credential: new attribute oauth_refresh_token

Git authentication with OAuth access token is supported by every popular
Git host including GitHub, GitLab and BitBucket [1][2][3]. Credential
helpers Git Credential Manager (GCM) and git-credential-oauth generate
OAuth credentials [4][5]. Following RFC 6749, the application prints a
link for the user to authorize access in browser. A loopback redirect
communicates the response including access token to the application.

For security, RFC 6749 recommends that OAuth response also includes
expiry date and refresh token [6]. After expiry, applications can use
the refresh token to generate a new access token without user
reauthorization in browser. GitLab and BitBucket set the expiry at two
hours [2][3]. (GitHub doesn't populate expiry or refresh token.)

However the Git credential protocol has no attribute to store the OAuth
refresh token (unrecognised attributes are silently discarded). This
means that the user has to regularly reauthorize the helper in browser.
On a browserless system, this is particularly intrusive, requiring a
second device.

Introduce a new attribute oauth_refresh_token. This is especially
useful when a storage helper and a read-only OAuth helper are configured
together. Recall that `credential fill` calls each helper until it has a
non-expired password.

```
[credential]
	helper = storage  # eg. cache or osxkeychain
	helper = oauth
```

The OAuth helper can use the stored refresh token forwarded by
`credential fill` to generate a fresh access token without opening the
browser. See
https://github.com/hickford/git-credential-oauth/pull/3/files
for an implementation tested with this patch.

Add support for the new attribute to credential-cache. Eventually, I
hope to see support in other popular storage helpers.

Alternatives considered: ask helpers to store all unrecognised
attributes. This seems excessively complex for no obvious gain.
Helpers would also need extra information to distinguish between
confidential and non-confidential attributes.

Workarounds: GCM abuses the helper get/store/erase contract to store the
refresh token during credential *get* as the password for a fictitious
host [7] (I wrote this hack). This workaround is only feasible for a
monolithic helper with its own storage.

[1] https://github.blog/2012-09-21-easier-builds-and-deployments-using-git-over-https-and-oauth/
[2] https://docs.gitlab.com/ee/api/oauth2.html#access-git-over-https-with-access-token
[3] https://support.atlassian.com/bitbucket-cloud/docs/use-oauth-on-bitbucket-cloud/#Cloning-a-repository-with-an-access-token
[4] https://github.com/GitCredentialManager/git-credential-manager
[5] https://github.com/hickford/git-credential-oauth
[6] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749#section-5.1
[7] https://github.com/GitCredentialManager/git-credential-manager/blob/66b94e489ad8cc1982836355493e369770b30211/src/shared/GitLab/GitLabHostProvider.cs#L207

Signed-off-by: M Hickford <mirth.hickford@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>

1 files changed, 6 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/credential.c b/credential.c
index f32011343f..3b5d3d058c 100644
--- a/credential.c
+++ b/credential.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ void credential_clear(struct credential *c)
 	free(c->path);
 	free(c->username);
 	free(c->password);
+	free(c->oauth_refresh_token);
 	string_list_clear(&c->helpers, 0);
 
 	credential_init(c);
@@ -240,6 +241,9 @@ int credential_read(struct credential *c, FILE *fp)
 			c->password_expiry_utc = parse_timestamp(value, NULL, 10);
 			if (c->password_expiry_utc == 0 || errno == ERANGE)
 				c->password_expiry_utc = TIME_MAX;
+		} else if (!strcmp(key, "oauth_refresh_token")) {
+			free(c->oauth_refresh_token);
+			c->oauth_refresh_token = xstrdup(value);
 		} else if (!strcmp(key, "url")) {
 			credential_from_url(c, value);
 		} else if (!strcmp(key, "quit")) {
@@ -275,6 +279,7 @@ void credential_write(const struct credential *c, FILE *fp)
 	credential_write_item(fp, "path", c->path, 0);
 	credential_write_item(fp, "username", c->username, 0);
 	credential_write_item(fp, "password", c->password, 0);
+	credential_write_item(fp, "oauth_refresh_token", c->oauth_refresh_token, 0);
 	if (c->password_expiry_utc != TIME_MAX) {
 		char *s = xstrfmt("%"PRItime, c->password_expiry_utc);
 		credential_write_item(fp, "password_expiry_utc", s, 0);
@@ -398,6 +403,7 @@ void credential_reject(struct credential *c)
 
 	FREE_AND_NULL(c->username);
 	FREE_AND_NULL(c->password);
+	FREE_AND_NULL(c->oauth_refresh_token);
 	c->password_expiry_utc = TIME_MAX;
 	c->approved = 0;
 }