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---
-stage: Verify
-group: Continuous Integration
-info: To determine the technical writer assigned to the Stage/Group associated with this page, see https://about.gitlab.com/handbook/engineering/ux/technical-writing/#assignments
-type: reference
+redirect_to: '../../ci/README.md'
---
-# New CI job permissions model
+This document is deprecated. See the latest [GitLab CI/CD documentation](../../ci/README.md).
-> Introduced in GitLab 8.12.
-
-GitLab 8.12 has a completely redesigned [job permissions](../permissions.md#job-permissions) system. You can find
-all discussion and all our concerns when choosing the current approach in issue
-[#18994](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab-foss/-/issues/18994).
-
-Jobs permissions should be tightly integrated with the permissions of a user
-who is triggering a job.
-
-The reasons to do it like that are:
-
-- We already have a permissions system in place: group and project membership
- of users.
-- We already fully know who is triggering a job (using `git push`, using the
- web UI, executing triggers).
-- We already know what user is allowed to do.
-- We use the user permissions for jobs that are triggered by the user.
-- It opens a lot of possibilities to further enforce user permissions, like
- allowing only specific users to access runners or use secure variables and
- environments.
-- It is simple and convenient that your job can access everything that you
- as a user have access to.
-- Short living unique tokens are now used, granting access for time of the job
- and maximizing security.
-
-With the new behavior, any job that is triggered by the user, is also marked
-with their read permissions. When a user does a `git push` or changes files through
-the web UI, a new pipeline is usually created. This pipeline is marked
-as created by the pusher (local push or via the UI) and any job created in this
-pipeline has the read permissions of the pusher but not write permissions.
-
-This allows us to make it really easy to evaluate the access for all projects
-that have [Git submodules](../../ci/git_submodules.md) or are using container images that the pusher
-would have access too. **The permission is granted only for the time that the job
-is running. The access is revoked after the job is finished.**
-
-## Types of users
-
-It is important to note that we have a few types of users:
-
-- **Administrators**: CI jobs created by Administrators don't have access
- to all GitLab projects, but only to projects and container images of projects
- that the administrator is a member of. That means that if a project is either
- public or internal users have access anyway, but if a project is private, the
- Administrator has to be a member of it in order to have access to it
- via another project's job.
-
-- **External users**: CI jobs created by [external users](../permissions.md#external-users) have
- access only to projects to which the user has at least Reporter access. This
- rules out accessing all internal projects by default.
-
-This allows us to make the CI and permission system more trustworthy.
-Let's consider the following scenario:
-
-1. You are an employee of a company. Your company has a number of internal tools
- hosted in private repositories and you have multiple CI jobs that make use
- of these repositories.
-
-1. You invite a new [external user](../permissions.md#external-users). CI jobs created by that user do not
- have access to internal repositories, because the user also doesn't have the
- access from within GitLab. You as an employee have to grant explicit access
- for this user. This allows us to prevent from accidental data leakage.
-
-## Job token
-
-When a pipeline job is about to run, GitLab generates a unique token and injects it as the
-[`CI_JOB_TOKEN` predefined variable](../../ci/variables/predefined_variables.md).
-This token can authenticate [API requests](../../api/README.md)
-from the job script (Runner) that needs to access the project's resources (for example, when
-fetching a job artifact).
-
-Once the token is authenticated, GitLab identifies the user who triggered the job and uses this user
-to authorize access to the resource. Therefore, this user must be assigned to
-[a role that has the required privileges](../permissions.md).
-
-The job token has these limitations:
-
-- Not all APIs allow job tokens for authentication. See [this list](../../api/README.md#gitlab-ci-job-token)
- for available endpoints.
-- The token is valid only while the pipeline job runs. Once the job finishes, the token can't be
- used for authentication.
-
-Although a job token is handy to quickly access a project's resources without any configuration, it
-sometimes gives extra permissions that aren't necessary. There is [a proposal](https://gitlab.com/groups/gitlab-org/-/epics/3559)
-to redesign the feature for more strategic control of the access permissions.
-
-If you need your CI pipeline to push to the Package Registry, consider using [deploy tokens](deploy_tokens/index.md).
-
-We try to make sure that this token doesn't leak by:
-
-1. Securing all API endpoints to not expose the job token.
-1. Masking the job token from job logs.
-1. Granting permissions to the job token **only** when the job is running.
-
-However, this brings up a question about the runner's security. To make sure that
-this token doesn't leak, you should also make sure that you configure
-your runners in the most possible secure way, by avoiding the following:
-
-1. Any usage of Docker's `privileged` mode is risky if the machines are re-used.
-1. Using the `shell` executor since jobs run on the same machine.
-
-By using an insecure GitLab Runner configuration, you allow the rogue developers
-to steal the tokens of other jobs.
-
-## Before GitLab 8.12
-
-In versions before GitLab 8.12, all CI jobs would use the runner's token
-to checkout project sources.
-
-The project's runner token was a token that you could find under the
-project's **Settings > Pipelines** and was limited to access only that
-project.
-It could be used for registering new specific runners assigned to the project
-and to checkout project sources.
-It could also be used with the GitLab Container Registry for that project,
-allowing pulling and pushing Docker images from within the CI job.
-
-GitLab would create a special checkout URL like:
-
-```plaintext
-https://gitlab-ci-token:<project-runners-token>/gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab-foss.git
-```
-
-And then the users could also use it in their CI jobs all Docker related
-commands to interact with GitLab Container Registry. For example:
-
-```shell
-docker login -u gitlab-ci-token -p $CI_JOB_TOKEN registry.gitlab.com
-```
-
-Using single token had multiple security implications:
-
-- The token would be readable to anyone who had Developer access to a project
- that could run CI jobs, allowing the developer to register any specific
- runner for that project.
-- The token would allow to access only the project's sources, forbidding from
- accessing any other projects.
-- The token was not expiring and was multi-purpose: used for checking out sources,
- for registering specific runners and for accessing a project's container
- registry with read-write permissions.
-
-All the above led to a new permission model for jobs that was introduced
-with GitLab 8.12.
-
-## Making use of the new CI job permissions model
-
-With the new job permissions model, there is now an easy way to access all
-dependent source code in a project. That way, we can:
-
-1. Access a project's dependent repositories
-1. Access a project's [Git submodules](../../ci/git_submodules.md)
-1. Access private container images
-1. Access project's and submodule LFS objects
-
-Below you can see the prerequisites needed to make use of the new permissions
-model and how that works with Git submodules and private Docker images hosted on
-the container registry.
-
-### Prerequisites to use the new permissions model
-
-With the new permissions model in place, there may be times that your job
-fails. This is most likely because your project tries to access other project's
-sources, and you don't have the appropriate permissions. In the job log look
-for information about 403 or forbidden access messages.
-
-In short here's what you need to do should you encounter any issues.
-
-As an administrator:
-
-- **500 errors**: You need to update [GitLab Workhorse](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab-workhorse) to at
- least 0.8.2. This is done automatically for Omnibus installations, you need to
- [check manually](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab-foss/tree/master/doc/update) for installations from source.
-- **500 errors**: Check if you have another web proxy sitting in front of NGINX (HAProxy,
- Apache, etc.). It might be a good idea to let GitLab use the internal NGINX
- web server and not disable it completely. See [this comment](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab-foss/-/issues/22484#note_16648302) for an
- example.
-- **403 errors**: You need to make sure that your installation has [HTTP(S)
- cloning enabled](../admin_area/settings/visibility_and_access_controls.md#enabled-git-access-protocols). HTTP(S) support is now a **requirement** by GitLab CI
- to clone all sources.
-
-As a user:
-
-- Make sure you are a member of the group or project you're trying to have
- access to. As an Administrator, you can verify that by impersonating the user
- and retry the failing job in order to verify that everything is correct.
-
-### Dependent repositories
-
-The [CI/CD variable](../../ci/variables/README.md#predefined-cicd-variables) `CI_JOB_TOKEN` can be used to
-authenticate any clones of dependent repositories. For example:
-
-```shell
-git clone https://gitlab-ci-token:${CI_JOB_TOKEN}@gitlab.com/<user>/<mydependentrepo>.git
-```
-
-It can also be used for system-wide authentication
-(only do this in a Docker container, it overwrites `~/.netrc`):
-
-```shell
-echo -e "machine gitlab.com\nlogin gitlab-ci-token\npassword ${CI_JOB_TOKEN}" > ~/.netrc
-```
-
-### Git submodules
-
-To properly configure submodules with GitLab CI/CD, read the
-[Git submodules documentation](../../ci/git_submodules.md).
-
-### Container Registry
-
-With the update permission model we also extended the support for accessing
-Container Registries for private projects.
-
-GitLab Runner versions prior to 1.8 don't incorporate the introduced changes
-for permissions. This makes the `image:` directive not work with private
-projects automatically and it needs to be configured manually on the GitLab Runner host
-with a predefined account (for example administrator's personal account with
-access token created explicitly for this purpose). This issue is resolved with
-latest changes in GitLab Runner 1.8 which receives GitLab credentials with
-build data.
-
-Starting from GitLab 8.12, if you have [2FA](../profile/account/two_factor_authentication.md) enabled in your account, you need
-to pass a [personal access token](../profile/personal_access_tokens.md) instead of your password in order to
-login to the Container Registry.
-
-Your jobs can access all container images that you would normally have access
-to. The only implication is that you can push to the Container Registry of the
-project for which the job is triggered.
-
-This is how an example usage can look like:
-
-```yaml
-test:
- script:
- - docker login -u "$CI_REGISTRY_USER" -p "$CI_REGISTRY_PASSWORD" $CI_REGISTRY
- - docker pull $CI_REGISTRY/group/other-project:latest
- - docker run $CI_REGISTRY/group/other-project:latest
-```
-
-### Pipeline triggers
-
-Since 9.0 [pipeline triggers](../../ci/triggers/README.md#ci-job-token) do support the new permission model.
-The new triggers do impersonate their associated user including their access
-to projects and their project permissions.
-
-### API
-
-GitLab API can be used via `CI_JOB_TOKEN`, see [the relevant documentation](../../api/README.md#gitlab-ci-job-token).
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