diff options
author | Rémy Coutable <remy@gitlab.com> | 2016-04-07 14:56:44 +0300 |
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committer | Rémy Coutable <remy@rymai.me> | 2016-04-07 18:33:47 +0300 |
commit | 4a9f5ef93152cce6309d6e7cbe84bc7006e220cd (patch) | |
tree | 170047bce4ca3c7453b53d42237981ce40ca94f5 | |
parent | 2b060c64e7e44e7ee65c15eaea2992bb3e78b73b (diff) |
Merge branch 'fix/2fa-authentication-spoofing' into 'master'
Fix 2FA authentication spoofing
This is security fix for vulnerability described at
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab-ce/issues/14900.
Attacker was able to bypass password authentication of users that have 2FA enabled, and consequently sign is as a different user, without knowing his password, if he managed to guess 2FA One Time Password for that user.
It was also possible to enumerate users and check if they have 2FA enabled, because GitLab responded with different error for each case.
This MR attempts to change default user search scope if `otp_user_id` session variable has been set. If it is present, it means that user has 2FA enabled, and has already been verified with login and password. In this case we should look for user with `otp_user_id` first, before picking it up by `login`.
Both, 2FA authentication spoofing and 2FA discovery have been covered by specs.
Current 2FA code is a bit tricky, so it probably needs some refactoring.
Signed-off-by: Rémy Coutable <remy@rymai.me>
-rw-r--r-- | CHANGELOG | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | app/controllers/sessions_controller.rb | 15 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | spec/controllers/sessions_controller_spec.rb | 101 |
3 files changed, 113 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/CHANGELOG b/CHANGELOG index 3bbaf66e37e..a67d246b494 100644 --- a/CHANGELOG +++ b/CHANGELOG @@ -1,5 +1,8 @@ Please view this file on the master branch, on stable branches it's out of date. +v 8.5.10 + - Fix a 2FA authentication spoofing vulnerability. + v 8.5.9 - Don't attempt to fetch any tags from a forked repo (Stan Hu). !3504 diff --git a/app/controllers/sessions_controller.rb b/app/controllers/sessions_controller.rb index 44eb58e418b..27637090d7f 100644 --- a/app/controllers/sessions_controller.rb +++ b/app/controllers/sessions_controller.rb @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ class SessionsController < Devise::SessionsController skip_before_action :check_2fa_requirement, only: [:destroy] - prepend_before_action :authenticate_with_two_factor, only: [:create] + prepend_before_action :authenticate_with_two_factor, + if: :two_factor_enabled?, only: [:create] prepend_before_action :store_redirect_path, only: [:new] before_action :auto_sign_in_with_provider, only: [:new] before_action :load_recaptcha @@ -38,10 +39,10 @@ class SessionsController < Devise::SessionsController end def find_user - if user_params[:login] - User.by_login(user_params[:login]) - elsif user_params[:otp_attempt] && session[:otp_user_id] + if session[:otp_user_id] User.find(session[:otp_user_id]) + elsif user_params[:login] + User.by_login(user_params[:login]) end end @@ -65,11 +66,13 @@ class SessionsController < Devise::SessionsController end end + def two_factor_enabled? + find_user.try(:two_factor_enabled?) + end + def authenticate_with_two_factor user = self.resource = find_user - return unless user && user.two_factor_enabled? - if user_params[:otp_attempt].present? && session[:otp_user_id] if valid_otp_attempt?(user) # Remove any lingering user data from login diff --git a/spec/controllers/sessions_controller_spec.rb b/spec/controllers/sessions_controller_spec.rb new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..83cc8ec6d26 --- /dev/null +++ b/spec/controllers/sessions_controller_spec.rb @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +require 'spec_helper' + +describe SessionsController do + describe '#create' do + before do + @request.env['devise.mapping'] = Devise.mappings[:user] + end + + context 'when using standard authentications' do + context 'invalid password' do + it 'does not authenticate user' do + post(:create, user: { login: 'invalid', password: 'invalid' }) + + expect(response) + .to set_flash.now[:alert].to /Invalid login or password/ + end + end + + context 'when using valid password' do + let(:user) { create(:user) } + + it 'authenticates user correctly' do + post(:create, user: { login: user.username, password: user.password }) + + expect(response).to set_flash.to /Signed in successfully/ + expect(subject.current_user). to eq user + end + end + end + + context 'when using two-factor authentication' do + let(:user) { create(:user, :two_factor) } + + def authenticate_2fa(user_params) + post(:create, { user: user_params }, { otp_user_id: user.id }) + end + + ## + # See #14900 issue + # + context 'when authenticating with login and OTP of another user' do + context 'when another user has 2FA enabled' do + let(:another_user) { create(:user, :two_factor) } + + context 'when OTP is valid for another user' do + it 'does not authenticate' do + authenticate_2fa(login: another_user.username, + otp_attempt: another_user.current_otp) + + expect(subject.current_user).to_not eq another_user + end + end + + context 'when OTP is invalid for another user' do + it 'does not authenticate' do + authenticate_2fa(login: another_user.username, + otp_attempt: 'invalid') + + expect(subject.current_user).to_not eq another_user + end + end + + context 'when authenticating with OTP' do + context 'when OTP is valid' do + it 'authenticates correctly' do + authenticate_2fa(otp_attempt: user.current_otp) + + expect(subject.current_user).to eq user + end + end + + context 'when OTP is invalid' do + before { authenticate_2fa(otp_attempt: 'invalid') } + + it 'does not authenticate' do + expect(subject.current_user).to_not eq user + end + + it 'warns about invalid OTP code' do + expect(response).to set_flash.now[:alert] + .to /Invalid two-factor code/ + end + end + end + + context 'when another user does not have 2FA enabled' do + let(:another_user) { create(:user) } + + it 'does not leak that 2FA is disabled for another user' do + authenticate_2fa(login: another_user.username, + otp_attempt: 'invalid') + + expect(response).to set_flash.now[:alert] + .to /Invalid two-factor code/ + end + end + end + end + end + end +end |