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Diffstat (limited to 'core/src/main/java/org/bouncycastle/crypto/tls/AlertDescription.java')
| -rw-r--r-- | core/src/main/java/org/bouncycastle/crypto/tls/AlertDescription.java | 215 |
1 files changed, 215 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/core/src/main/java/org/bouncycastle/crypto/tls/AlertDescription.java b/core/src/main/java/org/bouncycastle/crypto/tls/AlertDescription.java new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5e3269bd --- /dev/null +++ b/core/src/main/java/org/bouncycastle/crypto/tls/AlertDescription.java @@ -0,0 +1,215 @@ +package org.bouncycastle.crypto.tls; + +/** + * RFC 5246 7.2. + */ +public class AlertDescription +{ + + /** + * This message notifies the recipient that the sender will not send any more messages on this + * connection. The session becomes unresumable if any connection is terminated without proper + * close_notify messages with level equal to warning. + */ + public static final short close_notify = 0; + + /** + * An inappropriate message was received. This alert is always fatal and should never be + * observed in communication between proper implementations. + */ + public static final short unexpected_message = 10; + + /** + * This alert is returned if a record is received with an incorrect MAC. This alert also MUST be + * returned if an alert is sent because a TLSCiphertext decrypted in an invalid way: either it + * wasn't an even multiple of the block length, or its padding values, when checked, weren't + * correct. This message is always fatal and should never be observed in communication between + * proper implementations (except when messages were corrupted in the network). + */ + public static final short bad_record_mac = 20; + + /** + * This alert was used in some earlier versions of TLS, and may have permitted certain attacks + * against the CBC mode [CBCATT]. It MUST NOT be sent by compliant implementations. + */ + public static final short decryption_failed = 21; + + /** + * A TLSCiphertext record was received that had a length more than 2^14+2048 bytes, or a record + * decrypted to a TLSCompressed record with more than 2^14+1024 bytes. This message is always + * fatal and should never be observed in communication between proper implementations (except + * when messages were corrupted in the network). + */ + public static final short record_overflow = 22; + + /** + * The decompression function received improper input (e.g., data that would expand to excessive + * length). This message is always fatal and should never be observed in communication between + * proper implementations. + */ + public static final short decompression_failure = 30; + + /** + * Reception of a handshake_failure alert message indicates that the sender was unable to + * negotiate an acceptable set of security parameters given the options available. This is a + * fatal error. + */ + public static final short handshake_failure = 40; + + /** + * This alert was used in SSLv3 but not any version of TLS. It MUST NOT be sent by compliant + * implementations. + */ + public static final short no_certificate = 41; + + /** + * A certificate was corrupt, contained signatures that did not verify correctly, etc. + */ + public static final short bad_certificate = 42; + + /** + * A certificate was of an unsupported type. + */ + public static final short unsupported_certificate = 43; + + /** + * A certificate was revoked by its signer. + */ + public static final short certificate_revoked = 44; + + /** + * A certificate has expired or is not currently valid. + */ + public static final short certificate_expired = 45; + + /** + * Some other (unspecified) issue arose in processing the certificate, rendering it + * unacceptable. + */ + public static final short certificate_unknown = 46; + + /** + * A field in the handshake was out of range or inconsistent with other fields. This message is + * always fatal. + */ + public static final short illegal_parameter = 47; + + /** + * A valid certificate chain or partial chain was received, but the certificate was not accepted + * because the CA certificate could not be located or couldn't be matched with a known, trusted + * CA. This message is always fatal. + */ + public static final short unknown_ca = 48; + + /** + * A valid certificate was received, but when access control was applied, the sender decided not + * to proceed with negotiation. This message is always fatal. + */ + public static final short access_denied = 49; + + /** + * A message could not be decoded because some field was out of the specified range or the + * length of the message was incorrect. This message is always fatal and should never be + * observed in communication between proper implementations (except when messages were corrupted + * in the network). + */ + public static final short decode_error = 50; + + /** + * A handshake cryptographic operation failed, including being unable to correctly verify a + * signature or validate a Finished message. This message is always fatal. + */ + public static final short decrypt_error = 51; + + /** + * This alert was used in some earlier versions of TLS. It MUST NOT be sent by compliant + * implementations. + */ + public static final short export_restriction = 60; + + /** + * The protocol version the client has attempted to negotiate is recognized but not supported. + * (For example, old protocol versions might be avoided for security reasons.) This message is + * always fatal. + */ + public static final short protocol_version = 70; + + /** + * Returned instead of handshake_failure when a negotiation has failed specifically because the + * server requires ciphers more secure than those supported by the client. This message is + * always fatal. + */ + public static final short insufficient_security = 71; + + /** + * An internal error unrelated to the peer or the correctness of the protocol (such as a memory + * allocation failure) makes it impossible to continue. This message is always fatal. + */ + public static final short internal_error = 80; + + /** + * This handshake is being canceled for some reason unrelated to a protocol failure. If the user + * cancels an operation after the handshake is complete, just closing the connection by sending + * a close_notify is more appropriate. This alert should be followed by a close_notify. This + * message is generally a warning. + */ + public static final short user_canceled = 90; + + /** + * Sent by the client in response to a hello request or by the server in response to a client + * hello after initial handshaking. Either of these would normally lead to renegotiation; when + * that is not appropriate, the recipient should respond with this alert. At that point, the + * original requester can decide whether to proceed with the connection. One case where this + * would be appropriate is where a server has spawned a process to satisfy a request; the + * process might receive security parameters (key length, authentication, etc.) at startup, and + * it might be difficult to communicate changes to these parameters after that point. This + * message is always a warning. + */ + public static final short no_renegotiation = 100; + + /** + * Sent by clients that receive an extended server hello containing an extension that they did + * not put in the corresponding client hello. This message is always fatal. + */ + public static final short unsupported_extension = 110; + + /* + * RFC 3546 + */ + + /** + * This alert is sent by servers who are unable to retrieve a certificate chain from the URL + * supplied by the client (see Section 3.3). This message MAY be fatal - for example if client + * authentication is required by the server for the handshake to continue and the server is + * unable to retrieve the certificate chain, it may send a fatal alert. + */ + public static final short certificate_unobtainable = 111; + + /** + * This alert is sent by servers that receive a server_name extension request, but do not + * recognize the server name. This message MAY be fatal. + */ + public static final short unrecognized_name = 112; + + /** + * This alert is sent by clients that receive an invalid certificate status response (see + * Section 3.6). This message is always fatal. + */ + public static final short bad_certificate_status_response = 113; + + /** + * This alert is sent by servers when a certificate hash does not match a client provided + * certificate_hash. This message is always fatal. + */ + public static final short bad_certificate_hash_value = 114; + + /* + * RFC 4279 + */ + + /** + * If the server does not recognize the PSK identity, it MAY respond with an + * "unknown_psk_identity" alert message. + */ + public static final short unknown_psk_identity = 115; +} |