v0 protocol: use size_t for capability length/offset

When parsing server capabilities, we use "int" to store lengths and
offsets. At first glance this seems like a spot where our parser may be
confused by integer overflow if somebody sent us a malicious response.

In practice these strings are all bounded by the 64k limit of a
pkt-line, so using "int" is OK. However, it makes the code simpler to
audit if they just use size_t everywhere. Note that because we take
these parameters as pointers, this also forces many callers to update
their declared types.

Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>

1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/send-pack.c b/send-pack.c
index f81bbb28d7..97344b629e 100644
--- a/send-pack.c
+++ b/send-pack.c
@@ -538,7 +538,7 @@ int send_pack(struct send_pack_args *args,
 		die(_("the receiving end does not support this repository's hash algorithm"));
 
 	if (args->push_cert != SEND_PACK_PUSH_CERT_NEVER) {
-		int len;
+		size_t len;
 		push_cert_nonce = server_feature_value("push-cert", &len);
 		if (push_cert_nonce) {
 			reject_invalid_nonce(push_cert_nonce, len);