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We build up a string list of listen addresses from the command-line
arguments, but never free it. This causes t5811 to complain of a leak
(though curiously it seems to do so only when compiled with gcc, not
with clang).
To handle this correctly, we have to do a little refactoring:
- there are two exit points from the main function, depending on
whether we are entering the main loop or serving a single client
(since rather than a traditional fork model, we re-exec ourselves
with the extra "--serve" argument to accommodate Windows).
We don't need --listen at all in the --serve case, of course, but it
is passed along by the parent daemon, which simply copies all of the
command-line options it got.
- we just "return serve()" to run the main loop, giving us no chance
to do any cleanup
So let's use a "ret" variable to store the return code, and give
ourselves a single exit point at the end. That gives us one place to do
cleanup.
Note that this code also uses the "use a no-dup string-list, but
allocate strings we add to it" trick, meaning string_list_clear() will
not realize it should free them. We can fix this by switching to a "dup"
string-list, but using the "append_nodup" function to add to it (this is
preferable to tweaking the strdup_strings flag before clearing, as it
puts all the subtle memory-ownership code together).
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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If we are cloning an untrusted remote repository into a
sandbox, we may also want to fetch remote submodules in
order to get the complete view as intended by the other
side. However, that opens us up to attacks where a malicious
user gets us to clone something they would not otherwise
have access to (this is not necessarily a problem by itself,
but we may then act on the cloned contents in a way that
exposes them to the attacker).
Ideally such a setup would sandbox git entirely away from
high-value items, but this is not always practical or easy
to set up (e.g., OS network controls may block multiple
protocols, and we would want to enable some but not others).
We can help this case by providing a way to restrict
particular protocols. We use a whitelist in the environment.
This is more annoying to set up than a blacklist, but
defaults to safety if the set of protocols git supports
grows). If no whitelist is specified, we continue to default
to allowing all protocols (this is an "unsafe" default, but
since the minority of users will want this sandboxing
effect, it is the only sensible one).
A note on the tests: ideally these would all be in a single
test file, but the git-daemon and httpd test infrastructure
is an all-or-nothing proposition rather than a test-by-test
prerequisite. By putting them all together, we would be
unable to test the file-local code on machines without
apache.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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