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Clearing in-core repository (happens during e.g., "git fetch
--recurse-submodules" with commit graph enabled) made in-core
commit object in an inconsistent state by discarding the necessary
data from commit-graph too early, which has been corrected.
* jk/commit-graph-slab-clear-fix:
commit-graph: retain commit slab when closing NULL commit_graph
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Remove unused header "#include".
* en/header-cleanup:
treewide: remove unnecessary includes in source files
treewide: add direct includes currently only pulled in transitively
trace2/tr2_tls.h: remove unnecessary include
submodule-config.h: remove unnecessary include
pkt-line.h: remove unnecessary include
line-log.h: remove unnecessary include
http.h: remove unnecessary include
fsmonitor--daemon.h: remove unnecessary includes
blame.h: remove unnecessary includes
archive.h: remove unnecessary include
treewide: remove unnecessary includes in source files
treewide: remove unnecessary includes from header files
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This fixes a regression introduced in ac6d45d11f (commit-graph: move
slab-clearing to close_commit_graph(), 2023-10-03), in which running:
git -c fetch.writeCommitGraph=true fetch --recurse-submodules
multiple times in a freshly cloned repository causes a segfault. What
happens in the second (and subsequent) runs is this:
1. We make a "struct commit" for any ref tips which we're storing
(even if we already have them, they still go into FETCH_HEAD).
Because the first run will have created a commit graph, we'll find
those commits in the graph.
The commit struct is therefore created with a NULL "maybe_tree"
entry, because we can load its oid from the graph later. But to do
that we need to remember that we got the commit from the graph,
which is recorded in a global commit_graph_data_slab object.
2. Because we're using --recurse-submodules, we'll try to fetch each
of the possible submodules. That implies creating a separate
"struct repository" in-process for each submodule, which will
require a later call to repo_clear().
The call to repo_clear() calls raw_object_store_clear(), which in
turn calls close_object_store(), which in turn calls
close_commit_graph(). And the latter frees the commit graph data
slab.
3. Later, when trying to write out a new commit graph, we'll ask for
their tree oid via get_commit_tree_oid(), which will see that the
object is parsed but with a NULL maybe_tree field. We'd then
usually pull it from the graph file, but because the slab was
cleared, we don't realize that we can do so! We end up returning
NULL and segfaulting.
(It seems questionable that we'd write a graph entry for such a
commit anyway, since we know we already have one. I didn't
double-check, but that may simply be another side effect of having
cleared the slab).
The bug is in step (2) above. We should not be clearing the slab when
cleaning up the submodule repository structs. Prior to ac6d45d11f, we
did not do so because it was done inside a helper function that returned
early when it saw NULL. So the behavior change from that commit is that
we'll now _always_ clear the slab via repo_clear(), even if the
repository being closed did not have a commit graph (and thus would have
a NULL commit_graph struct).
The most immediate fix is to add in a NULL check in close_commit_graph(),
making it a true noop when passed in an object_store with a NULL
commit_graph (it's OK to just return early, since the rest of its code
is already a noop when passed NULL). That restores the pre-ac6d45d11f
behavior. And that's what this patch does, along with a test that
exercises it (we already have a test that uses submodules along with
fetch.writeCommitGraph, but the bug only triggers when there is a
subsequent fetch and when that fetch uses --recurse-submodules).
So that fixes the regression in the least-risky way possible.
I do think there's some fragility here that we might want to follow up
on. We have a global commit_graph_data_slab that contains graph
positions, and our global commit structs depend on the that slab
remaining valid. But close_commit_graph() is just about closing _one_
object store's graph. So it's dangerous to call that function and clear
the slab without also throwing away any "struct commit" we might have
parsed that depends on it.
Which at first glance seems like a bug we could already trigger. In the
situation described here, there is no commit graph in the submodule
repository, so our commit graph is NULL (in fact, in our test script
there is no submodule repo at all, so we immediately return from
repo_init() and call repo_clear() only to free up memory). But what
would happen if there was one? Wouldn't we see a non-NULL commit_graph
entry, and then clear the global slab anyway?
The answer is "no", but for very bizarre reasons. Remember that
repo_clear() calls raw_object_store_clear(), which then calls
close_object_store() and thus close_commit_graph(). But before it does
so, raw_object_store_clear() does something else: it frees the commit
graph and sets it to NULL! So by this code path we'll _never_ see a
non-NULL commit_graph struct, and thus never clear the slab.
So it happens to work out. But it still seems questionable to me that we
would clear a global slab (which might still be in use) when closing the
commit graph. This clearing comes from 957ba814bf (commit-graph: when
closing the graph, also release the slab, 2021-09-08), and was fixing a
case where we really did need it to be closed (and in that case we
presumably call close_object_store() more directly).
So I suspect there may still be a bug waiting to happen there, as any
object loaded before the call to close_object_store() may be stranded
with a bogus maybe_tree entry (and thus looking at it after the call
might cause an error). But I'm not sure how to trigger it, nor what the
fix should look like (you probably would need to "unparse" any objects
pulled from the graph). And so this patch punts on that for now in favor
of fixing the recent regression in the most direct way, which should not
have any other fallouts.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Signed-off-by: Elijah Newren <newren@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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The next commit will remove a bunch of unnecessary includes, but to do
so, we need some of the lower level direct includes that files rely on
to be explicitly specified.
Signed-off-by: Elijah Newren <newren@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Each of these were checked with
gcc -E -I. ${SOURCE_FILE} | grep ${HEADER_FILE}
to ensure that removing the direct inclusion of the header actually
resulted in that header no longer being included at all (i.e. that
no other header pulled it in transitively).
...except for a few cases where we verified that although the header
was brought in transitively, nothing from it was directly used in
that source file. These cases were:
* builtin/credential-cache.c
* builtin/pull.c
* builtin/send-pack.c
Signed-off-by: Elijah Newren <newren@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Earlier we stopped relying on commit-graph that (still) records
information about commits that are lost from the object store,
which has negative performance implications. The default has been
flipped to disable this pessimization.
* ps/commit-graph-less-paranoid:
commit-graph: disable GIT_COMMIT_GRAPH_PARANOIA by default
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Code clean-up for jk/chunk-bounds topic.
* jk/chunk-bounds-more:
commit-graph: mark chunk error messages for translation
commit-graph: drop verify_commit_graph_lite()
commit-graph: check order while reading fanout chunk
commit-graph: use fanout value for graph size
commit-graph: abort as soon as we see a bogus chunk
commit-graph: clarify missing-chunk error messages
commit-graph: drop redundant call to "lite" verification
midx: check consistency of fanout table
commit-graph: handle overflow in chunk_size checks
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In 7a5d604443 (commit: detect commits that exist in commit-graph but not
in the ODB, 2023-10-31), we have introduced a new object existence check
into `repo_parse_commit_internal()` so that we do not parse commits via
the commit-graph that don't have a corresponding object in the object
database. This new check of course comes with a performance penalty,
which the commit put at around 30% for `git rev-list --topo-order`. But
there are in fact scenarios where the performance regression is even
higher. The following benchmark against linux.git with a fully-build
commit-graph:
Benchmark 1: git.v2.42.1 rev-list --count HEAD
Time (mean ± σ): 658.0 ms ± 5.2 ms [User: 613.5 ms, System: 44.4 ms]
Range (min … max): 650.2 ms … 666.0 ms 10 runs
Benchmark 2: git.v2.43.0-rc1 rev-list --count HEAD
Time (mean ± σ): 1.333 s ± 0.019 s [User: 1.263 s, System: 0.069 s]
Range (min … max): 1.302 s … 1.361 s 10 runs
Summary
git.v2.42.1 rev-list --count HEAD ran
2.03 ± 0.03 times faster than git.v2.43.0-rc1 rev-list --count HEAD
While it's a noble goal to ensure that results are the same regardless
of whether or not we have a potentially stale commit-graph, taking twice
as much time is a tough sell. Furthermore, we can generally assume that
the commit-graph will be updated by git-gc(1) or git-maintenance(1) as
required so that the case where the commit-graph is stale should not at
all be common.
With that in mind, default-disable GIT_COMMIT_GRAPH_PARANOIA and restore
the behaviour and thus performance previous to the mentioned commit. In
order to not be inconsistent, also disable this behaviour by default in
`lookup_commit_in_graph()`, where the object existence check has been
introduced right at its inception via f559d6d45e (revision: avoid
hitting packfiles when commits are in commit-graph, 2021-08-09).
This results in another speedup in commands that end up calling this
function, even though it's less pronounced compared to the above
benchmark. The following has been executed in linux.git with ~1.2
million references:
Benchmark 1: GIT_COMMIT_GRAPH_PARANOIA=true git rev-list --all --no-walk=unsorted
Time (mean ± σ): 2.947 s ± 0.003 s [User: 2.412 s, System: 0.534 s]
Range (min … max): 2.943 s … 2.949 s 3 runs
Benchmark 2: GIT_COMMIT_GRAPH_PARANOIA=false git rev-list --all --no-walk=unsorted
Time (mean ± σ): 2.724 s ± 0.030 s [User: 2.207 s, System: 0.514 s]
Range (min … max): 2.704 s … 2.759 s 3 runs
Summary
GIT_COMMIT_GRAPH_PARANOIA=false git rev-list --all --no-walk=unsorted ran
1.08 ± 0.01 times faster than GIT_COMMIT_GRAPH_PARANOIA=true git rev-list --all --no-walk=unsorted
So whereas 7a5d604443 initially introduced the logic to start doing an
object existence check in `repo_parse_commit_internal()` by default, the
updated logic will now instead cause `lookup_commit_in_graph()` to stop
doing the check by default. This behaviour continues to be tweakable by
the user via the GIT_COMMIT_GRAPH_PARANOIA environment variable.
Note that this requires us to amend some tests to manually turn on the
paranoid checks again. This is because we cause repository corruption by
manually deleting objects which are part of the commit graph already.
These circumstances shouldn't usually happen in repositories.
Reported-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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The patches from f32af12cee (Merge branch 'jk/chunk-bounds', 2023-10-23)
added many new untranslated error messages. While it's unlikely for most
users to see these messages at all, most of the other commit-graph error
messages are translated (and likewise for the matching midx messages).
Let's mark them all for consistency (and to help any poor unfortunate
user who does manage to find a broken graph file).
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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As we've moved all of the checks from this function directly into the
chunk-reading code used by the caller (and there is only one caller), we
can just drop it entirely.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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We read the fanout chunk, storing a pointer to it, but only confirm that
the entries are monotonic in a final "lite" verification step. Let's
move that into the actual OIDF chunk callback, so that we can report
problems immediately (for all the reasons given in the previous
"commit-graph: abort as soon as we see a bogus chunk" commit).
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Commit-graph, midx, and pack idx files all have both a lookup table of
oids and an oid fanout table. In midx and pack idx files, we take the
final entry of the fanout table as the source of truth for the number of
entries, and then verify that the size of the lookup table matches that.
But for commit-graph files, we do the opposite: we use the size of the
lookup table as the source of truth, and then check the final fanout
entry against it.
As noted in 4169d89645 (commit-graph: check consistency of fanout
table, 2023-10-09), either is correct. But there are a few reasons to
prefer the fanout table as the source of truth:
1. The fanout entries are 32-bits on disk, and that defines the
maximum number of entries we can store. But since the size of the
lookup table is only bounded by the filesystem, it can be much
larger. And hence computing it as the commit-graph does means that
we may truncate the result when storing it in a uint32_t.
2. We read the fanout first, then the lookup table. If we're verifying
the chunks as we read them, then we'd want to take the fanout as
truth (we have nothing yet to check it against) and then we can
check that the lookup table matches what we already know.
3. It is pointlessly inconsistent with the midx and pack idx code.
Since the three have to do similar size and bounds checks, it is
easier to reason about all three if they use the same approach.
So this patch moves the assignment of g->num_commits to the fanout
parser, and then we can check the size of the lookup chunk as soon as we
try to load it.
There's already a test covering this situation, which munges the final
fanout entry to 2^32-1. In the current code we complain that it does not
agree with the table size. But now that we treat the munged value as the
source of truth, we'll complain that the lookup table is the wrong size
(again, either is correct). So we'll have to update the message we
expect (and likewise for an earlier test which does similar munging).
There's a similar test for this situation on the midx side, but rather
than making a very-large fanout value, it just truncates the lookup
table. We could do that here, too, but the very-large fanout value
actually shows an interesting corner case. On a 32-bit system,
multiplying to find the expected table size would cause an integer
overflow. Using st_mult() would detect that, but cause us to die()
rather than falling back to the non-graph code path. Checking the size
using division (as we do with existing chunk-size checks) avoids the
overflow entirely, and the test demonstrates this when run on a 32-bit
system.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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The code to read commit-graph files tries to read all of the required
chunks, but doesn't abort if we can't find one (or if it's corrupted).
It's only at the end of reading the file that we then do some sanity
checks for NULL entries. But it's preferable to detect the errors and
bail immediately, for a few reasons:
1. It's less error-prone. It's easy in the reader functions to flag an
error but still end up setting some struct fields (an error I in
fact made while working on this patch series).
2. It's safer. Since verifying some chunks depends on the values of
other chunks, we may be depending on not-yet-verified data. I don't
know offhand of any case where this can cause problems, but it's
one less subtle thing to worry about in the reader code.
3. It prevents the user from seeing nonsense errors. If we're missing
an OIDL chunk, then g->num_commits will be zero. And so we may
complain that the size of our CDAT chunk (which should have a
fixed-size record for each commit) is wrong unless it's also zero.
But that's misleading; the problem is the missing OIDL chunk; the
CDAT one might be fine!
So let's just check the return value from read_chunk(). This is exactly
how the midx chunk-reading code does it.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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When a required commit-graph chunk cannot be loaded, we leave its entry
in the struct NULL, and then later complain that it is missing. But
that's just one reason we might not have loaded it, as we also do some
data quality checks.
Let's switch these messages to say "missing or corrupted", which is
exactly what the midx code says for the same cases. Likewise, we'll use
the same phrasing and capitalization as those for consistency. And while
we're here, we can mark them for translation (just like the midx ones).
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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The idea of verify_commit_graph_lite() is to have cheap verification
checks both for everyday use of the graph files (to avoid out of bounds
reads, etc) as well as for doing a full check via "commit-graph verify"
(which will also check the hash, etc).
But the expensive verification checks operate on a commit_graph struct,
which we get by using the normal everyday-reader code! So any problem
we'd find by calling it would have been found before we even got to the
verify_one_commit_graph() function.
Removing it simplifies the code a bit, but also frees us up to move the
"lite" verification steps around within that everyday-reader code.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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We check the size of chunks with fixed records by multiplying the width
of each record by the number of commits in the file. Like:
if (chunk_size != g->num_commits * GRAPH_DATA_WIDTH)
If this multiplication overflows, we may not notice a chunk is too small
(which could later lead to out-of-bound reads).
In the current code this is only possible for the CDAT chunk, but the
reasons are quite subtle. We compute g->num_commits by dividing the size
of the OIDL chunk by the hash length (since it consists of a bunch of
hashes). So we know that any size_t multiplication that uses a value
smaller than the hash length cannot overflow. And the CDAT records are
the only ones that are larger (the others are just 4-byte records). So
it's worth fixing all of these, to make it clear that they're not
subject to overflow (without having to reason about seemingly unrelated
code).
The obvious thing to do is add an st_mult(), like:
if (chunk_size != st_mult(g->num_commits, GRAPH_DATA_WIDTH))
And that certainly works, but it has one downside: if we detect an
overflow, we'll immediately die(). But the commit graph is an optional
file; if we run into other problems loading it, we'll generally return
an error and fall back to accessing the full objects. Using st_mult()
means a malformed file will abort the whole process.
So instead, we can do a division like this:
if (chunk_size / GRAPH_DATA_WIDTH != g->num_commits)
where there's no possibility of overflow. We do lose a little bit of
precision; due to integer division truncation we'd allow up to an extra
GRAPH_DATA_WIDTH-1 bytes of data in the chunk. That's OK. Our main goal
here is making sure we don't have too _few_ bytes, which would cause an
out-of-bounds read (we could actually replace our "!=" with "<", but I
think it's worth being a little pedantic, as a large mismatch could be a
sign of other problems).
I didn't add a test here. We'd need to generate a very large graph file
in order to get g->num_commits large enough to cause an overflow. And a
later patch in this series will use this same division technique in a
way that is much easier to trigger in the tests.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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The codepath to traverse the commit-graph learned to notice that a
commit is missing (e.g., corrupt repository lost an object), even
though it knows something about the commit (like its parents) from
what is in commit-graph.
* ps/do-not-trust-commit-graph-blindly-for-existence:
commit: detect commits that exist in commit-graph but not in the ODB
commit-graph: introduce envvar to disable commit existence checks
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Our `lookup_commit_in_graph()` helper tries to look up commits from the
commit graph and, if it doesn't exist there, falls back to parsing it
from the object database instead. This is intended to speed up the
lookup of any such commit that exists in the database. There is an edge
case though where the commit exists in the graph, but not in the object
database. To avoid returning such stale commits the helper function thus
double checks that any such commit parsed from the graph also exists in
the object database. This makes the function safe to use even when
commit graphs aren't updated regularly.
We're about to introduce the same pattern into other parts of our code
base though, namely `repo_parse_commit_internal()`. Here the extra
sanity check is a bit of a tougher sell: `lookup_commit_in_graph()` was
a newly introduced helper, and as such there was no performance hit by
adding this sanity check. If we added `repo_parse_commit_internal()`
with that sanity check right from the beginning as well, this would
probably never have been an issue to begin with. But by retrofitting it
with this sanity check now we do add a performance regression to
preexisting code, and thus there is a desire to avoid this or at least
give an escape hatch.
In practice, there is no inherent reason why either of those functions
should have the sanity check whereas the other one does not: either both
of them are able to detect this issue or none of them should be. This
also means that the default of whether we do the check should likely be
the same for both. To err on the side of caution, we thus rather want to
make `repo_parse_commit_internal()` stricter than to loosen the checks
that we already have in `lookup_commit_in_graph()`.
The escape hatch is added in the form of a new GIT_COMMIT_GRAPH_PARANOIA
environment variable that mirrors GIT_REF_PARANOIA. If enabled, which is
the default, we will double check that commits looked up in the commit
graph via `lookup_commit_in_graph()` also exist in the object database.
This same check will also be added in `repo_parse_commit_internal()`.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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The codepaths that read "chunk" formatted files have been corrected
to pay attention to the chunk size and notice broken files.
* jk/chunk-bounds: (21 commits)
t5319: make corrupted large-offset test more robust
chunk-format: drop pair_chunk_unsafe()
commit-graph: detect out-of-order BIDX offsets
commit-graph: check bounds when accessing BIDX chunk
commit-graph: check bounds when accessing BDAT chunk
commit-graph: bounds-check generation overflow chunk
commit-graph: check size of generations chunk
commit-graph: bounds-check base graphs chunk
commit-graph: detect out-of-bounds extra-edges pointers
commit-graph: check size of commit data chunk
midx: check size of revindex chunk
midx: bounds-check large offset chunk
midx: check size of object offset chunk
midx: enforce chunk alignment on reading
midx: check size of pack names chunk
commit-graph: check consistency of fanout table
midx: check size of oid lookup chunk
commit-graph: check size of oid fanout chunk
midx: stop ignoring malformed oid fanout chunk
t: add library for munging chunk-format files
...
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Leakfix.
* jk/commit-graph-leak-fixes:
commit-graph: clear oidset after finishing write
commit-graph: free write-context base_graph_name during cleanup
commit-graph: free write-context entries before overwriting
commit-graph: free graph struct that was not added to chain
commit-graph: delay base_graph assignment in add_graph_to_chain()
commit-graph: free all elements of graph chain
commit-graph: move slab-clearing to close_commit_graph()
merge: free result of repo_get_merge_bases()
commit-reach: free temporary list in get_octopus_merge_bases()
t6700: mark test as leak-free
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We load the bloom_filter_indexes chunk using pair_chunk(), so we have no
idea how big it is. This can lead to out-of-bounds reads if it is
smaller than expected, since we index it based on the number of commits
found elsewhere in the graph file.
We can check the chunk size up front, like we do for CDAT and other
chunks with one fixed-size record per commit.
The test case demonstrates the problem. It actually won't segfault,
because we end up reading random data from the follow-on chunk (BDAT in
this case), and the bounds checks added in the previous patch complain.
But this is by no means assured, and you can craft a commit-graph file
with BIDX at the end (or a smaller BDAT) that does segfault.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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When loading Bloom filters from a commit-graph file, we use the offset
values in the BIDX chunk to index into the memory mapped for the BDAT
chunk. But since we don't record how big the BDAT chunk is, we just
trust that the BIDX offsets won't cause us to read outside of the chunk
memory. A corrupted or malicious commit-graph file will cause us to
segfault (in practice this isn't a very interesting attack, since
commit-graph files are local-only, and the worst case is an
out-of-bounds read).
We can't fix this by checking the chunk size during parsing, since the
data in the BDAT chunk doesn't have a fixed size (that's why we need the
BIDX in the first place). So we'll fix it in two parts:
1. Record the BDAT chunk size during parsing, and then later check
that the BIDX offsets we look up are within bounds.
2. Because the offsets are relative to the end of the BDAT header, we
must also make sure that the BDAT chunk is at least as large as the
expected header size. Otherwise, we overflow when trying to move
past the header, even for an offset of "0". We can check this
early, during the parsing stage.
The error messages are rather verbose, but since this is not something
you'd expect to see outside of severe bugs or corruption, it makes sense
to err on the side of too many details. Sadly we can't mention the
filename during the chunk-parsing stage, as we haven't set g->filename
at this point, nor passed it down through the stack.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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If the generation entry in a commit-graph doesn't fit, we instead insert
an offset into a generation overflow chunk. But since we don't record
the size of the chunk, we may read outside the chunk if the offset we
find on disk is malicious or corrupted.
We can't check the size of the chunk up-front; it will vary based on how
many entries need overflow. So instead, we'll do a bounds-check before
accessing the chunk memory. Unfortunately there is no error-return from
this function, so we'll just have to die(), which is what it does for
other forms of corruption.
As with other cases, we can drop the st_mult() call, since we know our
bounds-checked value will fit within a size_t.
Before this patch, the test here actually "works" because we read
garbage data from the next chunk. And since that garbage data happens
not to provide a generation number which changes the output, it appears
to work. We could construct a case that actually segfaults or produces
wrong output, but it would be a bit tricky. For our purposes its
sufficient to check that we've detected the bounds error.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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We neither check nor record the size of the generations chunk we parse
from a commit-graph file. This should have one uint32_t for each commit
in the file; if it is smaller (due to corruption, etc), we may read
outside the mapped memory.
The included test segfaults without this patch, as it shrinks the size
considerably (and the chunk is near the end of the file, so we read off
the end of the array rather than accidentally reading another chunk).
We can fix this by checking the size up front (like we do for other
fixed-size chunks, like CDAT).
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
|
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When we are loading a commit-graph chain, we check that each slice of the
chain points to the appropriate set of base graphs via its BASE chunk.
But since we don't record the size of the chunk, we may access
out-of-bounds memory if the file is corrupted.
Since we know the number of entries we expect to find (based on the
position within the commit-graph-chain file), we can just check the size
up front.
In theory this would also let us drop the st_mult() call a few lines
later when we actually access the memory, since we know that the
computed offset will fit in a size_t. But because the operands
"g->hash_len" and "n" have types "unsigned char" and "int", we'd have to
cast to size_t first. Leaving the st_mult() does that cast, and makes it
more obvious that we don't have an overflow problem.
Note that the test does not actually segfault before this patch, since
it just reads garbage from the chunk after BASE (and indeed, it even
rejects the file because that garbage does not have the expected hash
value). You could construct a file with BASE at the end that did
segfault, but corrupting the existing one is easy, and we can check
stderr for the expected message.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
|
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If an entry in a commit-graph file has more than 2 parents, the
fixed-size parent fields instead point to an offset within an "extra
edges" chunk. We blindly follow these, assuming that the chunk is
present and sufficiently large; this can lead to an out-of-bounds read
for a corrupt or malicious file.
We can fix this by recording the size of the chunk and adding a
bounds-check in fill_commit_in_graph(). There are a few tricky bits:
1. We'll switch from working with a pointer to an offset. This makes
some corner cases just fall out naturally:
a. If we did not find an EDGE chunk at all, our size will
correctly be zero (so everything is "out of bounds").
b. Comparing "size / 4" lets us make sure we have at least 4 bytes
to read, and we never compute a pointer more than one element
past the end of the array (computing a larger pointer is
probably OK in practice, but is technically undefined
behavior).
c. The current code casts to "uint32_t *". Replacing it with an
offset avoids any comparison between different types of pointer
(since the chunk is stored as "unsigned char *").
2. This is the first case in which fill_commit_in_graph() may return
anything but success. We need to make sure to roll back the
"parsed" flag (and any parents we might have added before running
out of buffer) so that the caller can cleanly fall back to
loading the commit object itself.
It's a little non-trivial to do this, and we might benefit from
factoring it out. But we can wait on that until we actually see a
second case where we return an error.
As a bonus, this lets us drop the st_mult() call. Since we've already
done a bounds check, we know there won't be any integer overflow (it
would imply our buffer is larger than a size_t can hold).
The included test does not actually segfault before this patch (though
you could construct a case where it does). Instead, it reads garbage
from the next chunk which results in it complaining about a bogus parent
id. This is sufficient for our needs, though (we care that the fallback
succeeds, and that stderr mentions the out-of-bounds read).
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
|
|
We expect a commit-graph file to have a fixed-size data record for each
commit in the file (and we know the number of commits to expct from the
size of the lookup table). If we encounter a file where this is too
small, we'll look past the end of the chunk (and possibly even off the
mapped memory).
We can fix this by checking the size up front when we record the
pointer.
The included test doesn't segfault, since it ends up reading bytes
from another chunk. But it produces nonsense results, since the values
it reads are garbage. Our test notices this by comparing the output to a
non-corrupted run of the same command (and of course we also check that
the expected error is printed to stderr).
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
|
|
The midx reader assumes chunks are aligned to a 4-byte boundary: we
treat the fanout chunk as an array of uint32_t, indexing it to feed the
results to ntohl(). Without aligning the chunks, we may violate the
CPU's alignment constraints. Though many platforms allow this, some do
not. And certanily UBSan will complain, since it is undefined behavior.
Even though most chunks are naturally 4-byte-aligned (because they are
storing uint32_t or larger types), PNAM is not. It stores NUL-terminated
pack names, so you can have a valid chunk with any length. The writing
side handles this by 4-byte-aligning the chunk, introducing a few extra
NULs as necessary. But since we don't check this on the reading side, we
may end up with a misaligned fanout and trigger the undefined behavior.
We have two options here:
1. Swap out ntohl(fanout[i]) for get_be32(fanout+i) everywhere. The
latter handles alignment itself. It's possible that it's slightly
slower (though in practice I'm not sure how true that is,
especially for these code paths which then go on to do a binary
search).
2. Enforce the alignment when reading the chunks. This is easy to do,
since the table-of-contents reader can check it in one spot.
I went with the second option here, just because it places less burden
on maintenance going forward (it is OK to continue using ntohl), and we
know it can't have any performance impact on the actual reads.
The commit-graph code uses the same chunk API. It's usually also 4-byte
aligned, but some chunks are not (like Bloom filter BDAT chunks). So
we'll pass "1" here to allow any alignment. It doesn't suffer from the
same problem as midx with its fanout because the fanout chunk is always
the first (and the rest of the format dictates that the first chunk will
start aligned).
The new test shows the effect on a midx with a misaligned PNAM chunk.
Note that the midx-reading code treats chunk-toc errors as soft, falling
back to the non-midx path rather than calling die(), as we do for other
parsing errors. Arguably we should make all of these behave the same,
but that's out of scope for this patch. For now the test just expects
the fallback behavior.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
|
|
We use bsearch_hash() to look up items in the oid index of a
commit-graph. It also has a fanout table to reduce the initial range in
which we'll search. But since the fanout comes from the on-disk file, a
corrupted or malicious file can cause us to look outside of the
allocated index memory.
One solution here would be to pass the total table size to
bsearch_hash(), which could then bounds check the values it reads from
the fanout. But there's an inexpensive up-front check we can do, and
it's the same one used by the midx and pack idx code (both of which
likewise have fanout tables and use bsearch_hash(), but are not affected
by this bug):
1. We can check the value of the final fanout entry against the size
of the table we got from the index chunk. These must always match,
since the fanout is just slicing up the index.
As a side note, the midx and pack idx code compute it the other
way around: they use the final fanout value as the object count, and
check the index size against it. Either is valid; if they
disagree we cannot know which is wrong (a corrupted fanout value,
or a too-small table of oids).
2. We can quickly scan the fanout table to make sure it is
monotonically increasing. If it is, then we know that every value
is less than or equal to the final value, and therefore less than
or equal to the table size.
It would also be sufficient to just check that each fanout value is
smaller than the final one, but the midx and pack idx code both do
a full monotonicity check. It's the same cost, and it catches some
other corruptions (though not all; the checks done by "commit-graph
verify" are more complete but more expensive, and our goal here is
to be fast and memory-safe).
There are two new tests. One just checks the final fanout value (this is
the mirror image of the "too small oid lookup" case added for the midx
in the previous commit; it's flipped here because commit-graph considers
the oid lookup chunk to be the source of truth).
The other actually creates a fanout with many out-of-bounds entries, and
prior to this patch, it does cause the segfault you'd expect. But note
that the error is not "your fanout entry is out-of-bounds", but rather
"fanout value out of order". That's because we leave the final fanout
value in place (to get past the table size check), making the index
non-monotonic (the second-to-last entry is big, but the last one must
remain small to match the actual table).
We need adjustments to a few existing tests, as well:
- an earlier test in t5318 corrupts the fanout and runs "commit-graph
verify". Its message is now changed, since we catch the problem
earlier (during the load step, rather than the careful validation
step).
- in t5324, we test that "commit-graph verify --shallow" does not do
expensive verification on the base file of the chain. But the
corruption it uses (munging a byte at offset 1000) happens to be in
the middle of the fanout table. And now we detect that problem in
the cheaper checks that are performed for every part of the graph.
We'll push this back to offset 1500, which is only caught by the
more expensive checksum validation.
Likewise, there's a later test in t5324 which munges an offset 100
bytes into a file (also in the fanout table) that is referenced by
an alternates file. So we now find that corruption during the load
step, rather than the verification step. At the very least we need
to change the error message (like the case above in t5318). But it
is probably good to make sure we handle all parts of the
verification even for alternate graph files. So let's likewise
corrupt byte 1500 and make sure we found the invalid checksum.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
|
|
We load the oid fanout chunk with pair_chunk(), which means we never see
the size of the chunk. We just assume the on-disk file uses the
appropriate size, and if it's too small we'll access random memory.
It's easy to check this up-front; the fanout always consists of 256
uint32's, since it is a fanout of the first byte of the hash pointing
into the oid index. These parameters can't be changed without
introducing a new chunk type.
This matches the similar check in the midx OIDF chunk (but note that
rather than checking for the error immediately, the graph code just
leaves parts of the struct NULL and checks for required fields later).
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
|
|
The pair_chunk() function is provided as an easy helper for parsing
chunks that just want a pointer to a set of bytes. But every caller has
a hidden bug: because we return only the pointer without the matching
chunk size, the callers have no clue how many bytes they are allowed to
look at. And as a result, they may read off the end of the mmap'd data
when the on-disk file does not match their expectations.
Since chunk files are typically used for local-repository data like
commit-graph files and midx's, the security implications here are pretty
mild. The worst that can happen is that you hand somebody a corrupted
repository tarball, and running Git on it does an out-of-bounds read and
crashes. So it's worth being more defensive, but we don't need to drop
everything and fix every caller immediately.
I noticed the problem because the pair_chunk_fn() callback does not look
at its chunk_size argument, and wanted to annotate it to silence
-Wunused-parameter. We could do that now, but we'd lose the hint that
this code should be audited and fixed.
So instead, let's set ourselves up for going down that path:
1. Provide a pair_chunk() function that does return the size, which
prepares us for fixing these cases.
2. Rename the existing function to pair_chunk_unsafe(). That gives us
an easy way to grep for cases which still need to be fixed, and the
name should cause anybody adding new calls to think twice before
using it.
There are no callers of the "safe" version yet, but we'll add some in
subsequent patches.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
|
|
Commit 6c622f9f0b (commit-graph: write commit-graph chains, 2019-06-18)
added a base_graph_name string to the write_commit_graph_context struct.
But the end-of-function cleanup forgot to free it, causing a leak.
This (presumably in combination with the preceding leak-fixes) lets us
mark t5328 as leak-free.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
|
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When writing a split graph file, we replace the final element of the
commit_graph_hash_after and commit_graph_filenames_after arrays. But
since these are allocated strings, we need to free them before
overwriting to avoid leaking the old string.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
|
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When reading the graph chain file, we open (and allocate) each
individual slice it mentions and then add them to a linked-list chain.
But if adding to the chain fails (e.g., because the base-graph chunk it
contains didn't match what we expected), we leave the function without
freeing the graph struct that caused the failure, leaking it.
We can fix it by calling free_graph_commit().
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
|
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When adding a graph to a chain, we do some consistency checks and then
if everything looks good, set g->base_graph to add a link to the chain.
But when we added a new consistency check in 209250ef38 (commit-graph.c:
prevent overflow in add_graph_to_chain(), 2023-07-12), it comes _after_
we've already set g->base_graph. So we might return failure, even though
we actually added to the chain.
This hasn't caused a bug yet, because after failing to add to the chain,
we discard the failed graph struct completely, leaking it. But in order
to fix that, it's important that the struct be in a consistent and
predictable state after the failure.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
|
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When running "commit-graph verify", we call free_commit_graph(). That's
sufficient for the case of a single graph file, but if we loaded a chain
of split graph files, they form a linked list via the base_graph
pointers. We need to free all of them, or we leak all but the first
struct.
We can make this work by teaching free_commit_graph() to walk the
base_graph pointers and free each element. This in turn lets us simplify
close_commit_graph(), which does the same thing by recursion (we cannot
just use close_commit_graph() in "commit-graph verify", as the function
takes a pointer to an object store, and the verify command creates a
single one-off graph struct).
While indenting the code in free_commit_graph() for the loop, I noticed
that setting g->data to NULL is rather pointless, as we free the struct
a few lines later. So I cleaned that up while we're here.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
|
|
When closing and freeing a commit-graph, the main entry point is
close_commit_graph(), which then uses close_commit_graph_one() to
recurse through the base_graph links and free each one.
Commit 957ba814bf (commit-graph: when closing the graph, also release
the slab, 2021-09-08) put the call to clear the slab into the recursive
function, but this is pointless: there's only a single global slab
variable. It works OK in practice because clearing the slab is
idempotent, but it makes the code harder to reason about and refactor.
Move it into the parent function so it's only called once (and there are
no other direct callers of the recursive close_commit_graph_one(), so we
are not hurting them).
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
|
|
The load_commit_graph_chain_fd_st() function will stop loading chains
when it sees an error. But if it has loaded any graph slice at all, it
will return it. This is a good thing for normal use (we use what data we
can, and this is just an optimization). But it's a bad thing for
"commit-graph verify", which should be careful about finding any
irregularities. We do complain to stderr with a warning(), but the
verify command still exits with a successful return code.
The new tests here cover corruption of both the base and tip slices of
the chain. The corruption of the base file already works (it is the
first file we look at, so when we see the error we return NULL). The
"tip" case is what is fixed by this patch (it complains to stderr but
still returns the base slice).
Likewise the existing tests for corruption of the commit-graph-chain
file itself need to be updated. We already exited non-zero correctly for
the "base" case, but the "tip" case can now do so, too.
Note that this also causes us to adjust a test later in the file that
similarly corrupts a tip (though confusingly the test script calls this
"base"). It checks stderr but erroneously expects the whole "verify"
command to exit with a successful code.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
|
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When we open a commit-graph-chain file, if it's smaller than a single
entry, we just quietly treat that as ENOENT. That make some sense if the
file is truly zero bytes, but it means that "commit-graph verify" will
quietly ignore a file that contains garbage if that garbage happens to
be short.
Instead, let's only simulate ENOENT when the file is truly empty, and
otherwise return EINVAL. The normal graph-loading routines don't care,
but "commit-graph verify" will notice and complain about the difference.
It's not entirely clear to me that the 0-is-ENOENT case actually happens
in real life, so we could perhaps just eliminate this special-case
altogether. But this is how we've always behaved, so I'm preserving it
in the name of backwards compatibility (though again, it really only
matters for "verify", as the regular routines are happy to load what
they can).
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
|
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In read_commit_graph_one(), we call validate_mixed_generation_chain()
after loading the graph. Even though we don't check the return value,
this has the side effect of clearing the read_generation_data flag,
which is important when working with mixed generation numbers.
But doing this in load_commit_graph_chain_fd_st() makes more sense:
1. We are calling it even when we did not load a chain at all, which
is pointless (you cannot have mixed generations in a single file).
2. For now, all callers load the graph via read_commit_graph_one().
But the point of factoring out the open/load in the previous commit
was to let "commit-graph verify" call them separately. So it needs
to trigger this function as part of the load.
Without this patch, the mixed-generation tests in t5324 would start
failing on "git commit-graph verify" calls, once we switch to using
a separate open/load call there.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
|
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The load_commit_graph_chain() function opens the chain file and all of
the slices of graph that it points to. If there is no chain file (which
is a totally normal condition), we return NULL. But if we run into
errors with the chain file or loading the actual graph data, we also
return NULL, and the caller cannot tell the difference.
The caller can check for ENOENT for the unremarkable "no such file"
case. But I'm hesitant to assume that the rest of the function would
never accidentally set errno to ENOENT itself, since it is opening the
slice files (and that would mean the caller fails to notice a real
error).
So let's break this into two functions: one to open the file, and one to
actually load it. This matches the interface we provide for the
non-chain graph file, which will also come in handy in a moment when we
fix some bugs in the "git commit-graph verify" code.
Some notes:
- I've kept the "1 is good, 0 is bad" return convention (and the weird
"fd" out-parameter) used by the matching open_commit_graph()
function and other parts of the commit-graph code. This is unlike
most of the rest of Git (which would just return the fd, with -1 for
error), but it makes sense to stay consistent with the adjacent bits
of the API here.
- The existing chain loading function will quietly return if the file
is too small to hold a single entry. I've retained that behavior
(and explicitly set ENOENT in the opener function) for now, under
the notion that it's probably valid (though I'd imagine unusual) to
have an empty chain file.
There are two small behavior changes here, but I think both are strictly
positive:
1. The original blindly did a stat() before checking if fopen()
succeeded, meaning we were making a pointless extra stat call.
2. We now use fstat() to check the file size. The previous code using
a regular stat() on the pathname meant we could technically race
with somebody updating the chain file, and end up with a size that
does not match what we just opened with fopen(). I doubt anybody
ever hit this in practice, but it may have caused an out-of-bounds
read.
We'll retain the load_commit_graph_chain() function which does both the
open and reading steps (most existing callers do not care about seeing
errors anyway, since loading commit-graphs is optimistic).
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
|
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Unused parameters to functions are marked as such, and/or removed,
in order to bring us closer to -Wunused-parameter clean.
* jk/unused-post-2.42: (22 commits)
update-ref: mark unused parameter in parser callbacks
gc: mark unused descriptors in scheduler callbacks
bundle-uri: mark unused parameters in callbacks
fetch: mark unused parameter in ref_transaction callback
credential: mark unused parameter in urlmatch callback
grep: mark unused parmaeters in pcre fallbacks
imap-send: mark unused parameters with NO_OPENSSL
worktree: mark unused parameters in noop repair callback
negotiator/noop: mark unused callback parameters
add-interactive: mark unused callback parameters
grep: mark unused parameter in output function
test-trace2: mark unused argv/argc parameters
trace2: mark unused config callback parameter
trace2: mark unused us_elapsed_absolute parameters
stash: mark unused parameter in diff callback
ls-tree: mark unused parameter in callback
commit-graph: mark unused data parameters in generation callbacks
worktree: mark unused parameters in each_ref_fn callback
pack-bitmap: mark unused parameters in show_object callback
ref-filter: mark unused parameters in parser callbacks
...
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The compute_generation_info code uses function pointers to abstract the
get/set generation operations. Some callers don't need the extra void
data pointer, which should be annotated to appease -Wunused-parameter.
Note that we can drop the assignment of the "data" parameter in
compute_generation_numbers(), as we've just shown that neither of the
callbacks it uses will access it. This matches the caller in
ensure_generations_valid(), which already does not bother to set "data".
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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When validating that a commit-graph has either all zero, or all non-zero
generation numbers, we emit a warning on both the rising and falling
edge of transitioning between the two.
So if we are unfortunate enough to see a commit-graph which has a
repeating sequence of zero, then non-zero generation numbers, we'll
generate many warnings that contain more or less the same information.
Avoid this by keeping track of a single example for a commit with zero-
and non-zero generation, and emit a single warning at the end of
verification if both are non-NULL.
Co-authored-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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In verify_one_commit_graph(), we have code that complains when a commit
is found with a generation number of zero, and then later with a
non-zero number. It works like this:
1. When we see an entry with generation zero, we set the
generation_zero flag to GENERATION_ZERO_EXISTS.
2. When we later see an entry with a non-zero generation, we complain
if the flag is GENERATION_ZERO_EXISTS.
There's a matching GENERATION_NUMBER_EXISTS value, which in theory would
be used to find the case that we see the entries in the opposite order:
1. When we see an entry with a non-zero generation, we set the
generation_zero flag to GENERATION_NUMBER_EXISTS.
2. When we later see an entry with a zero generation, we complain if
the flag is GENERATION_NUMBER_EXISTS.
But that doesn't work; step 2 is implemented, but there is no step 1. We
never use NUMBER_EXISTS at all, and Coverity rightly complains that step
2 is dead code.
We can fix that by implementing that step 1.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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In 2ee11f7261 (commit-graph: return generation from memory, 2023-03-20),
the `commit_graph_generation()` function stopped returning zeros when
asked to locate the generation number of a given commit.
This was done at the time to prepare for a later change which set
generation values in memory, meaning that we could no longer rely on
`graph_pos` alone to tell us whether or not to trust the generation
number returned by this function.
In 2ee11f7261, it was noted that this change only impacted very old
commit-graphs, which were written with all commits having generation
number 0. Indeed, zero is not a valid generation number, so we should
never expect to see that value outside of the aforementioned case.
The test fallout in 2ee11f7261 indicated that we were no longer able to
fsck a specific old case of commit-graph corruption, where we see a
non-zero generation number after having seen a generation number of 0
earlier.
Introduce a variant of `commit_graph_generation()` which behaves like
that function did prior to 2ee11f7261, known as
`commit_graph_generation_from_graph()`. Then use this function in the
context of `verify_one_commit_graph()`, where we only want to trust the
values from the graph.
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Various offset computation in the code that accesses the packfiles
and other data in the object layer has been hardened against
arithmetic overflow, especially on 32-bit systems.
* tb/object-access-overflow-protection:
commit-graph.c: prevent overflow in `verify_commit_graph()`
commit-graph.c: prevent overflow in `write_commit_graph()`
commit-graph.c: prevent overflow in `merge_commit_graph()`
commit-graph.c: prevent overflow in `split_graph_merge_strategy()`
commit-graph.c: prevent overflow in `load_tree_for_commit()`
commit-graph.c: prevent overflow in `fill_commit_in_graph()`
commit-graph.c: prevent overflow in `fill_commit_graph_info()`
commit-graph.c: prevent overflow in `load_oid_from_graph()`
commit-graph.c: prevent overflow in add_graph_to_chain()
commit-graph.c: prevent overflow in `write_commit_graph_file()`
pack-bitmap.c: ensure that eindex lookups don't overflow
midx.c: prevent overflow in `fill_included_packs_batch()`
midx.c: prevent overflow in `write_midx_internal()`
midx.c: store `nr`, `alloc` variables as `size_t`'s
midx.c: prevent overflow in `nth_midxed_offset()`
midx.c: prevent overflow in `nth_midxed_object_oid()`
midx.c: use `size_t`'s for fanout nr and alloc
packfile.c: use checked arithmetic in `nth_packed_object_offset()`
packfile.c: prevent overflow in `load_idx()`
packfile.c: prevent overflow in `nth_packed_object_id()`
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"git fsck --no-progress" still spewed noise from the commit-graph
subsystem, which has been corrected.
* tb/fsck-no-progress:
commit-graph.c: avoid duplicated progress output during `verify`
commit-graph.c: pass progress to `verify_one_commit_graph()`
commit-graph.c: iteratively verify commit-graph chains
commit-graph.c: extract `verify_one_commit_graph()`
fsck: suppress MIDX output with `--no-progress`
fsck: suppress commit-graph output with `--no-progress`
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In a similar spirit as previous commits, ensure that we don't overflow
when trying to read an OID out of an existing commit-graph during
verification.
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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