tls: fix out-of-bounds read in ClientHelloParser

ClientHelloParser::ParseHeader(data, avail) potentially accesses data
beyond avail bytes because it trusts the client to transmit a valid
frame length. Sending an impossibly small frame length causes the TLS
server to read beyond the buffer provided by the caller.

Guard against this by calling End() on the ClientHelloParser when the
client transmits an impossibly small frame length.

The test is designed to reliable cause a segmentation fault on Linux and
Windows when the buffer overrun occurs, and to trigger a spatial safety
violation when compiled with an address sanitizer enabled or when
running under valgrind.

PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/44580
Reviewed-By: Ben Noordhuis <info@bnoordhuis.nl>
Reviewed-By: Rich Trott <rtrott@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Minwoo Jung <nodecorelab@gmail.com>

1 files changed, 1 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/node.gyp b/node.gyp
index 2dfa91fea66..b94a2b1d986 100644
--- a/node.gyp
+++ b/node.gyp
@@ -1250,6 +1250,7 @@
             'HAVE_OPENSSL=1',
           ],
           'sources': [
+            'test/cctest/test_crypto_clienthello.cc',
             'test/cctest/test_node_crypto.cc',
           ]
         }],