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authorJohannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>2023-02-06 11:37:52 +0300
committerJohannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>2023-02-06 11:37:52 +0300
commit40843216c568d39ee4d10ee256dc76de4f54f0a0 (patch)
treec8ff30168bf8a2afbb73af194702b19082e9d036 /apply.c
parent5c1fc48d68d78aae1a84c5b7880b7e79d3dd7c1b (diff)
parentb7a92d078b9b9a39553623815699eb029074e39d (diff)
Sync with 2.35.7
* maint-2.35: Git 2.35.7 Git 2.34.7 http: support CURLOPT_PROTOCOLS_STR http: prefer CURLOPT_SEEKFUNCTION to CURLOPT_IOCTLFUNCTION http-push: prefer CURLOPT_UPLOAD to CURLOPT_PUT Git 2.33.7 Git 2.32.6 Git 2.31.7 Git 2.30.8 apply: fix writing behind newly created symbolic links dir-iterator: prevent top-level symlinks without FOLLOW_SYMLINKS clone: delay picking a transport until after get_repo_path() t5619: demonstrate clone_local() with ambiguous transport
Diffstat (limited to 'apply.c')
-rw-r--r--apply.c27
1 files changed, 27 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/apply.c b/apply.c
index d19c26d332..a957be0b90 100644
--- a/apply.c
+++ b/apply.c
@@ -4408,6 +4408,33 @@ static int create_one_file(struct apply_state *state,
if (state->cached)
return 0;
+ /*
+ * We already try to detect whether files are beyond a symlink in our
+ * up-front checks. But in the case where symlinks are created by any
+ * of the intermediate hunks it can happen that our up-front checks
+ * didn't yet see the symlink, but at the point of arriving here there
+ * in fact is one. We thus repeat the check for symlinks here.
+ *
+ * Note that this does not make the up-front check obsolete as the
+ * failure mode is different:
+ *
+ * - The up-front checks cause us to abort before we have written
+ * anything into the working directory. So when we exit this way the
+ * working directory remains clean.
+ *
+ * - The checks here happen in the middle of the action where we have
+ * already started to apply the patch. The end result will be a dirty
+ * working directory.
+ *
+ * Ideally, we should update the up-front checks to catch what would
+ * happen when we apply the patch before we damage the working tree.
+ * We have all the information necessary to do so. But for now, as a
+ * part of embargoed security work, having this check would serve as a
+ * reasonable first step.
+ */
+ if (path_is_beyond_symlink(state, path))
+ return error(_("affected file '%s' is beyond a symbolic link"), path);
+
res = try_create_file(state, path, mode, buf, size);
if (res < 0)
return -1;