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Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19654)
(cherry picked from commit 43086b1bd48958ce95fadba8459ad88675da4fdf)
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Note: The private key is test/certs/root-ed25519.privkey.pem
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19654)
(cherry picked from commit 42f917432999b34ad8618ae03a5f199738a2b5ba)
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Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19581)
(cherry picked from commit ec33ed712665ca65cabcd87d446e5db79a64379e)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Release: yes
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Release: yes
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Release: yes
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19560)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19558)
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SYS$GETTIM_PREC is a very new function, only available on OpenVMS v8.4.
OpenSSL binaries built on OpenVMS v8.4 become unusable on older OpenVM
versions, but building for the older CRTL version will make the high
precision time functions unavailable.
Tests have shown that on Alpha and Itanium, the time update granularity
between SYS$GETTIM and SYS$GETTIM_PREC is marginal, so the former plus
a sequence number turns out to be better to guarantee a unique nonce.
Fixes #18727
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18730)
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If rule_str ended in a "-", "l" was incremented one byte past the
end of the buffer. This resulted in an out-of-bounds read when "l"
is dereferenced at the end of the loop. It is safest to just return
early in this case since the condition occurs inside a nested loop.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19166)
(cherry picked from commit 428511ca66670e169a0e1b12e7540714b0be4cf8)
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Fixes #19460
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19461)
(cherry picked from commit 5b9480fc1e814bf8fa2dce0dbbede147f04d477c)
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Also change B< to I< in {CMS,PKCS7}_verify.pod, PKCS7_sign{,_add_signer}.pod
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19108)
(cherry picked from commit 312a6b3a0327a986344c85aa6bc43e135d70bc6c)
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This reverts commit 748df1874f0488ce0c86b6d2d083921abb34b1e3.
Fixes #19388
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19392)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Release: yes
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Release: yes
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Release: yes
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19383)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Release: yes
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19381)
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The IRIX mips64-cpu, n32-abi configurations include SIXTY_FOUR_BIT in bn_ops,
but it is missing from mips64*-linux-*abin32 (which OpenSSL calls
"linux-mips64"). This causes heap corruption when verifying TLS certificates
(which tend to be RSA-signed) with openssl 1.1.1q:
```
nix@oak:~$ /nix/store/4k04dh6a1zs6hxiacwcg4a4nvxvgli2j-openssl-mips64el-unknown-linux-gnuabin32-1.1.1q-bin/bin/openssl s_client -host www.google.com -port 443free(): invalid pointer
Aborted
```
and a slightly different failure with current HEAD:
```
nix@oak:~$ /nix/store/9bqxharxajsl9fid0c8ls6fb9wxp8kdc-openssl-mips64el-unknown-linux-gnuabin32-1.1.1q-bin/bin/openssl s_client -host www.google.com -port 443
Connecting to 142.250.180.4
CONNECTED(00000003)
Fatal glibc error: malloc assertion failure in sysmalloc: (old_top == initial_top (av) && old_size == 0) || ((unsigned long) (old_size) >= MINSIZE && prev_inuse (old_top) && ((unsigned long) old_end & (pagesize - 1)) == 0)
Aborted
```
Applying this patch and recompiling produces the expected output instead of a
crash.
Note that Gentoo (and to my knowledge all other other distributions which
support mips64n32) use the `linux-generic32` configuration, which uses only
32-bit arithmetic (rather than full 64-bit arithmetic) and lacks assembler
implementations for the SHA hash functions:
https://gitweb.gentoo.org/repo/gentoo.git/tree/dev-libs/openssl/files/gentoo.config-1.0.2#n102
For support in nixpkgs we would like to use the full 64-bit integer registers
and perlasm routines, so I'm submitting this upstream as well.
Fixes #19319
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19320)
(cherry picked from commit d250e8563fa400fd3d9b93cff609c7503149b908)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18879)
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We need to reencode X509_req_info_st if member data updated.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18879)
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Fixes #18183.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19081)
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CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19007)
(cherry picked from commit c92c3dfb99485eb2cfb840e92bd0ece8cdd72d0c)
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Fixes a bug in the cookie code which would have caused problems for ten
minutes before and after the lower 32 bits of time_t rolled over.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19022)
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Avoid problems when the lower 32 bits of time_t roll over by delaying
the cast to integer until after the time delta has been computed.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19004)
(cherry picked from commit a6cadcbdc3b4f3fbd0fd228e41177f0661b68264)
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As of clang-14 the strict aliasing is causing code to magically disappear.
By explicitly inlining the code, the aliasing problem evaporates.
Fixes #18225
Backport of #18258 to 1.1.1.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18948)
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If the first app data record arrives before the Finished message we should
be able to buffer it and move on to the Finished message.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18976)
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If app data is received before a Finished message in DTLS then we buffer
it to return later. The function SSL_pending() is supposed to tell you
how much processed app data we have already buffered, and SSL_has_pending()
is supposed to tell you if we have any data buffered (whether processed or
not, and whether app data or not).
Neither SSL_pending() or SSL_has_pending() were taking account of this
DTLS specific app data buffer.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18976)
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Updates the docs to describe EC_KEY_set_private_key() function behavior
when a NULL priv_key argument is passed.
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18874)
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This tests the behavior and API of the EC_KEY_set_private_key function.
It tests compliance with legacy features related to NULL private keys
too.
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18874)
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This allows to set EC_KEY's private key to NULL and fixes regression
issue following OTC guideline in
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/18744#issuecomment-1195175696
Fixes #18744.
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18874)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18926)
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Fixes: #13765
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17706)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18894)
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Checks if header is NULL or not before calling strlen().
CLA: trivial
Fixes #18825
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18865)
(cherry picked from commit 205957405d08ef199e6ab654e333a627bbca9ccc)
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Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18859)
(cherry picked from commit 316fad64c1e541a530910a13160d48b7545ac1e0)
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If an IP address prefix value is supplied that is too large then a crash
can result. v2i_IPAddrBlocks() should sanity check the prefix value, as
should X509v3_addr_add_prefix().
Reported by Theo Buehler (@botovq)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18847)
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(cherry picked from commit 9b887d5d5a8ef9aa1c3ce6e54a82ddcba25b9415)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18847)
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Unit test to show that a2i_IPADDRESS("1.2.3.4.test.example") ignores
trailing data.
See: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/12649
See: https://bugs.python.org/issue41556
(cherry picked from commit 1a9411a30b09a98498366979a1ea4898f70f6d19)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18847)
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sscanf() call in ipv4_from_asc does not check that
the string is terminated immediately after the last digit.
(cherry picked from commit 8b9a13b43ba3d71e441fca47a52e800ce79b3d2b)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18847)
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PR #18129 broke the scenario of signing a certificate (not CSR) with
different-sized key. This works in 3.0, so port the fix from 3.0
(which is to only update the issuer for a request).
Partially undo #18129, but keep setting the issuer only for a CSR
Create two certs (a and ca) then sign a with c (into b):
```
openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout a-key.pem -out a-cert.pem -days 365 -nodes -subj /CN=a.example.com
openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:4096 -keyout ${HERE}/ca-key.pem -out ${HERE}/ca-cert.pem -days 3650 -nodes -subj /CN=ca.example.com
openssl x509 -in a-cert.pem -CA ca-cert.pem -CAkey ca-key.pem -set_serial '1234567890' -preserve_dates -sha256 -out b-cert.pem
```
The above succeeds in 1.1.1n and 3.0, fails in 1.1.1o (which includes #18129)
The issue in #16080 is also fixed.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18836)
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Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18831)
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Fixes #18801
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18830)
(cherry picked from commit c00fd2dece8ba54b2597a61c8db6a001025d05d5)
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We need to check that error cert is available before printing its data
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18805)
(cherry picked from commit fad0f80eff188ef938fed614245a56ed56110deb)
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Backported from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18373
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18803)
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random serial.
Also improve openssl-x509.pod.in and error handling of load_serial() in apps.c.
Backported from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18373
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18803)
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Signed-off-by: Varun Sharma <varunsh@stepsecurity.io>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18766)
(cherry picked from commit c6e7f427c82dfa17416a39af7661c40162d57aaf)
(cherry picked from commit 90d6e6a3d5d30c3df4edf4a6430472c3eeb7d7a7)
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Fixes #18677
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18698)
(cherry picked from commit 4798e0680b112993815098ca21d7d68ff31ebc6e)
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Avoid this warning when compiled with llvm/gcc + mingw-w64 and
`USE_BCRYPTGENRANDOM` enabled:
```
../providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_win.c:31:11: warning: unknown pragma ignored [-Wunknown-pragmas]
^
1 warning generated.
```
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18709)
(cherry picked from commit 695cb63c744bab090144a86949b68324ee3094d6)
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Currently there is a race possible because the reseed_counter
of the master drbg may be incremented after the get_entropy call.
Therefore access the parent's reseed_counter while still holding
the rand_drbg_lock.
This improves commit 958fec77928a28350f6af252ac5e8d0e6e081faa
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16900)
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This was found by my Reproducible Error Injection patch (#18356)
Due to the exact location of the injected memory
error the sha256 digest is missing, and this causes much later
the memory leak (and a failed assertion) in tls13_generate_secret.
But the reproduction is a bit challenging, as it requires AESNI
and RDRAND capability.
OPENSSL_ia32cap=0x4200000000000000 ERROR_INJECT=1657070330 ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./client-test ./corpora/client/791afc153e17db072175eeef85385a38d7f6d194
#0 0x7fceaffb7d4f in __sanitizer_print_stack_trace ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_stack.cc:36
#1 0x55fb9117f934 in my_malloc fuzz/test-corpus.c:114
#2 0x7fceafa147f3 in OPENSSL_LH_insert crypto/lhash/lhash.c:109
#3 0x7fceafa42639 in lh_OBJ_NAME_insert crypto/objects/obj_local.h:12
#4 0x7fceafa42639 in OBJ_NAME_add crypto/objects/o_names.c:236
#5 0x7fceaf9f7baa in EVP_add_digest crypto/evp/names.c:39
#6 0x7fceaf9c6b97 in openssl_add_all_digests_int crypto/evp/c_alld.c:39
#7 0x7fceafa0f8ec in ossl_init_add_all_digests crypto/init.c:275
#8 0x7fceafa0f8ec in ossl_init_add_all_digests_ossl_ crypto/init.c:264
#9 0x7fceaf69b4de in __pthread_once_slow /build/glibc-SzIz7B/glibc-2.31/nptl/pthread_once.c:116
#10 0x7fceafafb27c in CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once crypto/threads_pthread.c:118
#11 0x7fceafa1000e in OPENSSL_init_crypto crypto/init.c:677
#12 0x7fceafa1000e in OPENSSL_init_crypto crypto/init.c:611
#13 0x7fceafdad3e8 in OPENSSL_init_ssl ssl/ssl_init.c:190
#14 0x55fb9117ee0f in FuzzerInitialize fuzz/client.c:46
#15 0x55fb9117e939 in main fuzz/test-corpus.c:194
#16 0x7fceaf4bc082 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308
#17 0x55fb9117ec7d in _start (.../openssl/fuzz/client-test+0x2c7d)
#0 0x7fceaffb7d4f in __sanitizer_print_stack_trace ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_stack.cc:36
#1 0x55fb9117f934 in my_malloc fuzz/test-corpus.c:114
#2 0x7fceafa147f3 in OPENSSL_LH_insert crypto/lhash/lhash.c:109
#3 0x7fceafa42639 in lh_OBJ_NAME_insert crypto/objects/obj_local.h:12
#4 0x7fceafa42639 in OBJ_NAME_add crypto/objects/o_names.c:236
#5 0x7fceaf9f7baa in EVP_add_digest crypto/evp/names.c:39
#6 0x7fceafdad328 in ossl_init_ssl_base ssl/ssl_init.c:87
#7 0x7fceafdad328 in ossl_init_ssl_base_ossl_ ssl/ssl_init.c:24
#8 0x7fceaf69b4de in __pthread_once_slow /build/glibc-SzIz7B/glibc-2.31/nptl/pthread_once.c:116
#9 0x7fceafafb27c in CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once crypto/threads_pthread.c:118
#10 0x7fceafdad412 in OPENSSL_init_ssl ssl/ssl_init.c:193
#11 0x55fb9117ee0f in FuzzerInitialize fuzz/client.c:46
#12 0x55fb9117e939 in main fuzz/test-corpus.c:194
#13 0x7fceaf4bc082 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308
#14 0x55fb9117ec7d in _start (.../openssl/fuzz/client-test+0x2c7d)
=================================================================
==1320996==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks
Direct leak of 80 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x7fceaffaa808 in __interceptor_malloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:144
#1 0x7fceafa19425 in CRYPTO_zalloc crypto/mem.c:230
#2 0x7fceafa03a85 in int_ctx_new crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c:144
#3 0x7fceafa03a85 in EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c:250
#4 0x7fceafe38de5 in tls13_generate_secret ssl/tls13_enc.c:174
#5 0x7fceafd9537f in ssl_derive ssl/s3_lib.c:4833
#6 0x7fceafdde91c in tls_parse_stoc_key_share ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c:1902
#7 0x7fceafdd4ac1 in tls_parse_all_extensions ssl/statem/extensions.c:752
#8 0x7fceafdf8079 in tls_process_server_hello ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c:1698
#9 0x7fceafe01f87 in ossl_statem_client_process_message ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c:1034
#10 0x7fceafdeec0d in read_state_machine ssl/statem/statem.c:636
#11 0x7fceafdeec0d in state_machine ssl/statem/statem.c:434
#12 0x7fceafdb88d7 in SSL_do_handshake ssl/ssl_lib.c:3718
#13 0x55fb9117f07c in FuzzerTestOneInput fuzz/client.c:98
#14 0x55fb9117f463 in testfile fuzz/test-corpus.c:182
#15 0x55fb9117eb92 in main fuzz/test-corpus.c:226
#16 0x7fceaf4bc082 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308
Indirect leak of 1080 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x7fceaffaa808 in __interceptor_malloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:144
#1 0x7fceafa19425 in CRYPTO_zalloc crypto/mem.c:230
#2 0x7fceafa11555 in pkey_hkdf_init crypto/kdf/hkdf.c:51
#3 0x7fceafa03b36 in int_ctx_new crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c:160
#4 0x7fceafa03b36 in EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c:250
#5 0x7fceafe38de5 in tls13_generate_secret ssl/tls13_enc.c:174
#6 0x7fceafd9537f in ssl_derive ssl/s3_lib.c:4833
#7 0x7fceafdde91c in tls_parse_stoc_key_share ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c:1902
#8 0x7fceafdd4ac1 in tls_parse_all_extensions ssl/statem/extensions.c:752
#9 0x7fceafdf8079 in tls_process_server_hello ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c:1698
#10 0x7fceafe01f87 in ossl_statem_client_process_message ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c:1034
#11 0x7fceafdeec0d in read_state_machine ssl/statem/statem.c:636
#12 0x7fceafdeec0d in state_machine ssl/statem/statem.c:434
#13 0x7fceafdb88d7 in SSL_do_handshake ssl/ssl_lib.c:3718
#14 0x55fb9117f07c in FuzzerTestOneInput fuzz/client.c:98
#15 0x55fb9117f463 in testfile fuzz/test-corpus.c:182
#16 0x55fb9117eb92 in main fuzz/test-corpus.c:226
#17 0x7fceaf4bc082 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 1160 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s).
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18725)
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The existing help text says:
> -badsig Corrupt last byte of loaded OSCP response signature (for test)
but this should be OCSP. This is the only occurrence within the project
of this typo.
CLA: trivial
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18684)
(cherry picked from commit 2837b19fcba4bf4ff2ecdc8435c650bf18c27552)
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