_str(config->restrict_outbound_clipboard,
+                         clip_restrict_map, ',', buf, sizeof(buf));
+        g_writeln("    RestrictOutboundClipboard: %s", buf);
+    }
+    g_writeln("    RestrictInboundClipboard:  %s", buf);
+    if (config->restrict_inbound_clipboard == CLIP_RESTRICT_NONE)
+    {
+        g_writeln("    RestrictInboundClipboard:  %s", "none");
+    }
+    else if (config->restrict_inbound_clipboard == CLIP_RESTRICT_ALL)
+    {
+        g_writeln("    RestrictInboundClipboard:  %s", "all");
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        g_bitmask_to_str(config->restrict_inbound_clipboard,
+                         clip_restrict_map, ',', buf, sizeof(buf));
+        g_writeln("    RestrictInboundClipboard:  %s", buf);
+    }
     g_writeln("\nChansrv configuration:");
     g_writeln("    EnableFuseMount            %s",
               g_bool2text(config->enable_fuse_mount));
diff --git a/sesman/chansrv/chansrv_config.h b/sesman/chansrv/chansrv_config.h
index f4acd592..b0327fea 100644
--- a/sesman/chansrv/chansrv_config.h
+++ b/sesman/chansrv/chansrv_config.h
@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ struct config_chansrv
 
     /** RestrictOutboundClipboard setting from sesman.ini */
     int restrict_outbound_clipboard;
+    /** RestrictInboundClipboard setting from sesman.ini */
+    int restrict_inbound_clipboard;
 
     /** * FuseMountName from sesman.ini */
     char *fuse_mount_name;
diff --git a/sesman/config.c b/sesman/config.c
index 481ae760..61e9e403 100644
--- a/sesman/config.c
+++ b/sesman/config.c
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
 #include "sesman.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "string_calls.h"
+#include "chansrv/chansrv_common.h"
 
 /***************************************************************************//**
  *
@@ -162,6 +163,26 @@ config_read_globals(int file, struct config_sesman *cf, struct list *param_n,
     return 0;
 }
 
+/*
+  Map clipboard strings into bitmask values.
+  Duplicated definition exists in chansrv_config,
+  because it avoids build failure for xrdp-sesman and xrdp-sesrun.
+  It should be unified in the future.
+*/
+static const struct bitmask_string clip_restrict_map[] =
+{
+    { CLIP_RESTRICT_TEXT, "text"},
+    { CLIP_RESTRICT_FILE, "file"},
+    { CLIP_RESTRICT_IMAGE, "image"},
+    { CLIP_RESTRICT_ALL, "all"},
+    { CLIP_RESTRICT_NONE, "none"},
+    /* Compatibility values */
+    { CLIP_RESTRICT_ALL, "true"},
+    { CLIP_RESTRICT_ALL, "yes"},
+    { CLIP_RESTRICT_NONE, "false"},
+    BITMASK_STRING_END_OF_LIST
+};
+
 /***************************************************************************//**
  *
  * @brief Reads sesman [Security] configuration section
@@ -190,6 +211,7 @@ config_read_security(int file, struct config_security *sc,
     sc->ts_users_enable = 0;
     sc->ts_admins_enable = 0;
     sc->restrict_outbound_clipboard = 0;
+    sc->restrict_inbound_clipboard = 0;
 
     file_read_section(file, SESMAN_CFG_SECURITY, param_n, param_v);
 
@@ -231,7 +253,31 @@ config_read_security(int file, struct config_security *sc,
 
         if (0 == g_strcasecmp(buf, SESMAN_CFG_SEC_RESTRICT_OUTBOUND_CLIPBOARD))
         {
-            sc->restrict_outbound_clipboard = g_text2bool((char *)list_get_item(param_v, i));
+            char unrecognised[256];
+            sc->restrict_outbound_clipboard =
+                g_str_to_bitmask((const char *)list_get_item(param_v, i),
+                                 clip_restrict_map, ",",
+                                 unrecognised, sizeof(unrecognised));
+            if (unrecognised[0] != '\0')
+            {
+                LOG(LOG_LEVEL_WARNING,
+                    "Unrecognised tokens parsing 'RestrictOutboundClipboard' %s",
+                    unrecognised);
+            }
+        }
+        if (0 == g_strcasecmp(buf, SESMAN_CFG_SEC_RESTRICT_INBOUND_CLIPBOARD))
+        {
+            char unrecognised[256];
+            sc->restrict_inbound_clipboard =
+                g_str_to_bitmask((const char *)list_get_item(param_v, i),
+                                 clip_restrict_map, ",",
+                                 unrecognised, sizeof(unrecognised));
+            if (unrecognised[0] != '\0')
+            {
+                LOG(LOG_LEVEL_WARNING,
+                    "Unrecognised tokens parsing 'RestrictInboundClipboard' %s",
+                    unrecognised);
+            }
         }
 
     }
@@ -553,12 +599,41 @@ config_dump(struct config_sesman *config)
 
     /* Security configuration */
     g_writeln("Security configuration:");
-    g_writeln("    AllowRootLogin:           %d", sc->allow_root);
-    g_writeln("    MaxLoginRetry:            %d", sc->login_retry);
-    g_writeln("    AlwaysGroupCheck:         %d", sc->ts_always_group_check);
-    g_writeln("    RestrictOutboundClipboard: %d", sc->restrict_outbound_clipboard);
+    g_writeln("    AllowRootLogin:            %d", sc->allow_root);
+    g_writeln("    MaxLoginRetry:             %d", sc->login_retry);
+    g_writeln("    AlwaysGroupCheck:          %d", sc->ts_always_group_check);
+    if (sc->restrict_outbound_clipboard == CLIP_RESTRICT_NONE)
+    {
+        g_writeln("    RestrictOutboundClipboard: %s", "none");
+    }
+    else if (sc->restrict_outbound_clipboard == CLIP_RESTRICT_ALL)
+    {
+        g_writeln("    RestrictOutboundClipboard: %s", "all");
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        char buf[256];
+        g_bitmask_to_str(sc->restrict_outbound_clipboard,
+                         clip_restrict_map, ',', buf, sizeof(buf));
+        g_writeln("    RestrictOutboundClipboard: %s", buf);
+    }
+    if (sc->restrict_inbound_clipboard == CLIP_RESTRICT_NONE)
+    {
+        g_writeln("    RestrictInboundClipboard:  %s", "none");
+    }
+    else if (sc->restrict_inbound_clipboard == CLIP_RESTRICT_ALL)
+    {
+        g_writeln("    RestrictInboundClipboard:  %s", "all");
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        char buf[256];
+        g_bitmask_to_str(sc->restrict_inbound_clipboard,
+                         clip_restrict_map, ',', buf, sizeof(buf));
+        g_writeln("    RestrictInboundClipboard:  %s", buf);
+    }
 
-    g_printf( "    TSUsersGroup:             ");
+    g_printf( "    TSUsersGroup:              ");
     if (sc->ts_users_enable)
     {
         g_printf("%d", sc->ts_users);
@@ -569,7 +644,7 @@ config_dump(struct config_sesman *config)
     }
     g_writeln("%s", "");
 
-    g_printf( "    TSAdminsGroup:            ");
+    g_printf( "    TSAdminsGroup:             ");
     if (sc->ts_admins_enable)
     {
         g_printf("%d", sc->ts_admins);
diff --git a/sesman/config.h b/sesman/config.h
index d9dbcefe..c6b72f8a 100644
--- a/sesman/config.h
+++ b/sesman/config.h
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
 #define SESMAN_CFG_SEC_ADM_GROUP                   "TerminalServerAdmins"
 #define SESMAN_CFG_SEC_ALWAYSGROUPCHECK            "AlwaysGroupCheck"
 #define SESMAN_CFG_SEC_RESTRICT_OUTBOUND_CLIPBOARD "RestrictOutboundClipboard"
+#define SESMAN_CFG_SEC_RESTRICT_INBOUND_CLIPBOARD  "RestrictInboundClipboard"
 
 #define SESMAN_CFG_SESSIONS          "Sessions"
 #define SESMAN_CFG_SESS_MAX          "MaxSessions"
@@ -134,6 +135,12 @@ struct config_security
      * @brief if the clipboard should be enforced restricted. If true only allow client -> server, not vice versa.
      */
     int restrict_outbound_clipboard;
+
+    /**
+     * @var restrict_inbound_clipboard
+     * @brief if the clipboard should be enforced restricted. If true only allow server -> client, not vice versa.
+     */
+    int restrict_inbound_clipboard;
 };
 
 /**
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From fb1c4ec9450e4576b97938e22858a6864da6bf9e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kentaro Hayashi <hayashi@clear-code.com>
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2021 14:43:49 +0900
Subject: Block outbound clipboard text/image/file respectively

RestrictOutboundClipboard kills all of test/file/image
transfer via clipboard.

For controlling each content type behavior,
clipboard_xevent is not appropriate place to block respectively.

Instead, in clipboard_event_selection_notify, these media type
will be blocked which depends on the following configurations in
sesman.ini [Security] section.

  * RestrictOutboundClipboard=text
  * RestrictOutboundClipboard=file
  * RestrictOutboundClipboard=image

You can also set comma separated list

  * RestrictOutboundClipboard=text, file, image
---
 sesman/chansrv/clipboard.c | 187 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 143 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)

diff --git a/sesman/chansrv/clipboard.c b/sesman/chansrv/clipboard.c
index 245a51ee..5cbaf6f5 100644
--- a/sesman/chansrv/clipboard.c
+++ b/sesman/chansrv/clipboard.c
@@ -171,6 +171,7 @@ x-special/gnome-copied-files
 #include "os_calls.h"
 #include "string_calls.h"
 #include "chansrv.h"
+#include "chansrv_common.h"
 #include "chansrv_config.h"
 #include "clipboard.h"
 #include "clipboard_file.h"
@@ -2005,14 +2006,33 @@ clipboard_event_selection_notify(XEvent *xevent)
                     g_clip_s2c.data[g_clip_s2c.total_bytes] = 0;
                     if (g_clip_s2c.xrdp_clip_type == XRDP_CB_FILE)
                     {
-                        clipboard_send_data_response_for_file(g_clip_s2c.data,
-                                                              g_clip_s2c.total_bytes);
+                        if (g_cfg->restrict_outbound_clipboard & CLIP_RESTRICT_FILE)
+                        {
+                            LOG(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG,
+                                "outbound clipboard(file) UTF8_STRING(%s) is restricted because of config",
+                                g_clip_s2c.data);
+                        }
+                        else
+                        {
+                            clipboard_send_data_response_for_file(g_clip_s2c.data,
+                                                                  g_clip_s2c.total_bytes);
+                        }
                     }
                     else
                     {
-                        clipboard_send_data_response_for_text(g_clip_s2c.data,
-                                                              g_clip_s2c.total_bytes);
+                        if (g_cfg->restrict_outbound_clipboard & CLIP_RESTRICT_TEXT)
+                        {
+                            LOG(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG,
+                                "outbound clipboard(text) UTF8_STRING(%s) is restricted because of config",
+                                g_clip_s2c.data);
+                        }
+                        else
+                        {
+                            clipboard_send_data_response_for_text(g_clip_s2c.data,
+                                                                  g_clip_s2c.total_bytes);
+                        }
                     }
+
                 }
             }
             else if (lxevent->target == XA_STRING)
@@ -2026,8 +2046,18 @@ clipboard_event_selection_notify(XEvent *xevent)
                     g_clip_s2c.data = (char *) g_malloc(g_clip_s2c.total_bytes + 1, 0);
                     g_memcpy(g_clip_s2c.data, data, g_clip_s2c.total_bytes);
                     g_clip_s2c.data[g_clip_s2c.total_bytes] = 0;
-                    clipboard_send_data_response_for_text(g_clip_s2c.data,
-                                                          g_clip_s2c.total_bytes);
+                    if (g_cfg->restrict_outbound_clipboard & CLIP_RESTRICT_TEXT)
+                    {
+                        LOG(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG,
+                            "outbound clipboard(text) XA_STRING(%s) is restricted because of config",
+                            g_clip_s2c.data);
+                    }
+                    else
+                    {
+                        clipboard_send_data_response_for_text(g_clip_s2c.data,
+                                                              g_clip_s2c.total_bytes);
+                    }
+
                 }
             }
             else if (lxevent->target == g_image_bmp_atom)
@@ -2037,11 +2067,21 @@ clipboard_event_selection_notify(XEvent *xevent)
                 if ((g_clip_s2c.incr_in_progress == 0) && (data_size > 14))
                 {
                     g_free(g_clip_s2c.data);
-                    g_clip_s2c.total_bytes = data_size;
-                    g_clip_s2c.data = (char *) g_malloc(data_size, 0);
-                    g_memcpy(g_clip_s2c.data, data, data_size);
-                    clipboard_send_data_response_for_image(g_clip_s2c.data + 14,
-                                                           data_size - 14);
+
+                    if (g_cfg->restrict_outbound_clipboard & CLIP_RESTRICT_IMAGE)
+                    {
+                        LOG(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG,
+                            "outbound clipboard(image) image/bmp is restricted because of config");
+                    }
+                    else
+                    {
+                        g_clip_s2c.total_bytes = data_size;
+                        g_clip_s2c.data = (char *) g_malloc(data_size, 0);
+                        g_memcpy(g_clip_s2c.data, data, data_size);
+                        clipboard_send_data_response_for_image(g_clip_s2c.data + 14,
+                                                               data_size - 14);
+                    }
+
                 }
             }
             else if (lxevent->target == g_file_atom1)
@@ -2055,8 +2095,19 @@ clipboard_event_selection_notify(XEvent *xevent)
                     g_clip_s2c.data = (char *) g_malloc(g_clip_s2c.total_bytes + 1, 0);
                     g_memcpy(g_clip_s2c.data, data, g_clip_s2c.total_bytes);
                     g_clip_s2c.data[g_clip_s2c.total_bytes] = 0;
-                    clipboard_send_data_response_for_file(g_clip_s2c.data,
-                                                          g_clip_s2c.total_bytes);
+                    if (g_cfg->restrict_outbound_clipboard & CLIP_RESTRICT_FILE)
+                    {
+                        LOG(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG,
+                            "outbound clipboard(file) text/uri-list(%s) is restricted because of config",
+                            g_clip_s2c.data);
+                    }
+                    else
+                    {
+                        clipboard_send_data_response_for_file(g_clip_s2c.data,
+                                                              g_clip_s2c.total_bytes);
+
+                    }
+
                 }
             }
             else if (lxevent->target == g_file_atom2)
@@ -2070,8 +2121,18 @@ clipboard_event_selection_notify(XEvent *xevent)
                     g_clip_s2c.data = (char *) g_malloc(g_clip_s2c.total_bytes + 1, 0);
                     g_memcpy(g_clip_s2c.data, data, g_clip_s2c.total_bytes);
                     g_clip_s2c.data[g_clip_s2c.total_bytes] = 0;
-                    clipboard_send_data_response_for_file(g_clip_s2c.data,
-                                                          g_clip_s2c.total_bytes);
+                    if (g_cfg->restrict_outbound_clipboard & CLIP_RESTRICT_FILE)
+                    {
+                        LOG(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG,
+                            "outbound clipboard(file) x-special/gnome-copied-files(%s) is restricted because of config",
+                            g_clip_s2c.data);
+                    }
+                    else
+                    {
+                        clipboard_send_data_response_for_file(g_clip_s2c.data,
+                                                              g_clip_s2c.total_bytes);
+                    }
+
                 }
             }
             else
@@ -2090,35 +2151,81 @@ clipboard_event_selection_notify(XEvent *xevent)
     if (got_file_atom != 0)
     {
         /* text/uri-list or x-special/gnome-copied-files */
-        g_clip_s2c.type = got_file_atom;
-        g_clip_s2c.xrdp_clip_type = XRDP_CB_FILE;
-        g_clip_s2c.converted = 0;
-        g_clip_s2c.clip_time = lxevent->time;
-        send_format_announce = 1;
+
+        if (g_cfg->restrict_outbound_clipboard & CLIP_RESTRICT_FILE)
+        {
+            LOG(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG,
+                "outbound clipboard(file) is restricted because of config");
+        }
+        else
+        {
+            g_clip_s2c.type = got_file_atom;
+            g_clip_s2c.xrdp_clip_type = XRDP_CB_FILE;
+            g_clip_s2c.converted = 0;
+            g_clip_s2c.clip_time = lxevent->time;
+            send_format_announce = 1;
+        }
+
     }
     else if (got_utf8)
     {
-        g_clip_s2c.type = g_utf8_atom;
-        g_clip_s2c.xrdp_clip_type = XRDP_CB_TEXT;
-        g_clip_s2c.converted = 0;
-        g_clip_s2c.clip_time = lxevent->time;
-        send_format_announce = 1;
+
+        if (g_cfg->restrict_outbound_clipboard & CLIP_RESTRICT_TEXT)
+        {
+            LOG(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG,
+                "outbound clipboard(text) is restricted because of config");
+        }
+        else
+        {
+            g_clip_s2c.type = g_utf8_atom;
+            g_clip_s2c.xrdp_clip_type = XRDP_CB_TEXT;
+            g_clip_s2c.converted = 0;
+            g_clip_s2c.clip_time = lxevent->time;
+            send_format_announce = 1;
+        }
+
     }
     else if (got_string)
     {
-        g_clip_s2c.type = XA_STRING;
-        g_clip_s2c.xrdp_clip_type = XRDP_CB_TEXT;
-        g_clip_s2c.converted = 0;
-        g_clip_s2c.clip_time = lxevent->time;
-        send_format_announce = 1;
+
+        /*
+         * In most cases, when copying text, TARGETS atom and UTF8_STRING atom exists,
+         * it means that this code block which checks STRING atom might not be never executed
+         * in recent platforms.
+         * Use echo foo | xclip -selection clipboard -noutf8 to reproduce it.
+         */
+        if (g_cfg->restrict_outbound_clipboard & CLIP_RESTRICT_TEXT)
+        {
+            LOG(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG,
+                "outbound clipboard(text) is restricted because of config");
+        }
+        else
+        {
+            g_clip_s2c.type = XA_STRING;
+            g_clip_s2c.xrdp_clip_type = XRDP_CB_TEXT;
+            g_clip_s2c.converted = 0;
+            g_clip_s2c.clip_time = lxevent->time;
+            send_format_announce = 1;
+        }
+
     }
     else if (got_bmp_image)
     {
-        g_clip_s2c.type = g_image_bmp_atom;
-        g_clip_s2c.xrdp_clip_type = XRDP_CB_BITMAP;
-        g_clip_s2c.converted = 0;
-        g_clip_s2c.clip_time = lxevent->time;
-        send_format_announce = 1;
+
+        if (g_cfg->restrict_outbound_clipboard & CLIP_RESTRICT_IMAGE)
+        {
+            LOG(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG,
+                "outbound clipboard(image) is restricted because of config");
+        }
+        else
+        {
+            g_clip_s2c.type = g_image_bmp_atom;
+            g_clip_s2c.xrdp_clip_type = XRDP_CB_BITMAP;
+            g_clip_s2c.converted = 0;
+            g_clip_s2c.clip_time = lxevent->time;
+            send_format_announce = 1;
+        }
+
     }
 
     if (send_format_announce)
@@ -2527,15 +2634,7 @@ clipboard_xevent(void *xevent)
     switch (lxevent->type)
     {
         case SelectionNotify:
-            if (g_cfg->restrict_outbound_clipboard == 0)
-            {
-                clipboard_event_selection_notify(lxevent);
-            }
-            else
-            {
-                LOG(LOG_LEVEL_INFO, "outbound clipboard is restricted because of config");
-                return 1;
-            }
+            clipboard_event_selection_notify(lxevent);
             break;
         case SelectionRequest:
             clipboard_event_selection_request(lxevent);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 1d6d80d14f5c02bb02288f8c1a7fc220f2391d7c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kentaro Hayashi <hayashi@clear-code.com>
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2021 14:45:54 +0900
Subject: Block inbound clipboard text/image/file respectively

Disable clipboard_event_selection_request call is overkill for
blocking text/image/file purpose.
For example, it breaks existing behavior (slow response from gedit,
gimp as a side effects)

Instead, in clipboard_event_selection_request, these media format will
be blocked respectively which depends on the following configurations
in sesman.ini [Security] section.

  * RestrictInboundClipboard=text
  * RestrictInboundClipboard=file
  * RestrictInboundClipboard=image

You can also set comma separated list.

  * RestrictInboundClipboard=text,file,image
---
 sesman/chansrv/clipboard.c | 148 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 118 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)

diff --git a/sesman/chansrv/clipboard.c b/sesman/chansrv/clipboard.c
index 5cbaf6f5..e44a2063 100644
--- a/sesman/chansrv/clipboard.c
+++ b/sesman/chansrv/clipboard.c
@@ -2350,19 +2350,43 @@ clipboard_event_selection_request(XEvent *xevent)
         {
             LOG_DEVEL(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, "clipboard_event_selection_request: "
                       "text requested when files available");
-            g_memcpy(&g_saved_selection_req_event, lxev,
-                     sizeof(g_saved_selection_req_event));
-            g_clip_c2s.type = lxev->target;
-            g_clip_c2s.xrdp_clip_type = XRDP_CB_FILE;
-            clipboard_send_data_request(g_file_format_id);
+
+            if (g_cfg->restrict_inbound_clipboard & CLIP_RESTRICT_FILE)
+            {
+                LOG(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG,
+                    "inbound clipboard %s is restricted because of config",
+                    lxev->target == XA_STRING ? "XA_STRING" : "UTF8_STRING");
+                clipboard_refuse_selection(lxev);
+            }
+            else
+            {
+                g_memcpy(&g_saved_selection_req_event, lxev,
+                         sizeof(g_saved_selection_req_event));
+                g_clip_c2s.type = lxev->target;
+                g_clip_c2s.xrdp_clip_type = XRDP_CB_FILE;
+                clipboard_send_data_request(g_file_format_id);
+            }
+
         }
         else
         {
-            g_memcpy(&g_saved_selection_req_event, lxev,
-                     sizeof(g_saved_selection_req_event));
-            g_clip_c2s.type = lxev->target;
-            g_clip_c2s.xrdp_clip_type = XRDP_CB_TEXT;
-            clipboard_send_data_request(CB_FORMAT_UNICODETEXT);
+
+            if (g_cfg->restrict_inbound_clipboard & CLIP_RESTRICT_TEXT)
+            {
+                LOG(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG,
+                    "inbound clipboard %s is restricted because of config",
+                    lxev->target == XA_STRING ? "XA_STRING" : "UTF8_STRING");
+                clipboard_refuse_selection(lxev);
+            }
+            else
+            {
+                g_memcpy(&g_saved_selection_req_event, lxev,
+                         sizeof(g_saved_selection_req_event));
+                g_clip_c2s.type = lxev->target;
+                g_clip_c2s.xrdp_clip_type = XRDP_CB_TEXT;
+                clipboard_send_data_request(CB_FORMAT_UNICODETEXT);
+            }
+
         }
         return 0;
     }
@@ -2372,15 +2396,37 @@ clipboard_event_selection_request(XEvent *xevent)
         if ((g_clip_c2s.type == lxev->target) && g_clip_c2s.converted)
         {
             LOG_DEVEL(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, "clipboard_event_selection_request: -------------------------------------------");
-            clipboard_provide_selection_c2s(lxev, lxev->target);
+
+            if (g_cfg->restrict_inbound_clipboard & CLIP_RESTRICT_IMAGE)
+            {
+                LOG(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG,
+                    "inbound clipboard image/bmp converted is restricted because of config");
+                clipboard_refuse_selection(lxev);
+            }
+            else
+            {
+                clipboard_provide_selection_c2s(lxev, lxev->target);
+            }
             return 0;
+
+        }
+
+        if (g_cfg->restrict_inbound_clipboard & CLIP_RESTRICT_IMAGE)
+        {
+            LOG(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG,
+                "inbound clipboard image/bmp is restricted because of config");
+            clipboard_refuse_selection(lxev);
+        }
+        else
+        {
+            g_memcpy(&g_saved_selection_req_event, lxev,
+                     sizeof(g_saved_selection_req_event));
+            g_clip_c2s.type = g_image_bmp_atom;
+            g_clip_c2s.xrdp_clip_type = XRDP_CB_BITMAP;
+            clipboard_send_data_request(CB_FORMAT_DIB);
         }
-        g_memcpy(&g_saved_selection_req_event, lxev,
-                 sizeof(g_saved_selection_req_event));
-        g_clip_c2s.type = g_image_bmp_atom;
-        g_clip_c2s.xrdp_clip_type = XRDP_CB_BITMAP;
-        clipboard_send_data_request(CB_FORMAT_DIB);
         return 0;
+
     }
     else if (lxev->target == g_file_atom1)
     {
@@ -2388,31 +2434,73 @@ clipboard_event_selection_request(XEvent *xevent)
         if ((g_clip_c2s.type == lxev->target) && g_clip_c2s.converted)
         {
             LOG_DEVEL(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, "clipboard_event_selection_request: -------------------------------------------");
-            clipboard_provide_selection_c2s(lxev, lxev->target);
+            if (g_cfg->restrict_inbound_clipboard & CLIP_RESTRICT_FILE)
+            {
+                LOG(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG,
+                    "inbound clipboard text/uri-list is restricted because of config");
+                clipboard_refuse_selection(lxev);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            else
+            {
+                clipboard_provide_selection_c2s(lxev, lxev->target);
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+        if (g_cfg->restrict_inbound_clipboard & CLIP_RESTRICT_FILE)
+        {
+            LOG(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG,
+                "inbound clipboard text/uri-list is restricted because of config");
+            clipboard_refuse_selection(lxev);
             return 0;
         }
-        g_memcpy(&g_saved_selection_req_event, lxev,
-                 sizeof(g_saved_selection_req_event));
-        g_clip_c2s.type = g_file_atom1;
-        g_clip_c2s.xrdp_clip_type = XRDP_CB_FILE;
-        clipboard_send_data_request(g_file_format_id);
-        return 0;
+        else
+        {
+            g_memcpy(&g_saved_selection_req_event, lxev,
+                     sizeof(g_saved_selection_req_event));
+            g_clip_c2s.type = g_file_atom1;
+            g_clip_c2s.xrdp_clip_type = XRDP_CB_FILE;
+            clipboard_send_data_request(g_file_format_id);
+            return 0;
+        }
+
     }
     else if (lxev->target == g_file_atom2)
     {
         LOG_DEVEL(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, "clipboard_event_selection_request: g_file_atom2");
+
         if ((g_clip_c2s.type == lxev->target) && g_clip_c2s.converted)
         {
             LOG_DEVEL(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, "clipboard_event_selection_request: -------------------------------------------");
-            clipboard_provide_selection_c2s(lxev, lxev->target);
+            if (g_cfg->restrict_inbound_clipboard & CLIP_RESTRICT_FILE)
+            {
+                LOG(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG,
+                    "inbound clipboard x-special/gnome-copied-files converted is restricted because of config");
+                clipboard_refuse_selection(lxev);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            else
+            {
+                clipboard_provide_selection_c2s(lxev, lxev->target);
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+        if (g_cfg->restrict_inbound_clipboard & CLIP_RESTRICT_FILE)
+        {
+            LOG(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG,
+                "inbound clipboard x-special/gnome-copied-files is restricted because of config");
+            clipboard_refuse_selection(lxev);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        else
+        {
+            g_memcpy(&g_saved_selection_req_event, lxev,
+                     sizeof(g_saved_selection_req_event));
+            g_clip_c2s.type = g_file_atom2;
+            g_clip_c2s.xrdp_clip_type = XRDP_CB_FILE;
+            clipboard_send_data_request(g_file_format_id);
             return 0;
         }
-        g_memcpy(&g_saved_selection_req_event, lxev,
-                 sizeof(g_saved_selection_req_event));
-        g_clip_c2s.type = g_file_atom2;
-        g_clip_c2s.xrdp_clip_type = XRDP_CB_FILE;
-        clipboard_send_data_request(g_file_format_id);
-        return 0;
     }
     else
     {
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 47bc56f5a4678e3f4a7dd83e5bd532cf8c496d66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kentaro Hayashi <hayashi@clear-code.com>
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2021 14:38:52 +0900
Subject: Add sesman.ini new text/file/image restriction settings

RestrictInboundClipboard is added.

Then, RestrictOutboundClipboard/RestrictInboundClipboard configuration
is extended to accept comma separated list.

  * RestrictOutboundClipboard=none
  * RestrictOutboundClipboard=text
  * RestrictOutboundClipboard=file
  * RestrictOutboundClipboard=image
  * RestrictOutboundClipboard=all
  * RestrictOutboundClipboard=text, image, file

For compatibility, the following configuration is also
accepted (alias)

  * RestrictOutboundClipboard=true
  * RestrictOutboundClipboard=false
  * RestrictOutboundClipboard=yes
---
 sesman/sesman.ini.in | 19 +++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/sesman/sesman.ini.in b/sesman/sesman.ini.in
index 7b8f0880..8c5f173f 100644
--- a/sesman/sesman.ini.in
+++ b/sesman/sesman.ini.in
@@ -19,9 +19,24 @@ TerminalServerAdmins=tsadmins
 ; When AlwaysGroupCheck=false access will be permitted
 ; if the group TerminalServerUsers is not defined.
 AlwaysGroupCheck=false
-; When RestrictOutboundClipboard=true clipboard from the
+; When RestrictOutboundClipboard=all clipboard from the
 ; server is not pushed to the client.
-RestrictOutboundClipboard=false
+; In addition, you can control text/file/image transfer restrictions
+; respectively. It also accepts comma separated list such as text,file,image.
+; To keep compatibility, some aliases are also available:
+;   true: an alias of all
+;   false: an alias of none
+;   yes: an alias of all
+RestrictOutboundClipboard=none
+; When RestrictInboundClipboard=all clipboard from the
+; client is not pushed to the server.
+; In addition, you can control text/file/image transfer restrictions
+; respectively. It also accepts comma separated list such as text,file,image.
+; To keep compatibility, some aliases are also available:
+;   true: an alias of all
+;   false: an alias of none
+;   yes: an alias of all
+RestrictInboundClipboard=none
 
 [Sessions]
 ;; X11DisplayOffset - x11 display number offset
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 8487c298ba06233bc749ab63f6a3ba80755e0ed7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kentaro Hayashi <hayashi@clear-code.com>
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2021 17:59:15 +0900
Subject: Update sesman.ini.5 explanation about
 RestrictOutboundClipboard,RestrictOutboundClipboard

RestrictOutboundClipboard,RestrictOutboundClipboard are extended to
accept text,file,image configuration value.
---
 docs/man/sesman.ini.5.in | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 55 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/docs/man/sesman.ini.5.in b/docs/man/sesman.ini.5.in
index 0f58c0ce..7291038f 100644
--- a/docs/man/sesman.ini.5.in
+++ b/docs/man/sesman.ini.5.in
@@ -221,10 +221,62 @@ login for all users is enabled.
 have session management rights.
 
 .TP
-\fBRestrictOutboundClipboard\fR=\fI[true|false]\fR
-If set to \fB1\fR, \fBtrue\fR or \fByes\fR, will restrict the clipboard
+\fBRestrictOutboundClipboard\fR=\fI[all|none|text|file|image]\fR
+If set to \fBall\fR, will restrict the clipboard
 outbound from the server, to prevent data copied inside the xrdp session
-to be be pasted in the client host. Default value is \fBfalse\fR.
+to be pasted in the client. Default value is \fBnone\fR.
+In addition, you can control text/file/image transfer restrictions
+respectively. It also accepts comma separated list such as text,file,image.
+.br
+
+.br
+\fBnone\fR - No restriction about copying inbound clipboard data.
+.br
+\fBall\fR - Restrict to copy inbound clipboard data.
+.br
+\fBtext\fR - Restrict to copy only inbound text clipboard data.
+.br
+\fBfile\fR - Restrict to copy only inbound file clipboard data.
+.br
+\fBimage\fR - Restrict to copy only inbound image clipboard data.
+.br
+
+To keep compatibility, the following aliases are also available.
+.br
+\fBtrue\fR - an alias of \fBall\fR.
+.br
+\fBfalse\fR - an alias of \fBnone\fR.
+.br
+\fByes\fR - an alias of \fBall\fR.
+
+.TP
+\fBRestrictInboundClipboard\fR=\fI[none|all|text|file|image]\fR
+If set to \fBall\fR, will restrict the clipboard
+inbound from the client, to prevent data copied inside the client
+to be pasted in the xrdp session. Default value is \fBnone\fR.
+In addition, you can control text/file/image transfer restrictions
+respectively. It also accepts comma separated list such as text,file,image.
+.br
+
+.br
+\fBnone\fR - No restriction about copying inbound clipboard data.
+.br
+\fBall\fR - Restrict to copy inbound clipboard data.
+.br
+\fBtext\fR - Restrict to copy only inbound text clipboard data.
+.br
+\fBfile\fR - Restrict to copy only inbound file clipboard data.
+.br
+\fBimage\fR - Restrict to copy only inbound image clipboard data.
+.br
+
+To keep compatibility, the following aliases are also available.
+.br
+\fBtrue\fR - an alias of \fBall\fR.
+.br
+\fBfalse\fR - an alias of \fBnone\fR.
+.br
+\fByes\fR - an alias of \fBall\fR.
 
 .TP
 \fBAlwaysGroupCheck\fR=\fI[true|false]\fR
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From cffce1f8561d9855f031610b1db5040652155d59 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: matt335672 <30179339+matt335672@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Jan 2022 11:11:03 +0000
Subject: Only advertise X11 clip formats we can supply

---
 sesman/chansrv/clipboard.c | 17 ++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/sesman/chansrv/clipboard.c b/sesman/chansrv/clipboard.c
index e44a2063..e2a716ef 100644
--- a/sesman/chansrv/clipboard.c
+++ b/sesman/chansrv/clipboard.c
@@ -2294,16 +2294,23 @@ clipboard_event_selection_request(XEvent *xevent)
         atom_buf[0] = g_targets_atom;
         atom_buf[1] = g_timestamp_atom;
         atom_buf[2] = g_multiple_atom;
-        atom_buf[3] = XA_STRING;
-        atom_buf[4] = g_utf8_atom;
-        atom_count = 5;
-        if (clipboard_find_format_id(CB_FORMAT_DIB) >= 0)
+        atom_count = 3;
+        if ((g_cfg->restrict_inbound_clipboard & CLIP_RESTRICT_TEXT) == 0)
+        {
+            atom_buf[atom_count] = XA_STRING;
+            atom_count++;
+            atom_buf[atom_count] = g_utf8_atom;
+            atom_count++;
+        }
+        if (clipboard_find_format_id(CB_FORMAT_DIB) >= 0 &&
+                (g_cfg->restrict_inbound_clipboard & CLIP_RESTRICT_IMAGE) == 0)
         {
             LOG_DEVEL(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, "  reporting image/bmp");
             atom_buf[atom_count] = g_image_bmp_atom;
             atom_count++;
         }
-        if (clipboard_find_format_id(g_file_format_id) >= 0)
+        if (clipboard_find_format_id(g_file_format_id) >= 0 &&
+                (g_cfg->restrict_inbound_clipboard & CLIP_RESTRICT_FILE) == 0)
         {
             LOG_DEVEL(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, "  reporting text/uri-list");
             atom_buf[atom_count] = g_file_atom1;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 307bfc1f4a6c673f297d18e36b567d55add8dff0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: matt335672 <30179339+matt335672@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Jan 2022 12:40:22 +0000
Subject: Fix typo in README.md

---
 README.md | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 1baa2a76..624f3840 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ you would need **openssl-devel**, **pam-devel**, **libX11-devel**,
 be needed depending on your configuration.
 
 To compile xrdp from a checked out git repository, you would additionally
-need **autoconf**, **automake**, **libtool** and **pkgconfig**.
+need **autoconf**, **automake**, **libtool** and **pkg-config**.
 
 ### Get the source and build it
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From bf4c5f263164c15287d193a147dbd0f0ea5b5ad1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: matt335672 <30179339+matt335672@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Mon, 17 Jan 2022 10:54:54 +0000
Subject: README : Make latest version dynamic

---
 README.md | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 624f3840..e2d05699 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 [![Gitter](https://badges.gitter.im/Join%20Chat.svg)](https://gitter.im/neutrinolabs/xrdp-questions)
 ![Apache-License](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-Apache%202.0-blue.svg)
 
-*Current Version:* 0.9.17
+[![Latest Version](https://img.shields.io/github/v/release/neutrinolabs/xrdp.svg?label=Latest%20Version)](https://github.com/neutrinolabs/xrdp/releases)
 
 # xrdp - an open source RDP server
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 3146e624c40143ba7f442c7241162505ba08ce03 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: matt335672 <30179339+matt335672@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Wed, 19 Jan 2022 11:08:13 +0000
Subject: Fix problems with check 0.15.2 (F36)

---
 tests/common/test_os_calls.c            | 3 ++-
 tests/common/test_string_calls.c        | 3 ++-
 tests/libxrdp/test_monitor_processing.c | 3 ++-
 tests/xrdp/test_bitmap_load.c           | 3 ++-
 tests/xrdp/test_xrdp_main.c             | 3 ++-
 5 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tests/common/test_os_calls.c b/tests/common/test_os_calls.c
index 1c518e1d..ac785715 100644
--- a/tests/common/test_os_calls.c
+++ b/tests/common/test_os_calls.c
@@ -4,9 +4,10 @@
 #endif
 
 #include <stdlib.h>
-#include "test_common.h"
 #include "os_calls.h"
 
+#include "test_common.h"
+
 #ifndef TOP_SRCDIR
 #define TOP_SRCDIR "."
 #endif
diff --git a/tests/common/test_string_calls.c b/tests/common/test_string_calls.c
index 58dcaea0..1380357c 100644
--- a/tests/common/test_string_calls.c
+++ b/tests/common/test_string_calls.c
@@ -3,9 +3,10 @@
 #include "config_ac.h"
 #endif
 
-#include "test_common.h"
 #include "string_calls.h"
 
+#include "test_common.h"
+
 #define RESULT_LEN 1024
 
 START_TEST(test_strnjoin__when_src_is_null__returns_empty_string)
diff --git a/tests/libxrdp/test_monitor_processing.c b/tests/libxrdp/test_monitor_processing.c
index 969da780..951ffe68 100644
--- a/tests/libxrdp/test_monitor_processing.c
+++ b/tests/libxrdp/test_monitor_processing.c
@@ -2,10 +2,11 @@
 #include "config_ac.h"
 #endif
 
-#include "test_libxrdp.h"
 #include "libxrdp.h"
 #include "os_calls.h"
 
+#include "test_libxrdp.h"
+
 struct xrdp_sec *sec_layer;
 struct xrdp_rdp *rdp_layer;
 struct xrdp_session *session;
diff --git a/tests/xrdp/test_bitmap_load.c b/tests/xrdp/test_bitmap_load.c
index 42b5a325..5c25504e 100644
--- a/tests/xrdp/test_bitmap_load.c
+++ b/tests/xrdp/test_bitmap_load.c
@@ -2,9 +2,10 @@
 #include "config_ac.h"
 #endif
 
-#include "test_xrdp.h"
 #include "xrdp.h"
 
+#include "test_xrdp.h"
+
 /* Where the image files are located */
 #ifndef IMAGEDIR
 #define IMAGEDIR "."
diff --git a/tests/xrdp/test_xrdp_main.c b/tests/xrdp/test_xrdp_main.c
index eb118a1e..d56dcb37 100644
--- a/tests/xrdp/test_xrdp_main.c
+++ b/tests/xrdp/test_xrdp_main.c
@@ -33,9 +33,10 @@
 
 #include "log.h"
 #include "os_calls.h"
-#include "test_xrdp.h"
 #include <stdlib.h>
 
+#include "test_xrdp.h"
+
 int main (void)
 {
     int number_failed;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From d853228c1927d48fb1ec3181b50a6a481448a049 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: matt335672 <30179339+matt335672@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2022 16:30:52 +0000
Subject: const fixes for SSL calls

---
 common/ssl_calls.c | 4 ++--
 common/ssl_calls.h | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/common/ssl_calls.c b/common/ssl_calls.c
index b305815f..30640c51 100644
--- a/common/ssl_calls.c
+++ b/common/ssl_calls.c
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ ssl_rc4_info_delete(void *rc4_info)
 
 /*****************************************************************************/
 void
-ssl_rc4_set_key(void *rc4_info, char *key, int len)
+ssl_rc4_set_key(void *rc4_info, const char *key, int len)
 {
     RC4_set_key((RC4_KEY *)rc4_info, len, (tui8 *)key);
 }
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ ssl_md5_clear(void *md5_info)
 
 /*****************************************************************************/
 void
-ssl_md5_transform(void *md5_info, char *data, int len)
+ssl_md5_transform(void *md5_info, const char *data, int len)
 {
     MD5_Update((MD5_CTX *)md5_info, data, len);
 }
diff --git a/common/ssl_calls.h b/common/ssl_calls.h
index 121cb390..78edd946 100644
--- a/common/ssl_calls.h
+++ b/common/ssl_calls.h
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ ssl_rc4_info_create(void);
 void
 ssl_rc4_info_delete(void *rc4_info);
 void
-ssl_rc4_set_key(void *rc4_info, char *key, int len);
+ssl_rc4_set_key(void *rc4_info, const char *key, int len);
 void
 ssl_rc4_crypt(void *rc4_info, char *data, int len);
 void *
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ ssl_md5_info_delete(void *md5_info);
 void
 ssl_md5_clear(void *md5_info);
 void
-ssl_md5_transform(void *md5_info, char *data, int len);
+ssl_md5_transform(void *md5_info, const char *data, int len);
 void
 ssl_md5_complete(void *md5_info, char *data);
 void *
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From d02059d967f0bc1deaf915d3971d4aa8c41dbb4e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: matt335672 <30179339+matt335672@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Jan 2022 16:43:00 +0000
Subject: Add missing ssl_sha1_clear()/ssl_md5_clear() calls

---
 sesman/env.c       | 1 +
 vnc/vnc.c          | 1 +
 xrdp/xrdp_bitmap.c | 1 +
 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/sesman/env.c b/sesman/env.c
index cdac0f17..b8b2c030 100644
--- a/sesman/env.c
+++ b/sesman/env.c
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ env_check_password_file(const char *filename, const char *passwd)
     /* create password hash from password */
     passwd_bytes = g_strlen(passwd);
     sha1 = ssl_sha1_info_create();
+    ssl_sha1_clear(sha1);
     ssl_sha1_transform(sha1, "xrdp_vnc", 8);
     ssl_sha1_transform(sha1, passwd, passwd_bytes);
     ssl_sha1_transform(sha1, passwd, passwd_bytes);
diff --git a/vnc/vnc.c b/vnc/vnc.c
index 81e5ecd0..74861329 100644
--- a/vnc/vnc.c
+++ b/vnc/vnc.c
@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ rfbHashEncryptBytes(char *bytes, const char *passwd)
     /* create password hash from password */
     passwd_bytes = g_strlen(passwd);
     sha1 = ssl_sha1_info_create();
+    ssl_sha1_clear(sha1);
     ssl_sha1_transform(sha1, "xrdp_vnc", 8);
     ssl_sha1_transform(sha1, passwd, passwd_bytes);
     ssl_sha1_transform(sha1, passwd, passwd_bytes);
diff --git a/xrdp/xrdp_bitmap.c b/xrdp/xrdp_bitmap.c
index efab0621..72aafff2 100644
--- a/xrdp/xrdp_bitmap.c
+++ b/xrdp/xrdp_bitmap.c
@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ xrdp_bitmap_hash_crc(struct xrdp_bitmap *self)
         return 1;
     }
     hash = ssl_md5_info_create();
+    ssl_md5_clear(hash);
     ssl_md5_transform(hash, self->data, bytes);
     ssl_md5_complete(hash, hash_data);
     ssl_md5_info_delete(hash);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From fde161bac3eebc73b2e7c7bba4ab9381ef5327b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: matt335672 <30179339+matt335672@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Jan 2022 16:44:49 +0000
Subject: Add unit tests for SSL calls

---
 tests/common/Makefile.am        |   3 +-
 tests/common/test_common.h      |   1 +
 tests/common/test_common_main.c |  18 +-
 tests/common/test_ssl_calls.c   | 417 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 437 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 tests/common/test_ssl_calls.c

diff --git a/tests/common/Makefile.am b/tests/common/Makefile.am
index 5a5ca8d5..88548b71 100644
--- a/tests/common/Makefile.am
+++ b/tests/common/Makefile.am
@@ -13,7 +13,8 @@ test_common_SOURCES = \
     test_common.h \
     test_common_main.c \
     test_string_calls.c \
-    test_os_calls.c
+    test_os_calls.c \
+    test_ssl_calls.c
 
 test_common_CFLAGS = \
     @CHECK_CFLAGS@ \
diff --git a/tests/common/test_common.h b/tests/common/test_common.h
index b9db8373..3493c3bf 100644
--- a/tests/common/test_common.h
+++ b/tests/common/test_common.h
@@ -6,5 +6,6 @@
 
 Suite *make_suite_test_string(void);
 Suite *make_suite_test_os_calls(void);
+Suite *make_suite_test_ssl_calls(void);
 
 #endif /* TEST_COMMON_H */
diff --git a/tests/common/test_common_main.c b/tests/common/test_common_main.c
index 694a827a..2674bea0 100644
--- a/tests/common/test_common_main.c
+++ b/tests/common/test_common_main.c
@@ -4,7 +4,10 @@
 #endif
 
 #include <stdlib.h>
-#include <check.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "ssl_calls.h"
+
 #include "test_common.h"
 
 int main (void)
@@ -14,11 +17,24 @@ int main (void)
 
     sr = srunner_create (make_suite_test_string());
     srunner_add_suite(sr, make_suite_test_os_calls());
+    srunner_add_suite(sr, make_suite_test_ssl_calls());
     //   srunner_add_suite(sr, make_list_suite());
 
     srunner_set_tap(sr, "-");
+    /*
+     * Set up console logging */
+    struct log_config *lc = log_config_init_for_console(LOG_LEVEL_INFO, NULL);
+    log_start_from_param(lc);
+    log_config_free(lc);
+
+    /* Initialise the ssl module */
+    ssl_init();
+
     srunner_run_all (sr, CK_ENV);
     number_failed = srunner_ntests_failed(sr);
     srunner_free(sr);
+
+    ssl_finish();
+    log_end();
     return (number_failed == 0) ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE;
 }
diff --git a/tests/common/test_ssl_calls.c b/tests/common/test_ssl_calls.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c5198fd9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/common/test_ssl_calls.c
@@ -0,0 +1,417 @@
+
+#if defined(HAVE_CONFIG_H)
+#include "config_ac.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "os_calls.h"
+#include "string_calls.h"
+#include "ssl_calls.h"
+
+#include "test_common.h"
+
+static
+char *bin_to_hex(const char *input, int length)
+{
+    int i;
+    char *result = (char *)g_malloc(length * 2 + 1, 0);
+    if (result != NULL)
+    {
+        char *p = result;
+        const char *hexdigit = "0123456789abcdef";
+        for (i = 0 ; i < length ; ++i)
+        {
+            int c = input[i];
+            if (c < 0)
+            {
+                c += 256;
+            }
+            *p++ = hexdigit[ c / 16];
+            *p++ = hexdigit[ c % 16];
+        }
+        *p = '\0';
+    }
+
+    return result;
+}
+
+
+START_TEST(test_rc4_enc_ok)
+{
+    const char *key = "16_byte_key-----";
+    char text[] = "xrdp-test-suite-rc4-encryption";
+    char *result;
+
+    void *info = ssl_rc4_info_create();
+    ssl_rc4_set_key(info, key, g_strlen(key));
+    ssl_rc4_crypt(info, text, sizeof(text) - 1);
+    ssl_rc4_info_delete(info);
+    result = bin_to_hex(text, sizeof(text) - 1);
+    ck_assert(result != NULL);
+    /* Result should be the same as
+     * echo -n '<text>' | \
+     *     openssl rc4 -K <hex-key> -e [-provider legacy] | \
+     *     xxd -g0
+     *
+     * where <hex-key> is the string above in hexadecimal */
+    ck_assert_str_eq(result, "c080f175b2d85802dbf1042f07180ddc4be1d9bd4a44158f0aebf11c961b");
+    g_free(result);
+}
+END_TEST
+
+START_TEST(test_rc4_enc_tv0_ok)
+{
+    /*
+     * This is one of the 5 original RC4 test vectors posted in response to
+     * the 'RC4 Algorithm revealed' sci.crypt usenet posting */
+    unsigned char key[] = {0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef};
+    unsigned char text[] = {0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef};
+    const char *expected = "75b7878099e0c596";
+    char *result;
+
+    void *info = ssl_rc4_info_create();
+    ssl_rc4_set_key(info, (char *)key, sizeof(key));
+    ssl_rc4_crypt(info, (char *)text, sizeof(text));
+    ssl_rc4_info_delete(info);
+
+    result = bin_to_hex((char *)text, sizeof(text));
+    ck_assert(result != NULL);
+    ck_assert_str_eq(result, expected);
+    g_free(result);
+}
+END_TEST
+
+START_TEST(test_rc4_enc_tv1_ok)
+{
+    /*
+     * This is one of the 5 original RC4 test vectors posted in response to
+     * the 'RC4 Algorithm revealed' sci.crypt usenet posting */
+    unsigned char key[] = {0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef};
+    unsigned char text[] = {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00};
+    const char *expected = "7494c2e7104b0879";
+    char *result;
+
+    void *info = ssl_rc4_info_create();
+    ssl_rc4_set_key(info, (char *)key, sizeof(key));
+    ssl_rc4_crypt(info, (char *)text, sizeof(text));
+    ssl_rc4_info_delete(info);
+
+    result = bin_to_hex((char *)text, sizeof(text));
+    ck_assert(result != NULL);
+    ck_assert_str_eq(result, expected);
+    g_free(result);
+}
+END_TEST
+
+START_TEST(test_rc4_enc_tv2_ok)
+{
+    /*
+     * This is one of the 5 original RC4 test vectors posted in response to
+     * the 'RC4 Algorithm revealed' sci.crypt usenet posting */
+    unsigned char key[] = {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00};
+    unsigned char text[] = {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00};
+    const char *expected = "de188941a3375d3a";
+    char *result;
+
+    void *info = ssl_rc4_info_create();
+    ssl_rc4_set_key(info, (char *)key, sizeof(key));
+    ssl_rc4_crypt(info, (char *)text, sizeof(text));
+    ssl_rc4_info_delete(info);
+
+    result = bin_to_hex((char *)text, sizeof(text));
+    ck_assert(result != NULL);
+    ck_assert_str_eq(result, expected);
+    g_free(result);
+}
+END_TEST
+
+START_TEST(test_rc4_enc_tv3_ok)
+{
+    /*
+     * This is one of the 5 original RC4 test vectors posted in response to
+     * the 'RC4 Algorithm revealed' sci.crypt usenet posting */
+    unsigned char key[] = {0xef, 0x01, 0x23, 0x45};
+    unsigned char text[] = {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00};
+    const char *expected = "d6a141a7ec3c38dfbd61";
+    char *result;
+
+    void *info = ssl_rc4_info_create();
+    ssl_rc4_set_key(info, (char *)key, sizeof(key));
+    ssl_rc4_crypt(info, (char *)text, sizeof(text));
+    ssl_rc4_info_delete(info);
+
+    result = bin_to_hex((char *)text, sizeof(text));
+    ck_assert(result != NULL);
+    ck_assert_str_eq(result, expected);
+    g_free(result);
+}
+END_TEST
+
+START_TEST(test_rc4_enc_tv4_ok)
+{
+    /*
+     * This is one of the 5 original RC4 test vectors posted in response to
+     * the 'RC4 Algorithm revealed' sci.crypt usenet posting */
+    unsigned char key[] = {0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef};
+    unsigned char text[] =
+    {
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+        0x01, 0x01
+    };
+    const char *expected =
+        "7595c3e6114a09780c4ad452338e1ffd9a1be9498f813d76533449b6778dca"
+        "d8c78a8d2ba9ac66085d0e53d59c26c2d1c490c1ebbe0ce66d1b6b1b13b6"
+        "b919b847c25a91447a95e75e4ef16779cde8bf0a95850e32af9689444fd3"
+        "77108f98fdcbd4e726567500990bcc7e0ca3c4aaa304a387d20f3b8fbbcd"
+        "42a1bd311d7a4303dda5ab078896ae80c18b0af66dff319616eb784e495a"
+        "d2ce90d7f772a81747b65f62093b1e0db9e5ba532fafec47508323e67132"
+        "7df9444432cb7367cec82f5d44c0d00b67d650a075cd4b70dedd77eb9b10"
+        "231b6b5b741347396d62897421d43df9b42e446e358e9c11a9b2184ecbef"
+        "0cd8e7a877ef968f1390ec9b3d35a5585cb009290e2fcde7b5ec66d9084b"
+        "e44055a619d9dd7fc3166f9487f7cb272912426445998514c15d53a18c86"
+        "4ce3a2b7555793988126520eacf2e3066e230c91bee4dd5304f5fd0405b3"
+        "5bd99c73135d3d9bc335ee049ef69b3867bf2d7bd1eaa595d8bfc0066ff8"
+        "d31509eb0c6caa006c807a623ef84c3d33c195d23ee320c40de0558157c8"
+        "22d4b8c569d849aed59d4e0fd7f379586b4b7ff684ed6a189f7486d49b9c"
+        "4bad9ba24b96abf924372c8a8fffb10d55354900a77a3db5f205e1b99fcd"
+        "8660863a159ad4abe40fa48934163ddde542a6585540fd683cbfd8c00f12"
+        "129a284deacc4cdefe58be7137541c047126c8d49e2755ab181ab7e940b0c0";
+
+    char *result;
+
+    void *info = ssl_rc4_info_create();
+    ssl_rc4_set_key(info, (char *)key, sizeof(key));
+    ssl_rc4_crypt(info, (char *)text, sizeof(text));
+    ssl_rc4_info_delete(info);
+
+    result = bin_to_hex((char *)text, sizeof(text));
+    ck_assert(result != NULL);
+    ck_assert_str_eq(result, expected);
+    g_free(result);
+}
+END_TEST
+
+START_TEST(test_sha1_hash_ok)
+{
+    const char *hash_string = "xrdp-test-suite-sha1-hash";
+    char digest[20];
+    char *result1;
+    char *result2;
+
+    void *info = ssl_sha1_info_create();
+    ssl_sha1_clear(info);
+    ssl_sha1_transform(info, hash_string, g_strlen(hash_string));
+    ssl_sha1_complete(info, digest);
+    result1 = bin_to_hex(digest, sizeof(digest));
+    ck_assert(result1 != NULL);
+    /* Check result with echo -n '<hash_string>' | sha1sum */
+    ck_assert_str_eq(result1, "3ea0ae84e97e6262c7cfe79ccd7ad2094c06885d");
+
+    /* Check a clear has the desired effect */
+    ssl_sha1_clear(info);
+    ssl_sha1_transform(info, hash_string, g_strlen(hash_string));
+    ssl_sha1_complete(info, digest);
+    result2 = bin_to_hex(digest, sizeof(digest));
+    ck_assert(result2 != NULL);
+    ck_assert_str_eq(result1, result2);
+
+    ssl_sha1_info_delete(info);
+    g_free(result1);
+    g_free(result2);
+}
+END_TEST
+
+START_TEST(test_md5_hash_ok)
+{
+    const char *hash_string = "xrdp-test-suite-md5-hash";
+    char digest[16];
+    char *result1;
+    char *result2;
+
+    void *info = ssl_md5_info_create();
+
+    ssl_md5_clear(info);
+    ssl_md5_transform(info, hash_string, g_strlen(hash_string));
+    ssl_md5_complete(info, digest);
+    result1 = bin_to_hex(digest, sizeof(digest));
+    ck_assert(result1 != NULL);
+    /* Check result with echo -n '<hash_string>' | md5sum */
+    ck_assert_str_eq(result1, "ddc599dc7ec62b8f78760b071704c007");
+
+    /* Check a clear has the desired effect */
+    ssl_md5_clear(info);
+    ssl_md5_transform(info, hash_string, g_strlen(hash_string));
+    ssl_md5_complete(info, digest);
+    result2 = bin_to_hex(digest, sizeof(digest));
+    ck_assert(result2 != NULL);
+    ck_assert_str_eq(result1, result2);
+
+    ssl_md5_info_delete(info);
+    g_free(result1);
+    g_free(result2);
+}
+END_TEST
+
+START_TEST(test_des3_enc_ok)
+{
+    const char *key = "24_byte_key-------------";
+    char plaintext[] = "xrdp-test-suite-des3-encryption-must-be-multiple-of-8-chars-long--------";
+    char ciphertext[sizeof(plaintext) - 1]; /* No terminator needed */
+    char plaintext2[sizeof(plaintext)];
+
+    char *result;
+
+    void *info = ssl_des3_encrypt_info_create(key, 0);
+    ssl_des3_encrypt(info, sizeof(plaintext) - 1, plaintext, ciphertext);
+    ssl_des3_info_delete(info);
+    result = bin_to_hex(ciphertext, sizeof(ciphertext));
+    ck_assert(result != NULL);
+    /* Result should be the same as
+     * echo -n '<text>' | \
+     *     openssl des3 -iv 0000000000000000 -K <hex-key> -e -nopad | \
+     *     od -t x1
+     *
+     * where <hex-key> is the string above in hexadecimal */
+    ck_assert_str_eq(result,
+                     "856d70861827365e188781616e4f9dcc3009b2c5dc7785edcbc05fa825a4ea5e10b23735c0e971ca20f895f455b8845418963af6dd8e649719790eed6cbcee0fb97b743c60e32e8b");
+    g_free(result);
+
+    /* Let's go back again */
+    info = ssl_des3_decrypt_info_create(key, 0);
+    ssl_des3_decrypt(info, sizeof(ciphertext), ciphertext, plaintext2);
+    ssl_des3_info_delete(info);
+    plaintext2[sizeof(plaintext2) - 1] = '\0';
+
+    ck_assert_str_eq(plaintext, plaintext2);
+}
+END_TEST
+
+START_TEST(test_hmac_sha1_dgst_ok)
+{
+    const char *key = "20_byte_key---------";
+    const char *hash_string = "xrdp-test-suite-hmac-sha1-dgst";
+    char hmac[20];
+
+    char *result;
+
+    void *info = ssl_hmac_info_create();
+    ssl_hmac_sha1_init(info, key, g_strlen(key));
+    ssl_hmac_transform(info, hash_string, g_strlen(hash_string));
+    ssl_hmac_complete(info, hmac, sizeof(hmac));
+    ssl_hmac_info_delete(info);
+    result = bin_to_hex(hmac, sizeof(hmac));
+    ck_assert(result != NULL);
+    /* Result should be the same as
+     * echo -n '<text>' | openssl dgst -sha1 -hmac '<key>'
+     *
+     * or:-
+     *
+     * echo -n '<text>' | openssl mac -digest sha1 -macopt key:'<key>' hmac
+     */
+    ck_assert_str_eq(result, "af8c04e609e9f3cba53ad7815b60160dc69a9936");
+    g_free(result);
+
+}
+END_TEST
+
+START_TEST(test_gen_key_xrdp1)
+{
+#define RSA_TEST_BITS 2048
+    char modulus[RSA_TEST_BITS / 8] = {0};
+    char private_key[RSA_TEST_BITS / 8] = {0};
+    unsigned char exponent[4] =
+    {
+        0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00 /* 65537 in little-endian format */
+    };
+
+    /*
+     * We can't do much here because of the nature of the call, but we can
+     * at least check it completes without error */
+    int error;
+    error = ssl_gen_key_xrdp1(RSA_TEST_BITS,
+                              (const char *)exponent, sizeof(exponent),
+                              modulus, sizeof(modulus),
+                              private_key, sizeof(private_key));
+    ck_assert(error == 0);
+
+    /* Both the modulus and the privatekey should be odd */
+    ck_assert((modulus[0] & 1) == 1);
+    ck_assert((private_key[0] & 1) == 1);
+#undef RSA_TEST_BITS
+}
+END_TEST
+
+/******************************************************************************/
+Suite *
+make_suite_test_ssl_calls(void)
+{
+    Suite *s;
+    TCase *tc_ssl_calls;
+
+    s = suite_create("SSL-Calls");
+
+    tc_ssl_calls = tcase_create("ssl_calls");
+    suite_add_tcase(s, tc_ssl_calls);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_ssl_calls, test_rc4_enc_ok);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_ssl_calls, test_rc4_enc_tv0_ok);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_ssl_calls, test_rc4_enc_tv1_ok);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_ssl_calls, test_rc4_enc_tv2_ok);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_ssl_calls, test_rc4_enc_tv3_ok);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_ssl_calls, test_rc4_enc_tv4_ok);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_ssl_calls, test_sha1_hash_ok);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_ssl_calls, test_md5_hash_ok);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_ssl_calls, test_des3_enc_ok);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_ssl_calls, test_hmac_sha1_dgst_ok);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_ssl_calls, test_gen_key_xrdp1);
+
+    return s;
+}
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 6cebade78e15ac5fdb5c807220291ef19ed41a5b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: matt335672 <30179339+matt335672@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Jan 2022 16:45:25 +0000
Subject: OpenSSL 3.x compatibility

---
 common/ssl_calls.c | 406 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 370 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)

diff --git a/common/ssl_calls.c b/common/ssl_calls.c
index 30640c51..792a9130 100644
--- a/common/ssl_calls.c
+++ b/common/ssl_calls.c
@@ -44,6 +44,16 @@
 
 #define SSL_WANT_READ_WRITE_TIMEOUT 100
 
+/*
+ * Globals used by openssl 3 and later */
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
+static EVP_MD *g_md_md5;    /* MD5 message digest */
+static EVP_MD *g_md_sha1;   /* SHA1 message digest */
+static EVP_CIPHER *g_cipher_des_ede3_cbc; /* DES3 CBC cipher */
+static EVP_MAC *g_mac_hmac; /* HMAC MAC */
+#endif
+
+
 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
 static inline HMAC_CTX *
 HMAC_CTX_new(void)
@@ -106,12 +116,41 @@ DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g)
 #endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L */
 
 
+
+/*****************************************************************************/
+static void
+dump_error_stack(const char *prefix)
+{
+    /* Dump the error stack from the SSL library */
+    unsigned long code;
+    char buff[256];
+    while ((code = ERR_get_error()) != 0L)
+    {
+        ERR_error_string_n(code, buff, sizeof(buff));
+        LOG(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "%s: %s", prefix, buff);
+    }
+}
+
+/*****************************************************************************/
+/* As above, but used for TLS connection errors where only the first
+   error is logged */
+static void
+dump_ssl_error_stack(struct ssl_tls *self)
+{
+    if (!self->error_logged)
+    {
+        dump_error_stack("SSL");
+        self->error_logged = 1;
+    }
+}
+
 /*****************************************************************************/
 int
 ssl_init(void)
 {
     SSL_load_error_strings();
     SSL_library_init();
+
     return 0;
 }
 
@@ -119,16 +158,44 @@ ssl_init(void)
 int
 ssl_finish(void)
 {
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
+    /* De-allocate any allocated globals
+     * For OpenSSL 3, these can all safely be passed a NULL pointer */
+    EVP_MD_free(g_md_md5);
+    EVP_MD_free(g_md_sha1);
+    EVP_CIPHER_free(g_cipher_des_ede3_cbc);
+    EVP_MAC_free(g_mac_hmac);
+#endif
     return 0;
 }
 
-/* rc4 stuff */
+/* rc4 stuff
+ *
+ * For OpenSSL 3.0, the rc4 encryption algorithm is only provided by the
+ * legacy provider (see crypto(7)). Since RC4 is so simple, we can implement
+ * it directly rather than having to load the legacy provider.  This will
+ * avoids problems if running on a system where openssl has been built
+ * without the legacy provider */
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
+struct rc4_data
+{
+    /* See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RC4 */
+    unsigned char S[256];
+    int i;
+    int j;
+};
+#endif
 
 /*****************************************************************************/
 void *
 ssl_rc4_info_create(void)
 {
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
     return g_malloc(sizeof(RC4_KEY), 1);
+#else
+    return g_malloc(sizeof(struct rc4_data), 1);
+#endif
 }
 
 /*****************************************************************************/
@@ -142,14 +209,75 @@ ssl_rc4_info_delete(void *rc4_info)
 void
 ssl_rc4_set_key(void *rc4_info, const char *key, int len)
 {
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
     RC4_set_key((RC4_KEY *)rc4_info, len, (tui8 *)key);
+#else
+    unsigned char *S = ((struct rc4_data *)rc4_info)->S;
+    int i;
+    int j = 0;
+    unsigned char t;
+    for (i = 0 ; i < 256; ++i)
+    {
+        S[i] = i;
+    }
+    for (i = 0 ; i < 256; ++i)
+    {
+        j = (j + S[i] + key[i % len]) & 0xff;
+        t = S[i];
+        S[i] = S[j];
+        S[j] = t;
+    }
+    ((struct rc4_data *)rc4_info)->i = 0;
+    ((struct rc4_data *)rc4_info)->j = 0;
+#endif
 }
 
 /*****************************************************************************/
 void
 ssl_rc4_crypt(void *rc4_info, char *data, int len)
 {
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
     RC4((RC4_KEY *)rc4_info, len, (tui8 *)data, (tui8 *)data);
+#else
+    unsigned char *S = ((struct rc4_data *)rc4_info)->S;
+    int i = ((struct rc4_data *)rc4_info)->i;
+    int j = ((struct rc4_data *)rc4_info)->j;
+    unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)data;
+    unsigned char t;
+    unsigned char k;
+
+    /*
+     * Do some loop-unrolling for performance. Here are the steps
+     * for each byte */
+#define RC4_ROUND \
+    i = (i + 1) & 0xff; \
+    j = (j + S[i]) & 0xff; \
+    t = S[i]; \
+    S[i] = S[j]; \
+    S[j] = t; \
+    k = S[(S[i] + S[j]) & 0xff]; \
+    *p++ ^= k
+
+    while (len >= 8)
+    {
+        RC4_ROUND;
+        RC4_ROUND;
+        RC4_ROUND;
+        RC4_ROUND;
+        RC4_ROUND;
+        RC4_ROUND;
+        RC4_ROUND;
+        RC4_ROUND;
+        len -= 8;
+    }
+    while (len-- > 0)
+    {
+        RC4_ROUND;
+    }
+
+    ((struct rc4_data *)rc4_info)->i = i;
+    ((struct rc4_data *)rc4_info)->j = j;
+#endif
 }
 
 /* sha1 stuff */
@@ -158,35 +286,78 @@ ssl_rc4_crypt(void *rc4_info, char *data, int len)
 void *
 ssl_sha1_info_create(void)
 {
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
     return g_malloc(sizeof(SHA_CTX), 1);
+#else
+    /*
+     * If we can't get the digest loaded, there's a problem with the
+     * library providers, so there's no point in us returning anything useful.
+     * If we do load the digest, it's used later */
+    if (g_md_sha1 == NULL)
+    {
+        if ((g_md_sha1 = EVP_MD_fetch(NULL, "sha1", NULL)) == NULL)
+        {
+            dump_error_stack("sha1");
+            return NULL;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return (void *)EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+#endif
 }
 
 /*****************************************************************************/
 void
 ssl_sha1_info_delete(void *sha1_info)
 {
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
     g_free(sha1_info);
+#else
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free((EVP_MD_CTX *)sha1_info);
+#endif
 }
 
 /*****************************************************************************/
 void
 ssl_sha1_clear(void *sha1_info)
 {
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
     SHA1_Init((SHA_CTX *)sha1_info);
+#else
+    if (sha1_info != NULL)
+    {
+        EVP_DigestInit_ex(sha1_info, g_md_sha1, NULL);
+    }
+#endif
 }
 
 /*****************************************************************************/
 void
 ssl_sha1_transform(void *sha1_info, const char *data, int len)
 {
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
     SHA1_Update((SHA_CTX *)sha1_info, data, len);
+#else
+    if (sha1_info != NULL)
+    {
+        EVP_DigestUpdate((EVP_MD_CTX *)sha1_info, data, len);
+    }
+#endif
 }
 
 /*****************************************************************************/
 void
 ssl_sha1_complete(void *sha1_info, char *data)
 {
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
     SHA1_Final((tui8 *)data, (SHA_CTX *)sha1_info);
+#else
+    if (sha1_info != NULL)
+    {
+        EVP_DigestFinal_ex((EVP_MD_CTX *)sha1_info, (unsigned char *)data,
+                           NULL);
+    }
+#endif
 }
 
 /* md5 stuff */
@@ -195,35 +366,77 @@ ssl_sha1_complete(void *sha1_info, char *data)
 void *
 ssl_md5_info_create(void)
 {
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
     return g_malloc(sizeof(MD5_CTX), 1);
+#else
+    /*
+     * If we can't get the digest loaded, there's a problem with the
+     * library providers, so there's no point in us returning anything useful.
+     * If we do load the digest, it's used later */
+    if (g_md_md5 == NULL)
+    {
+        if ((g_md_md5 = EVP_MD_fetch(NULL, "md5", NULL)) == NULL)
+        {
+            dump_error_stack("md5");
+            return NULL;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return (void *)EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+#endif
 }
 
 /*****************************************************************************/
 void
 ssl_md5_info_delete(void *md5_info)
 {
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
     g_free(md5_info);
+#else
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free((EVP_MD_CTX *)md5_info);
+#endif
 }
 
 /*****************************************************************************/
 void
 ssl_md5_clear(void *md5_info)
 {
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
     MD5_Init((MD5_CTX *)md5_info);
+#else
+    if (md5_info != NULL)
+    {
+        EVP_DigestInit_ex(md5_info, g_md_md5, NULL);
+    }
+#endif
 }
 
 /*****************************************************************************/
 void
 ssl_md5_transform(void *md5_info, const char *data, int len)
 {
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
     MD5_Update((MD5_CTX *)md5_info, data, len);
+#else
+    if (md5_info != NULL)
+    {
+        EVP_DigestUpdate((EVP_MD_CTX *)md5_info, data, len);
+    }
+#endif
 }
 
 /*****************************************************************************/
 void
 ssl_md5_complete(void *md5_info, char *data)
 {
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
     MD5_Final((tui8 *)data, (MD5_CTX *)md5_info);
+#else
+    if (md5_info != NULL)
+    {
+        EVP_DigestFinal_ex((EVP_MD_CTX *)md5_info, (unsigned char *)data, NULL);
+    }
+#endif
 }
 
 /* FIPS stuff */
@@ -236,10 +449,30 @@ ssl_des3_encrypt_info_create(const char *key, const char *ivec)
     const tui8 *lkey;
     const tui8 *livec;
 
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
+    /*
+     * For these versions of OpenSSL, there are no long-term guarantees the
+     * DES3 cipher will be available. We'll try to load it here so we
+     * can log any errors */
+    if (g_cipher_des_ede3_cbc == NULL)
+    {
+        g_cipher_des_ede3_cbc = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(NULL, "des-ede3-cbc", NULL);
+        if (g_cipher_des_ede3_cbc == NULL)
+        {
+            dump_error_stack("DES-EDE3-CBC");
+            return NULL;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
     des3_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
     lkey = (const tui8 *) key;
     livec = (const tui8 *) ivec;
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
     EVP_EncryptInit_ex(des3_ctx, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, lkey, livec);
+#else
+    EVP_EncryptInit_ex(des3_ctx, g_cipher_des_ede3_cbc, NULL, lkey, livec);
+#endif
     EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(des3_ctx, 0);
     return des3_ctx;
 }
@@ -252,10 +485,30 @@ ssl_des3_decrypt_info_create(const char *key, const char *ivec)
     const tui8 *lkey;
     const tui8 *livec;
 
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
+    /*
+     * For these versions of OpenSSL, there are no long-term guarantees the
+     * DES3 cipher will be available. We'll try to load it here so we
+     * can log any errors */
+    if (g_cipher_des_ede3_cbc == NULL)
+    {
+        g_cipher_des_ede3_cbc = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(NULL, "des-ede3-cbc", NULL);
+        if (g_cipher_des_ede3_cbc == NULL)
+        {
+            dump_error_stack("DES-EDE3-CBC");
+            return NULL;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
     des3_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
     lkey = (const tui8 *) key;
     livec = (const tui8 *) ivec;
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
     EVP_DecryptInit_ex(des3_ctx, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, lkey, livec);
+#else
+    EVP_DecryptInit_ex(des3_ctx, g_cipher_des_ede3_cbc, NULL, lkey, livec);
+#endif
     EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(des3_ctx, 0);
     return des3_ctx;
 }
@@ -283,10 +536,13 @@ ssl_des3_encrypt(void *des3, int length, const char *in_data, char *out_data)
     tui8 *lout_data;
 
     des3_ctx = (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *) des3;
-    lin_data = (const tui8 *) in_data;
-    lout_data = (tui8 *) out_data;
-    len = 0;
-    EVP_EncryptUpdate(des3_ctx, lout_data, &len, lin_data, length);
+    if (des3_ctx != NULL)
+    {
+        lin_data = (const tui8 *) in_data;
+        lout_data = (tui8 *) out_data;
+        len = 0;
+        EVP_EncryptUpdate(des3_ctx, lout_data, &len, lin_data, length);
+    }
     return 0;
 }
 
@@ -300,10 +556,13 @@ ssl_des3_decrypt(void *des3, int length, const char *in_data, char *out_data)
     tui8 *lout_data;
 
     des3_ctx = (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *) des3;
-    lin_data = (const tui8 *) in_data;
-    lout_data = (tui8 *) out_data;
-    len = 0;
-    EVP_DecryptUpdate(des3_ctx, lout_data, &len, lin_data, length);
+    if (des3_ctx != NULL)
+    {
+        lin_data = (const tui8 *) in_data;
+        lout_data = (tui8 *) out_data;
+        len = 0;
+        EVP_DecryptUpdate(des3_ctx, lout_data, &len, lin_data, length);
+    }
     return 0;
 }
 
@@ -311,16 +570,28 @@ ssl_des3_decrypt(void *des3, int length, const char *in_data, char *out_data)
 void *
 ssl_hmac_info_create(void)
 {
-    HMAC_CTX *hmac_ctx;
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
+    return (HMAC_CTX *)HMAC_CTX_new();
+#else
+    /* Need a MAC algorithm loaded */
+    if (g_mac_hmac == NULL)
+    {
+        if ((g_mac_hmac = EVP_MAC_fetch(NULL, "hmac", NULL)) == NULL)
+        {
+            dump_error_stack("hmac");
+            return NULL;
+        }
+    }
 
-    hmac_ctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
-    return hmac_ctx;
+    return (void *)EVP_MAC_CTX_new(g_mac_hmac);
+#endif
 }
 
 /*****************************************************************************/
 void
 ssl_hmac_info_delete(void *hmac)
 {
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
     HMAC_CTX *hmac_ctx;
 
     hmac_ctx = (HMAC_CTX *) hmac;
@@ -328,34 +599,61 @@ ssl_hmac_info_delete(void *hmac)
     {
         HMAC_CTX_free(hmac_ctx);
     }
+#else
+    EVP_MAC_CTX_free((EVP_MAC_CTX *)hmac);
+#endif
 }
 
 /*****************************************************************************/
 void
 ssl_hmac_sha1_init(void *hmac, const char *data, int len)
 {
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
     HMAC_CTX *hmac_ctx;
 
     hmac_ctx = (HMAC_CTX *) hmac;
     HMAC_Init_ex(hmac_ctx, data, len, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
+#else
+    if (hmac != NULL)
+    {
+        char digest[] = "sha1";
+        OSSL_PARAM params[3];
+        size_t n = 0;
+        params[n++] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string("digest", digest, 0);
+        params[n++] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+        if (EVP_MAC_init((EVP_MAC_CTX *)hmac, (unsigned char *)data,
+                         len, params) == 0)
+        {
+            dump_error_stack("hmac-sha1");
+        }
+    }
+#endif
 }
 
 /*****************************************************************************/
 void
 ssl_hmac_transform(void *hmac, const char *data, int len)
 {
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
     HMAC_CTX *hmac_ctx;
     const tui8 *ldata;
 
     hmac_ctx = (HMAC_CTX *) hmac;
     ldata = (const tui8 *) data;
     HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, ldata, len);
+#else
+    if (hmac != NULL)
+    {
+        EVP_MAC_update((EVP_MAC_CTX *)hmac, (unsigned char *)data, len);
+    }
+#endif
 }
 
 /*****************************************************************************/
 void
 ssl_hmac_complete(void *hmac, char *data, int len)
 {
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
     HMAC_CTX *hmac_ctx;
     tui8 *ldata;
     tui32 llen;
@@ -364,6 +662,12 @@ ssl_hmac_complete(void *hmac, char *data, int len)
     ldata = (tui8 *) data;
     llen = len;
     HMAC_Final(hmac_ctx, ldata, &llen);
+#else
+    if (hmac != NULL)
+    {
+        EVP_MAC_final((EVP_MAC_CTX *)hmac, (unsigned char *)data, NULL, len);
+    }
+#endif
 }
 
 /*****************************************************************************/
@@ -455,7 +759,6 @@ ssl_gen_key_xrdp1(int key_size_in_bits, const char *exp, int exp_len,
                   char *mod, int mod_len, char *pri, int pri_len)
 {
     BIGNUM *my_e;
-    RSA *my_key;
     char *lexp;
     char *lmod;
     char *lpri;
@@ -477,12 +780,44 @@ ssl_gen_key_xrdp1(int key_size_in_bits, const char *exp, int exp_len,
     ssl_reverse_it(lexp, exp_len);
     my_e = BN_new();
     BN_bin2bn((tui8 *)lexp, exp_len, my_e);
-    my_key = RSA_new();
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
+    const BIGNUM *n = NULL;
+    const BIGNUM *d = NULL;
+    RSA *my_key = RSA_new();
     error = RSA_generate_key_ex(my_key, key_size_in_bits, my_e, 0) == 0;
 
-    const BIGNUM *n;
-    const BIGNUM *d;
+    /* After this call, n and d point directly into my_key, and are valid
+     * until my_key is free'd */
     RSA_get0_key(my_key, &n, NULL, &d);
+#else
+    BIGNUM *n = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *d = NULL;
+    OSSL_PARAM params[] =
+    {
+        OSSL_PARAM_construct_int("bits", &key_size_in_bits),
+        OSSL_PARAM_construct_end()
+    };
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "RSA", NULL);
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+
+    if (pctx != NULL &&
+            EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(pctx) > 0 &&
+            EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(pctx, params) > 0 &&
+            EVP_PKEY_generate(pctx, &pkey) > 0 &&
+            EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pkey, "n", &n) > 0 &&
+            EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pkey, "d", &d) > 0)
+    {
+        error = 0;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        error = 1;
+    }
+
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+#endif
 
     if (error == 0)
     {
@@ -517,7 +852,12 @@ ssl_gen_key_xrdp1(int key_size_in_bits, const char *exp, int exp_len,
     }
 
     BN_free(my_e);
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
     RSA_free(my_key);
+#else
+    BN_free(n);
+    BN_clear_free(d);
+#endif
     g_free(lexp);
     g_free(lmod);
     g_free(lpri);
@@ -529,7 +869,11 @@ ssl_gen_key_xrdp1(int key_size_in_bits, const char *exp, int exp_len,
 see also
  * https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/Diffie-Hellman_parameters
  * https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/Manual:SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(3)
+ *
+ * We dont do this for OpenSSL 3 - we use SSL_CTX_set_dh_auto() instead, as this
+ * can cater for different key sizes on the certificate
 */
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
 static DH *ssl_get_dh2236()
 {
     static unsigned char dh2236_p[] =
@@ -591,6 +935,7 @@ static DH *ssl_get_dh2236()
 
     return dh;
 }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L */
 
 /*****************************************************************************/
 struct ssl_tls *
@@ -613,25 +958,6 @@ ssl_tls_create(struct trans *trans, const char *key, const char *cert)
 
     return self;
 }
-
-/*****************************************************************************/
-static void
-dump_ssl_error_stack(struct ssl_tls *self)
-{
-    if (!self->error_logged)
-    {
-        /* Dump the error stack from the SSL library */
-        unsigned long code;
-        char buff[256];
-        while ((code = ERR_get_error()) != 0L)
-        {
-            ERR_error_string_n(code, buff, sizeof(buff));
-            LOG(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "SSL: %s", buff);
-        }
-        self->error_logged = 1;
-    }
-}
-
 /*****************************************************************************/
 static int
 ssl_tls_log_error(struct ssl_tls *self, const char *func, int value)
@@ -752,6 +1078,7 @@ ssl_tls_accept(struct ssl_tls *self, long ssl_protocols,
     SSL_CTX_set_options(self->ctx, options);
 
     /* set DH parameters */
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
     DH *dh = ssl_get_dh2236();
     if (dh == NULL)
     {
@@ -766,7 +1093,14 @@ ssl_tls_accept(struct ssl_tls *self, long ssl_protocols,
         return 1;
     }
     DH_free(dh); // ok to free, copied into ctx by SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh()
-
+#else
+    if (!SSL_CTX_set_dh_auto(self->ctx, 1))
+    {
+        LOG(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "TLS DHE auto failed to be enabled");
+        dump_ssl_error_stack(self);
+        return 1;
+    }
+#endif
 #if defined(SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto)
     if (!SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto(self->ctx, 1))
     {
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From c894ba5b40011c36afdfb3d57547d2801fdf6409 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: matt335672 <30179339+matt335672@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Fri, 28 Jan 2022 12:17:38 +0000
Subject: Better logging of classic connection security

---
 libxrdp/xrdp_rdp.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/libxrdp/xrdp_rdp.c b/libxrdp/xrdp_rdp.c
index c2b23289..d08f068a 100644
--- a/libxrdp/xrdp_rdp.c
+++ b/libxrdp/xrdp_rdp.c
@@ -942,11 +942,21 @@ xrdp_rdp_incoming(struct xrdp_rdp *self)
     /* log non-TLS connections */
     else
     {
+        int crypt_level = self->sec_layer->crypt_level;
+        const char *security_level =
+            (crypt_level == CRYPT_LEVEL_NONE) ? "none" :
+            (crypt_level == CRYPT_LEVEL_LOW) ? "low" :
+            (crypt_level == CRYPT_LEVEL_CLIENT_COMPATIBLE) ? "medium" :
+            (crypt_level == CRYPT_LEVEL_HIGH) ? "high" :
+            (crypt_level == CRYPT_LEVEL_FIPS) ? "fips" :
+            /* default */ "unknown";
+
         LOG(LOG_LEVEL_INFO,
             "Non-TLS connection established from %s port %s: "
-            "encrypted with standard RDP security",
+            "with security level : %s",
             self->client_info.client_addr,
-            self->client_info.client_port);
+            self->client_info.client_port,
+            security_level);
     }
 
     return 0;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From e79bc7f1815b25390b4228378845a1f9028e74fc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: matt335672 <30179339+matt335672@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Thu, 27 Jan 2022 15:55:53 +0000
Subject: Fix banner comments in test results

---
 tests/libxrdp/Makefile.am | 2 ++
 tests/memtest/Makefile.am | 2 ++
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+)

diff --git a/tests/libxrdp/Makefile.am b/tests/libxrdp/Makefile.am
index e98e8d9c..30138cbf 100644
--- a/tests/libxrdp/Makefile.am
+++ b/tests/libxrdp/Makefile.am
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ AM_CPPFLAGS = \
 LOG_DRIVER = env AM_TAP_AWK='$(AWK)' $(SHELL) \
                   $(top_srcdir)/tap-driver.sh
 
+PACKAGE_STRING = "libxrdp"
+
 TESTS = test_libxrdp
 check_PROGRAMS = test_libxrdp
 
diff --git a/tests/memtest/Makefile.am b/tests/memtest/Makefile.am
index 40669125..8660fc99 100644
--- a/tests/memtest/Makefile.am
+++ b/tests/memtest/Makefile.am
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
 AM_CPPFLAGS = \
   -I$(top_srcdir)/common
 
+PACKAGE_STRING = "memtest"
+
 check_PROGRAMS = \
   memtest
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 8b8cfbe1195bef6384674641225d40b5e98e88f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: matt335672 <30179339+matt335672@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Thu, 27 Jan 2022 16:31:53 +0000
Subject: Improve wrapping of openssl module

---
 common/ssl_calls.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++----
 common/ssl_calls.h | 22 ++++++++--------------
 common/trans.c     | 12 ++++--------
 3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)

diff --git a/common/ssl_calls.c b/common/ssl_calls.c
index 792a9130..168add76 100644
--- a/common/ssl_calls.c
+++ b/common/ssl_calls.c
@@ -53,6 +53,17 @@ static EVP_CIPHER *g_cipher_des_ede3_cbc; /* DES3 CBC cipher */
 static EVP_MAC *g_mac_hmac; /* HMAC MAC */
 #endif
 
+/* definition of ssl_tls */
+struct ssl_tls
+{
+    SSL *ssl; /* SSL * */
+    SSL_CTX *ctx; /* SSL_CTX * */
+    char *cert;
+    char *key;
+    struct trans *trans;
+    tintptr rwo; /* wait obj */
+    int error_logged; /* Error has already been logged */
+};
 
 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
 static inline HMAC_CTX *
@@ -1392,16 +1403,23 @@ ssl_tls_can_recv(struct ssl_tls *tls, int sck, int millis)
 
 /*****************************************************************************/
 const char *
-ssl_get_version(const struct ssl_st *ssl)
+ssl_get_version(const struct ssl_tls *ssl)
 {
-    return SSL_get_version(ssl);
+    return SSL_get_version(ssl->ssl);
 }
 
 /*****************************************************************************/
 const char *
-ssl_get_cipher_name(const struct ssl_st *ssl)
+ssl_get_cipher_name(const struct ssl_tls *ssl)
+{
+    return SSL_get_cipher_name(ssl->ssl);
+}
+
+/*****************************************************************************/
+tintptr
+ssl_get_rwo(const struct ssl_tls *ssl)
 {
-    return SSL_get_cipher_name(ssl);
+    return ssl->rwo;
 }
 
 /*****************************************************************************/
diff --git a/common/ssl_calls.h b/common/ssl_calls.h
index 78edd946..01b67406 100644
--- a/common/ssl_calls.h
+++ b/common/ssl_calls.h
@@ -22,6 +22,10 @@
 
 #include "arch.h"
 
+/* Incomplete types */
+struct ssl_tls;
+struct trans;
+
 int
 ssl_init(void);
 int
@@ -81,18 +85,6 @@ int
 ssl_gen_key_xrdp1(int key_size_in_bits, const char *exp, int exp_len,
                   char *mod, int mod_len, char *pri, int pri_len);
 
-/* ssl_tls */
-struct ssl_tls
-{
-    struct ssl_st *ssl; /* SSL * */
-    struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx; /* SSL_CTX * */
-    char *cert;
-    char *key;
-    struct trans *trans;
-    tintptr rwo; /* wait obj */
-    int error_logged; /* Error has already been logged */
-};
-
 /* xrdp_tls.c */
 struct ssl_tls *
 ssl_tls_create(struct trans *trans, const char *key, const char *cert);
@@ -110,12 +102,14 @@ ssl_tls_write(struct ssl_tls *tls, const char *data, int length);
 int
 ssl_tls_can_recv(struct ssl_tls *tls, int sck, int millis);
 const char *
-ssl_get_version(const struct ssl_st *ssl);
+ssl_get_version(const struct ssl_tls *ssl);
 const char *
-ssl_get_cipher_name(const struct ssl_st *ssl);
+ssl_get_cipher_name(const struct ssl_tls *ssl);
 int
 ssl_get_protocols_from_string(const char *str, long *ssl_protocols);
 const char *
 get_openssl_version();
+tintptr
+ssl_get_rwo(const struct ssl_tls *ssl);
 
 #endif
diff --git a/common/trans.c b/common/trans.c
index 3afae55d..55d2a638 100644
--- a/common/trans.c
+++ b/common/trans.c
@@ -179,13 +179,9 @@ trans_get_wait_objs(struct trans *self, tbus *objs, int *count)
     objs[*count] = self->sck;
     (*count)++;
 
-    if (self->tls != 0)
+    if (self->tls != NULL && (objs[*count] = ssl_get_rwo(self->tls)) != 0)
     {
-        if (self->tls->rwo != 0)
-        {
-            objs[*count] = self->tls->rwo;
-            (*count)++;
-        }
+        (*count)++;
     }
 
     return 0;
@@ -995,8 +991,8 @@ trans_set_tls_mode(struct trans *self, const char *key, const char *cert,
     self->trans_send = trans_tls_send;
     self->trans_can_recv = trans_tls_can_recv;
 
-    self->ssl_protocol = ssl_get_version(self->tls->ssl);
-    self->cipher_name = ssl_get_cipher_name(self->tls->ssl);
+    self->ssl_protocol = ssl_get_version(self->tls);
+    self->cipher_name = ssl_get_cipher_name(self->tls);
 
     return 0;
 }
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 4699dced141698bde452abb0b3ec817503e11c27 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: matt335672 <30179339+matt335672@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Thu, 27 Jan 2022 16:23:51 +0000
Subject: Implement base64 without openssl

---
 common/base64.c                 | 246 ++++++++++++++++++++----
 common/base64.h                 |  64 ++++++-
 tests/common/Makefile.am        |   5 +-
 tests/common/test_base64.c      | 400 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 tests/common/test_common.h      |   4 +
 tests/common/test_common_main.c |  31 ++++
 tests/common/test_ssl_calls.c   |  26 ---
 xrdp/xrdp_login_wnd.c           |  10 +-
 8 files changed, 712 insertions(+), 74 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 tests/common/test_base64.c

diff --git a/common/base64.c b/common/base64.c
index af01d7f5..0b8cfe67 100644
--- a/common/base64.c
+++ b/common/base64.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /**
- * Copyright (C) 2017 Koichiro Iwao, all xrdp contributors
+ * Copyright (C) 2022 Matt Burt, all xrdp contributors
  *
  * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
  * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
@@ -26,57 +26,229 @@
 
 #include "string_calls.h"
 
-#include <openssl/bio.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include "base64.h"
 
-size_t
-base64_decoded_bytes(const char *src)
+/*
+ * Values for invalid and padding characters, used in the charmap
+ * for converting base64 to binary
+ *
+ * Thse value are specially chosen to make it easy to detect padding or
+ * invalid characters by or-ing together the values looked up in
+ * a base64 quantum */
+#define E_INVALID 0x40
+#define E_PAD 0x80
+
+/* Determine the character set on this platform */
+#if ('a' == 0x61 && 'z' == 0x7a ) && \
+    ('A' == 0x41 && 'Z' == 0x5a ) && \
+    ('0' == 0x30 && '9' == 0x39 )
+# define PLATFORM_IS_ASCII 1
+#else
+#   error "Unrecognised character set on this platform"
+#endif /* character set check */
+
+
+/*
+ * Define a table to map the base64 character values to bit values.
+ */
+#ifdef PLATFORM_IS_ASCII
+#define CHARMAP_BASE 0x28
+#define E_IV E_INVALID  /* For table alignment */
+const unsigned char charmap[] =
+{
+    /* 0x28 */ E_IV, E_IV, E_IV, 0x3e, E_IV, E_IV, E_IV, 0x3f,
+    /* 0x30 */ 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38, 0x39, 0x3a, 0x3b,
+    /* 0x38 */ 0x3c, 0x3d, E_IV, E_IV, E_IV, E_PAD, E_IV, E_IV,
+    /* 0x40 */ E_IV, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06,
+    /* 0x48 */ 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e,
+    /* 0x50 */ 0x0f, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16,
+    /* 0x58 */ 0x17, 0x18, 0x19, E_IV, E_IV, E_IV, E_IV, E_IV,
+    /* 0x60 */ E_IV, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f, 0x20,
+    /* 0x68 */ 0x21, 0x22, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25, 0x26, 0x27, 0x28,
+    /* 0x70 */ 0x29, 0x2a, 0x2b, 0x2c, 0x2d, 0x2e, 0x2f, 0x30,
+    /* 0x78 */ 0x31, 0x32, 0x33
+};
+#undef E_IV
+#endif /* PLATFORM_IS_ASCII */
+
+
+/**
+ * Lookup a value in the charmap
+ *
+ * @param x - byte to lookup. Only referenced once so can safely have
+ *            side effects.
+ * @param dest - destination to assign result to.
+ */
+#define CM_LOOKUP(x,dest) \
+    { \
+        unsigned int t = (unsigned int)(x) - CHARMAP_BASE;\
+        dest = (t < sizeof(charmap)) ? charmap[t] : E_INVALID; \
+    }
+
+/*****************************************************************************/
+
+int
+base64_decode(const char *src, char *dst, size_t dst_len, size_t *actual_len)
 {
-    size_t len;
-    size_t padding;
+    *actual_len = 0;
+    size_t src_len;
+    size_t src_i = 0;
+    size_t dst_i = 0;
+    unsigned int a;  /* Four characters of base64 quantum */
+    unsigned int b;
+    unsigned int c;
+    unsigned int d;
+    unsigned int v;
+
+#define OUTPUT_CHAR(x) \
+    { \
+        if (dst_i < dst_len) \
+        { \
+            dst[dst_i] = (x);\
+        } \
+        ++dst_i; \
+    }
 
-    len = g_strlen(src);
-    padding = 0;
+    src_len = g_strlen(src);
 
-    if (src[len - 1] == '=')
+    while (src_i < src_len)
     {
-        padding++;
+        if ((src_len - src_i) >= 4)
+        {
+            /* Usual case  - full quantum */
+            CM_LOOKUP(src[src_i++], a);
+            CM_LOOKUP(src[src_i++], b);
+            CM_LOOKUP(src[src_i++], c);
+            CM_LOOKUP(src[src_i++], d);
+        }
+        else
+        {
+            /* Add padding on the end to make up the full quantum */
+            CM_LOOKUP(src[src_i++], a);
+            b = E_PAD;
+            c = E_PAD;
+            d = E_PAD;
+            if ((src_len - src_i) > 0)
+            {
+                CM_LOOKUP(src[src_i++], b);
+            }
+            if ((src_len - src_i) > 0)
+            {
+                CM_LOOKUP(src[src_i++], c);
+            }
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * Bitwise-or the translated quantum values together, so that
+         * any invalid or padding characters can be detected with a
+         * single test */
+        v = a | b | c | d;
+
+        if ((v & E_INVALID) != 0)
+        {
+            return -1;  /* At least one invalid character */
+        }
 
-        if (src[len - 2] == '=')
+        if ((v & E_PAD) == 0)
+        {
+            /* No padding - a full quantum */
+            v = (a << 18) | (b << 12) | (c << 6) | d;
+            OUTPUT_CHAR(v >> 16);
+            OUTPUT_CHAR((v >> 8) & 0xff);
+            OUTPUT_CHAR(v & 0xff);
+        }
+        else if (((a | b | c) & E_PAD) == 0)
+        {
+            /* No padding in the first 3 chars, so the padding must
+             * be at the end */
+            v = (a << 10) | (b << 4) | (c >> 2);
+            OUTPUT_CHAR(v >> 8);
+            OUTPUT_CHAR(v & 0xff);
+        }
+        else if (((a | b) & E_PAD) == 0 && c == d)
         {
-            padding++;
+            /* No padding in first two chars, so if the last two chars are
+             * equal, they must both be padding */
+            v = (a << 2) | (b >> 4);
+            OUTPUT_CHAR(v);
+        }
+        else
+        {
+            /* Illegal padding */
+            return -1;
         }
     }
 
-    return len * 3 / 4 - padding;
+    *actual_len = dst_i;
+    return 0;
+
+#undef OUTPUT_CHAR
 }
 
 /*****************************************************************************/
-char *
-base64_decode(char *dst, const char *src, size_t len)
+size_t
+base64_encode(const char *src, size_t src_len, char *dst, size_t dst_len)
 {
-    BIO *b64;
-    BIO *bio;
-    char *b64str;
-    size_t estimated_decoded_bytes;
-    size_t decoded_bytes;
-
-    b64str = g_strdup(src);
-    estimated_decoded_bytes = base64_decoded_bytes(b64str);
-    dst[estimated_decoded_bytes] = '\0';
-
-    b64 = BIO_new(BIO_f_base64());
-    bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(b64str, len);
-    bio = BIO_push(b64, bio);
-    BIO_set_flags(bio, BIO_FLAGS_BASE64_NO_NL);
-    decoded_bytes = BIO_read(bio, dst, len);
-    BIO_free_all(bio);
-
-    /* if input is corrupt, return empty string */
-    if (estimated_decoded_bytes != decoded_bytes)
+    char *p = dst;
+    size_t src_i = 0;
+    size_t max_src_len;
+    unsigned int v;
+    static const char *b64chr =
+        "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ"
+        "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"
+        "0123456789+/=";
+
+    /* Each three octets of the source results in four bytes at the output,
+     * plus we need a terminator. So we can work out the maximum number of
+     * source octets we can process */
+    if (dst_len == 0)
+    {
+        max_src_len = 0;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        max_src_len = (dst_len - 1) / 4 * 3;
+    }
+
+    if (src_len > max_src_len)
+    {
+        src_len = max_src_len;
+    }
+
+    while (src_i < src_len)
     {
-        g_strncpy(dst, "", sizeof(""));
+        switch (src_len - src_i)
+        {
+            case 1:
+                v = (unsigned int)(unsigned char)src[src_i++] << 4;
+                *p++ = b64chr[v >> 6];
+                *p++ = b64chr[v & 0x3f];
+                *p++ = b64chr[64];
+                *p++ = b64chr[64];
+                break;
+
+            case 2:
+                v = (unsigned int)(unsigned char)src[src_i++] << 10;
+                v |= (unsigned int)(unsigned char)src[src_i++] << 2;
+                *p++ = b64chr[v >> 12];
+                *p++ = b64chr[(v >> 6) & 0x3f];
+                *p++ = b64chr[v & 0x3f];
+                *p++ = b64chr[64];
+                break;
+
+            default:
+                v = (unsigned int)(unsigned char)src[src_i++] << 16;
+                v |= (unsigned int)(unsigned char)src[src_i++] << 8;
+                v |= (unsigned int)(unsigned char)src[src_i++];
+                *p++ = b64chr[v >> 18];
+                *p++ = b64chr[(v >> 12) & 0x3f];
+                *p++ = b64chr[(v >> 6) & 0x3f];
+                *p++ = b64chr[v & 0x3f];
+                break;
+        }
     }
 
-    return dst;
+    *p = '\0';
+
+    return src_len;
 }
diff --git a/common/base64.h b/common/base64.h
index b53ed88f..1b341e9b 100644
--- a/common/base64.h
+++ b/common/base64.h
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /**
- * Copyright (C) 2017 Koichiro Iwao, all xrdp contributors
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 Koichiro Iwao, all xrdp contributors
  *
  * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
  * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
@@ -17,16 +17,66 @@
 /**
  * @file    common/base64.h
  * @brief   Base64 encoder / decoder
+ *
+ * Base-64 is described in RFC4648. The following notes apply to this
+ * implementation:-
+ * - The only supported characters are [A-Za-z0-9+/=]. At present,
+ *   embedded linefeeds and URL encodings are not supported.
+ *
  */
 
-#if !defined(SSL_CALLS_H)
-#define SSL_CALLS_H
+#if !defined(BASE64_CALLS_H)
+#define BASE64_CALLS_H
 
 #include "arch.h"
 
+/*
+ * Decodes a base64 string
+ *
+ * @param src Pointer to null-terminated source
+ * @param dst Pointer to output buffer
+ * @param dst_len Length of above. No more than this is written to the
+ *                output buffer
+ * @param actual_len Pointer to value to receive actual length of decoded data
+ * @return 0 for success, 1 for an invalid input string
+ *
+ * The following notes apply to this implementation:-
+ * - Embedded padding is supported, provided it only occurs at the end
+ *   of a quantum as described in RFC4648(4). This allows concatenated
+ *   encodings to be fed into the decoder.
+ * - Padding of the last quantum is assumed if not provided.
+ * - Excess padding of the last quantum is ignored.
+ *
+ * Only dst_len bytes at most are written to the output. The length
+ * returned in actual_len however represents how much buffer is needed for
+ * a correct result. This may be more than dst_len, and enables the caller
+ * to detect a potential buffer overflow
+ */
+int
+base64_decode(const char *src, char *dst, size_t dst_len, size_t *actual_len);
+
+/*
+ * Encodes a buffer as base64
+ *
+ * @param src Pointer to source
+ * @param src_len Length of above.
+ * @param dst Pointer to output buffer for null-terminated string
+ * @param dst_len Length of above. No more than this is written to the
+ *                output buffer
+ * @return Number of source characters processed
+ *
+ * The following notes apply to this implementation:-
+ * - Padding of the last quantum is always written if the number of
+ *   source bytes is not divisible by 3.
+ *
+ * The number of source characters processed is always returned. If
+ * the destination buffer is too small for all the output plus a
+ * terminator, the returned value from this procedure will be less than
+ * src_len. In this case no padding characters will have been written,
+ * and the remaining characters can be converted with more calls to
+ * this procedure.
+ */
 size_t
-base64_decoded_bytes(const char *src);
-char *
-base64_decode(char *dst, const char *src, size_t len);
+base64_encode(const char *src, size_t src_len, char *dst, size_t dst_len);
 
-#endif
+#endif /* BASE64_CALLS_H */
diff --git a/tests/common/Makefile.am b/tests/common/Makefile.am
index 88548b71..e6686e31 100644
--- a/tests/common/Makefile.am
+++ b/tests/common/Makefile.am
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ AM_CPPFLAGS = \
 LOG_DRIVER = env AM_TAP_AWK='$(AWK)' $(SHELL) \
                   $(top_srcdir)/tap-driver.sh
 
+PACKAGE_STRING = "libcommon"
+
 TESTS = test_common
 check_PROGRAMS = test_common
 
@@ -14,7 +16,8 @@ test_common_SOURCES = \
     test_common_main.c \
     test_string_calls.c \
     test_os_calls.c \
-    test_ssl_calls.c
+    test_ssl_calls.c \
+    test_base64.c
 
 test_common_CFLAGS = \
     @CHECK_CFLAGS@ \
diff --git a/tests/common/test_base64.c b/tests/common/test_base64.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..4a70c921
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/common/test_base64.c
@@ -0,0 +1,400 @@
+
+#if defined(HAVE_CONFIG_H)
+#include "config_ac.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "os_calls.h"
+#include "string_calls.h"
+#include "base64.h"
+
+#include "test_common.h"
+/*
+* These are the example test strings in RFC4648(10)
+*/
+static const char *rfc4648_ex1_text = "";
+static const char *rfc4648_ex1_b64 = "";
+static const char *rfc4648_ex2_text = "f";
+static const char *rfc4648_ex2_b64 = "Zg==";
+static const char *rfc4648_ex3_text = "fo";
+static const char *rfc4648_ex3_b64 = "Zm8=";
+static const char *rfc4648_ex4_text = "foo";
+static const char *rfc4648_ex4_b64 = "Zm9v";
+static const char *rfc4648_ex5_text = "foob";
+static const char *rfc4648_ex5_b64 = "Zm9vYg==";
+static const char *rfc4648_ex6_text = "fooba";
+static const char *rfc4648_ex6_b64 = "Zm9vYmE=";
+static const char *rfc4648_ex7_text = "foobar";
+static const char *rfc4648_ex7_b64 = "Zm9vYmFy";
+
+/* Every single valid base64 character, except padding */
+static const char *all_b64 =
+    "ABCDEFGHIJKL"
+    "MNOPQRSTUVWX"
+    "YZabcdefghij"
+    "klmnopqrstuv"
+    "wxyz01234567"
+    "89+/";
+
+/* What we should get as binary if we decode this */
+static const char all_b64_decoded[] =
+{
+    '\x00', '\x10', '\x83', '\x10', '\x51', '\x87', '\x20', '\x92', '\x8b',
+    '\x30', '\xd3', '\x8f', '\x41', '\x14', '\x93', '\x51', '\x55', '\x97',
+    '\x61', '\x96', '\x9b', '\x71', '\xd7', '\x9f', '\x82', '\x18', '\xa3',
+    '\x92', '\x59', '\xa7', '\xa2', '\x9a', '\xab', '\xb2', '\xdb', '\xaf',
+    '\xc3', '\x1c', '\xb3', '\xd3', '\x5d', '\xb7', '\xe3', '\x9e', '\xbb',
+    '\xf3', '\xdf', '\xbf'
+};
+
+static void
+test_rfc4648_to_b64(const char *plaintext, size_t len, const char *b64)
+{
+    char buff[256];
+    size_t result;
+
+    result = base64_encode(plaintext, len, buff, sizeof(buff));
+    ck_assert_int_eq(result, len);
+    ck_assert_str_eq(buff, b64);
+
+}
+
+/* Text-only encoder wrapper */
+static void
+test_rfc4648_to_b64_text(const char *plaintext, const char *b64)
+{
+    test_rfc4648_to_b64(plaintext, g_strlen(plaintext), b64);
+}
+
+/* Text-only decoder wrapper for valid base64 */
+static void
+test_rfc4648_from_b64_text(const char *b64, const char *text)
+{
+    char buff[256];
+    size_t actual_len;
+    int result;
+
+    result = base64_decode(b64, buff, sizeof(buff), &actual_len);
+    ck_assert_int_eq(result, 0);
+    ck_assert_int_lt(actual_len, sizeof(buff));
+    buff[actual_len] = '\0';
+    ck_assert_str_eq(buff, text);
+}
+
+/******************************************************************************/
+START_TEST(test_b64_rfc4648_ex1_to)
+{
+    test_rfc4648_to_b64_text(rfc4648_ex1_text, rfc4648_ex1_b64);
+}
+END_TEST
+
+/******************************************************************************/
+START_TEST(test_b64_rfc4648_ex1_from)
+{
+    test_rfc4648_from_b64_text(rfc4648_ex1_b64, rfc4648_ex1_text);
+}
+END_TEST
+
+/******************************************************************************/
+START_TEST(test_b64_rfc4648_ex2_to)
+{
+    test_rfc4648_to_b64_text(rfc4648_ex2_text, rfc4648_ex2_b64);
+}
+END_TEST
+
+/******************************************************************************/
+START_TEST(test_b64_rfc4648_ex2_from)
+{
+    test_rfc4648_from_b64_text(rfc4648_ex2_b64, rfc4648_ex2_text);
+}
+END_TEST
+
+/******************************************************************************/
+START_TEST(test_b64_rfc4648_ex3_to)
+{
+    test_rfc4648_to_b64_text(rfc4648_ex3_text, rfc4648_ex3_b64);
+}
+END_TEST
+
+/******************************************************************************/
+START_TEST(test_b64_rfc4648_ex3_from)
+{
+    test_rfc4648_from_b64_text(rfc4648_ex3_b64, rfc4648_ex3_text);
+}
+END_TEST
+
+/******************************************************************************/
+START_TEST(test_b64_rfc4648_ex4_to)
+{
+    test_rfc4648_to_b64_text(rfc4648_ex4_text, rfc4648_ex4_b64);
+}
+END_TEST
+
+/******************************************************************************/
+START_TEST(test_b64_rfc4648_ex4_from)
+{
+    test_rfc4648_from_b64_text(rfc4648_ex4_b64, rfc4648_ex4_text);
+}
+END_TEST
+
+/******************************************************************************/
+START_TEST(test_b64_rfc4648_ex5_to)
+{
+    test_rfc4648_to_b64_text(rfc4648_ex5_text, rfc4648_ex5_b64);
+}
+END_TEST
+
+/******************************************************************************/
+START_TEST(test_b64_rfc4648_ex5_from)
+{
+    test_rfc4648_from_b64_text(rfc4648_ex5_b64, rfc4648_ex5_text);
+}
+END_TEST
+
+/******************************************************************************/
+START_TEST(test_b64_rfc4648_ex6_to)
+{
+    test_rfc4648_to_b64_text(rfc4648_ex6_text, rfc4648_ex6_b64);
+}
+END_TEST
+
+/******************************************************************************/
+START_TEST(test_b64_rfc4648_ex6_from)
+{
+    test_rfc4648_from_b64_text(rfc4648_ex6_b64, rfc4648_ex6_text);
+}
+END_TEST
+
+/******************************************************************************/
+START_TEST(test_b64_rfc4648_ex7_to)
+{
+    test_rfc4648_to_b64_text(rfc4648_ex7_text, rfc4648_ex7_b64);
+}
+END_TEST
+
+/******************************************************************************/
+START_TEST(test_b64_rfc4648_ex7_from)
+{
+    test_rfc4648_from_b64_text(rfc4648_ex7_b64, rfc4648_ex7_text);
+}
+END_TEST
+
+/******************************************************************************/
+START_TEST(test_b64_all_valid_from)
+{
+    char buff[256];
+    size_t actual_len;
+    int result;
+    char *str_result;
+    char *str_expected;
+
+    result = base64_decode(all_b64, buff, sizeof(buff), &actual_len);
+    ck_assert_int_eq(result, 0);
+    ck_assert_int_eq(actual_len, sizeof(all_b64_decoded));
+    str_result = bin_to_hex(buff, actual_len);
+    str_expected = bin_to_hex(all_b64_decoded, sizeof(all_b64_decoded));
+    ck_assert_str_eq(str_result, str_expected);
+    free(str_result);
+    free(str_expected);
+}
+END_TEST
+
+/******************************************************************************/
+START_TEST(test_b64_all_valid_to)
+{
+    char buff[256];
+    size_t result;
+
+    result = base64_encode(all_b64_decoded, sizeof(all_b64_decoded),
+                           buff, sizeof(buff));
+    ck_assert_int_eq(result, sizeof(all_b64_decoded));
+    ck_assert_str_eq(buff, all_b64);
+}
+END_TEST
+
+/******************************************************************************/
+START_TEST(test_b64_all_invalid)
+{
+    char buff[256];
+    size_t actual_len;
+    char valid[256] = {0};
+    char encoded[5] = { "T0sh" }; /* Decodes to 'OK!' */
+    int result;
+
+    /* Make a note of all the valid b64 characters */
+    unsigned int i = 0;
+    unsigned char c;
+    while ((c = all_b64[i]) != '\0')
+    {
+        valid[c] = 1;
+        ++i;
+    }
+
+    /* Check the decoder's working on a simple string...*/
+    result = base64_decode(encoded, buff, sizeof(buff), &actual_len);
+    ck_assert_int_eq(result, 0);
+    ck_assert_int_eq(actual_len, 3);
+    buff[actual_len] = '\0';
+    ck_assert_str_eq(buff, "OK!");
+
+    /* Now replace the 1st character with all invalid characters in turn,
+     * and check they're rejected */
+    for (i = 0 ; i < 256; ++i)
+    {
+        if (i != '\0' && !valid[i]) /* Don't try the string terminator char! */
+        {
+            encoded[0] = i;
+            result = base64_decode(encoded, buff, sizeof(buff), &actual_len);
+            if (result == 0)
+            {
+                ck_abort_msg("Character 0x%02x was not rejected", i);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+END_TEST
+
+/******************************************************************************/
+START_TEST(test_b64_small_buffer_encode)
+{
+    char buff[10 * 4 + 1]; /* Enough space for 10 quanta */
+
+    size_t result;
+
+    result = base64_encode(all_b64_decoded, sizeof(all_b64_decoded),
+                           buff, sizeof(buff));
+    /* Should have read 10 lots of 24 bits from the input */
+    ck_assert_int_eq(result, 10 * 3);
+    ck_assert_str_eq(buff, "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmn");
+}
+END_TEST
+
+/******************************************************************************/
+START_TEST(test_b64_small_buffer_decode)
+{
+    char buff[10]; /* Enough space for 10 chars */
+
+    size_t actual_len;
+    int result;
+    char *str_result;
+    char *str_expected;
+
+    result = base64_decode(all_b64, buff, sizeof(buff), &actual_len);
+    ck_assert_int_eq(result, 0);
+    ck_assert_int_eq(actual_len, sizeof(all_b64_decoded));
+    str_result = bin_to_hex(buff, sizeof(buff));
+    str_expected = bin_to_hex(all_b64_decoded, sizeof(buff));
+    ck_assert_str_eq(str_result, str_expected);
+    free(str_result);
+    free(str_expected);
+}
+END_TEST
+
+/******************************************************************************/
+START_TEST(test_b64_add_pad_one)
+{
+    /* Check that a missing trailing '=' is added when decoding */
+    test_rfc4648_from_b64_text("Zm8", "fo"); /* RFC4648 example 3 */
+}
+END_TEST
+
+/******************************************************************************/
+START_TEST(test_b64_add_pad_two)
+{
+    /* Check that two missing trailing '=' chars are added when decoding */
+    test_rfc4648_from_b64_text("Zg", "f"); /* RFC4648 example 2 */
+}
+END_TEST
+
+/******************************************************************************/
+START_TEST(test_b64_bad_pad)
+{
+    char buff[16];
+    size_t actual_len;
+
+    /* Check all bad quanta with padding chars */
+    static const char *bad_pad[] =
+    {
+        "=AAA",
+        "A=AA",
+        "AA=A",
+        "==AA",
+        "=A=A",
+        "=AA=",
+        "A==A",
+        "A=A=",
+        "===A",
+        "A===",
+        NULL
+    };
+    const char **p;
+
+    for (p = bad_pad ; *p != NULL ; ++p)
+    {
+        int result = base64_decode(*p, buff, sizeof(buff), &actual_len);
+        if (result == 0)
+        {
+            ck_abort_msg("Padding '%s' was not rejected", *p);
+        }
+    }
+}
+END_TEST
+
+/******************************************************************************/
+START_TEST(test_b64_concat_pad)
+{
+    const char *src =
+        "VGVzdA=="  /* Test */
+        "IA=="      /* <space> */
+        "Y29uY2F0ZW5hdGVk" /* concatenated */
+        "IA=="      /* <space> */
+        "cGFkZGluZw=="; /*padding */
+    const char *expected = "Test concatenated padding";
+    char buff[64];
+    size_t actual_len;
+    int result;
+
+    result = base64_decode(src, buff, sizeof(buff), &actual_len);
+    ck_assert_int_eq(result, 0);
+    ck_assert_int_eq(actual_len, g_strlen(expected));
+    buff[actual_len] = '\0';
+    ck_assert_str_eq(buff, expected);
+}
+END_TEST
+
+/******************************************************************************/
+Suite *
+make_suite_test_base64(void)
+{
+    Suite *s;
+    TCase *tc_b64;
+
+    s = suite_create("base64");
+
+    tc_b64 = tcase_create("base64");
+    suite_add_tcase(s, tc_b64);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_b64, test_b64_rfc4648_ex1_to);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_b64, test_b64_rfc4648_ex1_from);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_b64, test_b64_rfc4648_ex2_to);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_b64, test_b64_rfc4648_ex2_from);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_b64, test_b64_rfc4648_ex3_to);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_b64, test_b64_rfc4648_ex3_from);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_b64, test_b64_rfc4648_ex4_to);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_b64, test_b64_rfc4648_ex4_from);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_b64, test_b64_rfc4648_ex5_to);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_b64, test_b64_rfc4648_ex5_from);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_b64, test_b64_rfc4648_ex6_to);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_b64, test_b64_rfc4648_ex6_from);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_b64, test_b64_rfc4648_ex7_to);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_b64, test_b64_rfc4648_ex7_from);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_b64, test_b64_all_valid_from);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_b64, test_b64_all_valid_to);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_b64, test_b64_all_invalid);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_b64, test_b64_small_buffer_encode);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_b64, test_b64_small_buffer_decode);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_b64, test_b64_add_pad_one);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_b64, test_b64_add_pad_two);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_b64, test_b64_bad_pad);
+    tcase_add_test(tc_b64, test_b64_concat_pad);
+
+    return s;
+}
diff --git a/tests/common/test_common.h b/tests/common/test_common.h
index 3493c3bf..ed422ab4 100644
--- a/tests/common/test_common.h
+++ b/tests/common/test_common.h
@@ -4,8 +4,12 @@
 
 #include <check.h>
 
+char *
+bin_to_hex(const char *input, int length);
+
 Suite *make_suite_test_string(void);
 Suite *make_suite_test_os_calls(void);
 Suite *make_suite_test_ssl_calls(void);
+Suite *make_suite_test_base64(void);
 
 #endif /* TEST_COMMON_H */
diff --git a/tests/common/test_common_main.c b/tests/common/test_common_main.c
index 2674bea0..a08bc7f7 100644
--- a/tests/common/test_common_main.c
+++ b/tests/common/test_common_main.c
@@ -10,6 +10,36 @@
 
 #include "test_common.h"
 
+/**
+ * Converts a binary buffer to a hexadecimal representation
+ *
+ * Result must be free'd after use
+ */
+char *
+bin_to_hex(const char *input, int length)
+{
+    int i;
+    char *result = (char *)malloc(length * 2 + 1);
+    if (result != NULL)
+    {
+        char *p = result;
+        const char *hexdigit = "0123456789abcdef";
+        for (i = 0 ; i < length ; ++i)
+        {
+            int c = input[i];
+            if (c < 0)
+            {
+                c += 256;
+            }
+            *p++ = hexdigit[ c / 16];
+            *p++ = hexdigit[ c % 16];
+        }
+        *p = '\0';
+    }
+
+    return result;
+}
+
 int main (void)
 {
     int number_failed;
@@ -18,6 +48,7 @@ int main (void)
     sr = srunner_create (make_suite_test_string());
     srunner_add_suite(sr, make_suite_test_os_calls());
     srunner_add_suite(sr, make_suite_test_ssl_calls());
+    srunner_add_suite(sr, make_suite_test_base64());
     //   srunner_add_suite(sr, make_list_suite());
 
     srunner_set_tap(sr, "-");
diff --git a/tests/common/test_ssl_calls.c b/tests/common/test_ssl_calls.c
index c5198fd9..56d8935b 100644
--- a/tests/common/test_ssl_calls.c
+++ b/tests/common/test_ssl_calls.c
@@ -9,32 +9,6 @@
 
 #include "test_common.h"
 
-static
-char *bin_to_hex(const char *input, int length)
-{
-    int i;
-    char *result = (char *)g_malloc(length * 2 + 1, 0);
-    if (result != NULL)
-    {
-        char *p = result;
-        const char *hexdigit = "0123456789abcdef";
-        for (i = 0 ; i < length ; ++i)
-        {
-            int c = input[i];
-            if (c < 0)
-            {
-                c += 256;
-            }
-            *p++ = hexdigit[ c / 16];
-            *p++ = hexdigit[ c % 16];
-        }
-        *p = '\0';
-    }
-
-    return result;
-}
-
-
 START_TEST(test_rc4_enc_ok)
 {
     const char *key = "16_byte_key-----";
diff --git a/xrdp/xrdp_login_wnd.c b/xrdp/xrdp_login_wnd.c
index a1d7e9a5..da5917b2 100644
--- a/xrdp/xrdp_login_wnd.c
+++ b/xrdp/xrdp_login_wnd.c
@@ -346,6 +346,7 @@ xrdp_wm_show_edits(struct xrdp_wm *self, struct xrdp_bitmap *combo)
     struct xrdp_cfg_globals *globals;
     char resultIP[256];
     char *plain; /* base64 decoded string */
+    size_t plain_length; /* length of decoded base64 string */
     size_t base64_length; /* length of base64 string */
 
     globals = &self->xrdp_config->cfg_globals;
@@ -379,8 +380,9 @@ xrdp_wm_show_edits(struct xrdp_wm *self, struct xrdp_bitmap *combo)
             {
                 base64_length = g_strlen(value + BASE64PREFIX_LEN);
                 plain = (char *)g_malloc(base64_length, 0);
-                base64_decode(plain, value + BASE64PREFIX_LEN, base64_length);
-                g_strncpy(value, plain, g_strlen(plain));
+                base64_decode(value + BASE64PREFIX_LEN,
+                              plain, base64_length, &plain_length);
+                g_strncpy(value, plain, plain_length);
                 g_free(plain);
             }
             else if (g_strncmp(ASK, value, ASK_LEN) == 0)
@@ -421,7 +423,9 @@ xrdp_wm_show_edits(struct xrdp_wm *self, struct xrdp_bitmap *combo)
                 {
                     base64_length = g_strlen(value + ASK_LEN + BASE64PREFIX_LEN);
                     plain = (char *)g_malloc(base64_length, 0);
-                    base64_decode(plain, value + ASK_LEN + BASE64PREFIX_LEN, base64_length);
+                    base64_decode(value + ASK_LEN + BASE64PREFIX_LEN,
+                                  plain, base64_length, &plain_length);
+                    plain[plain_length] = '\0';
                     g_strncpy(b->caption1, plain, 255);
                     g_free(plain);
                 }
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From eb4a8e342dcf848ca716792763ca1904e913ca9d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: matt335672 <30179339+matt335672@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Feb 2022 10:39:50 +0000
Subject: Add lower bound to sesman data input size check

---
 sesman/sesman.c | 8 +++++---
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/sesman/sesman.c b/sesman/sesman.c
index a8576905..e2b057e6 100644
--- a/sesman/sesman.c
+++ b/sesman/sesman.c
@@ -276,6 +276,7 @@ sesman_close_all(void)
 static int
 sesman_data_in(struct trans *self)
 {
+#define HEADER_SIZE 8
     int version;
     int size;
 
@@ -283,9 +284,9 @@ sesman_data_in(struct trans *self)
     {
         in_uint32_be(self->in_s, version);
         in_uint32_be(self->in_s, size);
-        if (size > self->in_s->size)
+        if (size < HEADER_SIZE || size > self->in_s->size)
         {
-            LOG(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "sesman_data_in: bad message size");
+            LOG(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "sesman_data_in: bad message size %d", size);
             return 1;
         }
         self->header_size = size;
@@ -302,11 +303,12 @@ sesman_data_in(struct trans *self)
             return 1;
         }
         /* reset for next message */
-        self->header_size = 8;
+        self->header_size = HEADER_SIZE;
         self->extra_flags = 0;
         init_stream(self->in_s, 0); /* Reset input stream pointers */
     }
     return 0;
+#undef HEADER_SIZE
 }
 
 /******************************************************************************/
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 79bc7c040e6024ce58be741cea40176961b07d12 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Koichiro IWAO <meta@vmeta.jp>
Date: Mon, 7 Feb 2022 15:54:38 +0900
Subject: Fix typo in past CVE number

---
 NEWS.md | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/NEWS.md b/NEWS.md
index 8c959801..d0e60959 100644
--- a/NEWS.md
+++ b/NEWS.md
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ These changes are likely to impact operating system package builders and those b
 
 This is a security fix release that includes fixes for the following local buffer overflow vulnerability.
 
-* [CVE-2022-4044: Local users can perform a buffer overflow attack against the xrdp-sesman service and then impersonate it](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-4044)
+* [CVE-2020-4044: Local users can perform a buffer overflow attack against the xrdp-sesman service and then impersonate it](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-4044)
 
 This update is recommended for all xrdp users.
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From baf62457a3a75be4dc56c25778f02e49ae96b32a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: matt335672 <30179339+matt335672@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Feb 2022 09:31:34 +0000
Subject: Move to cppcheck 2.7 and bump default threads to 2

---
 .github/workflows/build.yml | 2 +-
 scripts/run_cppcheck.sh     | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/.github/workflows/build.yml b/.github/workflows/build.yml
index d91f1dff..0b02237d 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/build.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/build.yml
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ jobs:
       CC: gcc
       # This is required to use a version of cppcheck other than that
       # supplied with the operating system
-      CPPCHECK_VER: 2.6
+      CPPCHECK_VER: 2.7
       CPPCHECK_REPO: https://github.com/danmar/cppcheck.git
     steps:
       # This is currently the only way to get a version into
diff --git a/scripts/run_cppcheck.sh b/scripts/run_cppcheck.sh
index 2c152782..65ec254e 100755
--- a/scripts/run_cppcheck.sh
+++ b/scripts/run_cppcheck.sh
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ fi
 
 # Any options/directories specified?
 if [ $# -eq 0 ]; then
-    set -- .
+    set -- -j 2 .
 fi
 
 # Display the cppcheck version and command for debugging
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From e6c098e750ec232a87a55b2cc1120fe5e1ee2312 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: matt335672 <30179339+matt335672@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 10:18:15 +0000
Subject: Remove s_check() macro

---
 common/parse.h             | 3 ---
 sesman/chansrv/clipboard.c | 2 +-
 vnc/vnc_clip.c             | 2 +-
 3 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/common/parse.h b/common/parse.h
index b27bb0c9..a3721ef8 100644
--- a/common/parse.h
+++ b/common/parse.h
@@ -89,9 +89,6 @@ parser_stream_overflow_check(const struct stream *s, int n, int is_out,
 #   define S_CHECK_REM_OUT(s,n)
 #endif
 
-/******************************************************************************/
-#define s_check(s) s_check_rem(s, 0)
-
 /******************************************************************************/
 #define s_check_rem(s, n) ((s)->p + (n) <= (s)->end)
 
diff --git a/sesman/chansrv/clipboard.c b/sesman/chansrv/clipboard.c
index e2a716ef..d5422483 100644
--- a/sesman/chansrv/clipboard.c
+++ b/sesman/chansrv/clipboard.c
@@ -1334,7 +1334,7 @@ clipboard_process_data_response(struct stream *s, int clip_msg_status,
         return 0;
     }
     index = 0;
-    while (s_check(s))
+    while (s_check_rem(s, 2))
     {
         in_uint16_le(s, wchr);
         wtext[index] = wchr;
diff --git a/vnc/vnc_clip.c b/vnc/vnc_clip.c
index ebbfae36..364bdff7 100644
--- a/vnc/vnc_clip.c
+++ b/vnc/vnc_clip.c
@@ -575,7 +575,7 @@ handle_cb_format_data_response(struct vnc *v, struct stream *s)
             {
                 case CF_TEXT:
                     lastc = '\0';
-                    while (s_check(s))
+                    while (s_check_rem(s, 1))
                     {
                         in_uint8(s, c);
                         if (c == '\n' && lastc == '\r')
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 35d400a8990cfd08caaecc96a87d3686e2a7a166 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: zbstao <zhongbin757@foxmail.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2022 09:42:33 +0800
Subject: Fixed possible SIGCHILD signal lost

When multiple(eg. 20) xrdp connections are disconnected at the same time(eg.  close all rdp client at the same time), zombie process may be spawned.
---
 sesman/sig.c | 12 ++++++++----
 xrdp/xrdp.c  |  4 +---
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/sesman/sig.c b/sesman/sig.c
index 53fb8bd1..fabff3af 100644
--- a/sesman/sig.c
+++ b/sesman/sig.c
@@ -122,12 +122,16 @@ sig_sesman_session_end(int sig)
         return;
     }
 
-    pid = g_waitchild();
-
-    if (pid > 0)
+    do
     {
-        session_kill(pid);
+        pid = g_waitchild();
+
+        if (pid > 0)
+        {
+            session_kill(pid);
+        }
     }
+    while (pid >= 0);
 }
 
 /******************************************************************************/
diff --git a/xrdp/xrdp.c b/xrdp/xrdp.c
index ecaa9983..6da93884 100644
--- a/xrdp/xrdp.c
+++ b/xrdp/xrdp.c
@@ -163,9 +163,7 @@ xrdp_shutdown(int sig)
 static void
 xrdp_child(int sig)
 {
-    int safety;
-
-    for (safety = 0; (g_waitchild() >= 0) && (safety <= 10); safety++)
+    while (g_waitchild() >= 0)
     {
     }
 }
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From a0f4d94cfeb38655a3d49c388def1cfdd63680cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nexarian <cmp@pitstick.net>
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 14:18:24 -0500
Subject: Fix NPEs in log.c

Multiple NPEs can happen in the internal_log_config_copy procedure,
and we need to address this before we merge in changes for egfx.
---
 common/log.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)

diff --git a/common/log.c b/common/log.c
index b2bab18e..bfce267a 100644
--- a/common/log.c
+++ b/common/log.c
@@ -495,6 +495,11 @@ internal_log_config_copy(struct log_config *dest, const struct log_config *src)
 {
     int i;
 
+    if (src == NULL || dest == NULL)
+    {
+        return;
+    }
+
     dest->enable_syslog = src->enable_syslog;
     dest->fd = src->fd;
     dest->log_file = g_strdup(src->log_file);
@@ -508,6 +513,21 @@ internal_log_config_copy(struct log_config *dest, const struct log_config *src)
     dest->console_level = src->console_level;
     dest->enable_pid = src->enable_pid;
     dest->dump_on_start = src->dump_on_start;
+
+    if (src->per_logger_level == NULL)
+    {
+        return;
+    }
+    if (dest->per_logger_level == NULL)
+    {
+        dest->per_logger_level = list_create();
+        if (dest->per_logger_level == NULL)
+        {
+            return;
+        }
+        dest->per_logger_level->auto_free = 1;
+    }
+
     for (i = 0; i < src->per_logger_level->count; ++i)
     {
         struct log_logger_level *dst_logger =
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 773a8f7da1660a2e728963d5717341541f87ec0d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nexarian <cmp@pitstick.net>
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 14:41:37 -0500
Subject: Move DRDYNVC_STATUS_* to xrdp_channel.h

These statuses are necessary for egfx resizing, as visibility to channel
status is a pre-req for closing and re-opening a channel.
---
 libxrdp/Makefile.am    |  1 +
 libxrdp/xrdp_channel.c | 14 +-------------
 libxrdp/xrdp_channel.h | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 libxrdp/xrdp_channel.h

diff --git a/libxrdp/Makefile.am b/libxrdp/Makefile.am
index c843a531..49df6c65 100644
--- a/libxrdp/Makefile.am
+++ b/libxrdp/Makefile.am
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ libxrdp_la_SOURCES = \
   xrdp_bitmap_compress.c \
   xrdp_caps.c \
   xrdp_channel.c \
+  xrdp_channel.h \
   xrdp_fastpath.c \
   xrdp_iso.c \
   xrdp_jpeg_compress.c \
diff --git a/libxrdp/xrdp_channel.c b/libxrdp/xrdp_channel.c
index 16a8668e..fff00ece 100644
--- a/libxrdp/xrdp_channel.c
+++ b/libxrdp/xrdp_channel.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 
 #include "libxrdp.h"
 #include "string_calls.h"
+#include "xrdp_channel.h"
 
 #define CMD_DVC_OPEN_CHANNEL    0x10
 #define CMD_DVC_DATA_FIRST      0x20
@@ -31,19 +32,6 @@
 #define CMD_DVC_CLOSE_CHANNEL   0x40
 #define CMD_DVC_CAPABILITY      0x50
 
-#define XRDP_DRDYNVC_STATUS_CLOSED          0
-#define XRDP_DRDYNVC_STATUS_OPEN_SENT       1
-#define XRDP_DRDYNVC_STATUS_OPEN            2
-#define XRDP_DRDYNVC_STATUS_CLOSE_SENT      3
-
-#define XRDP_DRDYNVC_STATUS_TO_STR(status) \
-    ((status) == XRDP_DRDYNVC_STATUS_CLOSED ? "CLOSED" : \
-     (status) == XRDP_DRDYNVC_STATUS_OPEN_SENT ? "OPEN_SENT" : \
-     (status) == XRDP_DRDYNVC_STATUS_OPEN ? "OPEN" : \
-     (status) == XRDP_DRDYNVC_STATUS_CLOSE_SENT ? "CLOSE_SENT" : \
-     "unknown" \
-    )
-
 #define XRDP_DRDYNVC_CHANNEL_ID_TO_NAME(self, chan_id) \
     (xrdp_channel_get_item((self), (chan_id)) != NULL \
      ? xrdp_channel_get_item((self), (chan_id))->name \
diff --git a/libxrdp/xrdp_channel.h b/libxrdp/xrdp_channel.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..9f795911
--- /dev/null
+++ b/libxrdp/xrdp_channel.h
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+/**
+ * xrdp: A Remote Desktop Protocol server.
+ *
+ * MS-RDPEDYC : Definitions related to documentation in [MS-RDPEDYC]
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ *
+ * References to MS-RDPEDYC are currently correct for v20210406 of that
+ * document
+ */
+
+#if !defined(XRDP_CHANNEL_H)
+#define XRDP_CHANNEL_H
+
+/*
+   These are not directly defined in MS-RDPEDYC, but
+   they are derived statuses needed to implement it.
+*/
+#define XRDP_DRDYNVC_STATUS_CLOSED          0
+#define XRDP_DRDYNVC_STATUS_OPEN_SENT       1
+#define XRDP_DRDYNVC_STATUS_OPEN            2
+#define XRDP_DRDYNVC_STATUS_CLOSE_SENT      3
+
+#define XRDP_DRDYNVC_STATUS_TO_STR(status) \
+    ((status) == XRDP_DRDYNVC_STATUS_CLOSED ? "CLOSED" : \
+     (status) == XRDP_DRDYNVC_STATUS_OPEN_SENT ? "OPEN_SENT" : \
+     (status) == XRDP_DRDYNVC_STATUS_OPEN ? "OPEN" : \
+     (status) == XRDP_DRDYNVC_STATUS_CLOSE_SENT ? "CLOSE_SENT" : \
+     "unknown" \
+    )
+
+#endif /* XRDP_CHANNEL_H */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From ff39ce719e966ecd2b104e1c3cc87a2f34f6a928 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: zbstao <zhongbin757@foxmail.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2022 09:41:21 +0800
Subject: Fixed possible infinite loop

Fixed possible infinite loop
---
 sesman/sig.c | 2 +-
 xrdp/xrdp.c  | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/sesman/sig.c b/sesman/sig.c
index fabff3af..cc29dea1 100644
--- a/sesman/sig.c
+++ b/sesman/sig.c
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ sig_sesman_session_end(int sig)
             session_kill(pid);
         }
     }
-    while (pid >= 0);
+    while (pid > 0);
 }
 
 /******************************************************************************/
diff --git a/xrdp/xrdp.c b/xrdp/xrdp.c
index 6da93884..22eee5b3 100644
--- a/xrdp/xrdp.c
+++ b/xrdp/xrdp.c
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ xrdp_shutdown(int sig)
 static void
 xrdp_child(int sig)
 {
-    while (g_waitchild() >= 0)
+    while (g_waitchild() > 0)
     {
     }
 }
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From d23f7328f8ba02eee04cba34ad984981ef0734e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nexarian <cmp@pitstick.net>
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 22:03:22 -0500
Subject: Minor logging fixes in xrdp_iso.c

Two logging errors found while working in these files.
---
 libxrdp/xrdp_channel.c | 2 +-
 libxrdp/xrdp_iso.c     | 3 ++-
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/libxrdp/xrdp_channel.c b/libxrdp/xrdp_channel.c
index fff00ece..f43804d7 100644
--- a/libxrdp/xrdp_channel.c
+++ b/libxrdp/xrdp_channel.c
@@ -923,7 +923,7 @@ xrdp_channel_drdynvc_close(struct xrdp_channel *self, int chan_id)
 
     LOG_DEVEL(LOG_LEVEL_TRACE, "Sending [MS-RDPEDYC] DYNVC_CLOSE "
               "cbId %d, Sp 0, Cmd 0x%2.2x, ChannelId %d",
-              cbChId, CMD_DVC_OPEN_CHANNEL, ChId);
+              cbChId, CMD_DVC_CLOSE_CHANNEL, ChId);
     if (xrdp_channel_send(self, s, static_channel_id, total_data_len,
                           static_flags) != 0)
     {
diff --git a/libxrdp/xrdp_iso.c b/libxrdp/xrdp_iso.c
index f2593694..dde7a3ea 100644
--- a/libxrdp/xrdp_iso.c
+++ b/libxrdp/xrdp_iso.c
@@ -428,7 +428,8 @@ xrdp_iso_send_cc(struct xrdp_iso *self)
             out_uint16_le(s, 8);                          /* length (must be 8) */
             out_uint32_le(s, self->selectedProtocol);     /* selectedProtocol */
             LOG_DEVEL(LOG_LEVEL_TRACE, "Adding structure [MS-RDPBCGR] RDP_NEG_RSP "
-                      "flags 0, length 8, selectedProtocol 0x%8.8x",
+                      "flags 0x%02x, length 8, selectedProtocol 0x%8.8x",
+                      EXTENDED_CLIENT_DATA_SUPPORTED,
                       self->selectedProtocol);
         }
     }
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 1309ea405e7dc538d18025a275c43dac66947ec5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: zbstao <zhongbin757@foxmail.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2022 22:32:46 +0800
Subject: Fixed g_waitpid function

Fixed g_waitpid function
---
 common/os_calls.c | 10 +---------
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/common/os_calls.c b/common/os_calls.c
index dd2e964d..e7dea20e 100644
--- a/common/os_calls.c
+++ b/common/os_calls.c
@@ -2973,7 +2973,7 @@ g_waitchild(void)
 
 /*****************************************************************************/
 /* does not work in win32
-   returns pid of process that exits or zero if signal occurred */
+   returns pid of process that exits or <= 0 if no process was found */
 int
 g_waitpid(int pid)
 {
@@ -2989,14 +2989,6 @@ g_waitpid(int pid)
     else
     {
         rv = waitpid(pid, 0, 0);
-
-        if (rv == -1)
-        {
-            if (errno == EINTR) /* signal occurred */
-            {
-                rv = 0;
-            }
-        }
     }
 
     return rv;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From b689707d15f8da4d714e969f3cac7eb340115875 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: matt335672 <30179339+matt335672@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2022 11:59:56 +0000
Subject: Remove unnecessary log message

---
 sesman/chansrv/chansrv_config.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/sesman/chansrv/chansrv_config.c b/sesman/chansrv/chansrv_config.c
index 64297bcd..e3c30721 100644
--- a/sesman/chansrv/chansrv_config.c
+++ b/sesman/chansrv/chansrv_config.c
@@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ config_dump(struct config_chansrv *config)
                          clip_restrict_map, ',', buf, sizeof(buf));
         g_writeln("    RestrictOutboundClipboard: %s", buf);
     }
-    g_writeln("    RestrictInboundClipboard:  %s", buf);
+
     if (config->restrict_inbound_clipboard == CLIP_RESTRICT_NONE)
     {
         g_writeln("    RestrictInboundClipboard:  %s", "none");
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From fcd991844a11a295ef7b5dce6c6bba9c00b44cba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: matt335672 <30179339+matt335672@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Thu, 3 Mar 2022 15:35:13 +0000
Subject: sesman : Move global declarations to sesman.h

---
 sesman/access.c          | 2 --
 sesman/env.c             | 3 ---
 sesman/scp.c             | 2 --
 sesman/scp_v0.c          | 2 --
 sesman/scp_v1.c          | 2 --
 sesman/scp_v1_mng.c      | 2 --
 sesman/sesman.h          | 7 +++++++
 sesman/session.c         | 2 --
 sesman/sig.c             | 4 ----
 sesman/verify_user.c     | 2 --
 sesman/verify_user_bsd.c | 2 --
 11 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

diff --git a/sesman/access.c b/sesman/access.c
index 4b8489aa..442d9e7b 100644
--- a/sesman/access.c
+++ b/sesman/access.c
@@ -31,8 +31,6 @@
 #include "sesman.h"
 #include "string_calls.h"
 
-extern struct config_sesman *g_cfg; /* in sesman.c */
-
 /******************************************************************************/
 int
 access_login_allowed(const char *user)
diff --git a/sesman/env.c b/sesman/env.c
index b8b2c030..f3b3dc63 100644
--- a/sesman/env.c
+++ b/sesman/env.c
@@ -36,9 +36,6 @@
 #include "ssl_calls.h"
 #include "string_calls.h"
 
-extern unsigned char g_fixedkey[8]; /* in sesman.c */
-extern struct config_sesman *g_cfg;  /* in sesman.c */
-
 /******************************************************************************/
 int
 env_check_password_file(const char *filename, const char *passwd)
diff --git a/sesman/scp.c b/sesman/scp.c
index 36cf4045..62f6af39 100644
--- a/sesman/scp.c
+++ b/sesman/scp.c
@@ -33,8 +33,6 @@
 
 #include "sesman.h"
 
-extern struct config_sesman *g_cfg; /* in sesman.c */
-
 /******************************************************************************/
 enum SCP_SERVER_STATES_E
 scp_process(struct trans *t, struct SCP_SESSION *sdata)
diff --git a/sesman/scp_v0.c b/sesman/scp_v0.c
index 100c5902..195169fa 100644
--- a/sesman/scp_v0.c
+++ b/sesman/scp_v0.c
@@ -30,8 +30,6 @@
 
 #include "sesman.h"
 
-extern struct config_sesman *g_cfg; /* in sesman.c */
-
 /******************************************************************************/
 enum SCP_SERVER_STATES_E
 scp_v0_process(struct trans *t, struct SCP_SESSION *s)
diff --git a/sesman/scp_v1.c b/sesman/scp_v1.c
index a8a59ebd..91a47e07 100644
--- a/sesman/scp_v1.c
+++ b/sesman/scp_v1.c
@@ -33,8 +33,6 @@
 //#include "libscp_types.h"
 #include "libscp.h"
 
-extern struct config_sesman *g_cfg; /* in sesman.c */
-
 static void
 parseCommonStates(enum SCP_SERVER_STATES_E e, const char *f);
 
diff --git a/sesman/scp_v1_mng.c b/sesman/scp_v1_mng.c
index 1ae13476..2b7ff216 100644
--- a/sesman/scp_v1_mng.c
+++ b/sesman/scp_v1_mng.c
@@ -32,8 +32,6 @@
 
 #include "libscp.h"
 
-extern struct config_sesman *g_cfg; /* in sesman.c */
-
 static void parseCommonStates(enum SCP_SERVER_STATES_E e, const char *f);
 
 /******************************************************************************/
diff --git a/sesman/sesman.h b/sesman/sesman.h
index ebffff47..0c0a4c6d 100644
--- a/sesman/sesman.h
+++ b/sesman/sesman.h
@@ -41,6 +41,13 @@
 
 #include "libscp.h"
 
+/* Globals */
+extern struct config_sesman *g_cfg;
+extern unsigned char g_fixedkey[8];
+extern tintptr g_term_event;
+extern int g_pid;
+
+
 /*
  * Close all file descriptors used by sesman.
  *
diff --git a/sesman/session.c b/sesman/session.c
index 28fdb3d9..10b8a16d 100644
--- a/sesman/session.c
+++ b/sesman/session.c
@@ -47,8 +47,6 @@
 #define PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 38
 #endif
 
-extern unsigned char g_fixedkey[8];
-extern struct config_sesman *g_cfg; /* in sesman.c */
 struct session_chain *g_sessions;
 int g_session_count;
 
diff --git a/sesman/sig.c b/sesman/sig.c
index cc29dea1..0c4c4483 100644
--- a/sesman/sig.c
+++ b/sesman/sig.c
@@ -32,10 +32,6 @@
 
 #include "sesman.h"
 
-extern int g_pid;
-extern struct config_sesman *g_cfg; /* in sesman.c */
-extern tbus g_term_event;
-
 /******************************************************************************/
 void
 sig_sesman_shutdown(int sig)
diff --git a/sesman/verify_user.c b/sesman/verify_user.c
index 76918d68..2c72d38e 100644
--- a/sesman/verify_user.c
+++ b/sesman/verify_user.c
@@ -42,8 +42,6 @@
 #define SECS_PER_DAY (24L*3600L)
 #endif
 
-extern struct config_sesman *g_cfg; /* in sesman.c */
-
 static int
 auth_crypt_pwd(const char *pwd, const char *pln, char *crp);
 
diff --git a/sesman/verify_user_bsd.c b/sesman/verify_user_bsd.c
index 4b7793d1..06489653 100644
--- a/sesman/verify_user_bsd.c
+++ b/sesman/verify_user_bsd.c
@@ -43,8 +43,6 @@
 #define SECS_PER_DAY (24L*3600L)
 #endif
 
-extern struct config_sesman *g_cfg; /* in sesman.c */
-
 /******************************************************************************/
 /* returns boolean */
 long
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From a94ddce0bd9903146f98dac4803807f02a22b460 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: matt335672 <30179339+matt335672@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Thu, 3 Mar 2022 16:26:59 +0000
Subject: logging : Remove processing for unused variables

---
 common/log.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
 common/log.h |  6 ++++++
 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/common/log.c b/common/log.c
index bfce267a..8273e25b 100644
--- a/common/log.c
+++ b/common/log.c
@@ -470,6 +470,7 @@ internalInitAndAllocStruct(void)
     {
         ret->fd = -1;
         ret->enable_syslog = 0;
+#ifdef LOG_PER_LOGGER_LEVEL
         ret->per_logger_level = list_create();
         if (ret->per_logger_level != NULL)
         {
@@ -481,6 +482,7 @@ internalInitAndAllocStruct(void)
             g_free(ret);
             ret = NULL;
         }
+#endif
     }
     else
     {
@@ -493,8 +495,6 @@ internalInitAndAllocStruct(void)
 void
 internal_log_config_copy(struct log_config *dest, const struct log_config *src)
 {
-    int i;
-
     if (src == NULL || dest == NULL)
     {
         return;
@@ -504,8 +504,10 @@ internal_log_config_copy(struct log_config *dest, const struct log_config *src)
     dest->fd = src->fd;
     dest->log_file = g_strdup(src->log_file);
     dest->log_level = src->log_level;
+#ifdef ENABLE_THREAD
     dest->log_lock = src->log_lock;
     dest->log_lock_attr = src->log_lock_attr;
+#endif
     dest->program_name = src->program_name;
     dest->enable_syslog = src->enable_syslog;
     dest->syslog_level = src->syslog_level;
@@ -514,6 +516,7 @@ internal_log_config_copy(struct log_config *dest, const struct log_config *src)
     dest->enable_pid = src->enable_pid;
     dest->dump_on_start = src->dump_on_start;
 
+#ifdef LOG_PER_LOGGER_LEVEL
     if (src->per_logger_level == NULL)
     {
         return;
@@ -528,6 +531,8 @@ internal_log_config_copy(struct log_config *dest, const struct log_config *src)
         dest->per_logger_level->auto_free = 1;
     }
 
+    int i;
+
     for (i = 0; i < src->per_logger_level->count; ++i)
     {
         struct log_logger_level *dst_logger =
@@ -539,6 +544,7 @@ internal_log_config_copy(struct log_config *dest, const struct log_config *src)
 
         list_add_item(dest->per_logger_level, (tbus) dst_logger);
     }
+#endif
 }
 
 bool_t
@@ -591,6 +597,7 @@ internal_log_location_overrides_level(const char *function_name,
                                       const char *file_name,
                                       enum logLevels *log_level_return)
 {
+#ifdef LOG_PER_LOGGER_LEVEL
     struct log_logger_level *logger = NULL;
     int i;
 
@@ -611,6 +618,7 @@ internal_log_location_overrides_level(const char *function_name,
             return 1;
         }
     }
+#endif
 
     return 0;
 }
@@ -682,11 +690,13 @@ log_config_free(struct log_config *config)
 {
     if (config != NULL)
     {
+#ifdef LOG_PER_LOGGER_LEVEL
         if (config->per_logger_level != NULL)
         {
             list_delete(config->per_logger_level);
             config->per_logger_level = NULL;
         }
+#endif
 
         if (0 != config->log_file)
         {
diff --git a/common/log.h b/common/log.h
index 0194a530..e77f502c 100644
--- a/common/log.h
+++ b/common/log.h
@@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ enum logReturns
 
 #endif
 
+#ifdef LOG_PER_LOGGER_LEVEL
 enum log_logger_type
 {
     LOG_TYPE_FILE = 0,
@@ -174,6 +175,7 @@ struct log_logger_level
     enum log_logger_type logger_type;
     char logger_name[LOGGER_NAME_SIZE + 1];
 };
+#endif
 
 struct log_config
 {
@@ -185,11 +187,15 @@ struct log_config
     enum logLevels console_level;
     int enable_syslog;
     enum logLevels syslog_level;
+#ifdef LOG_PER_LOGGER_LEVEL
     struct list *per_logger_level;
+#endif
     int dump_on_start;
     int enable_pid;
+#ifdef LOG_ENABLE_THREAD
     pthread_mutex_t log_lock;
     pthread_mutexattr_t log_lock_attr;
+#endif
 };
 
 /* internal functions, only used in log.c if this ifdef is defined.*/
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 2484928a5a47f5dba5ddd087d893c6c968b35dbb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: matt335672 <30179339+matt335672@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Thu, 3 Mar 2022 15:37:09 +0000
Subject: Change 3rd parameter of log_start() to flags field

---
 common/log.c    | 147 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 common/log.h    |  25 ++++++++--
 sesman/sesman.c |   5 +-
 xrdp/xrdp.c     |   2 +-
 4 files changed, 137 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)

diff --git a/common/log.c b/common/log.c
index 8273e25b..c0cc857f 100644
--- a/common/log.c
+++ b/common/log.c
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ internal_log_end(struct log_config *l_cfg)
 }
 
 /**
- * Converts a string representing th log level to a value
+ * Converts a string representing the log level to a value
  * @param buf
  * @return
  */
@@ -492,35 +492,21 @@ internalInitAndAllocStruct(void)
     return ret;
 }
 
-void
-internal_log_config_copy(struct log_config *dest, const struct log_config *src)
-{
-    if (src == NULL || dest == NULL)
-    {
-        return;
-    }
+/**
+ * Copies logging levels only from one log_config structure to another
+ **/
 
-    dest->enable_syslog = src->enable_syslog;
-    dest->fd = src->fd;
-    dest->log_file = g_strdup(src->log_file);
+static void
+internal_log_config_copy_levels(struct log_config *dest,
+                                const struct log_config *src)
+{
     dest->log_level = src->log_level;
-#ifdef ENABLE_THREAD
-    dest->log_lock = src->log_lock;
-    dest->log_lock_attr = src->log_lock_attr;
-#endif
-    dest->program_name = src->program_name;
     dest->enable_syslog = src->enable_syslog;
     dest->syslog_level = src->syslog_level;
     dest->enable_console = src->enable_console;
     dest->console_level = src->console_level;
-    dest->enable_pid = src->enable_pid;
-    dest->dump_on_start = src->dump_on_start;
 
 #ifdef LOG_PER_LOGGER_LEVEL
-    if (src->per_logger_level == NULL)
-    {
-        return;
-    }
     if (dest->per_logger_level == NULL)
     {
         dest->per_logger_level = list_create();
@@ -530,6 +516,15 @@ internal_log_config_copy(struct log_config *dest, const struct log_config *src)
         }
         dest->per_logger_level->auto_free = 1;
     }
+    else
+    {
+        list_clear(dest->per_logger_level);
+    }
+
+    if (src->per_logger_level == NULL)
+    {
+        return;
+    }
 
     int i;
 
@@ -538,15 +533,33 @@ internal_log_config_copy(struct log_config *dest, const struct log_config *src)
         struct log_logger_level *dst_logger =
             (struct log_logger_level *)g_malloc(sizeof(struct log_logger_level), 1);
 
-        g_memcpy(dst_logger,
-                 (struct log_logger_level *) list_get_item(src->per_logger_level, i),
-                 sizeof(struct log_logger_level));
+        *dst_logger = *(struct log_logger_level *) list_get_item(src->per_logger_level, i),
 
-        list_add_item(dest->per_logger_level, (tbus) dst_logger);
+         list_add_item(dest->per_logger_level, (tbus) dst_logger);
     }
 #endif
 }
 
+void
+internal_log_config_copy(struct log_config *dest, const struct log_config *src)
+{
+    if (src != NULL && dest != NULL)
+    {
+        dest->fd = src->fd;
+        g_free(dest->log_file);
+        dest->log_file = g_strdup(src->log_file);
+#ifdef LOG_ENABLE_THREAD
+        dest->log_lock = src->log_lock;
+        dest->log_lock_attr = src->log_lock_attr;
+#endif
+        dest->program_name = src->program_name;
+        dest->enable_pid = src->enable_pid;
+        dest->dump_on_start = src->dump_on_start;
+
+        internal_log_config_copy_levels(dest, src);
+    }
+}
+
 bool_t
 internal_log_is_enabled_for_level(const enum logLevels log_level,
                                   const bool_t override_destination_level,
@@ -710,6 +723,62 @@ log_config_free(struct log_config *config)
     return LOG_STARTUP_OK;
 }
 
+/**
+ * Restarts the logging.
+ *
+ * The logging file is never changed, as it is common in xrdp to share a
+ * log file between parents and children. The end result would be
+ * confusing for the user.
+ */
+static enum logReturns
+log_restart_from_param(const struct log_config *lc)
+{
+    enum logReturns rv = LOG_GENERAL_ERROR;
+
+    if (g_staticLogConfig == NULL)
+    {
+        log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ALWAYS, "Log not already initialized");
+    }
+    else if (lc == NULL)
+    {
+        g_writeln("lc to log_start_from_param is NULL");
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        if (g_staticLogConfig->fd >= 0 &&
+                g_strcmp(g_staticLogConfig->log_file, lc->log_file) != 0)
+        {
+            log_message(LOG_LEVEL_WARNING,
+                        "Unable to change log file name from %s to %s",
+                        g_staticLogConfig->log_file,
+                        lc->log_file);
+        }
+        /* Reconfigure syslog logging, allowing for a program_name change */
+        if (g_staticLogConfig->enable_syslog)
+        {
+            closelog();
+        }
+        if (lc->enable_syslog)
+        {
+            openlog(lc->program_name, LOG_CONS | LOG_PID, LOG_DAEMON);
+        }
+
+        /* Copy over simple values... */
+#ifdef LOG_ENABLE_THREAD
+        g_staticLogConfig->log_lock = lc->log_lock;
+        g_staticLogConfig->log_lock_attr = lc->log_lock_attr;
+#endif
+        g_staticLogConfig->program_name = lc->program_name;
+        g_staticLogConfig->enable_pid = lc->enable_pid;
+        g_staticLogConfig->dump_on_start = lc->dump_on_start;
+
+        /* ... and the log levels */
+        internal_log_config_copy_levels(g_staticLogConfig, lc);
+        rv = LOG_STARTUP_OK;
+    }
+    return rv;
+}
+
 enum logReturns
 log_start_from_param(const struct log_config *src_log_config)
 {
@@ -758,7 +827,7 @@ log_start_from_param(const struct log_config *src_log_config)
  */
 enum logReturns
 log_start(const char *iniFile, const char *applicationName,
-          bool_t dump_on_start)
+          unsigned int flags)
 {
     enum logReturns ret = LOG_GENERAL_ERROR;
     struct log_config *config;
@@ -767,14 +836,24 @@ log_start(const char *iniFile, const char *applicationName,
 
     if (config != NULL)
     {
-        config->dump_on_start = dump_on_start;
-        ret = log_start_from_param(config);
-        log_config_free(config);
-
-        if (ret != LOG_STARTUP_OK)
+        config->dump_on_start = (flags & LOG_START_DUMP_CONFIG) ? 1 : 0;
+        if (flags & LOG_START_RESTART)
         {
-            g_writeln("Could not start log");
+            ret = log_restart_from_param(config);
+            if (ret != LOG_STARTUP_OK)
+            {
+                g_writeln("Could not restart log");
+            }
+        }
+        else
+        {
+            ret = log_start_from_param(config);
+            if (ret != LOG_STARTUP_OK)
+            {
+                g_writeln("Could not start log");
+            }
         }
+        log_config_free(config);
     }
     else
     {
@@ -824,7 +903,7 @@ log_hexdump_with_location(const char *function_name,
 {
     char *dump_buffer;
     enum logReturns rv = LOG_STARTUP_OK;
-    enum logLevels override_log_level;
+    enum logLevels override_log_level = LOG_LEVEL_NEVER;
     bool_t override_destination_level = 0;
 
     override_destination_level = internal_log_location_overrides_level(
diff --git a/common/log.h b/common/log.h
index e77f502c..17615560 100644
--- a/common/log.h
+++ b/common/log.h
@@ -162,6 +162,22 @@ enum logReturns
 
 #endif
 
+/* Flags values for log_start() */
+
+/**
+ * Dump the log config on startup
+ */
+#define LOG_START_DUMP_CONFIG (1<<0)
+
+/**
+ * Restart the logging system.
+ *
+ * On a restart, existing files are not closed. This is because the
+ * files may be shared by sub-processes, and the result will not be what the
+ * user expects
+ */
+#define LOG_START_RESTART (1<<1)
+
 #ifdef LOG_PER_LOGGER_LEVEL
 enum log_logger_type
 {
@@ -179,8 +195,8 @@ struct log_logger_level
 
 struct log_config
 {
-    const char *program_name;
-    char *log_file;
+    const char *program_name; /* Pointer to static storage */
+    char *log_file; /* Dynamically allocated */
     int fd;
     enum logLevels log_level;
     int enable_console;
@@ -300,13 +316,12 @@ internal_log_location_overrides_level(const char *function_name,
  * @param iniFile
  * @param applicationName the name that is used in the log for the running
  *                        application
- * @param dump_on_start Whether to dump the config on stdout before
- *                      logging is started
+ * @param flags Flags to affect the operation of the call
  * @return LOG_STARTUP_OK on success
  */
 enum logReturns
 log_start(const char *iniFile, const char *applicationName,
-          bool_t dump_on_start);
+          unsigned int flags);
 
 /**
  * An alternative log_start where the caller gives the params directly.
diff --git a/sesman/sesman.c b/sesman/sesman.c
index e2b057e6..b092d241 100644
--- a/sesman/sesman.c
+++ b/sesman/sesman.c
@@ -627,8 +627,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
     }
 
     /* starting logging subsystem */
-    log_error = log_start(startup_params.sesman_ini, "xrdp-sesman",
-                          startup_params.dump_config);
+    log_error = log_start(
+                    startup_params.sesman_ini, "xrdp-sesman",
+                    (startup_params.dump_config) ? LOG_START_DUMP_CONFIG : 0);
 
     if (log_error != LOG_STARTUP_OK)
     {
diff --git a/xrdp/xrdp.c b/xrdp/xrdp.c
index 22eee5b3..e91672fb 100644
--- a/xrdp/xrdp.c
+++ b/xrdp/xrdp.c
@@ -538,7 +538,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 
     /* starting logging subsystem */
     error = log_start(startup_params.xrdp_ini, "xrdp",
-                      startup_params.dump_config);
+                      (startup_params.dump_config) ? LOG_START_DUMP_CONFIG : 0);
 
     if (error != LOG_STARTUP_OK)
     {
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 8bd597a03885ebb23b224995d0c7bc5bf3f0e85c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: matt335672 <30179339+matt335672@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Thu, 3 Mar 2022 15:37:46 +0000
Subject: Fix signal handling in sesman

---
 sesman/sesman.c  | 204 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
 sesman/sesman.h  |  20 +++++-
 sesman/session.c |  13 ++--
 sesman/sig.c     | 126 ++++++----------------------------
 sesman/sig.h     |  23 +------
 5 files changed, 195 insertions(+), 191 deletions(-)

diff --git a/sesman/sesman.c b/sesman/sesman.c
index b092d241..3d15a83b 100644
--- a/sesman/sesman.c
+++ b/sesman/sesman.c
@@ -52,11 +52,11 @@ struct sesman_startup_params
     int dump_config;
 };
 
-int g_pid;
+struct config_sesman *g_cfg;
 unsigned char g_fixedkey[8] = { 23, 82, 107, 6, 35, 78, 88, 7 };
-struct config_sesman *g_cfg; /* defined in config.h */
-
 tintptr g_term_event = 0;
+tintptr g_sigchld_event = 0;
+tintptr g_reload_event = 0;
 
 /**
  * Items stored on the g_con_list
@@ -67,8 +67,9 @@ struct sesman_con
     struct SCP_SESSION *s;
 };
 
-static struct trans *g_list_trans = NULL;
+static struct trans *g_list_trans;
 static struct list *g_con_list = NULL;
+static int g_pid;
 
 /*****************************************************************************/
 /**
@@ -263,7 +264,7 @@ sesman_close_all(void)
     struct sesman_con *sc;
 
     LOG_DEVEL(LOG_LEVEL_TRACE, "sesman_close_all:");
-    trans_delete(g_list_trans);
+    sesman_delete_listening_transport();
     for (index = 0; index < g_con_list->count; index++)
     {
         sc = (struct sesman_con *) list_get_item(g_con_list, index);
@@ -340,6 +341,86 @@ sesman_listen_conn_in(struct trans *self, struct trans *new_self)
     return 0;
 }
 
+/******************************************************************************/
+/**
+ * Informs the main loop a termination signal has been received
+ */
+static void
+set_term_event(int sig)
+{
+    /* Don't try to use a wait obj in a child process */
+    if (g_getpid() == g_pid)
+    {
+        g_set_wait_obj(g_term_event);
+    }
+}
+
+/******************************************************************************/
+/**
+ * Informs the main loop a SIGCHLD has been received
+ */
+static void
+set_sigchld_event(int sig)
+{
+    /* Don't try to use a wait obj in a child process */
+    if (g_getpid() == g_pid)
+    {
+        g_set_wait_obj(g_sigchld_event);
+    }
+}
+
+/******************************************************************************/
+/**
+ * Informs the main loop a SIGHUP has been received
+ */
+static void
+set_reload_event(int sig)
+{
+    /* Don't try to use a wait obj in a child process */
+    if (g_getpid() == g_pid)
+    {
+        g_set_wait_obj(g_reload_event);
+    }
+}
+
+/******************************************************************************/
+void
+sesman_delete_listening_transport(void)
+{
+    trans_delete(g_list_trans);
+    g_list_trans = NULL;
+}
+
+/******************************************************************************/
+int
+sesman_create_listening_transport(const struct config_sesman *cfg)
+{
+    int rv = 1;
+    g_list_trans = trans_create(TRANS_MODE_TCP, 8192, 8192);
+    if (g_list_trans == NULL)
+    {
+        LOG(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "%s: trans_create failed", __func__);
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        LOG(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, "%s: address %s port %s",
+            __func__, cfg->listen_address, cfg->listen_port);
+        rv = trans_listen_address(g_list_trans, cfg->listen_port,
+                                  cfg->listen_address);
+        if (rv != 0)
+        {
+            LOG(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "%s: trans_listen_address failed", __func__);
+            sesman_delete_listening_transport();
+        }
+        else
+        {
+            g_list_trans->trans_conn_in = sesman_listen_conn_in;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return rv;
+}
+
 /******************************************************************************/
 /**
  *
@@ -352,7 +433,6 @@ sesman_main_loop(void)
     int error;
     int robjs_count;
     int wobjs_count;
-    int cont;
     int timeout;
     int index;
     intptr_t robjs[32];
@@ -365,33 +445,22 @@ sesman_main_loop(void)
         LOG(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "sesman_main_loop: list_create failed");
         return 1;
     }
-    g_list_trans = trans_create(TRANS_MODE_TCP, 8192, 8192);
-    if (g_list_trans == NULL)
+    if (sesman_create_listening_transport(g_cfg) != 0)
     {
-        LOG(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "sesman_main_loop: trans_create failed");
+        LOG(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
+            "sesman_main_loop: sesman_create_listening_transport failed");
         list_delete(g_con_list);
         return 1;
     }
 
-    LOG(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, "sesman_main_loop: address %s port %s",
-        g_cfg->listen_address, g_cfg->listen_port);
-    error = trans_listen_address(g_list_trans, g_cfg->listen_port,
-                                 g_cfg->listen_address);
-    if (error != 0)
-    {
-        LOG(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "sesman_main_loop: trans_listen_address "
-            "failed");
-        trans_delete(g_list_trans);
-        list_delete(g_con_list);
-        return 1;
-    }
-    g_list_trans->trans_conn_in = sesman_listen_conn_in;
-    cont = 1;
-    while (cont)
+    error = 0;
+    while (!error)
     {
         timeout = -1;
         robjs_count = 0;
         robjs[robjs_count++] = g_term_event;
+        robjs[robjs_count++] = g_sigchld_event;
+        robjs[robjs_count++] = g_reload_event;
         wobjs_count = 0;
         for (index = 0; index < g_con_list->count; index++)
         {
@@ -413,34 +482,53 @@ sesman_main_loop(void)
         {
             break;
         }
-        error = trans_get_wait_objs_rw(g_list_trans, robjs, &robjs_count,
-                                       wobjs, &wobjs_count, &timeout);
-        if (error != 0)
+        if (g_list_trans != NULL)
         {
-            LOG(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "sesman_main_loop: "
-                "trans_get_wait_objs_rw failed");
-            break;
+            /* g_list_trans might be NULL on a reconfigure if sesman
+             * is unable to listen again */
+            error = trans_get_wait_objs_rw(g_list_trans, robjs, &robjs_count,
+                                           wobjs, &wobjs_count, &timeout);
+            if (error != 0)
+            {
+                LOG(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "sesman_main_loop: "
+                    "trans_get_wait_objs_rw failed");
+                break;
+            }
         }
 
-        error = g_obj_wait(robjs, robjs_count, wobjs, wobjs_count, timeout);
-        if (error != 0)
+        if (g_obj_wait(robjs, robjs_count, wobjs, wobjs_count, timeout) != 0)
         {
-            /* error, should not get here */
+            /* should not get here */
+            LOG(LOG_LEVEL_WARNING, "sesman_main_loop: "
+                "Unexpected error from g_obj_wait()");
             g_sleep(100);
         }
 
         if (g_is_wait_obj_set(g_term_event)) /* term */
         {
+            LOG(LOG_LEVEL_INFO, "sesman_main_loop: "
+                "sesman asked to terminate");
             break;
         }
 
+        if (g_is_wait_obj_set(g_sigchld_event)) /* A child has exited */
+        {
+            g_reset_wait_obj(g_sigchld_event);
+            sig_sesman_session_end();
+        }
+
+        if (g_is_wait_obj_set(g_reload_event)) /* We're asked to reload */
+        {
+            g_reset_wait_obj(g_reload_event);
+            sig_sesman_reload_cfg();
+        }
+
         for (index = 0; index < g_con_list->count; index++)
         {
             scon = (struct sesman_con *)list_get_item(g_con_list, index);
             if (scon != NULL)
             {
-                error = trans_check_wait_objs(scon->t);
-                if (error != 0)
+                if (trans_check_wait_objs(scon->t) != 0)
                 {
                     LOG(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "sesman_main_loop: "
                         "trans_check_wait_objs failed, removing trans");
@@ -451,12 +539,16 @@ sesman_main_loop(void)
                 }
             }
         }
-        error = trans_check_wait_objs(g_list_trans);
-        if (error != 0)
+
+        if (g_list_trans != NULL)
         {
-            LOG(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "sesman_main_loop: "
-                "trans_check_wait_objs failed");
-            break;
+            error = trans_check_wait_objs(g_list_trans);
+            if (error != 0)
+            {
+                LOG(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "sesman_main_loop: "
+                    "trans_check_wait_objs failed");
+                break;
+            }
         }
     }
     for (index = 0; index < g_con_list->count; index++)
@@ -465,7 +557,7 @@ sesman_main_loop(void)
         delete_connection(scon);
     }
     list_delete(g_con_list);
-    trans_delete(g_list_trans);
+    sesman_delete_listening_transport();
     return 0;
 }
 
@@ -710,20 +802,17 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 
     /* signal handling */
     g_pid = g_getpid();
-    /* old style signal handling is now managed synchronously by a
-     * separate thread. uncomment this block if you need old style
-     * signal handling and comment out thread_sighandler_start()
-     * going back to old style for the time being
-     * problem with the sigaddset functions in sig.c - jts */
-#if 1
-    g_signal_hang_up(sig_sesman_reload_cfg); /* SIGHUP  */
-    g_signal_user_interrupt(sig_sesman_shutdown); /* SIGINT  */
-    g_signal_terminate(sig_sesman_shutdown); /* SIGTERM */
-    g_signal_child_stop(sig_sesman_session_end); /* SIGCHLD */
-#endif
-#if 0
-    thread_sighandler_start();
-#endif
+    g_snprintf(text, 255, "xrdp_sesman_%8.8x_main_term", g_pid);
+    g_term_event = g_create_wait_obj(text);
+    g_snprintf(text, 255, "xrdp_sesman_%8.8x_sigchld", g_pid);
+    g_sigchld_event = g_create_wait_obj(text);
+    g_snprintf(text, 255, "xrdp_sesman_%8.8x_reload", g_pid);
+    g_reload_event = g_create_wait_obj(text);
+
+    g_signal_hang_up(set_reload_event); /* SIGHUP  */
+    g_signal_user_interrupt(set_term_event); /* SIGINT  */
+    g_signal_terminate(set_term_event); /* SIGTERM */
+    g_signal_child_stop(set_sigchld_event); /* SIGCHLD */
 
     if (daemon)
     {
@@ -765,9 +854,6 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
         g_chmod_hex("/tmp/.X11-unix", 0x1777);
     }
 
-    g_snprintf(text, 255, "xrdp_sesman_%8.8x_main_term", g_pid);
-    g_term_event = g_create_wait_obj(text);
-
     error = sesman_main_loop();
 
     /* clean up PID file on exit */
@@ -776,6 +862,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
         g_file_delete(pid_file);
     }
 
+    g_delete_wait_obj(g_reload_event);
+    g_delete_wait_obj(g_sigchld_event);
     g_delete_wait_obj(g_term_event);
 
     if (!daemon)
diff --git a/sesman/sesman.h b/sesman/sesman.h
index 0c0a4c6d..e7e7fe63 100644
--- a/sesman/sesman.h
+++ b/sesman/sesman.h
@@ -45,8 +45,8 @@
 extern struct config_sesman *g_cfg;
 extern unsigned char g_fixedkey[8];
 extern tintptr g_term_event;
-extern int g_pid;
-
+extern tintptr g_sigchld_event;
+extern tintptr g_reload_event;
 
 /*
  * Close all file descriptors used by sesman.
@@ -60,4 +60,20 @@ extern int g_pid;
 int
 sesman_close_all(void);
 
+/*
+ * Remove the listening transport
+ *
+ * Needed if reloading the config and the listener has changed
+ */
+void
+sesman_delete_listening_transport(void);
+
+/*
+ * Create the listening socket transport
+ *
+ * @return 0 for success
+ */
+int
+sesman_create_listening_transport(const struct config_sesman *cfg);
+
 #endif
diff --git a/sesman/session.c b/sesman/session.c
index 10b8a16d..8be3855a 100644
--- a/sesman/session.c
+++ b/sesman/session.c
@@ -47,10 +47,8 @@
 #define PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 38
 #endif
 
-struct session_chain *g_sessions;
-int g_session_count;
-
-extern tbus g_term_event; /* in sesman.c */
+static struct session_chain *g_sessions;
+static int g_session_count;
 
 /**
  * Creates a string consisting of all parameters that is hosted in the param list
@@ -522,8 +520,13 @@ session_start_fork(tbus data, tui8 type, struct SCP_SESSION *s)
                 "Failed to clone the session data - out of memory");
             g_exit(1);
         }
-        auth_start_session(data, display);
+
+        /* Wait objects created in a parent are not valid in a child */
+        g_delete_wait_obj(g_reload_event);
+        g_delete_wait_obj(g_sigchld_event);
         g_delete_wait_obj(g_term_event);
+
+        auth_start_session(data, display);
         sesman_close_all();
         g_sprintf(geometry, "%dx%d", s->width, s->height);
         g_sprintf(depth, "%d", s->bpp);
diff --git a/sesman/sig.c b/sesman/sig.c
index 0c4c4483..14d4c820 100644
--- a/sesman/sig.c
+++ b/sesman/sig.c
@@ -28,48 +28,17 @@
 #include <config_ac.h>
 #endif
 
-#include <signal.h>
-
+#include "string_calls.h"
 #include "sesman.h"
 
 /******************************************************************************/
 void
-sig_sesman_shutdown(int sig)
-{
-    char pid_file[256];
-
-    LOG(LOG_LEVEL_INFO, "shutting down sesman %d", 1);
-
-    if (g_getpid() != g_pid)
-    {
-        LOG_DEVEL(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, "g_getpid() [%d] differs from g_pid [%d]", (g_getpid()), g_pid);
-        return;
-    }
-
-    LOG_DEVEL(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, " - getting signal %d pid %d", sig, g_getpid());
-
-    g_set_wait_obj(g_term_event);
-
-    session_sigkill_all();
-
-    g_snprintf(pid_file, 255, "%s/xrdp-sesman.pid", XRDP_PID_PATH);
-    g_file_delete(pid_file);
-}
-
-/******************************************************************************/
-void
-sig_sesman_reload_cfg(int sig)
+sig_sesman_reload_cfg(void)
 {
     int error;
     struct config_sesman *cfg;
 
-    LOG(LOG_LEVEL_WARNING, "receiving SIGHUP %d", 1);
-
-    if (g_getpid() != g_pid)
-    {
-        LOG_DEVEL(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, "g_getpid() [%d] differs from g_pid [%d]", g_getpid(), g_pid);
-        return;
-    }
+    LOG(LOG_LEVEL_INFO, "receiving SIGHUP");
 
     if ((cfg = config_read(g_cfg->sesman_ini)) == NULL)
     {
@@ -77,8 +46,18 @@ sig_sesman_reload_cfg(int sig)
         return;
     }
 
-    /* stop logging subsystem */
-    log_end();
+    /* Deal with significant config changes */
+    if (g_strcmp(g_cfg->listen_address, cfg->listen_address) != 0 ||
+            g_strcmp(g_cfg->listen_port, cfg->listen_port) != 0)
+    {
+        LOG(LOG_LEVEL_INFO, "sesman listen address changed to %s:%s",
+            cfg->listen_address, cfg->listen_port);
+
+        /* We have to delete the old port before listening to the new one
+         * in case they overlap in scope */
+        sesman_delete_listening_transport();
+        sesman_create_listening_transport(cfg);
+    }
 
     /* free old config data */
     config_free(g_cfg);
@@ -86,8 +65,8 @@ sig_sesman_reload_cfg(int sig)
     /* replace old config with newly read one */
     g_cfg = cfg;
 
-    /* start again logging subsystem */
-    error = log_start(g_cfg->sesman_ini, "xrdp-sesman", 0);
+    /* Restart logging subsystem */
+    error = log_start(g_cfg->sesman_ini, "xrdp-sesman", LOG_START_RESTART);
 
     if (error != LOG_STARTUP_OK)
     {
@@ -109,84 +88,21 @@ sig_sesman_reload_cfg(int sig)
 
 /******************************************************************************/
 void
-sig_sesman_session_end(int sig)
+sig_sesman_session_end(void)
 {
     int pid;
 
-    if (g_getpid() != g_pid)
-    {
-        return;
-    }
-
+    LOG(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, "receiving SIGCHLD");
     do
     {
         pid = g_waitchild();
 
         if (pid > 0)
         {
+            LOG(LOG_LEVEL_INFO, "Process %d has exited", pid);
+
             session_kill(pid);
         }
     }
     while (pid > 0);
 }
-
-/******************************************************************************/
-void *
-sig_handler_thread(void *arg)
-{
-    int recv_signal;
-    sigset_t sigmask;
-    sigset_t oldmask;
-    sigset_t waitmask;
-
-    /* mask signals to be able to wait for them... */
-    sigfillset(&sigmask);
-    /* it is a good idea not to block SIGILL SIGSEGV */
-    /* SIGFPE -- see sigaction(2) NOTES              */
-    pthread_sigmask(SIG_BLOCK, &sigmask, &oldmask);
-
-    /* building the signal wait mask... */
-    sigemptyset(&waitmask);
-    sigaddset(&waitmask, SIGHUP);
-    sigaddset(&waitmask, SIGCHLD);
-    sigaddset(&waitmask, SIGTERM);
-    sigaddset(&waitmask, SIGINT);
-
-    //  sigaddset(&waitmask, SIGFPE);
-    //  sigaddset(&waitmask, SIGILL);
-    //  sigaddset(&waitmask, SIGSEGV);
-
-    do
-    {
-        LOG_DEVEL(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, "calling sigwait()");
-        sigwait(&waitmask, &recv_signal);
-
-        switch (recv_signal)
-        {
-            case SIGHUP:
-                //reload cfg
-                //we must stop & restart logging, or copy logging cfg!!!!
-                LOG_DEVEL(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, "sesman received SIGHUP");
-                //return 0;
-                break;
-            case SIGCHLD:
-                /* a session died */
-                LOG_DEVEL(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, "sesman received SIGCHLD");
-                sig_sesman_session_end(SIGCHLD);
-                break;
-            case SIGINT:
-                /* we die */
-                LOG_DEVEL(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, "sesman received SIGINT");
-                sig_sesman_shutdown(recv_signal);
-                break;
-            case SIGTERM:
-                /* we die */
-                LOG_DEVEL(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, "sesman received SIGTERM");
-                sig_sesman_shutdown(recv_signal);
-                break;
-        }
-    }
-    while (1);
-
-    return 0;
-}
diff --git a/sesman/sig.h b/sesman/sig.h
index f7582686..447dde63 100644
--- a/sesman/sig.h
+++ b/sesman/sig.h
@@ -27,39 +27,20 @@
 #ifndef SIG_H
 #define SIG_H
 
-/**
- *
- * @brief Shutdown signal code
- * @param sig The received signal
- *
- */
-void
-sig_sesman_shutdown(int sig);
-
 /**
  *
  * @brief SIGHUP handling code
- * @param sig The received signal
  *
  */
 void
-sig_sesman_reload_cfg(int sig);
+sig_sesman_reload_cfg(void);
 
 /**
  *
  * @brief SIGCHLD handling code
- * @param sig The received signal
  *
  */
 void
-sig_sesman_session_end(int sig);
-
-/**
- *
- * @brief signal handling thread
- *
- */
-void *
-sig_handler_thread(void *arg);
+sig_sesman_session_end(void);
 
 #endif
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 0ad7bac6935110c505c4e80e390c49c5b6f32140 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Koichiro IWAO <meta@vmeta.jp>
Date: Mon, 7 Feb 2022 15:53:08 +0900
Subject: Update NEWS for v0.9.18.1

---
 NEWS.md | 14 ++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)

diff --git a/NEWS.md b/NEWS.md
index d0e60959..77d7b21b 100644
--- a/NEWS.md
+++ b/NEWS.md
@@ -1,3 +1,17 @@
+# Release notes for xrdp v0.9.18.1 (2022/02/08)
+
+This is a security fix release that includes fixes for the following privilege escalation vulnerability.
+
+* [CVE-2022-23613: Privilege escalation on xrdp-sesman](https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-23613)
+
+Users who uses xrdp v0.9.17 or v0.9.18 are recommended to update to this version.
+
+## Special thanks
+
+Thanks to [Gilad Kleinman](https://github.com/giladkl) reporting the vulnerability and reviewing fix.
+
+-----------------------
+
 # Release notes for xrdp v0.9.18 (2022/01/10)
 
 ## General announcements
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 68abf67a059c26dd4fd7e419ca39e72d987dadf7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Koichiro IWAO <meta@vmeta.jp>
Date: Mon, 7 Mar 2022 15:45:46 +0900
Subject: Update NEWS for v0.9.19

---
 NEWS.md | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+)

diff --git a/NEWS.md b/NEWS.md
index 77d7b21b..cc483986 100644
--- a/NEWS.md
+++ b/NEWS.md
@@ -1,3 +1,40 @@
+# Release notes for xrdp v0.9.19 (2022/03/17)
+
+## General announcements
+* Running xrdp and xrdp-sesman on separate hosts is still supported by this release, but is now deprecated. This is not secure. A future release will replace the TCP socket used between these processes with a Unix Domain Socket, and then cross-host running will not be possible.
+
+## New features
+* Both inbound and outbound clipboards can now be restricted for text, files or images [Sponsored by @CyberTrust @clear-code and @kenhys] (#2087)
+
+## Bug fixes
+* [CVE-2022-23613](https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-23613): Privilege escalation on xrdp-sesman (This fix is also in the out-of-band v0.9.18.1 release)
+* The versions of imlib2 used on RHEL 7 and 8 are now detected correctly (#2118)
+* Some situations where zombie processes could exist have been resolved (#2146, #2151, #2168)
+* Some null-pointer exceptions which can happen in the logging module have been addressed (#2149)
+* Some minor logging errors have been corrected (#2152)
+* The signal handling in sesman has been reworked to prevent race conditions when a child exits. This has also made it possible to reliably reload the sesman configuration with SIGHUP (#1729, #2168)
+
+## Internal changes
+* Versions 0.13 and later of checklib can undefine the pre-processor symbol `HAVE_STDINT_H`. The xrdp tests now build successfully against these versions (#2124)
+* OpenSSL packaging changes (#2130):-
+   - The OpenSSL 3 EVP interface is now fully supported
+   - When building against OpenSSL 3, an internal implementation of the RC4 cipher is used instead of the implementation from the OpenSSL legacy provider
+   - The wrapping of the OpenSSL library has been improved which should make it simpler to provide an alternative cryptographic provider in the future, if required
+   - The logging of TLS/non-TLS security negotiation has been improved
+* cppcheck version used for CI bumped to 2.7 (#2140)
+* The `s_check()` macro which is easily mis-used has been removed (#2144)
+* Status values for the DRDYNVC channel are now available in `libxrdp/xrdp_channel.h`
+
+## Changes for packagers or developers
+* On OpenSSL 3 systems, there is now no need to build with the `-Wno-error=deprecated-declarations` flag
+
+## Known issues
+
+* On-the-fly resolution change requires the Microsoft Store version of Remote Desktop client but sometimes crashes on connect (#1869)
+* xrdp's login dialog is not relocated at the center of the new resolution after on-the-fly resolution change happens (#1867)
+
+-----------------------
+
 # Release notes for xrdp v0.9.18.1 (2022/02/08)
 
 This is a security fix release that includes fixes for the following privilege escalation vulnerability.
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 3fa6e9852be1f633f0d6bd30ebadf4bffe9a73bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Koichiro IWAO <meta@vmeta.jp>
Date: Mon, 7 Mar 2022 15:46:17 +0900
Subject: Bump version to v0.9.19

---
 configure.ac | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index a7a10bf6..015f81a8 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # Process this file with autoconf to produce a configure script
 
 AC_PREREQ(2.65)
-AC_INIT([xrdp], [0.9.18], [xrdp-devel@googlegroups.com])
+AC_INIT([xrdp], [0.9.19], [xrdp-devel@googlegroups.com])
 AC_CONFIG_HEADERS(config_ac.h:config_ac-h.in)
 AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE([1.7.2 foreign])
 AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIR([m4])
-- 
cgit v1.2.3