diff options
| author | Ben Noordhuis <info@bnoordhuis.nl> | 2015-12-03 19:18:52 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Rod Vagg <rod@vagg.org> | 2015-12-03 21:39:50 +0300 |
| commit | 8d24a14f2c9d98f664fbe96a25cb2918982c39ba (patch) | |
| tree | 87d52c8f37950a5b6a68689cfc084d41a2534d06 | |
| parent | dfc6f4a9afdfa1e6f1d0a77098d1850b035643d4 (diff) | |
deps: upgrade to openssl 1.0.1q
Contains fixes for:
* CVE-2015-3194 Certificate verify crash with missing PSS parameter
* CVE-2015-3195 X509_ATTRIBUTE memory leak
fixup! character encoding noise
fixup! update opensslconf.h
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/4133
Reviewed-By: Fedor Indutny <fedor@indutny.com>
Reviewed-By: Shigeki Ohtsu <ohtsu@iij.ad.jp>
140 files changed, 1331 insertions, 677 deletions
diff --git a/deps/openssl/asm/arm-elf-gas/bn/armv4-gf2m.S b/deps/openssl/asm/arm-elf-gas/bn/armv4-gf2m.S index 552a883709f..7efebb81d4d 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/asm/arm-elf-gas/bn/armv4-gf2m.S +++ b/deps/openssl/asm/arm-elf-gas/bn/armv4-gf2m.S @@ -11,13 +11,13 @@ mul_1x1_neon: vshl.u64 d2,d16,#8 @ q1-q3 are slided - vmull.p8 q0,d16,d17 @ a·bb + vmull.p8 q0,d16,d17 @ a·bb vshl.u64 d4,d16,#16 - vmull.p8 q1,d2,d17 @ a<<8·bb + vmull.p8 q1,d2,d17 @ a<<8·bb vshl.u64 d6,d16,#24 - vmull.p8 q2,d4,d17 @ a<<16·bb + vmull.p8 q2,d4,d17 @ a<<16·bb vshr.u64 d2,#8 - vmull.p8 q3,d6,d17 @ a<<24·bb + vmull.p8 q3,d6,d17 @ a<<24·bb vshl.u64 d3,#24 veor d0,d2 vshr.u64 d4,#16 @@ -132,20 +132,20 @@ bn_GF2m_mul_2x2: vmov d16,d18 vmov d17,d19 - bl mul_1x1_neon @ a1·b1 + bl mul_1x1_neon @ a1·b1 vmov d22,d0 vmov d16,d20 vmov d17,d21 - bl mul_1x1_neon @ a0·b0 + bl mul_1x1_neon @ a0·b0 vmov d23,d0 veor d16,d20,d18 veor d17,d21,d19 veor d20,d23,d22 - bl mul_1x1_neon @ (a0+a1)·(b0+b1) + bl mul_1x1_neon @ (a0+a1)·(b0+b1) - veor d0,d20 @ (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)-a0·b0-a1·b1 + veor d0,d20 @ (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)-a0·b0-a1·b1 vshl.u64 d1,d0,#32 vshr.u64 d0,d0,#32 veor d23,d1 @@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ bn_GF2m_mul_2x2: mov r12,#7<<2 sub sp,sp,#32 @ allocate tab[8] - bl mul_1x1_ialu @ a1·b1 + bl mul_1x1_ialu @ a1·b1 str r5,[r10,#8] str r4,[r10,#12] @@ -175,13 +175,13 @@ bn_GF2m_mul_2x2: eor r2,r2,r1 eor r0,r0,r3 eor r1,r1,r2 - bl mul_1x1_ialu @ a0·b0 + bl mul_1x1_ialu @ a0·b0 str r5,[r10] str r4,[r10,#4] eor r1,r1,r2 eor r0,r0,r3 - bl mul_1x1_ialu @ (a1+a0)·(b1+b0) + bl mul_1x1_ialu @ (a1+a0)·(b1+b0) ldmia r10,{r6-r9} eor r5,r5,r4 eor r4,r4,r7 diff --git a/deps/openssl/asm/arm-elf-gas/modes/ghash-armv4.S b/deps/openssl/asm/arm-elf-gas/modes/ghash-armv4.S index 872aff1727f..c291a571167 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/asm/arm-elf-gas/modes/ghash-armv4.S +++ b/deps/openssl/asm/arm-elf-gas/modes/ghash-armv4.S @@ -368,8 +368,8 @@ gcm_ghash_neon: vdup.8 d4,d28[0] @ broadcast lowest byte .Linner_neon: subs r1,r1,#1 - vmull.p8 q9,d1,d4 @ H.lo·Xi[i] - vmull.p8 q8,d0,d4 @ H.hi·Xi[i] + vmull.p8 q9,d1,d4 @ H.lo·Xi[i] + vmull.p8 q8,d0,d4 @ H.hi·Xi[i] vext.8 q14,q12,#1 @ IN>>=8 veor q10,q13 @ modulo-scheduled part @@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ gcm_ghash_neon: vsli.8 d2,d3,#1 @ compose the "carry" byte vext.8 q10,q12,#1 @ Z>>=8 - vmull.p8 q11,d2,d5 @ "carry"·0xe1 + vmull.p8 q11,d2,d5 @ "carry"·0xe1 vshr.u8 d2,d3,#7 @ save Z's bottom bit vext.8 q13,q9,q12,#1 @ Qlo>>=8 veor q10,q8 diff --git a/deps/openssl/config/opensslconf.h b/deps/openssl/config/opensslconf.h index 9bf23692d64..508b1b2da71 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/config/opensslconf.h +++ b/deps/openssl/config/opensslconf.h @@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ even newer MIPS CPU's, but at the moment one size fits all for optimization options. Older Sparc's work better with only UNROLL, but there's no way to tell at compile time what it is you're running on */ -# if defined( sun ) /* Newer Sparc's */ +# if defined( __sun ) || defined ( sun ) /* Newer Sparc's */ # define DES_PTR # define DES_RISC1 # define DES_UNROLL diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/Makefile b/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/Makefile index cafe55458dd..8c3297ea672 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/Makefile +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/Makefile @@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ update: openssl-vms.cnf local_depend depend: local_depend @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi local_depend: - @[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(SRC); \ + @[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(SRC) dclean: $(PERL) -pe 'if (/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/) {print; exit(0);}' $(MAKEFILE) >Makefile.new diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/apps.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/apps.c index 68012383483..8ab4833668b 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/apps.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/apps.c @@ -119,9 +119,6 @@ #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> -#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32) && !defined(NETWARE_CLIB) -# include <strings.h> -#endif #include <sys/types.h> #include <ctype.h> #include <errno.h> @@ -1247,7 +1244,11 @@ int set_name_ex(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg) {"ca_default", XN_FLAG_MULTILINE, 0xffffffffL}, {NULL, 0, 0} }; - return set_multi_opts(flags, arg, ex_tbl); + if (set_multi_opts(flags, arg, ex_tbl) == 0) + return 0; + if ((*flags & XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK) == 0) + *flags |= XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC; + return 1; } int set_ext_copy(int *copy_type, const char *arg) diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/asn1pars.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/asn1pars.c index 11b07875943..0a6b990b503 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/asn1pars.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/asn1pars.c @@ -313,9 +313,9 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) } typ = ASN1_TYPE_get(at); if ((typ == V_ASN1_OBJECT) + || (typ == V_ASN1_BOOLEAN) || (typ == V_ASN1_NULL)) { - BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't parse %s type\n", - typ == V_ASN1_NULL ? "NULL" : "OBJECT"); + BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't parse %s type\n", ASN1_tag2str(typ)); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/ca.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/ca.c index 97ad0c1ffe9..4d64eb2dc39 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/ca.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/ca.c @@ -99,25 +99,19 @@ #undef PROG #define PROG ca_main -#define BASE_SECTION "ca" -#define CONFIG_FILE "openssl.cnf" +#define BASE_SECTION "ca" +#define CONFIG_FILE "openssl.cnf" #define ENV_DEFAULT_CA "default_ca" -#define STRING_MASK "string_mask" +#define STRING_MASK "string_mask" #define UTF8_IN "utf8" -#define ENV_DIR "dir" -#define ENV_CERTS "certs" -#define ENV_CRL_DIR "crl_dir" -#define ENV_CA_DB "CA_DB" #define ENV_NEW_CERTS_DIR "new_certs_dir" #define ENV_CERTIFICATE "certificate" #define ENV_SERIAL "serial" #define ENV_CRLNUMBER "crlnumber" -#define ENV_CRL "crl" #define ENV_PRIVATE_KEY "private_key" -#define ENV_RANDFILE "RANDFILE" #define ENV_DEFAULT_DAYS "default_days" #define ENV_DEFAULT_STARTDATE "default_startdate" #define ENV_DEFAULT_ENDDATE "default_enddate" @@ -2520,6 +2514,8 @@ static int do_updatedb(CA_DB *db) char **rrow, *a_tm_s; a_tm = ASN1_UTCTIME_new(); + if (a_tm == NULL) + return -1; /* get actual time and make a string */ a_tm = X509_gmtime_adj(a_tm, 0); diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/ecparam.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/ecparam.c index 1f340a9b84e..402fb3140d8 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/ecparam.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/ecparam.c @@ -413,14 +413,13 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) } if (check) { - if (group == NULL) - BIO_printf(bio_err, "no elliptic curve parameters\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "checking elliptic curve parameters: "); if (!EC_GROUP_check(group, NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "failed\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); - } else - BIO_printf(bio_err, "ok\n"); + goto end; + } + BIO_printf(bio_err, "ok\n"); } diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/engine.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/engine.c index 3d70cac416d..460ec60cb14 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/engine.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/engine.c @@ -99,8 +99,6 @@ static void identity(char *ptr) static int append_buf(char **buf, const char *s, int *size, int step) { - int l = strlen(s); - if (*buf == NULL) { *size = step; *buf = OPENSSL_malloc(*size); @@ -109,9 +107,6 @@ static int append_buf(char **buf, const char *s, int *size, int step) **buf = '\0'; } - if (**buf != '\0') - l += 2; /* ", " */ - if (strlen(*buf) + strlen(s) >= (unsigned int)*size) { *size += step; *buf = OPENSSL_realloc(*buf, *size); diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/md4.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/md4.c index 7f457b2ab1e..80e56b475c1 120000 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/md4.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/md4.c @@ -1 +1 @@ -../crypto/md4/md4.c
\ No newline at end of file +openssl-1.0.1q/../crypto/md4/md4.c
\ No newline at end of file diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/ocsp.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/ocsp.c index 572f0643e13..9fd95688251 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/ocsp.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/ocsp.c @@ -1220,8 +1220,8 @@ static OCSP_RESPONSE *query_responder(BIO *err, BIO *cbio, char *path, return NULL; } - if (BIO_get_fd(cbio, &fd) <= 0) { - BIO_puts(err, "Can't get connection fd\n"); + if (BIO_get_fd(cbio, &fd) < 0) { + BIO_puts(bio_err, "Can't get connection fd\n"); goto err; } diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/pkcs12.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/pkcs12.c index 4ff64495a95..e41b445a50b 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/pkcs12.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/pkcs12.c @@ -134,13 +134,6 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) apps_startup(); -# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS - if (FIPS_mode()) - cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC; - else -# endif - cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC; - enc = EVP_des_ede3_cbc(); if (bio_err == NULL) bio_err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE); @@ -148,6 +141,13 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) if (!load_config(bio_err, NULL)) goto end; +# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS + if (FIPS_mode()) + cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC; + else +# endif + cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC; + args = argv + 1; while (*args) { diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/s_client.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/s_client.c index c87df7c69b7..183116561b8 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/s_client.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/s_client.c @@ -1899,6 +1899,9 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) EVP_PKEY_free(key); if (pass) OPENSSL_free(pass); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + OPENSSL_free(srp_arg.srppassin); +#endif if (vpm) X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm); if (cbuf != NULL) { diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/s_server.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/s_server.c index b58e5e07c41..a8aee77a6e8 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/s_server.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/s_server.c @@ -2654,6 +2654,21 @@ static int www_body(char *hostname, int s, unsigned char *context) goto err; } else { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "read R BLOCK\n"); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + if (BIO_should_io_special(io) + && BIO_get_retry_reason(io) == BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP) { + BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during read\n"); + srp_callback_parm.user = + SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb, + srp_callback_parm.login); + if (srp_callback_parm.user) + BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n", + srp_callback_parm.user->info); + else + BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n"); + continue; + } +#endif #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) delay(1000); #elif !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(__DJGPP__) diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl index 687ed811be4..51b500ddeff 100755 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ # the undertaken effort was that it appeared that in tight IA-32 # register window little-endian flavor could achieve slightly higher # Instruction Level Parallelism, and it indeed resulted in up to 15% -# better performance on most recent µ-archs... +# better performance on most recent µ-archs... # # Third version adds AES_cbc_encrypt implementation, which resulted in # up to 40% performance imrovement of CBC benchmark results. 40% was @@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ sub _data_word() { my $i; while(defined($i=shift)) { &data_word($i,$i); } } $speed_limit=512; # chunks smaller than $speed_limit are # processed with compact routine in CBC mode $small_footprint=1; # $small_footprint=1 code is ~5% slower [on - # recent µ-archs], but ~5 times smaller! + # recent µ-archs], but ~5 times smaller! # I favor compact code to minimize cache # contention and in hope to "collect" 5% back # in real-life applications... @@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ sub enctransform() # Performance is not actually extraordinary in comparison to pure # x86 code. In particular encrypt performance is virtually the same. # Decrypt performance on the other hand is 15-20% better on newer -# µ-archs [but we're thankful for *any* improvement here], and ~50% +# µ-archs [but we're thankful for *any* improvement here], and ~50% # better on PIII:-) And additionally on the pros side this code # eliminates redundant references to stack and thus relieves/ # minimizes the pressure on the memory bus. diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl index 3dc345b585f..8c1d0b5bed2 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ $inout3="xmm5"; $in1="xmm5"; $inout4="xmm6"; $in0="xmm6"; $inout5="xmm7"; $ivec="xmm7"; -# AESNI extenstion +# AESNI extension sub aeskeygenassist { my($dst,$src,$imm)=@_; if ("$dst:$src" =~ /xmm([0-7]):xmm([0-7])/) diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c index a5d2da10bb7..0ca985a2be1 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c @@ -62,6 +62,10 @@ #include <openssl/objects.h> #include <openssl/asn1.h> +#ifndef ASN1_PARSE_MAXDEPTH +#define ASN1_PARSE_MAXDEPTH 128 +#endif + static int asn1_print_info(BIO *bp, int tag, int xclass, int constructed, int indent); static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length, @@ -128,6 +132,12 @@ static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length, #else dump_indent = 6; /* Because we know BIO_dump_indent() */ #endif + + if (depth > ASN1_PARSE_MAXDEPTH) { + BIO_puts(bp, "BAD RECURSION DEPTH\n"); + return 0; + } + p = *pp; tot = p + length; op = p - 1; diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/d2i_pr.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/d2i_pr.c index c96da091d39..d21829af192 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/d2i_pr.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/d2i_pr.c @@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_PrivateKey(int type, EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length) { EVP_PKEY *ret; + const unsigned char *p = *pp; if ((a == NULL) || (*a == NULL)) { if ((ret = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) { @@ -94,21 +95,23 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_PrivateKey(int type, EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp, } if (!ret->ameth->old_priv_decode || - !ret->ameth->old_priv_decode(ret, pp, length)) { + !ret->ameth->old_priv_decode(ret, &p, length)) { if (ret->ameth->priv_decode) { PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8 = NULL; - p8 = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, pp, length); + p8 = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, &p, length); if (!p8) goto err; EVP_PKEY_free(ret); ret = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8); PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8); - + if (ret == NULL) + goto err; } else { ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_PRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } } + *pp = p; if (a != NULL) (*a) = ret; return (ret); @@ -136,6 +139,7 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_AutoPrivateKey(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp, * input is surrounded by an ASN1 SEQUENCE. */ inkey = d2i_ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY(NULL, &p, length); + p = *pp; /* * Since we only need to discern "traditional format" RSA and DSA keys we * can just count the elements. @@ -146,7 +150,7 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_AutoPrivateKey(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp, keytype = EVP_PKEY_EC; else if (sk_ASN1_TYPE_num(inkey) == 3) { /* This seems to be PKCS8, not * traditional format */ - PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8 = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, pp, length); + PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8 = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, &p, length); EVP_PKEY *ret; sk_ASN1_TYPE_pop_free(inkey, ASN1_TYPE_free); @@ -157,6 +161,9 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_AutoPrivateKey(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp, } ret = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8); PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8); + if (ret == NULL) + return NULL; + *pp = p; if (a) { *a = ret; } diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c index 7fd336a4022..9256049d158 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c @@ -180,6 +180,8 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len, int otag; int ret = 0; ASN1_VALUE **pchptr, *ptmpval; + int combine = aclass & ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE; + aclass &= ~ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE; if (!pval) return 0; if (aux && aux->asn1_cb) @@ -350,9 +352,9 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len, } asn1_set_choice_selector(pval, i, it); - *in = p; if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_POST, pval, it, NULL)) goto auxerr; + *in = p; return 1; case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE: @@ -489,9 +491,9 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len, /* Save encoding */ if (!asn1_enc_save(pval, *in, p - *in, it)) goto auxerr; - *in = p; if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_POST, pval, it, NULL)) goto auxerr; + *in = p; return 1; default: @@ -500,7 +502,8 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len, auxerr: ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR); err: - ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it); + if (combine == 0) + ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it); if (errtt) ERR_add_error_data(4, "Field=", errtt->field_name, ", Type=", it->sname); @@ -689,7 +692,7 @@ static int asn1_template_noexp_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val, } else { /* Nothing special */ ret = ASN1_item_ex_d2i(val, &p, len, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), - -1, 0, opt, ctx); + -1, tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE, opt, ctx); if (!ret) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c index a5a403c26e1..eaf046639d6 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c @@ -141,8 +141,9 @@ static int bn_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len, int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { BIGNUM *bn; - if (!*pval) - bn_new(pval, it); + + if (*pval == NULL && !bn_new(pval, it)) + return 0; bn = (BIGNUM *)*pval; if (!BN_bin2bn(cont, len, bn)) { bn_free(pval, it); diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c index 4b682018c2d..6c57a7971c9 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c @@ -188,13 +188,16 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_PUBKEY(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length) { X509_PUBKEY *xpk; EVP_PKEY *pktmp; - xpk = d2i_X509_PUBKEY(NULL, pp, length); + const unsigned char *q; + q = *pp; + xpk = d2i_X509_PUBKEY(NULL, &q, length); if (!xpk) return NULL; pktmp = X509_PUBKEY_get(xpk); X509_PUBKEY_free(xpk); if (!pktmp) return NULL; + *pp = q; if (a) { EVP_PKEY_free(*a); *a = pktmp; diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c index f56e837b3a0..bcd9166c35e 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c @@ -180,16 +180,15 @@ X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length) if (!a || *a == NULL) { freeret = 1; } - ret = d2i_X509(a, pp, length); + ret = d2i_X509(a, &q, length); /* If certificate unreadable then forget it */ if (!ret) return NULL; /* update length */ - length -= *pp - q; - if (!length) - return ret; - if (!d2i_X509_CERT_AUX(&ret->aux, pp, length)) + length -= q - *pp; + if (length > 0 && !d2i_X509_CERT_AUX(&ret->aux, &q, length)) goto err; + *pp = q; return ret; err: if (freeret) { diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bio/b_dump.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bio/b_dump.c index 3293c724c94..87c8162c5e1 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bio/b_dump.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bio/b_dump.c @@ -104,7 +104,6 @@ int BIO_dump_indent_cb(int (*cb) (const void *data, size_t len, void *u), if ((rows * dump_width) < len) rows++; for (i = 0; i < rows; i++) { - buf[0] = '\0'; /* start with empty string */ BUF_strlcpy(buf, str, sizeof buf); BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%04x - ", i * dump_width); BUF_strlcat(buf, tmp, sizeof buf); diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c index d7f15b0699c..bfba93e62bb 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c @@ -115,9 +115,8 @@ static BIO_METHOD methods_filep = { NULL, }; -BIO *BIO_new_file(const char *filename, const char *mode) +static FILE *file_fopen(const char *filename, const char *mode) { - BIO *ret; FILE *file = NULL; # if defined(_WIN32) && defined(CP_UTF8) @@ -164,6 +163,14 @@ BIO *BIO_new_file(const char *filename, const char *mode) # else file = fopen(filename, mode); # endif + return (file); +} + +BIO *BIO_new_file(const char *filename, const char *mode) +{ + BIO *ret; + FILE *file = file_fopen(filename, mode); + if (file == NULL) { SYSerr(SYS_F_FOPEN, get_last_sys_error()); ERR_add_error_data(5, "fopen('", filename, "','", mode, "')"); @@ -386,7 +393,7 @@ static long MS_CALLBACK file_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) else strcat(p, "t"); # endif - fp = fopen(ptr, p); + fp = file_fopen(ptr, p); if (fp == NULL) { SYSerr(SYS_F_FOPEN, get_last_sys_error()); ERR_add_error_data(5, "fopen('", ptr, "','", p, "')"); diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-gf2m.pl b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-gf2m.pl index c52e0b75b5b..22ad1f85f9d 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-gf2m.pl +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-gf2m.pl @@ -41,13 +41,13 @@ $code=<<___; .align 5 mul_1x1_neon: vshl.u64 `&Dlo("q1")`,d16,#8 @ q1-q3 are slided $a - vmull.p8 `&Q("d0")`,d16,d17 @ a·bb + vmull.p8 `&Q("d0")`,d16,d17 @ a·bb vshl.u64 `&Dlo("q2")`,d16,#16 - vmull.p8 q1,`&Dlo("q1")`,d17 @ a<<8·bb + vmull.p8 q1,`&Dlo("q1")`,d17 @ a<<8·bb vshl.u64 `&Dlo("q3")`,d16,#24 - vmull.p8 q2,`&Dlo("q2")`,d17 @ a<<16·bb + vmull.p8 q2,`&Dlo("q2")`,d17 @ a<<16·bb vshr.u64 `&Dlo("q1")`,#8 - vmull.p8 q3,`&Dlo("q3")`,d17 @ a<<24·bb + vmull.p8 q3,`&Dlo("q3")`,d17 @ a<<24·bb vshl.u64 `&Dhi("q1")`,#24 veor d0,`&Dlo("q1")` vshr.u64 `&Dlo("q2")`,#16 @@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ ___ ################ # void bn_GF2m_mul_2x2(BN_ULONG *r, # BN_ULONG a1,BN_ULONG a0, -# BN_ULONG b1,BN_ULONG b0); # r[3..0]=a1a0·b1b0 +# BN_ULONG b1,BN_ULONG b0); # r[3..0]=a1a0·b1b0 ($A1,$B1,$A0,$B0,$A1B1,$A0B0)=map("d$_",(18..23)); @@ -184,20 +184,20 @@ bn_GF2m_mul_2x2: vmov d16,$A1 vmov d17,$B1 - bl mul_1x1_neon @ a1·b1 + bl mul_1x1_neon @ a1·b1 vmov $A1B1,d0 vmov d16,$A0 vmov d17,$B0 - bl mul_1x1_neon @ a0·b0 + bl mul_1x1_neon @ a0·b0 vmov $A0B0,d0 veor d16,$A0,$A1 veor d17,$B0,$B1 veor $A0,$A0B0,$A1B1 - bl mul_1x1_neon @ (a0+a1)·(b0+b1) + bl mul_1x1_neon @ (a0+a1)·(b0+b1) - veor d0,$A0 @ (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)-a0·b0-a1·b1 + veor d0,$A0 @ (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)-a0·b0-a1·b1 vshl.u64 d1,d0,#32 vshr.u64 d0,d0,#32 veor $A0B0,d1 @@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ $code.=<<___; mov $mask,#7<<2 sub sp,sp,#32 @ allocate tab[8] - bl mul_1x1_ialu @ a1·b1 + bl mul_1x1_ialu @ a1·b1 str $lo,[$ret,#8] str $hi,[$ret,#12] @@ -230,13 +230,13 @@ $code.=<<___; eor r2,r2,$a eor $b,$b,r3 eor $a,$a,r2 - bl mul_1x1_ialu @ a0·b0 + bl mul_1x1_ialu @ a0·b0 str $lo,[$ret] str $hi,[$ret,#4] eor $a,$a,r2 eor $b,$b,r3 - bl mul_1x1_ialu @ (a1+a0)·(b1+b0) + bl mul_1x1_ialu @ (a1+a0)·(b1+b0) ___ @r=map("r$_",(6..9)); $code.=<<___; diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S index 951abc53ea5..a9a42abfc30 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S @@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ bn_mul_add_words: // This loop spins in 3*(n+10) ticks on Itanium and in 2*(n+10) on // Itanium 2. Yes, unlike previous versions it scales:-) Previous -// version was peforming *all* additions in IALU and was starving +// version was performing *all* additions in IALU and was starving // for those even on Itanium 2. In this version one addition is // moved to FPU and is folded with multiplication. This is at cost // of propogating the result from previous call to this subroutine @@ -568,7 +568,7 @@ bn_sqr_comba8: // I've estimated this routine to run in ~120 ticks, but in reality // (i.e. according to ar.itc) it takes ~160 ticks. Are those extra // cycles consumed for instructions fetch? Or did I misinterpret some -// clause in Itanium µ-architecture manual? Comments are welcomed and +// clause in Itanium µ-architecture manual? Comments are welcomed and // highly appreciated. // // On Itanium 2 it takes ~190 ticks. This is because of stalls on diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-gf2m.pl b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-gf2m.pl index cd9f13eca29..9d18d40e778 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-gf2m.pl +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-gf2m.pl @@ -172,19 +172,19 @@ ___ if ($SIZE_T==8) { my @r=map("%r$_",(6..9)); $code.=<<___; - bras $ra,_mul_1x1 # a1·b1 + bras $ra,_mul_1x1 # a1·b1 stmg $lo,$hi,16($rp) lg $a,`$stdframe+128+4*$SIZE_T`($sp) lg $b,`$stdframe+128+6*$SIZE_T`($sp) - bras $ra,_mul_1x1 # a0·b0 + bras $ra,_mul_1x1 # a0·b0 stmg $lo,$hi,0($rp) lg $a,`$stdframe+128+3*$SIZE_T`($sp) lg $b,`$stdframe+128+5*$SIZE_T`($sp) xg $a,`$stdframe+128+4*$SIZE_T`($sp) xg $b,`$stdframe+128+6*$SIZE_T`($sp) - bras $ra,_mul_1x1 # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1) + bras $ra,_mul_1x1 # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1) lmg @r[0],@r[3],0($rp) xgr $lo,$hi diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86-gf2m.pl b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86-gf2m.pl index 808a1e59691..b5795302729 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86-gf2m.pl +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86-gf2m.pl @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ # the time being... Except that it has three code paths: pure integer # code suitable for any x86 CPU, MMX code suitable for PIII and later # and PCLMULQDQ suitable for Westmere and later. Improvement varies -# from one benchmark and µ-arch to another. Below are interval values +# from one benchmark and µ-arch to another. Below are interval values # for 163- and 571-bit ECDH benchmarks relative to compiler-generated # code: # @@ -226,22 +226,22 @@ if ($sse2) { &push ("edi"); &mov ($a,&wparam(1)); &mov ($b,&wparam(3)); - &call ("_mul_1x1_mmx"); # a1·b1 + &call ("_mul_1x1_mmx"); # a1·b1 &movq ("mm7",$R); &mov ($a,&wparam(2)); &mov ($b,&wparam(4)); - &call ("_mul_1x1_mmx"); # a0·b0 + &call ("_mul_1x1_mmx"); # a0·b0 &movq ("mm6",$R); &mov ($a,&wparam(1)); &mov ($b,&wparam(3)); &xor ($a,&wparam(2)); &xor ($b,&wparam(4)); - &call ("_mul_1x1_mmx"); # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1) + &call ("_mul_1x1_mmx"); # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1) &pxor ($R,"mm7"); &mov ($a,&wparam(0)); - &pxor ($R,"mm6"); # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)-a1·b1-a0·b0 + &pxor ($R,"mm6"); # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)-a1·b1-a0·b0 &movq ($A,$R); &psllq ($R,32); @@ -266,13 +266,13 @@ if ($sse2) { &mov ($a,&wparam(1)); &mov ($b,&wparam(3)); - &call ("_mul_1x1_ialu"); # a1·b1 + &call ("_mul_1x1_ialu"); # a1·b1 &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),$lo); &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),$hi); &mov ($a,&wparam(2)); &mov ($b,&wparam(4)); - &call ("_mul_1x1_ialu"); # a0·b0 + &call ("_mul_1x1_ialu"); # a0·b0 &mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),$lo); &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),$hi); @@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ if ($sse2) { &mov ($b,&wparam(3)); &xor ($a,&wparam(2)); &xor ($b,&wparam(4)); - &call ("_mul_1x1_ialu"); # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1) + &call ("_mul_1x1_ialu"); # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1) &mov ("ebp",&wparam(0)); @r=("ebx","ecx","edi","esi"); diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c index 9c5074b3085..0a5bb285a11 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ # undef sqr /*- - * "m"(a), "+m"(r) is the way to favor DirectPath µ-code; + * "m"(a), "+m"(r) is the way to favor DirectPath µ-code; * "g"(0) let the compiler to decide where does it * want to keep the value of zero; */ diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl index 226c66c35e3..42bbec2fb7e 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ # in bn_gf2m.c. It's kind of low-hanging mechanical port from C for # the time being... Except that it has two code paths: code suitable # for any x86_64 CPU and PCLMULQDQ one suitable for Westmere and -# later. Improvement varies from one benchmark and µ-arch to another. +# later. Improvement varies from one benchmark and µ-arch to another. # Vanilla code path is at most 20% faster than compiler-generated code # [not very impressive], while PCLMULQDQ - whole 85%-160% better on # 163- and 571-bit ECDH benchmarks on Intel CPUs. Keep in mind that @@ -184,13 +184,13 @@ ___ $code.=<<___; movdqa %xmm0,%xmm4 movdqa %xmm1,%xmm5 - pclmulqdq \$0,%xmm1,%xmm0 # a1·b1 + pclmulqdq \$0,%xmm1,%xmm0 # a1·b1 pxor %xmm2,%xmm4 pxor %xmm3,%xmm5 - pclmulqdq \$0,%xmm3,%xmm2 # a0·b0 - pclmulqdq \$0,%xmm5,%xmm4 # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1) + pclmulqdq \$0,%xmm3,%xmm2 # a0·b0 + pclmulqdq \$0,%xmm5,%xmm4 # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1) xorps %xmm0,%xmm4 - xorps %xmm2,%xmm4 # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)-a0·b0-a1·b1 + xorps %xmm2,%xmm4 # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)-a0·b0-a1·b1 movdqa %xmm4,%xmm5 pslldq \$8,%xmm4 psrldq \$8,%xmm5 @@ -225,13 +225,13 @@ $code.=<<___; mov \$0xf,$mask mov $a1,$a mov $b1,$b - call _mul_1x1 # a1·b1 + call _mul_1x1 # a1·b1 mov $lo,16(%rsp) mov $hi,24(%rsp) mov 48(%rsp),$a mov 64(%rsp),$b - call _mul_1x1 # a0·b0 + call _mul_1x1 # a0·b0 mov $lo,0(%rsp) mov $hi,8(%rsp) @@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ $code.=<<___; mov 56(%rsp),$b xor 48(%rsp),$a xor 64(%rsp),$b - call _mul_1x1 # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1) + call _mul_1x1 # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1) ___ @r=("%rbx","%rcx","%rdi","%rsi"); $code.=<<___; diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c index 27146c89e74..7e33ba91402 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c @@ -599,12 +599,13 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, bn_check_top(p); bn_check_top(m); - top = m->top; - - if (!(m->d[0] & 1)) { + if (!BN_is_odd(m)) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_CONSTTIME, BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS); return (0); } + + top = m->top; + bits = BN_num_bits(p); if (bits == 0) { ret = BN_one(rr); diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c index 97c55ab7209..ce59fe701f9 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c @@ -583,6 +583,7 @@ static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in, * BN_div_no_branch will be called eventually. */ pB = &local_B; + local_B.flags = 0; BN_with_flags(pB, B, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); if (!BN_nnmod(B, pB, A, ctx)) goto err; @@ -610,6 +611,7 @@ static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in, * BN_div_no_branch will be called eventually. */ pA = &local_A; + local_A.flags = 0; BN_with_flags(pA, A, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); /* (D, M) := (A/B, A%B) ... */ diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c index a0ba8de31ad..8ad44b48260 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c @@ -576,7 +576,7 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const int p[], bn_check_top(a); BN_CTX_start(ctx); if ((s = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) - return 0; + goto err; if (!bn_wexpand(s, 2 * a->top)) goto err; @@ -700,18 +700,21 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_inv(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx) int top = p->top; BN_ULONG *udp, *bdp, *vdp, *cdp; - bn_wexpand(u, top); + if (!bn_wexpand(u, top)) + goto err; udp = u->d; for (i = u->top; i < top; i++) udp[i] = 0; u->top = top; - bn_wexpand(b, top); + if (!bn_wexpand(b, top)) + goto err; bdp = b->d; bdp[0] = 1; for (i = 1; i < top; i++) bdp[i] = 0; b->top = top; - bn_wexpand(c, top); + if (!bn_wexpand(c, top)) + goto err; cdp = c->d; for (i = 0; i < top; i++) cdp[i] = 0; diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c index aadd5db1d8d..be95bd55d02 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c @@ -361,9 +361,9 @@ void BN_MONT_CTX_free(BN_MONT_CTX *mont) if (mont == NULL) return; - BN_free(&(mont->RR)); - BN_free(&(mont->N)); - BN_free(&(mont->Ni)); + BN_clear_free(&(mont->RR)); + BN_clear_free(&(mont->N)); + BN_clear_free(&(mont->Ni)); if (mont->flags & BN_FLG_MALLOCED) OPENSSL_free(mont); } @@ -373,6 +373,9 @@ int BN_MONT_CTX_set(BN_MONT_CTX *mont, const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx) int ret = 0; BIGNUM *Ri, *R; + if (BN_is_zero(mod)) + return 0; + BN_CTX_start(ctx); if ((Ri = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_recp.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_recp.c index 6826f93b388..7497ac624d9 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_recp.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_recp.c @@ -152,8 +152,10 @@ int BN_div_recp(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m, if (BN_ucmp(m, &(recp->N)) < 0) { BN_zero(d); - if (!BN_copy(r, m)) + if (!BN_copy(r, m)) { + BN_CTX_end(ctx); return 0; + } BN_CTX_end(ctx); return (1); } diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c index 6d76b1284e1..efa48bdf877 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c @@ -213,14 +213,14 @@ int BN_X931_generate_Xpq(BIGNUM *Xp, BIGNUM *Xq, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx) * exceeded. */ if (!BN_rand(Xp, nbits, 1, 0)) - return 0; + goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); t = BN_CTX_get(ctx); for (i = 0; i < 1000; i++) { if (!BN_rand(Xq, nbits, 1, 0)) - return 0; + goto err; /* Check that |Xp - Xq| > 2^(nbits - 100) */ BN_sub(t, Xp, Xq); if (BN_num_bits(t) > (nbits - 100)) @@ -234,6 +234,9 @@ int BN_X931_generate_Xpq(BIGNUM *Xp, BIGNUM *Xq, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx) return 0; + err: + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + return 0; } /* diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bntest.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bntest.c index 06662c58b32..6d55049e3d4 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bntest.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bntest.c @@ -441,6 +441,14 @@ int test_div(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx) BN_init(&d); BN_init(&e); + BN_one(&a); + BN_zero(&b); + + if (BN_div(&d, &c, &a, &b, ctx)) { + fprintf(stderr, "Division by zero succeeded!\n"); + return 0; + } + for (i = 0; i < num0 + num1; i++) { if (i < num1) { BN_bntest_rand(&a, 400, 0, 0); @@ -516,9 +524,9 @@ int test_div_word(BIO *bp) do { BN_bntest_rand(&a, 512, -1, 0); BN_bntest_rand(&b, BN_BITS2, -1, 0); - s = b.d[0]; - } while (!s); + } while (BN_is_zero(&b)); + s = b.d[0]; BN_copy(&b, &a); r = BN_div_word(&b, s); @@ -781,6 +789,18 @@ int test_mont(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx) if (mont == NULL) return 0; + BN_zero(&n); + if (BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, &n, ctx)) { + fprintf(stderr, "BN_MONT_CTX_set succeeded for zero modulus!\n"); + return 0; + } + + BN_set_word(&n, 16); + if (BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, &n, ctx)) { + fprintf(stderr, "BN_MONT_CTX_set succeeded for even modulus!\n"); + return 0; + } + BN_bntest_rand(&a, 100, 0, 0); BN_bntest_rand(&b, 100, 0, 0); for (i = 0; i < num2; i++) { @@ -887,6 +907,14 @@ int test_mod_mul(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx) d = BN_new(); e = BN_new(); + BN_one(a); + BN_one(b); + BN_zero(c); + if (BN_mod_mul(e, a, b, c, ctx)) { + fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_mul with zero modulus succeeded!\n"); + return 0; + } + for (j = 0; j < 3; j++) { BN_bntest_rand(c, 1024, 0, 0); for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) { @@ -952,6 +980,14 @@ int test_mod_exp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx) d = BN_new(); e = BN_new(); + BN_one(a); + BN_one(b); + BN_zero(c); + if (BN_mod_exp(d, a, b, c, ctx)) { + fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp with zero modulus succeeded!\n"); + return 0; + } + BN_bntest_rand(c, 30, 0, 1); /* must be odd for montgomery */ for (i = 0; i < num2; i++) { BN_bntest_rand(a, 20 + i * 5, 0, 0); @@ -999,6 +1035,22 @@ int test_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx) d = BN_new(); e = BN_new(); + BN_one(a); + BN_one(b); + BN_zero(c); + if (BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, a, b, c, ctx, NULL)) { + fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime with zero modulus " + "succeeded\n"); + return 0; + } + + BN_set_word(c, 16); + if (BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, a, b, c, ctx, NULL)) { + fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime with even modulus " + "succeeded\n"); + return 0; + } + BN_bntest_rand(c, 30, 0, 1); /* must be odd for montgomery */ for (i = 0; i < num2; i++) { BN_bntest_rand(a, 20 + i * 5, 0, 0); diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/buffer/buf_str.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/buffer/buf_str.c index fdde3d7db4b..233af246e4c 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/buffer/buf_str.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/buffer/buf_str.c @@ -58,12 +58,13 @@ #include <stdio.h> #include "cryptlib.h" +#include <limits.h> #include <openssl/buffer.h> char *BUF_strdup(const char *str) { if (str == NULL) - return (NULL); + return NULL; return BUF_strndup(str, strlen(str)); } @@ -72,14 +73,20 @@ char *BUF_strndup(const char *str, size_t siz) char *ret; if (str == NULL) - return (NULL); + return NULL; + + if (siz >= INT_MAX) + return NULL; ret = OPENSSL_malloc(siz + 1); if (ret == NULL) { BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_STRNDUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return (NULL); + return NULL; } - BUF_strlcpy(ret, str, siz + 1); + + memcpy(ret, str, siz); + ret[siz] = '\0'; + return (ret); } @@ -87,13 +94,13 @@ void *BUF_memdup(const void *data, size_t siz) { void *ret; - if (data == NULL) - return (NULL); + if (data == NULL || siz >= INT_MAX) + return NULL; ret = OPENSSL_malloc(siz); if (ret == NULL) { BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEMDUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return (NULL); + return NULL; } return memcpy(ret, data, siz); } diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/buffer/buffer.h b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/buffer/buffer.h index 632df93c657..89183adb4a8 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/buffer/buffer.h +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/buffer/buffer.h @@ -85,7 +85,13 @@ void BUF_MEM_free(BUF_MEM *a); int BUF_MEM_grow(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len); int BUF_MEM_grow_clean(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len); char *BUF_strdup(const char *str); + +/* + * Like strndup, but in addition, explicitly guarantees to never read past the + * first |siz| bytes of |str|. + */ char *BUF_strndup(const char *str, size_t siz); + void *BUF_memdup(const void *data, size_t siz); void BUF_reverse(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t siz); diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c index 85ae928a496..b14b4b68b5c 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c @@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec) ok = 1; err: - if (ec->key && !keep_key) { + if (ec->key && (!keep_key || !ok)) { OPENSSL_cleanse(ec->key, ec->keylen); OPENSSL_free(ec->key); ec->key = NULL; diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c index a8322dcdf1a..b91c01691fe 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c @@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add0_recipient_password(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, /* Setup algorithm identifier for cipher */ encalg = X509_ALGOR_new(); + if (encalg == NULL) { + goto merr; + } EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, kekciph, NULL, NULL, NULL) <= 0) { diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c index 8b37560821a..f45693ac207 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c @@ -714,7 +714,7 @@ int CMS_final(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *data, BIO *dcont, unsigned int flags) BIO *cmsbio; int ret = 0; if (!(cmsbio = CMS_dataInit(cms, dcont))) { - CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_FINAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_FINAL, CMS_R_CMS_LIB); return 0; } diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/comp/c_zlib.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/comp/c_zlib.c index 6731af8b0d7..9c32614d3c7 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/comp/c_zlib.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/comp/c_zlib.c @@ -404,8 +404,9 @@ COMP_METHOD *COMP_zlib(void) void COMP_zlib_cleanup(void) { #ifdef ZLIB_SHARED - if (zlib_dso) + if (zlib_dso != NULL) DSO_free(zlib_dso); + zlib_dso = NULL; #endif } diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/conf/conf_def.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/conf/conf_def.c index faca9aeb571..68c77cec7d8 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/conf/conf_def.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/conf/conf_def.c @@ -225,12 +225,11 @@ static int def_load_bio(CONF *conf, BIO *in, long *line) goto err; } - section = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(10); + section = BUF_strdup("default"); if (section == NULL) { CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } - BUF_strlcpy(section, "default", 10); if (_CONF_new_data(conf) == 0) { CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/conf/conf_sap.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/conf/conf_sap.c index 544fe973871..c042cf222dc 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/conf/conf_sap.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/conf/conf_sap.c @@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ void OPENSSL_config(const char *config_name) CONF_modules_load_file(NULL, config_name, CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION | CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE); + openssl_configured = 1; } void OPENSSL_no_config() diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c index c654a5c84f2..eccee72311f 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c @@ -930,13 +930,29 @@ void OPENSSL_showfatal(const char *fmta, ...) # if defined(_WIN32_WINNT) && _WIN32_WINNT>=0x0333 /* this -------------v--- guards NT-specific calls */ if (check_winnt() && OPENSSL_isservice() > 0) { - HANDLE h = RegisterEventSource(0, _T("OPENSSL")); - const TCHAR *pmsg = buf; - ReportEvent(h, EVENTLOG_ERROR_TYPE, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, &pmsg, 0); - DeregisterEventSource(h); + HANDLE hEventLog = RegisterEventSource(NULL, _T("OpenSSL")); + + if (hEventLog != NULL) { + const TCHAR *pmsg = buf; + + if (!ReportEvent(hEventLog, EVENTLOG_ERROR_TYPE, 0, 0, NULL, + 1, 0, &pmsg, NULL)) { +#if defined(DEBUG) + /* + * We are in a situation where we tried to report a critical + * error and this failed for some reason. As a last resort, + * in debug builds, send output to the debugger or any other + * tool like DebugView which can monitor the output. + */ + OutputDebugString(pmsg); +#endif + } + + (void)DeregisterEventSource(hEventLog); + } } else # endif - MessageBox(NULL, buf, _T("OpenSSL: FATAL"), MB_OK | MB_ICONSTOP); + MessageBox(NULL, buf, _T("OpenSSL: FATAL"), MB_OK | MB_ICONERROR); } #else void OPENSSL_showfatal(const char *fmta, ...) diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/des/t/test b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/des/t/test deleted file mode 100644 index 97acd0552e4..00000000000 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/des/t/test +++ /dev/null @@ -1,27 +0,0 @@ -#!./perl - -BEGIN { push(@INC, qw(../../../lib ../../lib ../lib lib)); } - -use DES; - -$key='00000000'; -$ks=DES::set_key($key); -@a=split(//,$ks); -foreach (@a) { printf "%02x-",ord($_); } -print "\n"; - - -$key=DES::random_key(); -print "($_)\n"; -@a=split(//,$key); -foreach (@a) { printf "%02x-",ord($_); } -print "\n"; -$str="this is and again into the breach"; -($k1,$k2)=DES::string_to_2keys($str); -@a=split(//,$k1); -foreach (@a) { printf "%02x-",ord($_); } -print "\n"; -@a=split(//,$k2); -foreach (@a) { printf "%02x-",ord($_); } -print "\n"; - diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c index a2840eaed09..6ddef459cc3 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c @@ -318,6 +318,7 @@ static int dsa_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey) dplen = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(prkey, &dp); ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey); + prkey = NULL; if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_dsa), 0, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, params, dp, dplen)) diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c index d686ab0af77..34c6113c45e 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c @@ -112,16 +112,8 @@ int DSA_generate_parameters_ex(DSA *ret, int bits, } # endif else { - const EVP_MD *evpmd; - size_t qbits = bits >= 2048 ? 256 : 160; - - if (bits >= 2048) { - qbits = 256; - evpmd = EVP_sha256(); - } else { - qbits = 160; - evpmd = EVP_sha1(); - } + const EVP_MD *evpmd = bits >= 2048 ? EVP_sha256() : EVP_sha1(); + size_t qbits = EVP_MD_size(evpmd) * 8; return dsa_builtin_paramgen(ret, bits, qbits, evpmd, seed_in, seed_len, NULL, counter_ret, @@ -174,13 +166,14 @@ int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, size_t bits, size_t qbits, if (seed_in != NULL) memcpy(seed, seed_in, seed_len); - if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) + if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; - if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL) + if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); + r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); g = BN_CTX_get(ctx); W = BN_CTX_get(ctx); @@ -201,7 +194,7 @@ int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, size_t bits, size_t qbits, if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, m++)) goto err; - if (!seed_len) { + if (!seed_len || !seed_in) { if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(seed, qsize) < 0) goto err; seed_is_random = 1; diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ec/ec.h b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ec/ec.h index c4e7aea938c..2a935fdb57c 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ec/ec.h +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ec/ec.h @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ typedef enum { /** the point is encoded as z||x, where the octet z specifies * which solution of the quadratic equation y is */ POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED = 2, - /** the point is encoded as z||x||y, where z is the octet 0x02 */ + /** the point is encoded as z||x||y, where z is the octet 0x04 */ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED = 4, /** the point is encoded as z||x||y, where the octet z specifies * which solution of the quadratic equation y is */ diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c index 4ad8494981b..33abf61f444 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c @@ -970,8 +970,9 @@ EC_GROUP *d2i_ECPKParameters(EC_GROUP **a, const unsigned char **in, long len) { EC_GROUP *group = NULL; ECPKPARAMETERS *params = NULL; + const unsigned char *p = *in; - if ((params = d2i_ECPKPARAMETERS(NULL, in, len)) == NULL) { + if ((params = d2i_ECPKPARAMETERS(NULL, &p, len)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS_FAILURE); ECPKPARAMETERS_free(params); return NULL; @@ -989,6 +990,7 @@ EC_GROUP *d2i_ECPKParameters(EC_GROUP **a, const unsigned char **in, long len) *a = group; ECPKPARAMETERS_free(params); + *in = p; return (group); } @@ -1016,8 +1018,9 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len) int ok = 0; EC_KEY *ret = NULL; EC_PRIVATEKEY *priv_key = NULL; + const unsigned char *p = *in; - if ((priv_key = d2i_EC_PRIVATEKEY(NULL, in, len)) == NULL) { + if ((priv_key = d2i_EC_PRIVATEKEY(NULL, &p, len)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); return NULL; } @@ -1096,6 +1099,7 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len) if (a) *a = ret; + *in = p; ok = 1; err: if (!ok) { diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_key.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_key.c index 55ce3fe9beb..c784b6fd30a 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_key.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_key.c @@ -366,7 +366,10 @@ int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *x, BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *tx, *ty; EC_POINT *point = NULL; - int ok = 0, tmp_nid, is_char_two = 0; + int ok = 0; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M + int tmp_nid, is_char_two = 0; +#endif if (!key || !key->group || !x || !y) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SET_PUBLIC_KEY_AFFINE_COORDINATES, @@ -382,14 +385,15 @@ int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *x, if (!point) goto err; + tx = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + ty = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M tmp_nid = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(key->group)); if (tmp_nid == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field) is_char_two = 1; - tx = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - ty = BN_CTX_get(ctx); -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M if (is_char_two) { if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(key->group, point, x, y, ctx)) diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c index bcb936dfa75..a8a24d05432 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c @@ -1230,15 +1230,18 @@ static DSA_SIG *cryptodev_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, if (cryptodev_asym(&kop, BN_num_bytes(dsa->q), r, BN_num_bytes(dsa->q), s) == 0) { dsaret = DSA_SIG_new(); + if (dsaret == NULL) + goto err; dsaret->r = r; dsaret->s = s; + r = s = NULL; } else { const DSA_METHOD *meth = DSA_OpenSSL(); - BN_free(r); - BN_free(s); dsaret = (meth->dsa_do_sign) (dgst, dlen, dsa); } err: + BN_free(r); + BN_free(s); kop.crk_param[0].crp_p = NULL; zapparams(&kop); return (dsaret); diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_list.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_list.c index 3384e318289..83c95d56f46 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_list.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_list.c @@ -260,6 +260,7 @@ int ENGINE_add(ENGINE *e) } if ((e->id == NULL) || (e->name == NULL)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_ADD, ENGINE_R_ID_OR_NAME_MISSING); + return 0; } CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE); if (!engine_list_add(e)) { diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/e_des3.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/e_des3.c index 07a5aca606d..12723057993 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/e_des3.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/e_des3.c @@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ static int des_ede_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, DES_cblock *deskey = (DES_cblock *)key; # ifdef EVP_CHECK_DES_KEY if (DES_set_key_checked(&deskey[0], &data(ctx)->ks1) - ! !DES_set_key_checked(&deskey[1], &data(ctx)->ks2)) + || DES_set_key_checked(&deskey[1], &data(ctx)->ks2)) return 0; # else DES_set_key_unchecked(&deskey[0], &data(ctx)->ks1); diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/encode.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/encode.c index 5c5988fc45e..c6abc4ae8e4 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/encode.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/encode.c @@ -60,9 +60,9 @@ #include "cryptlib.h" #include <openssl/evp.h> +static unsigned char conv_ascii2bin(unsigned char a); #ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC # define conv_bin2ascii(a) (data_bin2ascii[(a)&0x3f]) -# define conv_ascii2bin(a) (data_ascii2bin[(a)&0x7f]) #else /* * We assume that PEM encoded files are EBCDIC files (i.e., printable text @@ -71,7 +71,6 @@ * as the underlying textstring data_bin2ascii[] is already EBCDIC) */ # define conv_bin2ascii(a) (data_bin2ascii[(a)&0x3f]) -# define conv_ascii2bin(a) (data_ascii2bin[os_toascii[a]&0x7f]) #endif /*- @@ -103,6 +102,7 @@ abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/"; #define B64_WS 0xE0 #define B64_ERROR 0xFF #define B64_NOT_BASE64(a) (((a)|0x13) == 0xF3) +#define B64_BASE64(a) !B64_NOT_BASE64(a) static const unsigned char data_ascii2bin[128] = { 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, @@ -123,6 +123,23 @@ static const unsigned char data_ascii2bin[128] = { 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, }; +#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC +static unsigned char conv_ascii2bin(unsigned char a) +{ + if (a & 0x80) + return B64_ERROR; + return data_ascii2bin[a]; +} +#else +static unsigned char conv_ascii2bin(unsigned char a) +{ + a = os_toascii[a]; + if (a & 0x80) + return B64_ERROR; + return data_ascii2bin[a]; +} +#endif + void EVP_EncodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx) { ctx->length = 48; @@ -218,8 +235,9 @@ int EVP_EncodeBlock(unsigned char *t, const unsigned char *f, int dlen) void EVP_DecodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx) { - ctx->length = 30; + /* Only ctx->num is used during decoding. */ ctx->num = 0; + ctx->length = 0; ctx->line_num = 0; ctx->expect_nl = 0; } @@ -228,139 +246,123 @@ void EVP_DecodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx) * -1 for error * 0 for last line * 1 for full line + * + * Note: even though EVP_DecodeUpdate attempts to detect and report end of + * content, the context doesn't currently remember it and will accept more data + * in the next call. Therefore, the caller is responsible for checking and + * rejecting a 0 return value in the middle of content. + * + * Note: even though EVP_DecodeUpdate has historically tried to detect end of + * content based on line length, this has never worked properly. Therefore, + * we now return 0 when one of the following is true: + * - Padding or B64_EOF was detected and the last block is complete. + * - Input has zero-length. + * -1 is returned if: + * - Invalid characters are detected. + * - There is extra trailing padding, or data after padding. + * - B64_EOF is detected after an incomplete base64 block. */ int EVP_DecodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl, const unsigned char *in, int inl) { - int seof = -1, eof = 0, rv = -1, ret = 0, i, v, tmp, n, ln, exp_nl; + int seof = 0, eof = 0, rv = -1, ret = 0, i, v, tmp, n, decoded_len; unsigned char *d; n = ctx->num; d = ctx->enc_data; - ln = ctx->line_num; - exp_nl = ctx->expect_nl; - /* last line of input. */ - if ((inl == 0) || ((n == 0) && (conv_ascii2bin(in[0]) == B64_EOF))) { + if (n > 0 && d[n - 1] == '=') { + eof++; + if (n > 1 && d[n - 2] == '=') + eof++; + } + + /* Legacy behaviour: an empty input chunk signals end of input. */ + if (inl == 0) { rv = 0; goto end; } - /* We parse the input data */ for (i = 0; i < inl; i++) { - /* If the current line is > 80 characters, scream alot */ - if (ln >= 80) { - rv = -1; - goto end; - } - - /* Get char and put it into the buffer */ tmp = *(in++); v = conv_ascii2bin(tmp); - /* only save the good data :-) */ - if (!B64_NOT_BASE64(v)) { - OPENSSL_assert(n < (int)sizeof(ctx->enc_data)); - d[n++] = tmp; - ln++; - } else if (v == B64_ERROR) { + if (v == B64_ERROR) { rv = -1; goto end; } - /* - * have we seen a '=' which is 'definitly' the last input line. seof - * will point to the character that holds it. and eof will hold how - * many characters to chop off. - */ if (tmp == '=') { - if (seof == -1) - seof = n; eof++; + } else if (eof > 0 && B64_BASE64(v)) { + /* More data after padding. */ + rv = -1; + goto end; } - if (v == B64_CR) { - ln = 0; - if (exp_nl) - continue; + if (eof > 2) { + rv = -1; + goto end; } - /* eoln */ - if (v == B64_EOLN) { - ln = 0; - if (exp_nl) { - exp_nl = 0; - continue; - } - } - exp_nl = 0; - - /* - * If we are at the end of input and it looks like a line, process - * it. - */ - if (((i + 1) == inl) && (((n & 3) == 0) || eof)) { - v = B64_EOF; - /* - * In case things were given us in really small records (so two - * '=' were given in separate updates), eof may contain the - * incorrect number of ending bytes to skip, so let's redo the - * count - */ - eof = 0; - if (d[n - 1] == '=') - eof++; - if (d[n - 2] == '=') - eof++; - /* There will never be more than two '=' */ + if (v == B64_EOF) { + seof = 1; + goto tail; } - if ((v == B64_EOF && (n & 3) == 0) || (n >= 64)) { - /* - * This is needed to work correctly on 64 byte input lines. We - * process the line and then need to accept the '\n' - */ - if ((v != B64_EOF) && (n >= 64)) - exp_nl = 1; - if (n > 0) { - v = EVP_DecodeBlock(out, d, n); - n = 0; - if (v < 0) { - rv = 0; - goto end; - } - if (eof > v) { - rv = -1; - goto end; - } - ret += (v - eof); - } else { - eof = 1; - v = 0; + /* Only save valid base64 characters. */ + if (B64_BASE64(v)) { + if (n >= 64) { + /* + * We increment n once per loop, and empty the buffer as soon as + * we reach 64 characters, so this can only happen if someone's + * manually messed with the ctx. Refuse to write any more data. + */ + rv = -1; + goto end; } + OPENSSL_assert(n < (int)sizeof(ctx->enc_data)); + d[n++] = tmp; + } - /* - * This is the case where we have had a short but valid input - * line - */ - if ((v < ctx->length) && eof) { - rv = 0; + if (n == 64) { + decoded_len = EVP_DecodeBlock(out, d, n); + n = 0; + if (decoded_len < 0 || eof > decoded_len) { + rv = -1; goto end; - } else - ctx->length = v; + } + ret += decoded_len - eof; + out += decoded_len - eof; + } + } - if (seof >= 0) { - rv = 0; + /* + * Legacy behaviour: if the current line is a full base64-block (i.e., has + * 0 mod 4 base64 characters), it is processed immediately. We keep this + * behaviour as applications may not be calling EVP_DecodeFinal properly. + */ +tail: + if (n > 0) { + if ((n & 3) == 0) { + decoded_len = EVP_DecodeBlock(out, d, n); + n = 0; + if (decoded_len < 0 || eof > decoded_len) { + rv = -1; goto end; } - out += v; + ret += (decoded_len - eof); + } else if (seof) { + /* EOF in the middle of a base64 block. */ + rv = -1; + goto end; } } - rv = 1; - end: + + rv = seof || (n == 0 && eof) ? 0 : 1; +end: + /* Legacy behaviour. This should probably rather be zeroed on error. */ *outl = ret; ctx->num = n; - ctx->line_num = ln; - ctx->expect_nl = exp_nl; return (rv); } diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_key.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_key.c index 71fa627b20d..5be9e336f9e 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_key.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_key.c @@ -104,6 +104,8 @@ int EVP_read_pw_string_min(char *buf, int min, int len, const char *prompt, if ((prompt == NULL) && (prompt_string[0] != '\0')) prompt = prompt_string; ui = UI_new(); + if (ui == NULL) + return -1; UI_add_input_string(ui, prompt, 0, buf, min, (len >= BUFSIZ) ? BUFSIZ - 1 : len); if (verify) @@ -137,7 +139,7 @@ int EVP_BytesToKey(const EVP_CIPHER *type, const EVP_MD *md, EVP_MD_CTX_init(&c); for (;;) { if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&c, md, NULL)) - return 0; + goto err; if (addmd++) if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, &(md_buf[0]), mds)) goto err; @@ -188,6 +190,6 @@ int EVP_BytesToKey(const EVP_CIPHER *type, const EVP_MD *md, rv = type->key_len; err: EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&c); - OPENSSL_cleanse(&(md_buf[0]), EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); + OPENSSL_cleanse(md_buf, sizeof(md_buf)); return rv; } diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c index d4d2b4b2808..b16d623a93f 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c @@ -67,9 +67,19 @@ int EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type) if (c->cipher->set_asn1_parameters != NULL) ret = c->cipher->set_asn1_parameters(c, type); - else if (c->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) - ret = EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv(c, type); - else + else if (c->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) { + switch (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(c)) { + + case EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE: + case EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE: + case EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE: + ret = -1; + break; + + default: + ret = EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv(c, type); + } + } else ret = -1; return (ret); } @@ -80,9 +90,20 @@ int EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type) if (c->cipher->get_asn1_parameters != NULL) ret = c->cipher->get_asn1_parameters(c, type); - else if (c->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) - ret = EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv(c, type); - else + else if (c->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) { + switch (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(c)) { + + case EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE: + case EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE: + case EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE: + ret = -1; + break; + + default: + ret = EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv(c, type); + break; + } + } else ret = -1; return (ret); } diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_pbe.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_pbe.c index e3fa95db928..7934c95fad0 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_pbe.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_pbe.c @@ -228,12 +228,16 @@ int EVP_PBE_alg_add_type(int pbe_type, int pbe_nid, int cipher_nid, int md_nid, EVP_PBE_KEYGEN *keygen) { EVP_PBE_CTL *pbe_tmp; - if (!pbe_algs) + + if (pbe_algs == NULL) { pbe_algs = sk_EVP_PBE_CTL_new(pbe_cmp); - if (!(pbe_tmp = (EVP_PBE_CTL *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_PBE_CTL)))) { - EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_ALG_ADD_TYPE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return 0; + if (pbe_algs == NULL) + goto err; } + + if ((pbe_tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*pbe_tmp))) == NULL) + goto err; + pbe_tmp->pbe_type = pbe_type; pbe_tmp->pbe_nid = pbe_nid; pbe_tmp->cipher_nid = cipher_nid; @@ -242,6 +246,10 @@ int EVP_PBE_alg_add_type(int pbe_type, int pbe_nid, int cipher_nid, sk_EVP_PBE_CTL_push(pbe_algs, pbe_tmp); return 1; + + err: + EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_ALG_ADD_TYPE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; } int EVP_PBE_alg_add(int nid, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD *md, diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/p_lib.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/p_lib.c index 2b84dc75ec3..375f561258b 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/p_lib.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/p_lib.c @@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ int EVP_PKEY_set_type_str(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const char *str, int len) int EVP_PKEY_assign(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int type, void *key) { - if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(pkey, type)) + if (pkey == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(pkey, type)) return 0; pkey->pkey.ptr = key; return (key != NULL); diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/pmeth_gn.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/pmeth_gn.c index 59f81342e94..6435f1b632c 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/pmeth_gn.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/pmeth_gn.c @@ -96,12 +96,17 @@ int EVP_PKEY_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY **ppkey) return -1; } - if (!ppkey) + if (ppkey == NULL) return -1; - if (!*ppkey) + if (*ppkey == NULL) *ppkey = EVP_PKEY_new(); + if (*ppkey == NULL) { + EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_PARAMGEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return -1; + } + ret = ctx->pmeth->paramgen(ctx, *ppkey); if (ret <= 0) { EVP_PKEY_free(*ppkey); diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/hmac/hm_ameth.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/hmac/hm_ameth.c index 641c797ef1d..cf147437eaf 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/hmac/hm_ameth.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/hmac/hm_ameth.c @@ -108,9 +108,14 @@ static int old_hmac_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os; os = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new(); if (!os || !ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(os, *pder, derlen)) - return 0; - EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, os); + goto err; + if (!EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, os)) + goto err; return 1; + + err: + ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os); + return 0; } static int old_hmac_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder) diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/jpake/jpake.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/jpake/jpake.c index ed2e888eb4c..ac853d4914d 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/jpake/jpake.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/jpake/jpake.c @@ -218,6 +218,9 @@ static int verify_zkp(const JPAKE_STEP_PART *p, const BIGNUM *zkpg, BIGNUM *t3 = BN_new(); int ret = 0; + if (h == NULL || t1 == NULL || t2 == NULL || t3 == NULL) + goto end; + zkp_hash(h, zkpg, p, ctx->p.peer_name); /* t1 = g^b */ @@ -233,6 +236,7 @@ static int verify_zkp(const JPAKE_STEP_PART *p, const BIGNUM *zkpg, else JPAKEerr(JPAKE_F_VERIFY_ZKP, JPAKE_R_ZKP_VERIFY_FAILED); +end: /* cleanup */ BN_free(t3); BN_free(t2); diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/mem_clr.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/mem_clr.c index 3df1f3928d0..1a06636d0ce 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/mem_clr.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/mem_clr.c @@ -66,6 +66,10 @@ void OPENSSL_cleanse(void *ptr, size_t len) { unsigned char *p = ptr; size_t loop = len, ctr = cleanse_ctr; + + if (ptr == NULL) + return; + while (loop--) { *(p++) = (unsigned char)ctr; ctr += (17 + ((size_t)p & 0xF)); diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-armv4.pl b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-armv4.pl index d91586ee292..e46f8e34da1 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-armv4.pl +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-armv4.pl @@ -374,8 +374,8 @@ gcm_ghash_neon: vdup.8 $xi,`&Dlo("$IN")`[0] @ broadcast lowest byte .Linner_neon: subs $cnt,$cnt,#1 - vmull.p8 $Qlo,$Hlo,$xi @ H.lo·Xi[i] - vmull.p8 $Qhi,$Hhi,$xi @ H.hi·Xi[i] + vmull.p8 $Qlo,$Hlo,$xi @ H.lo·Xi[i] + vmull.p8 $Qhi,$Hhi,$xi @ H.hi·Xi[i] vext.8 $IN,$zero,#1 @ IN>>=8 veor $Z,$Qpost @ modulo-scheduled part @@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ gcm_ghash_neon: vsli.8 $Zo,$T,#1 @ compose the "carry" byte vext.8 $Z,$zero,#1 @ Z>>=8 - vmull.p8 $R,$Zo,$mod @ "carry"·0xe1 + vmull.p8 $R,$Zo,$mod @ "carry"·0xe1 vshr.u8 $Zo,$T,#7 @ save Z's bottom bit vext.8 $Qpost,$Qlo,$zero,#1 @ Qlo>>=8 veor $Z,$Qhi diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl index 83c727e07f9..2426cd0c8a0 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl @@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ $S=12; # shift factor for rem_4bit # effective address calculation and finally merge of value to Z.hi. # Reference to rem_4bit is scheduled so late that I had to >>4 # rem_4bit elements. This resulted in 20-45% procent improvement -# on contemporary µ-archs. +# on contemporary µ-archs. { my $cnt; my $rem_4bit = "eax"; diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lib.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lib.c index d28d6b5c042..8db62ba7656 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lib.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lib.c @@ -246,12 +246,6 @@ int OCSP_parse_url(char *url, char **phost, char **pport, char **ppath, if ((p = strchr(p, ':'))) { *p = 0; port = p + 1; - } else { - /* Not found: set default port */ - if (*pssl) - port = "443"; - else - port = "80"; } *pport = BUF_strdup(port); diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_prn.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_prn.c index 1834256af27..47d5f83ef9b 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_prn.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_prn.c @@ -212,8 +212,7 @@ int OCSP_RESPONSE_print(BIO *bp, OCSP_RESPONSE *o, unsigned long flags) return 1; } - i = ASN1_STRING_length(rb->response); - if (!(br = OCSP_response_get1_basic(o))) + if ((br = OCSP_response_get1_basic(o)) == NULL) goto err; rd = br->tbsResponseData; l = ASN1_INTEGER_get(rd->version); diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h.in b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h.in index 814309becb6..7a1c85d6ec9 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h.in +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h.in @@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ optimization options. Older Sparc's work better with only UNROLL, but there's no way to tell at compile time what it is you're running on */ -#if defined( sun ) /* Newer Sparc's */ +#if defined( __sun ) || defined ( sun ) /* Newer Sparc's */ # define DES_PTR # define DES_RISC1 # define DES_UNROLL diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h index bd66999c1c6..9b1afc5af72 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h @@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ extern "C" { * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for * major minor fix final patch/beta) */ -# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000110fL +# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000111fL # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS -# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1p-fips 9 Jul 2015" +# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1q-fips 3 Dec 2015" # else -# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1p 9 Jul 2015" +# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1q 3 Dec 2015" # endif # define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_info.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_info.c index 68747d16258..4d736a1d07e 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_info.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_info.c @@ -172,6 +172,8 @@ STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(BIO *bp, STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk, xi->enc_len = 0; xi->x_pkey = X509_PKEY_new(); + if (xi->x_pkey == NULL) + goto err; ptype = EVP_PKEY_RSA; pp = &xi->x_pkey->dec_pkey; if ((int)strlen(header) > 10) /* assume encrypted */ @@ -193,6 +195,8 @@ STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(BIO *bp, STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk, xi->enc_len = 0; xi->x_pkey = X509_PKEY_new(); + if (xi->x_pkey == NULL) + goto err; ptype = EVP_PKEY_DSA; pp = &xi->x_pkey->dec_pkey; if ((int)strlen(header) > 10) /* assume encrypted */ @@ -214,6 +218,8 @@ STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(BIO *bp, STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk, xi->enc_len = 0; xi->x_pkey = X509_PKEY_new(); + if (xi->x_pkey == NULL) + goto err; ptype = EVP_PKEY_EC; pp = &xi->x_pkey->dec_pkey; if ((int)strlen(header) > 10) /* assume encrypted */ diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c index ee4b6a8241c..82d45273ed1 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c @@ -624,13 +624,11 @@ static int do_PVK_header(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int length, PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_HEADER, PEM_R_PVK_TOO_SHORT); return 0; } - length -= 20; } else { if (length < 24) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_HEADER, PEM_R_PVK_TOO_SHORT); return 0; } - length -= 24; pvk_magic = read_ledword(&p); if (pvk_magic != MS_PVKMAGIC) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_HEADER, PEM_R_BAD_MAGIC_NUMBER); @@ -692,23 +690,23 @@ static EVP_PKEY *do_PVK_body(const unsigned char **in, inlen = PEM_def_callback(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u); if (inlen <= 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_BODY, PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ); - return NULL; + goto err; } enctmp = OPENSSL_malloc(keylen + 8); if (!enctmp) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_BODY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return NULL; + goto err; } if (!derive_pvk_key(keybuf, p, saltlen, (unsigned char *)psbuf, inlen)) - return NULL; + goto err; p += saltlen; /* Copy BLOBHEADER across, decrypt rest */ memcpy(enctmp, p, 8); p += 8; if (keylen < 8) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_BODY, PEM_R_PVK_TOO_SHORT); - return NULL; + goto err; } inlen = keylen - 8; q = enctmp + 8; diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c index 982805d988d..d9f03a39fd1 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c @@ -75,15 +75,19 @@ PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_item_pack_safebag(void *obj, const ASN1_ITEM *it, bag->type = OBJ_nid2obj(nid1); if (!ASN1_item_pack(obj, it, &bag->value.octet)) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_PACK_SAFEBAG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return NULL; + goto err; } if (!(safebag = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_new())) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_PACK_SAFEBAG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return NULL; + goto err; } safebag->value.bag = bag; safebag->type = OBJ_nid2obj(nid2); return safebag; + + err: + PKCS12_BAGS_free(bag); + return NULL; } /* Turn PKCS8 object into a keybag */ @@ -127,6 +131,7 @@ PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_MAKE_SHKEYBAG(int pbe_nid, const char *pass, PKCS8_encrypt(pbe_nid, pbe_ciph, pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter, p8))) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_MAKE_SHKEYBAG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free(bag); return NULL; } @@ -144,14 +149,18 @@ PKCS7 *PKCS12_pack_p7data(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *sk) p7->type = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_data); if (!(p7->d.data = M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new())) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return NULL; + goto err; } if (!ASN1_item_pack(sk, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS), &p7->d.data)) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7DATA, PKCS12_R_CANT_PACK_STRUCTURE); - return NULL; + goto err; } return p7; + + err: + PKCS7_free(p7); + return NULL; } /* Unpack SAFEBAGS from PKCS#7 data ContentInfo */ @@ -181,7 +190,7 @@ PKCS7 *PKCS12_pack_p7encdata(int pbe_nid, const char *pass, int passlen, if (!PKCS7_set_type(p7, NID_pkcs7_encrypted)) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7ENCDATA, PKCS12_R_ERROR_SETTING_ENCRYPTED_DATA_TYPE); - return NULL; + goto err; } pbe_ciph = EVP_get_cipherbynid(pbe_nid); @@ -193,7 +202,7 @@ PKCS7 *PKCS12_pack_p7encdata(int pbe_nid, const char *pass, int passlen, if (!pbe) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7ENCDATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return NULL; + goto err; } X509_ALGOR_free(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm); p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm = pbe; @@ -202,10 +211,14 @@ PKCS7 *PKCS12_pack_p7encdata(int pbe_nid, const char *pass, int passlen, PKCS12_item_i2d_encrypt(pbe, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS), pass, passlen, bags, 1))) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7ENCDATA, PKCS12_R_ENCRYPT_ERROR); - return NULL; + goto err; } return p7; + + err: + PKCS7_free(p7); + return NULL; } STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(PKCS7 *p7, const char *pass, diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_crpt.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_crpt.c index 3a166e61300..9c2dcab0246 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_crpt.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_crpt.c @@ -77,6 +77,9 @@ int PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen, const unsigned char *pbuf; unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH], iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; + if (cipher == NULL) + return 0; + /* Extract useful info from parameter */ if (param == NULL || param->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || param->value.sequence == NULL) { diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c index 5ab4bf290e1..a9277827ff2 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c @@ -173,11 +173,11 @@ int PKCS12_setup_mac(PKCS12 *p12, int iter, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, } if (!saltlen) saltlen = PKCS12_SALT_LEN; - p12->mac->salt->length = saltlen; - if (!(p12->mac->salt->data = OPENSSL_malloc(saltlen))) { + if ((p12->mac->salt->data = OPENSSL_malloc(saltlen)) == NULL) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SETUP_MAC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } + p12->mac->salt->length = saltlen; if (!salt) { if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p12->mac->salt->data, saltlen) < 0) return 0; diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c index c8d7db01bd7..946aaa65435 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c @@ -656,6 +656,8 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert) bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(data_body->data, data_body->length); else { bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); + if (bio == NULL) + goto err; BIO_set_mem_eof_return(bio, 0); } if (bio == NULL) @@ -1156,7 +1158,6 @@ PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *PKCS7_get_issuer_and_serial(PKCS7 *p7, int idx) rsk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->recipientinfo; if (rsk == NULL) return NULL; - ri = sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk, 0); if (sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk) <= idx) return (NULL); ri = sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk, idx); diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl index 75750dbf334..20722d3e724 100755 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ # achieves respectful 432MBps on 2.8GHz processor now. For reference. # If executed on Xeon, current RC4_CHAR code-path is 2.7x faster than # RC4_INT code-path. While if executed on Opteron, it's only 25% -# slower than the RC4_INT one [meaning that if CPU µ-arch detection +# slower than the RC4_INT one [meaning that if CPU µ-arch detection # is not implemented, then this final RC4_CHAR code-path should be # preferred, as it provides better *all-round* performance]. diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c index 93e071de75e..c7f1148a1de 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c @@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ static RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_pss_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg, if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm) { ASN1_TYPE *param = pss->maskGenAlgorithm->parameter; if (OBJ_obj2nid(pss->maskGenAlgorithm->algorithm) == NID_mgf1 - && param->type == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) { + && param && param->type == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) { p = param->value.sequence->data; plen = param->value.sequence->length; *pmaskHash = d2i_X509_ALGOR(NULL, &p, plen); diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c index 2465fbdebf1..7f7dca39fd0 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c @@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ #include <openssl/rsa.h> #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS # include <openssl/fips.h> +extern int FIPS_rsa_x931_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e, + BN_GENCB *cb); #endif static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, @@ -94,7 +96,7 @@ int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb) return rsa->meth->rsa_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb); #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS if (FIPS_mode()) - return FIPS_rsa_generate_key_ex(rsa, bits, e_value, cb); + return FIPS_rsa_x931_generate_key_ex(rsa, bits, e_value, cb); #endif return rsa_builtin_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb); } diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c index bc91da2c1fe..41c827f4531 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c @@ -218,14 +218,13 @@ int int_rsa_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, memcpy(rm, s + 2, 16); *prm_len = 16; ret = 1; - } else if (memcmp(m, s + 2, 16)) + } else if (memcmp(m, s + 2, 16)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); - else + } else { ret = 1; - } - - /* Special case: SSL signature */ - if (dtype == NID_md5_sha1) { + } + } else if (dtype == NID_md5_sha1) { + /* Special case: SSL signature */ if ((i != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) || memcmp(s, m, SSL_SIG_LENGTH)) RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); else diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_test.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_test.c index e9712953e99..85c7440b8c6 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_test.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_test.c @@ -297,22 +297,30 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) } else printf("OAEP encryption/decryption ok\n"); - /* Try decrypting corrupted ciphertexts */ + /* Try decrypting corrupted ciphertexts. */ for (n = 0; n < clen; ++n) { - int b; - unsigned char saved = ctext[n]; - for (b = 0; b < 256; ++b) { - if (b == saved) - continue; - ctext[n] = b; - num = RSA_private_decrypt(num, ctext, ptext, key, + ctext[n] ^= 1; + num = RSA_private_decrypt(clen, ctext, ptext, key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING); - if (num > 0) { - printf("Corrupt data decrypted!\n"); - err = 1; - } + if (num > 0) { + printf("Corrupt data decrypted!\n"); + err = 1; + break; } + ctext[n] ^= 1; } + + /* Test truncated ciphertexts, as well as negative length. */ + for (n = -1; n < clen; ++n) { + num = RSA_private_decrypt(n, ctext, ptext, key, + RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING); + if (num > 0) { + printf("Truncated data decrypted!\n"); + err = 1; + break; + } + } + next: RSA_free(key); } diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl index 1084d227fe0..2b119ffa461 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl @@ -66,9 +66,9 @@ # switch to AVX alone improves performance by as little as 4% in # comparison to SSSE3 code path. But below result doesn't look like # 4% improvement... Trouble is that Sandy Bridge decodes 'ro[rl]' as -# pair of µ-ops, and it's the additional µ-ops, two per round, that +# pair of µ-ops, and it's the additional µ-ops, two per round, that # make it run slower than Core2 and Westmere. But 'sh[rl]d' is decoded -# as single µ-op by Sandy Bridge and it's replacing 'ro[rl]' with +# as single µ-op by Sandy Bridge and it's replacing 'ro[rl]' with # equivalent 'sh[rl]d' that is responsible for the impressive 5.1 # cycles per processed byte. But 'sh[rl]d' is not something that used # to be fast, nor does it appear to be fast in upcoming Bulldozer diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl index 928ec53123b..52a7c7f8a3b 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ # purposes. # # Performance improvement over compiler generated code varies from -# 10% to 40% [see above]. Not very impressive on some µ-archs, but +# 10% to 40% [see above]. Not very impressive on some µ-archs, but # it's 5 times smaller and optimizies amount of writes. $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl index 7eab6a5b88b..9f8c51eb54c 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ # # IALU code-path is optimized for elder Pentiums. On vanilla Pentium # performance improvement over compiler generated code reaches ~60%, -# while on PIII - ~35%. On newer µ-archs improvement varies from 15% +# while on PIII - ~35%. On newer µ-archs improvement varies from 15% # to 50%, but it's less important as they are expected to execute SSE2 # code-path, which is commonly ~2-3x faster [than compiler generated # code]. SSE2 code-path is as fast as original sha512-sse2.pl, even diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-parisc.pl b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-parisc.pl index fc0e15b3c05..6cad72e2557 100755 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-parisc.pl +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-parisc.pl @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ # SHA512 performance is >2.9x better than gcc 3.2 generated code on # PA-7100LC, PA-RISC 1.1 processor. Then implementation detects if the # code is executed on PA-RISC 2.0 processor and switches to 64-bit -# code path delivering adequate peformance even in "blended" 32-bit +# code path delivering adequate performance even in "blended" 32-bit # build. Though 64-bit code is not any faster than code generated by # vendor compiler on PA-8600... # diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/sparccpuid.S b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/sparccpuid.S index 0cc247e4897..c63d5da46fe 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/sparccpuid.S +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/sparccpuid.S @@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ OPENSSL_wipe_cpu: fmovs %f1,%f3 fmovs %f0,%f2 - add %fp,BIAS,%i0 ! return pointer to caller´s top of stack + add %fp,BIAS,%i0 ! return pointer to caller´s top of stack ret restore diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c index 50f75d7e4c9..a3f1a8a0a4d 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c @@ -521,12 +521,12 @@ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt, char **verifier, const char *N, const char *g) { int len; - char *result = NULL; - char *vf; + char *result = NULL, *vf = NULL; BIGNUM *N_bn = NULL, *g_bn = NULL, *s = NULL, *v = NULL; unsigned char tmp[MAX_LEN]; unsigned char tmp2[MAX_LEN]; char *defgNid = NULL; + int vfsize = 0; if ((user == NULL) || (pass == NULL) || (salt == NULL) || (verifier == NULL)) @@ -564,22 +564,23 @@ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt, goto err; BN_bn2bin(v, tmp); - if (((vf = OPENSSL_malloc(BN_num_bytes(v) * 2)) == NULL)) + vfsize = BN_num_bytes(v) * 2; + if (((vf = OPENSSL_malloc(vfsize)) == NULL)) goto err; t_tob64(vf, tmp, BN_num_bytes(v)); - *verifier = vf; if (*salt == NULL) { char *tmp_salt; if ((tmp_salt = OPENSSL_malloc(SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN * 2)) == NULL) { - OPENSSL_free(vf); goto err; } t_tob64(tmp_salt, tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN); *salt = tmp_salt; } + *verifier = vf; + vf = NULL; result = defgNid; err: @@ -587,11 +588,21 @@ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt, BN_free(N_bn); BN_free(g_bn); } + OPENSSL_cleanse(vf, vfsize); + OPENSSL_free(vf); + BN_clear_free(s); + BN_clear_free(v); return result; } /* - * create a verifier (*salt,*verifier,g and N are BIGNUMs) + * create a verifier (*salt,*verifier,g and N are BIGNUMs). If *salt != NULL + * then the provided salt will be used. On successful exit *verifier will point + * to a newly allocated BIGNUM containing the verifier and (if a salt was not + * provided) *salt will be populated with a newly allocated BIGNUM containing a + * random salt. + * The caller is responsible for freeing the allocated *salt and *verifier + * BIGNUMS. */ int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt, BIGNUM **verifier, BIGNUM *N, BIGNUM *g) @@ -600,6 +611,7 @@ int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt, BIGNUM *x = NULL; BN_CTX *bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); unsigned char tmp2[MAX_LEN]; + BIGNUM *salttmp = NULL; if ((user == NULL) || (pass == NULL) || @@ -614,10 +626,12 @@ int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt, if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) < 0) goto err; - *salt = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL); + salttmp = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL); + } else { + salttmp = *salt; } - x = SRP_Calc_x(*salt, user, pass); + x = SRP_Calc_x(salttmp, user, pass); *verifier = BN_new(); if (*verifier == NULL) @@ -631,9 +645,11 @@ int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt, srp_bn_print(*verifier); result = 1; + *salt = salttmp; err: - + if (*salt != salttmp) + BN_clear_free(salttmp); BN_clear_free(x); BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); return result; diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c index 32b4d9923f4..1a3a7c5248c 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c @@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ static int TS_check_status_info(TS_RESP *response) if (ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit(info->failure_info, TS_failure_info[i].code)) { if (!first) - strcpy(failure_text, ","); + strcat(failure_text, ","); else first = 0; strcat(failure_text, TS_failure_info[i].text); diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-mmx.pl b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-mmx.pl index cb2381c22ba..90c2eca53b8 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-mmx.pl +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-mmx.pl @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ # table]. I stick to value of 2 for two reasons: 1. smaller table # minimizes cache trashing and thus mitigates the hazard of side- # channel leakage similar to AES cache-timing one; 2. performance -# gap among different µ-archs is smaller. +# gap among different µ-archs is smaller. # # Performance table lists rounded amounts of CPU cycles spent by # whirlpool_block_mmx routine on single 64 byte input block, i.e. diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c index 3c5b717c15a..5792e7f51dd 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c @@ -179,11 +179,24 @@ unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x) */ int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) { + int rv; + /* ensure hash is valid */ X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0); X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0); - return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); + rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); + if (rv) + return rv; + /* Check for match against stored encoding too */ + if (!a->cert_info->enc.modified && !b->cert_info->enc.modified) { + rv = (int)(a->cert_info->enc.len - b->cert_info->enc.len); + if (rv) + return rv; + return memcmp(a->cert_info->enc.enc, b->cert_info->enc.enc, + a->cert_info->enc.len); + } + return rv; } #endif diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c index 8415d1d8b35..8084c4a4747 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c @@ -523,8 +523,6 @@ STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *X509_STORE_get1_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm) X509_OBJECT *obj, xobj; sk = sk_X509_CRL_new_null(); CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); - /* Check cache first */ - idx = x509_object_idx_cnt(ctx->ctx->objs, X509_LU_CRL, nm, &cnt); /* * Always do lookup to possibly add new CRLs to cache diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c index 0febc1b3edc..d97f6226b9e 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c @@ -186,6 +186,10 @@ static STACK_OF(POLICYINFO) *r2i_certpol(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, goto err; } pol = POLICYINFO_new(); + if (pol == NULL) { + X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_CERTPOL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } pol->policyid = pobj; } if (!sk_POLICYINFO_push(pols, pol)) { diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c index b97ed271e3e..2855269668b 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c @@ -132,6 +132,8 @@ static void *v2i_NAME_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, } tval.value = val->value; sub = GENERAL_SUBTREE_new(); + if (sub == NULL) + goto memerr; if (!v2i_GENERAL_NAME_ex(sub->base, method, ctx, &tval, 1)) goto err; if (!*ptree) diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c index fe0d8063d1f..48ac0959cb1 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ * Contributed to the OpenSSL Project 2004 by Richard Levitte * (richard@levitte.org) */ -/* Copyright (c) 2004 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +/* Copyright (c) 2004 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). * All rights reserved. * diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c index 350b39889fc..43fd362aeda 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ * Contributed to the OpenSSL Project 2004 by Richard Levitte * (richard@levitte.org) */ -/* Copyright (c) 2004 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +/* Copyright (c) 2004 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). * All rights reserved. * diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/ciphers.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/ciphers.pod index 0aa1bad111c..0afe80d97d5 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/ciphers.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/ciphers.pod @@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ keys or either respectively. cipher suites using ephemeral ECDH key agreement, including anonymous cipher suites. -=item B<EECDHE> +=item B<EECDH> cipher suites using authenticated ephemeral ECDH key agreement. diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/dgst.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/dgst.pod index 9e15798d827..b27bb946b1b 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/dgst.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/dgst.pod @@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ B<openssl> B<dgst> [B<-hex>] [B<-binary>] [B<-r>] -[B<-hmac arg>] [B<-non-fips-allow>] [B<-out filename>] [B<-sign filename>] @@ -64,10 +63,6 @@ output the digest or signature in binary form. output the digest in the "coreutils" format used by programs like B<sha1sum>. -=item B<-hmac arg> - -set the HMAC key to "arg". - =item B<-non-fips-allow> Allow use of non FIPS digest when in FIPS mode. This has no effect when not in diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/genrsa.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/genrsa.pod index cb03d09b95e..3dc9870f34b 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/genrsa.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/genrsa.pod @@ -10,12 +10,6 @@ B<openssl> B<genrsa> [B<-out filename>] [B<-passout arg>] [B<-aes128>] -[B<-aes128>] -[B<-aes192>] -[B<-aes256>] -[B<-camellia128>] -[B<-camellia192>] -[B<-camellia256>] [B<-aes192>] [B<-aes256>] [B<-camellia128>] diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/req.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/req.pod index 0730d117b39..37ed377c7a4 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/req.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/req.pod @@ -490,7 +490,7 @@ be input by calling it "1.organizationName". The actual permitted field names are any object identifier short or long names. These are compiled into OpenSSL and include the usual values such as commonName, countryName, localityName, organizationName, -organizationUnitName, stateOrProvinceName. Additionally emailAddress +organizationalUnitName, stateOrProvinceName. Additionally emailAddress is include as well as name, surname, givenName initials and dnQualifier. Additional object identifiers can be defined with the B<oid_file> or diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/x509.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/x509.pod index 6109389e0bb..1bb055023b2 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/x509.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/x509.pod @@ -529,7 +529,8 @@ very rare and their use is discouraged). The options ending in "space" additionally place a space after the separator to make it more readable. The B<sep_multiline> uses a linefeed character for the RDN separator and a spaced B<+> for the AVA separator. It also -indents the fields by four characters. +indents the fields by four characters. If no field separator is specified +then B<sep_comma_plus_space> is used by default. =item B<dn_rev> diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/BIO_read.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/BIO_read.pod index b34528104dd..2c177f0b6d8 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/BIO_read.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/BIO_read.pod @@ -9,9 +9,9 @@ BIO_read, BIO_write, BIO_gets, BIO_puts - BIO I/O functions #include <openssl/bio.h> int BIO_read(BIO *b, void *buf, int len); - int BIO_gets(BIO *b,char *buf, int size); + int BIO_gets(BIO *b, char *buf, int size); int BIO_write(BIO *b, const void *buf, int len); - int BIO_puts(BIO *b,const char *buf); + int BIO_puts(BIO *b, const char *buf); =head1 DESCRIPTION @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ return the digest and other BIOs may not support BIO_gets() at all. BIO_write() attempts to write B<len> bytes from B<buf> to BIO B<b>. -BIO_puts() attempts to write a null terminated string B<buf> to BIO B<b> +BIO_puts() attempts to write a null terminated string B<buf> to BIO B<b>. =head1 RETURN VALUES diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod index 3b2796c5df4..fde5f72636b 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ BN_rand, BN_pseudo_rand - generate pseudo-random number =head1 DESCRIPTION BN_rand() generates a cryptographically strong pseudo-random number of -B<bits> bits in length and stores it in B<rnd>. If B<top> is -1, the +B<bits> in length and stores it in B<rnd>. If B<top> is -1, the most significant bit of the random number can be zero. If B<top> is 0, it is set to 1, and if B<top> is 1, the two most significant bits of the number will be set to 1, so that the product of two such random @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ non-cryptographic purposes and for certain purposes in cryptographic protocols, but usually not for key generation etc. BN_rand_range() generates a cryptographically strong pseudo-random -number B<rnd> in the range 0 <lt>= B<rnd> E<lt> B<range>. +number B<rnd> in the range 0 E<lt>= B<rnd> E<lt> B<range>. BN_pseudo_rand_range() does the same, but is based on BN_pseudo_rand(), and hence numbers generated by it are not necessarily unpredictable. diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/DSA_generate_parameters.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/DSA_generate_parameters.pod index be7c924ff8f..f24c9c7d447 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/DSA_generate_parameters.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/DSA_generate_parameters.pod @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ maximum of 1024 bits. If B<seed> is B<NULL> or B<seed_len> E<lt> 20, the primes will be generated at random. Otherwise, the seed is used to generate them. If the given seed does not yield a prime q, a new random -seed is chosen and placed at B<seed>. +seed is chosen. DSA_generate_parameters() places the iteration count in *B<counter_ret> and a counter used for finding a generator in diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_DigestVerifyInit.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_DigestVerifyInit.pod index cfeccd96eff..54cad92e6fd 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_DigestVerifyInit.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_DigestVerifyInit.pod @@ -37,10 +37,11 @@ EVP_DigestVerifyInit() and EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate() return 1 for success and 0 or a negative value for failure. In particular a return value of -2 indicates the operation is not supported by the public key algorithm. -Unlike other functions the return value 0 from EVP_DigestVerifyFinal() only -indicates that the signature did not verify successfully (that is tbs did -not match the original data or the signature was of invalid form) it is not an -indication of a more serious error. +EVP_DigestVerifyFinal() returns 1 for success; any other value indicates +failure. A return value of zero indicates that the signature did not verify +successfully (that is, tbs did not match the original data or the signature had +an invalid form), while other values indicate a more serious error (and +sometimes also indicate an invalid signature form). The error codes can be obtained from L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_SignInit.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_SignInit.pod index 14ecc775af6..c63d6b33931 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_SignInit.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_SignInit.pod @@ -2,7 +2,8 @@ =head1 NAME -EVP_SignInit, EVP_SignUpdate, EVP_SignFinal - EVP signing functions +EVP_SignInit, EVP_SignInit_ex, EVP_SignUpdate, EVP_SignFinal - EVP signing +functions =head1 SYNOPSIS diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/buffer.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/buffer.pod index 781f5b11ee5..9d6de53e8e4 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/buffer.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/buffer.pod @@ -2,8 +2,11 @@ =head1 NAME -BUF_MEM_new, BUF_MEM_free, BUF_MEM_grow, BUF_strdup - simple -character arrays structure +BUF_MEM_new, BUF_MEM_new_ex, BUF_MEM_free, BUF_MEM_grow - simple +character array structure + +BUF_strdup, BUF_strndup, BUF_memdup, BUF_strlcpy, BUF_strlcat - +standard C library equivalents =head1 SYNOPSIS @@ -15,25 +18,20 @@ character arrays structure int BUF_MEM_grow(BUF_MEM *str, int len); - char * BUF_strdup(const char *str); + char *BUF_strdup(const char *str); -=head1 DESCRIPTION + char *BUF_strndup(const char *str, size_t siz); -The buffer library handles simple character arrays. Buffers are used for -various purposes in the library, most notably memory BIOs. + void *BUF_memdup(const void *data, size_t siz); -The library uses the BUF_MEM structure defined in buffer.h: + size_t BUF_strlcpy(char *dst, const char *src, size_t size); - typedef struct buf_mem_st - { - int length; /* current number of bytes */ - char *data; - int max; /* size of buffer */ - } BUF_MEM; + size_t BUF_strlcat(char *dst, const char *src, size_t size); -B<length> is the current size of the buffer in bytes, B<max> is the amount of -memory allocated to the buffer. There are three functions which handle these -and one "miscellaneous" function. +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The buffer library handles simple character arrays. Buffers are used for +various purposes in the library, most notably memory BIOs. BUF_MEM_new() allocates a new buffer of zero size. @@ -44,14 +42,17 @@ BUF_MEM_grow() changes the size of an already existing buffer to B<len>. Any data already in the buffer is preserved if it increases in size. -BUF_strdup() copies a null terminated string into a block of allocated -memory and returns a pointer to the allocated block. -Unlike the standard C library strdup() this function uses OPENSSL_malloc() and so -should be used in preference to the standard library strdup() because it can -be used for memory leak checking or replacing the malloc() function. +BUF_strdup(), BUF_strndup(), BUF_memdup(), BUF_strlcpy() and +BUF_strlcat() are equivalents of the standard C library functions. The +dup() functions use OPENSSL_malloc() underneath and so should be used +in preference to the standard library for memory leak checking or +replacing the malloc() function. + +Memory allocated from these functions should be freed up using the +OPENSSL_free() function. -The memory allocated from BUF_strdup() should be freed up using the OPENSSL_free() -function. +BUF_strndup makes the explicit guarantee that it will never read past +the first B<siz> bytes of B<str>. =head1 RETURN VALUES diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_NAME.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_NAME.pod index 343ffe15191..b025de7b2ff 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_NAME.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_NAME.pod @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ d2i_X509_NAME, i2d_X509_NAME - X509_NAME encoding functions =head1 DESCRIPTION These functions decode and encode an B<X509_NAME> structure which is the -the same as the B<Name> type defined in RFC2459 (and elsewhere) and used +same as the B<Name> type defined in RFC2459 (and elsewhere) and used for example in certificate subject and issuer names. Othewise the functions behave in a similar way to d2i_X509() and i2d_X509() diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert.pod index 5955ee1cb41..18fb2e2d2db 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert.pod @@ -2,29 +2,39 @@ =head1 NAME -SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert - add certificate to chain +SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert, SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs - add or clear +extra chain certificates =head1 SYNOPSIS #include <openssl/ssl.h> - long SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(SSL_CTX ctx, X509 *x509) + long SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509); + long SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs(SSL_CTX *ctx); =head1 DESCRIPTION -SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert() adds the certificate B<x509> to the certificate -chain presented together with the certificate. Several certificates -can be added one after the other. +SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert() adds the certificate B<x509> to the extra chain +certificates associated with B<ctx>. Several certificates can be added one +after another. + +SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs() clears all extra chain certificates +associated with B<ctx>. + +These functions are implemented as macros. =head1 NOTES -When constructing the certificate chain, the chain will be formed from -these certificates explicitly specified. If no chain is specified, -the library will try to complete the chain from the available CA -certificates in the trusted CA storage, see +When sending a certificate chain, extra chain certificates are sent in order +following the end entity certificate. + +If no chain is specified, the library will try to complete the chain from the +available CA certificates in the trusted CA storage, see L<SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)|SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)>. -The B<x509> certificate provided to SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert() will be freed by the library when the B<SSL_CTX> is destroyed. An application B<should not> free the B<x509> object. +The B<x509> certificate provided to SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert() will be +freed by the library when the B<SSL_CTX> is destroyed. An application +B<should not> free the B<x509> object. =head1 RESTRICTIONS @@ -36,8 +46,9 @@ function. =head1 RETURN VALUES -SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert() returns 1 on success. Check out the -error stack to find out the reason for failure otherwise. +SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert() and SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs() return +1 on success and 0 for failure. Check out the error stack to find out the +reason for failure. =head1 SEE ALSO diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/include/openssl/buffer.h b/deps/openssl/openssl/include/openssl/buffer.h index 632df93c657..89183adb4a8 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/include/openssl/buffer.h +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/include/openssl/buffer.h @@ -85,7 +85,13 @@ void BUF_MEM_free(BUF_MEM *a); int BUF_MEM_grow(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len); int BUF_MEM_grow_clean(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len); char *BUF_strdup(const char *str); + +/* + * Like strndup, but in addition, explicitly guarantees to never read past the + * first |siz| bytes of |str|. + */ char *BUF_strndup(const char *str, size_t siz); + void *BUF_memdup(const void *data, size_t siz); void BUF_reverse(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t siz); diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/include/openssl/ec.h b/deps/openssl/openssl/include/openssl/ec.h index c4e7aea938c..2a935fdb57c 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/include/openssl/ec.h +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/include/openssl/ec.h @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ typedef enum { /** the point is encoded as z||x, where the octet z specifies * which solution of the quadratic equation y is */ POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED = 2, - /** the point is encoded as z||x||y, where z is the octet 0x02 */ + /** the point is encoded as z||x||y, where z is the octet 0x04 */ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED = 4, /** the point is encoded as z||x||y, where the octet z specifies * which solution of the quadratic equation y is */ diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/include/openssl/opensslv.h b/deps/openssl/openssl/include/openssl/opensslv.h index bd66999c1c6..9b1afc5af72 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/include/openssl/opensslv.h +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/include/openssl/opensslv.h @@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ extern "C" { * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for * major minor fix final patch/beta) */ -# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000110fL +# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000111fL # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS -# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1p-fips 9 Jul 2015" +# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1q-fips 3 Dec 2015" # else -# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1p 9 Jul 2015" +# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1q 3 Dec 2015" # endif # define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/include/openssl/ssl.h b/deps/openssl/openssl/include/openssl/ssl.h index d2ab0c074c9..b8456c692bd 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/include/openssl/ssl.h +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/include/openssl/ssl.h @@ -2313,6 +2313,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); # define SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 292 # define SSL_F_SSL3_ENC 134 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK 238 +# define SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_MASTER_SECRET 388 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 135 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS 289 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY 136 @@ -2465,8 +2466,11 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); # define SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK 106 # define SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION 107 # define SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH 108 +# define SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_VALUE 375 # define SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH 109 +# define SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_VALUE 393 # define SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH 110 +# define SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_VALUE 395 # define SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH 111 # define SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE 112 # define SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT 304 diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/include/openssl/ssl3.h b/deps/openssl/openssl/include/openssl/ssl3.h index 2dd54626588..e9b1170d7b0 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/include/openssl/ssl3.h +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/include/openssl/ssl3.h @@ -263,6 +263,8 @@ extern "C" { # define SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE 32 # define SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH 5 +# define SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH 4 + # ifndef SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD /* * Some will argue that this increases memory footprint, but it's not diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/include/openssl/tls1.h b/deps/openssl/openssl/include/openssl/tls1.h index 69d8186a4e2..91504b17e89 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/include/openssl/tls1.h +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/include/openssl/tls1.h @@ -235,8 +235,7 @@ extern "C" { /* * ExtensionType value for TLS padding extension. - * http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-values/tls-extensiontype-values.xhtml - * http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 + * http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding */ # define TLSEXT_TYPE_padding 21 @@ -261,20 +260,19 @@ extern "C" { # define TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg 13172 # endif -/* NameType value from RFC 3546 */ +/* NameType value from RFC3546 */ # define TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name 0 -/* status request value from RFC 3546 */ +/* status request value from RFC3546 */ # define TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp 1 -/* ECPointFormat values from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */ +/* ECPointFormat values from RFC4492 */ # define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_first 0 # define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed 0 # define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime 1 # define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2 2 # define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_last 2 -/* Signature and hash algorithms from RFC 5246 */ - +/* Signature and hash algorithms from RFC5246 */ # define TLSEXT_signature_anonymous 0 # define TLSEXT_signature_rsa 1 # define TLSEXT_signature_dsa 2 @@ -404,7 +402,6 @@ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB,(void (*)(void))cb) # define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x03000066 /* AES ciphersuites from RFC3268 */ - # define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA 0x0300002F # define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA 0x03000030 # define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA 0x03000031 @@ -570,7 +567,7 @@ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB,(void (*)(void))cb) # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA "DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA "ADH-AES256-SHA" -/* ECC ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001) */ +/* ECC ciphersuites from RFC4492 */ # define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA "ECDH-ECDSA-NULL-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA "ECDH-ECDSA-RC4-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "ECDH-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA" diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/Makefile b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/Makefile index 29d9e4528fc..ad14abb0b38 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/Makefile +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/Makefile @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ KRB5_INCLUDES= CFLAGS= $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAG) GENERAL=Makefile README ssl-lib.com install.com -TEST=ssltest.c heartbeat_test.c +TEST=ssltest.c heartbeat_test.c clienthellotest.c APPS= LIB=$(TOP)/libssl.a diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/bio_ssl.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/bio_ssl.c index a0c583e3421..d2d4d2ea2d2 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/bio_ssl.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/bio_ssl.c @@ -419,6 +419,10 @@ static long ssl_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) BIO_set_flags(b, BIO_FLAGS_IO_SPECIAL | BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY); b->retry_reason = b->next_bio->retry_reason; break; + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP: + BIO_set_retry_special(b); + b->retry_reason = BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP; + break; default: break; } diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/clienthellotest.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/clienthellotest.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..a00a7ea02d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/clienthellotest.c @@ -0,0 +1,218 @@ +/* Written by Matt Caswell for the OpenSSL Project */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * openssl-core@openssl.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ + +#include <string.h> + +#include <openssl/bio.h> +#include <openssl/crypto.h> +#include <openssl/evp.h> +#include <openssl/ssl.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> + + +#define CLIENT_VERSION_LEN 2 +#define SESSION_ID_LEN_LEN 1 +#define CIPHERS_LEN_LEN 2 +#define COMPRESSION_LEN_LEN 1 +#define EXTENSIONS_LEN_LEN 2 +#define EXTENSION_TYPE_LEN 2 +#define EXTENSION_SIZE_LEN 2 + + +#define TOTAL_NUM_TESTS 2 + +/* + * Test that explicitly setting ticket data results in it appearing in the + * ClientHello for TLS1.2 + */ +#define TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_TLS_1_2 0 + +/* + * Test that explicitly setting ticket data results in it appearing in the + * ClientHello for a negotiated SSL/TLS version + */ +#define TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_VER_NEG 1 + +int main(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + SSL_CTX *ctx; + SSL *con; + BIO *rbio; + BIO *wbio; + BIO *err; + long len; + unsigned char *data; + unsigned char *dataend; + char *dummytick = "Hello World!"; + unsigned int tmplen; + unsigned int type; + unsigned int size; + int testresult = 0; + int currtest = 0; + + SSL_library_init(); + SSL_load_error_strings(); + + err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT); + + CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init(); + CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_options(V_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL); + CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON); + + /* + * For each test set up an SSL_CTX and SSL and see what ClientHello gets + * produced when we try to connect + */ + for (; currtest < TOTAL_NUM_TESTS; currtest++) { + testresult = 0; + if (currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_TLS_1_2) { + ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_2_method()); + } else { + ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method()); + } + con = SSL_new(ctx); + + rbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); + wbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); + SSL_set_bio(con, rbio, wbio); + SSL_set_connect_state(con); + + if (currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_TLS_1_2 + || currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_VER_NEG) { + if (!SSL_set_session_ticket_ext(con, dummytick, strlen(dummytick))) + goto end; + } + + if (SSL_connect(con) > 0) { + /* This shouldn't succeed because we don't have a server! */ + goto end; + } + + len = BIO_get_mem_data(wbio, (char **)&data); + dataend = data + len; + + /* Skip the record header */ + data += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; + /* Skip the handshake message header */ + data += SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; + /* Skip client version and random */ + data += CLIENT_VERSION_LEN + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; + if (data + SESSION_ID_LEN_LEN > dataend) + goto end; + /* Skip session id */ + tmplen = *data; + data += SESSION_ID_LEN_LEN + tmplen; + if (data + CIPHERS_LEN_LEN > dataend) + goto end; + /* Skip ciphers */ + tmplen = ((*data) << 8) | *(data + 1); + data += CIPHERS_LEN_LEN + tmplen; + if (data + COMPRESSION_LEN_LEN > dataend) + goto end; + /* Skip compression */ + tmplen = *data; + data += COMPRESSION_LEN_LEN + tmplen; + if (data + EXTENSIONS_LEN_LEN > dataend) + goto end; + /* Extensions len */ + tmplen = ((*data) << 8) | *(data + 1); + data += EXTENSIONS_LEN_LEN; + if (data + tmplen > dataend) + goto end; + + /* Loop through all extensions */ + while (tmplen > EXTENSION_TYPE_LEN + EXTENSION_SIZE_LEN) { + type = ((*data) << 8) | *(data + 1); + data += EXTENSION_TYPE_LEN; + size = ((*data) << 8) | *(data + 1); + data += EXTENSION_SIZE_LEN; + if (data + size > dataend) + goto end; + + if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { + if (currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_TLS_1_2 + || currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_VER_NEG) { + if (size == strlen(dummytick) + && memcmp(data, dummytick, size) == 0) { + /* Ticket data is as we expected */ + testresult = 1; + } else { + printf("Received session ticket is not as expected\n"); + } + break; + } + } + + tmplen -= EXTENSION_TYPE_LEN + EXTENSION_SIZE_LEN + size; + data += size; + } + + end: + SSL_free(con); + SSL_CTX_free(ctx); + if (!testresult) { + printf("ClientHello test: FAILED (Test %d)\n", currtest); + break; + } + } + + ERR_free_strings(); + ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL); + EVP_cleanup(); + CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(); + CRYPTO_mem_leaks(err); + + return testresult?0:1; +} diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c index 8dd8ea33ca7..d453c07c8e6 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c @@ -1490,9 +1490,12 @@ int dtls1_shutdown(SSL *s) { int ret; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP - if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) && + BIO *wbio; + + wbio = SSL_get_wbio(s); + if (wbio != NULL && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(wbio) && !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN)) { - ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(SSL_get_wbio(s)); + ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(wbio); if (ret < 0) return -1; diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c index 377c1e61f75..eb371a255f8 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c @@ -299,13 +299,12 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s) #endif case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A: - case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B: - s->shutdown = 0; /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */ ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); + case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B: dtls1_start_timer(s); ret = dtls1_client_hello(s); if (ret <= 0) @@ -350,11 +349,15 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s) sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL), DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL); - SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, + if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, - 0); + 0) <= 0) { + ret = -1; + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; + goto end; + } BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, @@ -362,6 +365,10 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s) #endif s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; + if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) { + /* receive renewed session ticket */ + s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; + } } else s->state = DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A; } @@ -484,9 +491,13 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s) snprintf((char *)labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL), DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL); - SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, + if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, - sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0); + sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) { + ret = -1; + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; + goto end; + } BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c index 41c7dc519f1..f01b8a693f4 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c @@ -267,6 +267,19 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s) ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; + } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && + !(s->options & + SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { + /* + * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't + * support secure renegotiation. + */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT, + SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + ret = -1; + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; + goto end; } else { /* * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a @@ -405,9 +418,13 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s) snprintf((char *)labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL), DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL); - SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, - sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, - sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0); + if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, + sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, + sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) { + ret = -1; + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; + goto end; + } BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); @@ -628,9 +645,13 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s) snprintf((char *)labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL), DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL); - SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, + if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, - sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0); + sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) { + ret = -1; + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; + goto end; + } BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c index 3766567c8f8..2b2855dee4a 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c @@ -373,12 +373,13 @@ static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s) buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) { -#if 0 - /* don't reuse session-id's */ + /* + * Since we're sending s23 client hello, we're not reusing a session, as + * we'd be using the method from the saved session instead + */ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) { - return (-1); + return -1; } -#endif p = s->s3->client_random; if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) @@ -439,9 +440,6 @@ static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s) /* * put in the session-id length (zero since there is no reuse) */ -#if 0 - s->session->session_id_length = 0; -#endif s2n(0, d); if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG) @@ -729,6 +727,8 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s) goto err; } + s->session->ssl_version = s->version; + /* ensure that TLS_MAX_VERSION is up-to-date */ OPENSSL_assert(s->version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION); @@ -784,13 +784,6 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s) } s->init_num = 0; - /* - * Since, if we are sending a ssl23 client hello, we are not reusing a - * session-id - */ - if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) - goto err; - return (SSL_connect(s)); err: return (-1); diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c index 2fb71f277e9..b3bff743495 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c @@ -411,8 +411,9 @@ char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) * functions, above, we know that data_plus_mac_size is large enough to contain * a padding byte and MAC. (If the padding was invalid, it might contain the * padding too. ) + * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error */ -void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, +int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md_out, size_t *md_out_size, const unsigned char header[13], @@ -455,7 +456,8 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, switch (EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx)) { case NID_md5: - MD5_Init((MD5_CTX *)md_state.c); + if (MD5_Init((MD5_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0) + return 0; md_final_raw = tls1_md5_final_raw; md_transform = (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))MD5_Transform; @@ -464,7 +466,8 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, length_is_big_endian = 0; break; case NID_sha1: - SHA1_Init((SHA_CTX *)md_state.c); + if (SHA1_Init((SHA_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0) + return 0; md_final_raw = tls1_sha1_final_raw; md_transform = (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA1_Transform; @@ -472,14 +475,16 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 case NID_sha224: - SHA224_Init((SHA256_CTX *)md_state.c); + if (SHA224_Init((SHA256_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0) + return 0; md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw; md_transform = (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA256_Transform; md_size = 224 / 8; break; case NID_sha256: - SHA256_Init((SHA256_CTX *)md_state.c); + if (SHA256_Init((SHA256_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0) + return 0; md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw; md_transform = (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA256_Transform; @@ -488,7 +493,8 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 case NID_sha384: - SHA384_Init((SHA512_CTX *)md_state.c); + if (SHA384_Init((SHA512_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0) + return 0; md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw; md_transform = (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA512_Transform; @@ -497,7 +503,8 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, md_length_size = 16; break; case NID_sha512: - SHA512_Init((SHA512_CTX *)md_state.c); + if (SHA512_Init((SHA512_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0) + return 0; md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw; md_transform = (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA512_Transform; @@ -514,7 +521,7 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, OPENSSL_assert(0); if (md_out_size) *md_out_size = -1; - return; + return 0; } OPENSSL_assert(md_length_size <= MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES); @@ -652,7 +659,7 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, */ if (header_length <= md_block_size) { /* Should never happen */ - return; + return 0; } overhang = header_length - md_block_size; md_transform(md_state.c, header); @@ -733,26 +740,34 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, } EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); - EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, ctx->digest, NULL /* engine */ ); + if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, ctx->digest, NULL /* engine */ ) <= 0) + goto err; if (is_sslv3) { /* We repurpose |hmac_pad| to contain the SSLv3 pad2 block. */ memset(hmac_pad, 0x5c, sslv3_pad_length); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_secret, mac_secret_length); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, sslv3_pad_length); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size); + if (EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_secret, mac_secret_length) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, sslv3_pad_length) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size) <= 0) + goto err; } else { /* Complete the HMAC in the standard manner. */ for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++) hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x6a; - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, md_block_size); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size); + if (EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, md_block_size) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size) <= 0) + goto err; } EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx, md_out, &md_out_size_u); if (md_out_size) *md_out_size = md_out_size_u; EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); + + return 1; +err: + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); + return 0; } #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c index 35ad1217a65..0578a9c4e56 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c @@ -1624,6 +1624,12 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) } p += i; + if (BN_is_zero(dh->p)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_VALUE); + goto f_err; + } + + if (2 > n - param_len) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; @@ -1644,6 +1650,11 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) } p += i; + if (BN_is_zero(dh->g)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_VALUE); + goto f_err; + } + if (2 > n - param_len) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; @@ -1665,6 +1676,11 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) p += i; n -= param_len; + if (BN_is_zero(dh->pub_key)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_VALUE); + goto f_err; + } + # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) pkey = @@ -1867,14 +1883,20 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) q = md_buf; for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) { EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); - EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2) - ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len); - EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, &size); + if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, + (num == 2) ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, + NULL) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, &size) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } q += size; j += size; } @@ -1893,12 +1915,16 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) } else #endif { - EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL); - EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len); + if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 + || EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len) <= 0) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto f_err; + } if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx, p, (int)n, pkey) <= 0) { /* bad signature */ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; @@ -2118,6 +2144,7 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) long n; const unsigned char *p; unsigned char *d; + unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint; n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A, @@ -2136,6 +2163,19 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; + n2l(p, ticket_lifetime_hint); + n2s(p, ticklen); + /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */ + if (ticklen + 6 != n) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + + /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */ + if (ticklen == 0) + return 1; + if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) { int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode; SSL_SESSION *new_sess; @@ -2167,14 +2207,6 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) s->session = new_sess; } - n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint); - n2s(p, ticklen); - /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */ - if (ticklen + 6 != n) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } if (s->session->tlsext_tick) { OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick); s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0; @@ -2185,6 +2217,7 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) goto err; } memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen); + s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint; s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; /* * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set @@ -2354,6 +2387,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); goto err; } rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa; @@ -2801,6 +2835,11 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key = X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL); + if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } /* * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key * @@ -2810,10 +2849,13 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */ - EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx); - /* Generate session key */ - if (RAND_bytes(premaster_secret, 32) <= 0) { + if (pkey_ctx == NULL + || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0 + /* Generate session key */ + || RAND_bytes(premaster_secret, 32) <= 0) { EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } /* @@ -2834,13 +2876,18 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) * data */ ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); - EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, - EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94)); - EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random, - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random, - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len); + if (EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, + EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94)) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random, + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random, + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) { + EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash); if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl (pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, @@ -2856,7 +2903,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) *(p++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED; msglen = 255; if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, premaster_secret, 32) - < 0) { + <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); goto err; @@ -3057,7 +3104,10 @@ int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s) pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey; /* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */ pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); - EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx); + if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1()) > 0) { if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, @@ -3194,7 +3244,6 @@ int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s) * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; * return(-1); We then get retied later */ - i = 0; i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey); if (i < 0) { s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c index 152f40db582..85ebac8d849 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c @@ -253,7 +253,10 @@ int ssl3_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_read_ctx); dd = s->enc_read_ctx; - ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, m); + if (ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, m) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err2; + } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP /* COMPRESS */ if (s->expand != NULL) { @@ -288,7 +291,10 @@ int ssl3_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) */ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_write_ctx); dd = s->enc_write_ctx; - ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, m); + if (ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, m) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err2; + } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP /* COMPRESS */ if (s->compress != NULL) { @@ -674,19 +680,21 @@ static int ssl3_handshake_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, return 0; npad = (48 / n) * n; - if (sender != NULL) - EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, sender, len); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, s->session->master_key, - s->session->master_key_length); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad); - EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, md_buf, &i); - - EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_md(&ctx), NULL); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, s->session->master_key, - s->session->master_key_length); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, md_buf, i); - EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, p, &ret); + if ((sender != NULL && EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, sender, len) <= 0) + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, s->session->master_key, + s->session->master_key_length) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, md_buf, &i) <= 0 + + || EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_md(&ctx), NULL) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, s->session->master_key, + s->session->master_key_length) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, md_buf, i) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, p, &ret) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_HANDSHAKE_MAC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + ret = 0; + } EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); @@ -758,33 +766,36 @@ int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send) header[j++] = rec->length & 0xff; /* Final param == is SSLv3 */ - ssl3_cbc_digest_record(hash, - md, &md_size, - header, rec->input, - rec->length + md_size, orig_len, - mac_sec, md_size, 1); + if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(hash, + md, &md_size, + header, rec->input, + rec->length + md_size, orig_len, + mac_sec, md_size, 1) <= 0) + return -1; } else { unsigned int md_size_u; /* Chop the digest off the end :-) */ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); - EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&md_ctx, hash); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, seq, 8); rec_char = rec->type; - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &rec_char, 1); p = md; s2n(rec->length, p); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, md, 2); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, rec->input, rec->length); - EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL); - - EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&md_ctx, hash); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, md, md_size); - EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, &md_size_u); + if (EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&md_ctx, hash) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, seq, 8) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &rec_char, 1) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, md, 2) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 + || EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&md_ctx, hash) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, md, md_size) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, &md_size_u) <= 0) { + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); + return -1; + } md_size = md_size_u; EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); @@ -826,17 +837,24 @@ int ssl3_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p, EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { - EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, s->ctx->sha1, NULL); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, salt[i], strlen((const char *)salt[i])); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, p, len); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, buf, &n); - - EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, s->ctx->md5, NULL); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, p, len); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, buf, n); - EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &n); + if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, s->ctx->sha1, NULL) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, salt[i], + strlen((const char *)salt[i])) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, p, len) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, buf, &n) <= 0 + + || EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, s->ctx->md5, NULL) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, p, len) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, buf, n) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &n) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_MASTER_SECRET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + ret = 0; + break; + } out += n; ret += n; } diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c index de917d3f836..f716d77c812 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c @@ -2955,7 +2955,7 @@ int ssl3_new(SSL *s) void ssl3_free(SSL *s) { - if (s == NULL) + if (s == NULL || s->s3 == NULL) return; #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c index 3a5f71d745f..fcfc2fb9698 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c @@ -383,7 +383,6 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) */ if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; ret = -1; s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; @@ -967,7 +966,7 @@ int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s) int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) { - int i, j, ok, al, ret = -1; + int i, j, ok, al, ret = -1, cookie_valid = 0; unsigned int cookie_len; long n; unsigned long id; @@ -1155,8 +1154,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } - - ret = 2; + cookie_valid = 1; } p += cookie_len; @@ -1264,7 +1262,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /* TLS extensions */ if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { - if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n, &al)) { + if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d + n, &al)) { /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); goto f_err; @@ -1492,8 +1490,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) } } - if (ret < 0) - ret = 1; + ret = cookie_valid ? 2 : 1; if (0) { f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); @@ -1503,7 +1500,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); - return (ret); + return ret; } int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) @@ -1987,14 +1984,22 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) { EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); - EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2) - ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[4]), n); - EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, (unsigned int *)&i); + if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, + (num == 2) ? s->ctx->md5 + : s->ctx->sha1, + NULL) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[4]), n) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, + (unsigned int *)&i) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_LIB_EVP); + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } q += i; j += i; } @@ -2024,16 +2029,17 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) #ifdef SSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif - EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL); - EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[4]), n); - if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]), - (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) { + if (EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 + || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[4]), n) <= 0 + || EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]), + (unsigned int *)&i, pkey) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP); - goto err; + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto f_err; } s2n(i, p); n += i + 2; @@ -2879,7 +2885,15 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); - EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx); + if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto f_err; + } + if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto gerr; + } /* * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from @@ -3123,7 +3137,17 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) unsigned char signature[64]; int idx; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); - EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx); + if (pctx == NULL) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto f_err; + } + if (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) <= 0) { + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto f_err; + } if (i != 64) { fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i); } diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/ssl.h b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/ssl.h index d2ab0c074c9..b8456c692bd 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/ssl.h +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/ssl.h @@ -2313,6 +2313,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); # define SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 292 # define SSL_F_SSL3_ENC 134 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK 238 +# define SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_MASTER_SECRET 388 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 135 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS 289 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY 136 @@ -2465,8 +2466,11 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); # define SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK 106 # define SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION 107 # define SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH 108 +# define SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_VALUE 375 # define SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH 109 +# define SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_VALUE 393 # define SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH 110 +# define SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_VALUE 395 # define SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH 111 # define SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE 112 # define SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT 304 diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h index 2dd54626588..e9b1170d7b0 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h @@ -263,6 +263,8 @@ extern "C" { # define SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE 32 # define SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH 5 +# define SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH 4 + # ifndef SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD /* * Some will argue that this increases memory footprint, but it's not diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/ssl_asn1.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/ssl_asn1.c index 39d48eabf03..35cc27c5e98 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/ssl_asn1.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/ssl_asn1.c @@ -121,13 +121,16 @@ typedef struct ssl_session_asn1_st { int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp) { #define LSIZE2 (sizeof(long)*2) - int v1 = 0, v2 = 0, v3 = 0, v4 = 0, v5 = 0, v7 = 0, v8 = 0; + int v1 = 0, v2 = 0, v3 = 0, v4 = 0, v5 = 0; unsigned char buf[4], ibuf1[LSIZE2], ibuf2[LSIZE2]; unsigned char ibuf3[LSIZE2], ibuf4[LSIZE2], ibuf5[LSIZE2]; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT int v6 = 0, v9 = 0, v10 = 0; unsigned char ibuf6[LSIZE2]; #endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + int v7 = 0, v8 = 0; +#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP unsigned char cbuf; int v11 = 0; diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c index 5df2413f719..9a4e1041496 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c @@ -206,6 +206,7 @@ CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert) memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT)); + ret->references = 1; ret->key = &ret->pkeys[cert->key - &cert->pkeys[0]]; /* * or ret->key = ret->pkeys + (cert->key - cert->pkeys), if you find that @@ -282,7 +283,6 @@ CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert) * chain is held inside SSL_CTX */ - ret->references = 1; /* * Set digests to defaults. NB: we don't copy existing values as they * will be set during handshake. diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c index cac525e8600..cb559d987f6 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c @@ -356,10 +356,11 @@ static int get_optional_pkey_id(const char *pkey_name) const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; int pkey_id = 0; ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(NULL, pkey_name, -1); - if (ameth) { - EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, ameth); + if (ameth && EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, + ameth) > 0) { + return pkey_id; } - return pkey_id; + return 0; } #else @@ -371,7 +372,9 @@ static int get_optional_pkey_id(const char *pkey_name) int pkey_id = 0; ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(&tmpeng, pkey_name, -1); if (ameth) { - EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, ameth); + if (EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, + ameth) <= 0) + pkey_id = 0; } if (tmpeng) ENGINE_finish(tmpeng); diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c index 88621b72500..caa671a2707 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c @@ -162,6 +162,8 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_ENC), "SSL3_ENC"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED), "SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK), "SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK"}, + {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_MASTER_SECRET), + "ssl3_generate_master_secret"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST), "SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS), "SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS"}, @@ -369,8 +371,11 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[] = { "bad data returned by callback"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION), "bad decompression"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH), "bad dh g length"}, + {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_VALUE), "bad dh g value"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH), "bad dh pub key length"}, + {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_VALUE), "bad dh pub key value"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH), "bad dh p length"}, + {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_VALUE), "bad dh p value"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH), "bad digest length"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE), "bad dsa signature"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT), "bad ecc cert"}, diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c index e11746a6950..93d1cbe438e 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c @@ -307,6 +307,7 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) s->options = ctx->options; s->mode = ctx->mode; s->max_cert_list = ctx->max_cert_list; + s->references = 1; if (ctx->cert != NULL) { /* @@ -375,7 +376,6 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) if (!s->method->ssl_new(s)) goto err; - s->references = 1; s->server = (ctx->method->ssl_accept == ssl_undefined_function) ? 0 : 1; SSL_clear(s); @@ -3283,8 +3283,11 @@ EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash, const EVP_MD *md) { ssl_clear_hash_ctx(hash); *hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); - if (md) - EVP_DigestInit_ex(*hash, md, NULL); + if (*hash == NULL || (md && EVP_DigestInit_ex(*hash, md, NULL) <= 0)) { + EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(*hash); + *hash = NULL; + return NULL; + } return *hash; } diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h index a7f3f8dad4a..f5d9df6bc0e 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h @@ -1154,7 +1154,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit); int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **data, - unsigned char *d, int n, int *al); + unsigned char *limit, int *al); int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **data, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al); int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s); @@ -1218,15 +1218,15 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size); char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); -void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, - unsigned char *md_out, - size_t *md_out_size, - const unsigned char header[13], - const unsigned char *data, - size_t data_plus_mac_size, - size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size, - const unsigned char *mac_secret, - unsigned mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3); +int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, + unsigned char *md_out, + size_t *md_out_size, + const unsigned char header[13], + const unsigned char *data, + size_t data_plus_mac_size, + size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size, + const unsigned char *mac_secret, + unsigned mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3); void tls_fips_digest_extra(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx, const unsigned char *data, diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/ssl_rsa.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/ssl_rsa.c index daf15dd97e1..c91a998185b 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/ssl_rsa.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/ssl_rsa.c @@ -160,7 +160,10 @@ int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL *ssl, RSA *rsa) } RSA_up_ref(rsa); - EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa); + if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) <= 0) { + RSA_free(rsa); + return 0; + } ret = ssl_set_pkey(ssl->cert, pkey); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); @@ -181,6 +184,15 @@ static int ssl_set_pkey(CERT *c, EVP_PKEY *pkey) if (c->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL) { EVP_PKEY *pktmp; pktmp = X509_get_pubkey(c->pkeys[i].x509); + if (pktmp == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_PKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp); + return 0; + } + /* + * The return code from EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters is deliberately + * ignored. Some EVP_PKEY types cannot do this. + */ EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pktmp, pkey); EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp); ERR_clear_error(); @@ -382,6 +394,10 @@ static int ssl_set_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x) } if (c->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL) { + /* + * The return code from EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters is deliberately + * ignored. Some EVP_PKEY types cannot do this. + */ EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, c->pkeys[i].privatekey); ERR_clear_error(); @@ -502,7 +518,10 @@ int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *rsa) } RSA_up_ref(rsa); - EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa); + if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) <= 0) { + RSA_free(rsa); + return 0; + } ret = ssl_set_pkey(ctx->cert, pkey); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c index 1ad9dc79493..de4c59e21fe 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c @@ -256,8 +256,8 @@ SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket) dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL; dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = NULL; # endif -#endif dest->tlsext_tick = NULL; +#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP dest->srp_username = NULL; #endif @@ -324,7 +324,6 @@ SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket) goto err; } # endif -#endif if (ticket != 0) { dest->tlsext_tick = BUF_memdup(src->tlsext_tick, src->tlsext_ticklen); @@ -334,6 +333,7 @@ SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket) dest->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = 0; dest->tlsext_ticklen = 0; } +#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (src->srp_username) { diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c index 6a0c293aa5a..349ee1e03e8 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c @@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ /* Or gethostname won't be declared properly on Linux and GNU platforms. */ #define _BSD_SOURCE 1 +#define _DEFAULT_SOURCE 1 #include <assert.h> #include <errno.h> diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c index 8f45294e557..985356d74b2 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c @@ -385,6 +385,8 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_read_ctx); dd = s->enc_read_ctx; mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, NULL); + if (mac_ctx == NULL) + goto err; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP if (s->expand != NULL) { COMP_CTX_free(s->expand); @@ -423,11 +425,14 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) dd = s->enc_write_ctx; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); - if (!mac_ctx) + if (mac_ctx == NULL) goto err; s->write_hash = mac_ctx; - } else + } else { mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, NULL); + if (mac_ctx == NULL) + goto err; + } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP if (s->compress != NULL) { COMP_CTX_free(s->compress); @@ -500,7 +505,12 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) { mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL, mac_secret, *mac_secret_size); - EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, m, NULL, mac_key); + if (mac_key == NULL + || EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, m, NULL, mac_key) <= 0) { + EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err2; + } EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); } #ifdef TLS_DEBUG @@ -913,8 +923,9 @@ int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out) } EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); - EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, d); - EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &ret); + if (EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, d) <=0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &ret) <= 0) + ret = 0; EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); return ((int)ret); } @@ -1041,17 +1052,24 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send) * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle. */ /* Final param == not SSLv3 */ - ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx, - md, &md_size, - header, rec->input, - rec->length + md_size, orig_len, - ssl->s3->read_mac_secret, - ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size, 0); + if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx, + md, &md_size, + header, rec->input, + rec->length + md_size, orig_len, + ssl->s3->read_mac_secret, + ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size, 0) <= 0) { + if (!stream_mac) + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac); + return -1; + } } else { - EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)); - EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length); - t = EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size); - OPENSSL_assert(t > 0); + if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0) { + if (!stream_mac) + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac); + return -1; + } #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS if (!send && FIPS_mode()) tls_fips_digest_extra(ssl->enc_read_ctx, diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c index d70b93feadf..27f1216c576 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c @@ -913,7 +913,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work). */ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, - const unsigned char *d, int n) + const unsigned char *limit) { unsigned short type, size; static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { @@ -942,11 +942,11 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ }; - if (data >= (d + n - 2)) + if (data >= (limit - 2)) return; data += 2; - if (data > (d + n - 4)) + if (data > (limit - 4)) return; n2s(data, type); n2s(data, size); @@ -954,7 +954,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) return; - if (data + size > d + n) + if (data + size > limit) return; data += size; @@ -962,7 +962,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock); - if (data + len1 + len2 != d + n) + if (data + len1 + len2 != limit) return; if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0) return; @@ -971,7 +971,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, } else { const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); - if (data + len != d + n) + if (data + len != limit) return; if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0) return; @@ -981,8 +981,8 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, } # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ -int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, - int n, int *al) +int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, + unsigned char *limit, int *al) { unsigned short type; unsigned short size; @@ -1004,7 +1004,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) - ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n); + ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, limit); # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP @@ -1016,22 +1016,22 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, s->srtp_profile = NULL; - if (data == d + n) + if (data == limit) goto ri_check; - if (data > (d + n - 2)) + if (data > (limit - 2)) goto err; n2s(data, len); - if (data > (d + n - len)) + if (data + len != limit) goto err; - while (data <= (d + n - 4)) { + while (data <= (limit - 4)) { n2s(data, type); n2s(data, size); - if (data + size > (d + n)) + if (data + size > (limit)) goto err; # if 0 fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size); @@ -1396,7 +1396,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, } /* Spurious data on the end */ - if (data != d + n) + if (data != limit) goto err; *p = data; @@ -2291,10 +2291,13 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, /* Check key name matches */ if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) return 2; - HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, - tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); - EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, - tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16); + if (HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, + tlsext_tick_md(), NULL) <= 0 + || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, + tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, + etick + 16) <= 0) { + goto err; + } } /* * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity @@ -2302,13 +2305,14 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, */ mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx); if (mlen < 0) { - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - return -1; + goto err; } eticklen -= mlen; /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ - HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen); - HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL); + if (HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0 + || HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) { + goto err; + } HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); @@ -2319,11 +2323,10 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen); - if (!sdec) { + if (!sdec || EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); return -1; } - EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen); if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); OPENSSL_free(sdec); @@ -2356,6 +2359,10 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket. */ return 2; +err: + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); + HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); + return -1; } /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */ diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/tls1.h b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/tls1.h index 69d8186a4e2..91504b17e89 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/tls1.h +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/tls1.h @@ -235,8 +235,7 @@ extern "C" { /* * ExtensionType value for TLS padding extension. - * http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-values/tls-extensiontype-values.xhtml - * http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 + * http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding */ # define TLSEXT_TYPE_padding 21 @@ -261,20 +260,19 @@ extern "C" { # define TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg 13172 # endif -/* NameType value from RFC 3546 */ +/* NameType value from RFC3546 */ # define TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name 0 -/* status request value from RFC 3546 */ +/* status request value from RFC3546 */ # define TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp 1 -/* ECPointFormat values from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */ +/* ECPointFormat values from RFC4492 */ # define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_first 0 # define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed 0 # define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime 1 # define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2 2 # define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_last 2 -/* Signature and hash algorithms from RFC 5246 */ - +/* Signature and hash algorithms from RFC5246 */ # define TLSEXT_signature_anonymous 0 # define TLSEXT_signature_rsa 1 # define TLSEXT_signature_dsa 2 @@ -404,7 +402,6 @@ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB,(void (*)(void))cb) # define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x03000066 /* AES ciphersuites from RFC3268 */ - # define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA 0x0300002F # define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA 0x03000030 # define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA 0x03000031 @@ -570,7 +567,7 @@ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB,(void (*)(void))cb) # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA "DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA "ADH-AES256-SHA" -/* ECC ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001) */ +/* ECC ciphersuites from RFC4492 */ # define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA "ECDH-ECDSA-NULL-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA "ECDH-ECDSA-RC4-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "ECDH-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA" |