odb: guard against data loss checking out a huge file

This introduces an additional guard for platforms where `unsigned long`
and `size_t` are not of the same size. If the size of an object in the
database would overflow `unsigned long`, instead we now exit with an
error.

A complete fix will have to update _many_ other functions throughout the
codebase to use `size_t` instead of `unsigned long`. It will have to be
implemented at some stage.

This commit puts in a stop-gap for the time being.

Helped-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Matt Cooper <vtbassmatt@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>

1 files changed, 3 insertions, 3 deletions

diff --git a/packfile.c b/packfile.c
index 755aa7aec5..3ccea00439 100644
--- a/packfile.c
+++ b/packfile.c
@@ -1059,7 +1059,7 @@ unsigned long unpack_object_header_buffer(const unsigned char *buf,
 		unsigned long len, enum object_type *type, unsigned long *sizep)
 {
 	unsigned shift;
-	unsigned long size, c;
+	size_t size, c;
 	unsigned long used = 0;
 
 	c = buf[used++];
@@ -1073,10 +1073,10 @@ unsigned long unpack_object_header_buffer(const unsigned char *buf,
 			break;
 		}
 		c = buf[used++];
-		size += (c & 0x7f) << shift;
+		size = st_add(size, st_left_shift(c & 0x7f, shift));
 		shift += 7;
 	}
-	*sizep = size;
+	*sizep = cast_size_t_to_ulong(size);
 	return used;
 }