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authorSimon Tatham <anakin@pobox.com>2022-06-12 12:04:26 +0300
committerSimon Tatham <anakin@pobox.com>2022-06-25 16:32:23 +0300
commitf579b3c01e2bfd439d493be06b934404e13d3376 (patch)
treec89254e418d4536417c55c85a42430b360887620
parent08d58fe13e84a929c72c5d4aa98001279463a79f (diff)
Certificate trust scope: change to a boolean-expression system.
This replaces the previous placeholder scheme of having a list of hostname wildcards with implicit logical-OR semantics (if any wildcard matched then the certificate would be trusted to sign for that host). That scheme didn't allow for exceptions within a domain ('everything in example.com except extra-high-security-machine.example.com'), and also had no way to specify port numbers. In the new system, you can still write a hostname wildcard by itself in the simple case, but now those are just atomic subexpressions in a boolean-logic domain-specific language I've made up. So if you want multiple wildcards, you can separate them with || in a single longer expression, and also you can use && and ! to impose exceptions on top of that. Full details of the expression language are in the comment at the top of utils/cert-expr.c. It'll need documenting properly before release, of course. For the sake of backwards compatibility for early adopters who've already set up configuration in the old system, I've put in some code that will read the old MatchHosts configuration and automatically translate it into the equivalent boolean expression (by simply stringing together the list of wildcards with || between them).
-rw-r--r--CMakeLists.txt5
-rw-r--r--defs.h2
-rw-r--r--misc.h14
-rw-r--r--ssh/ca-config.c138
-rw-r--r--ssh/transport2.c13
-rw-r--r--storage.h3
-rw-r--r--unix/storage.c24
-rw-r--r--utils/CMakeLists.txt1
-rw-r--r--utils/cert-expr.c967
-rw-r--r--utils/host_ca_new_free.c4
-rw-r--r--windows/storage.c26
11 files changed, 1057 insertions, 140 deletions
diff --git a/CMakeLists.txt b/CMakeLists.txt
index 0eb4cf1c..deba83f7 100644
--- a/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -94,6 +94,11 @@ add_executable(test_wildcard
target_compile_definitions(test_wildcard PRIVATE TEST)
target_link_libraries(test_wildcard utils ${platform_libraries})
+add_executable(test_cert_expr
+ utils/cert-expr.c)
+target_compile_definitions(test_cert_expr PRIVATE TEST)
+target_link_libraries(test_cert_expr utils ${platform_libraries})
+
add_executable(bidi_gettype
terminal/bidi_gettype.c)
target_link_libraries(bidi_gettype guiterminal utils ${platform_libraries})
diff --git a/defs.h b/defs.h
index 14e378ab..48cbaf23 100644
--- a/defs.h
+++ b/defs.h
@@ -143,6 +143,8 @@ typedef struct Channel Channel;
typedef struct SshChannel SshChannel;
typedef struct mainchan mainchan;
+typedef struct CertExprBuilder CertExprBuilder;
+
typedef struct ssh_sharing_state ssh_sharing_state;
typedef struct ssh_sharing_connstate ssh_sharing_connstate;
typedef struct share_channel share_channel;
diff --git a/misc.h b/misc.h
index 9cf656fd..bdfa8c2e 100644
--- a/misc.h
+++ b/misc.h
@@ -507,4 +507,18 @@ static inline ptrlen ptrlen_from_lf(LoadedFile *lf)
* is made to handle difficult overlap cases. */
void memxor(uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in1, const uint8_t *in2, size_t size);
+/* Boolean expressions used in OpenSSH certificate configuration */
+bool cert_expr_valid(const char *expression,
+ char **error_msg, ptrlen *error_loc);
+bool cert_expr_match_str(const char *expression,
+ const char *hostname, unsigned port);
+/* Build a certificate expression out of hostname wildcards. Required
+ * to handle legacy configuration from early in development, when
+ * multiple wildcards were stored separately in config, implicitly
+ * ORed together. */
+CertExprBuilder *cert_expr_builder_new();
+void cert_expr_builder_free(CertExprBuilder *eb);
+void cert_expr_builder_add(CertExprBuilder *eb, const char *wildcard);
+char *cert_expr_expression(CertExprBuilder *eb);
+
#endif
diff --git a/ssh/ca-config.c b/ssh/ca-config.c
index 6c84b68b..350613df 100644
--- a/ssh/ca-config.c
+++ b/ssh/ca-config.c
@@ -18,12 +18,10 @@ struct ca_state {
dlgcontrol *ca_reclist;
dlgcontrol *ca_pubkey_edit;
dlgcontrol *ca_pubkey_info;
- dlgcontrol *ca_wclist;
- dlgcontrol *ca_wc_edit;
+ dlgcontrol *ca_validity_edit;
dlgcontrol *rsa_type_checkboxes[NRSATYPES];
- char *name, *pubkey, *wc;
+ char *name, *pubkey, *validity;
tree234 *ca_names; /* stores plain 'char *' */
- tree234 *host_wcs; /* stores plain 'char *' */
ca_options opts;
strbuf *ca_pubkey_blob;
};
@@ -45,10 +43,8 @@ static void ca_state_free(void *vctx)
struct ca_state *st = (struct ca_state *)vctx;
clear_string_tree(st->ca_names);
freetree234(st->ca_names);
- clear_string_tree(st->host_wcs);
- freetree234(st->host_wcs);
sfree(st->name);
- sfree(st->wc);
+ sfree(st->validity);
sfree(st);
}
@@ -86,13 +82,8 @@ static void set_from_hca(struct ca_state *st, host_ca *hca)
else
st->pubkey = dupstr("");
- clear_string_tree(st->host_wcs);
- for (size_t i = 0; i < hca->n_hostname_wildcards; i++) {
- char *name = dupstr(hca->hostname_wildcards[i]);
- char *added = add234(st->host_wcs, name);
- if (added != name)
- sfree(name); /* de-duplicate, just in case */
- }
+ st->validity = dupstr(hca->validity_expression ?
+ hca->validity_expression : "");
st->opts = hca->opts; /* structure copy */
}
@@ -194,7 +185,7 @@ static void ca_load_selected_record(struct ca_state *st, dlgparam *dp)
dlg_refresh(st->ca_name_edit, dp);
dlg_refresh(st->ca_pubkey_edit, dp);
- dlg_refresh(st->ca_wclist, dp);
+ dlg_refresh(st->ca_validity_edit, dp);
for (size_t i = 0; i < NRSATYPES; i++)
dlg_refresh(st->rsa_type_checkboxes[i], dp);
ca_refresh_pubkey_info(st, dp);
@@ -259,8 +250,23 @@ static void ca_save_handler(dlgcontrol *ctrl, dlgparam *dp,
{
struct ca_state *st = (struct ca_state *)ctrl->context.p;
if (event == EVENT_ACTION) {
- if (!count234(st->host_wcs)) {
- dlg_error_msg(dp, "No hostnames configured for this key");
+ if (!*st->validity) {
+ dlg_error_msg(dp, "No validity expression configured "
+ "for this key");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ char *error_msg;
+ ptrlen error_loc;
+ if (!cert_expr_valid(st->validity, &error_msg, &error_loc)) {
+ char *error_full = dupprintf("Error in expression: %s", error_msg);
+ dlg_error_msg(dp, error_full);
+ dlg_set_focus(st->ca_validity_edit, dp);
+ dlg_editbox_select_range(
+ st->ca_validity_edit, dp,
+ (const char *)error_loc.ptr - st->validity, error_loc.len);
+ sfree(error_msg);
+ sfree(error_full);
return;
}
@@ -274,10 +280,7 @@ static void ca_save_handler(dlgcontrol *ctrl, dlgparam *dp,
hca->name = dupstr(st->name);
hca->ca_public_key = strbuf_dup(ptrlen_from_strbuf(
st->ca_pubkey_blob));
- hca->n_hostname_wildcards = count234(st->host_wcs);
- hca->hostname_wildcards = snewn(hca->n_hostname_wildcards, char *);
- for (size_t i = 0; i < hca->n_hostname_wildcards; i++)
- hca->hostname_wildcards[i] = dupstr(index234(st->host_wcs, i));
+ hca->validity_expression = dupstr(st->validity);
hca->opts = st->opts; /* structure copy */
char *error = host_ca_save(hca);
@@ -360,73 +363,15 @@ static void ca_pubkey_file_handler(dlgcontrol *ctrl, dlgparam *dp,
}
}
-static void ca_wclist_handler(dlgcontrol *ctrl, dlgparam *dp,
- void *data, int event)
-{
- struct ca_state *st = (struct ca_state *)ctrl->context.p;
- if (event == EVENT_REFRESH) {
- dlg_update_start(ctrl, dp);
- dlg_listbox_clear(ctrl, dp);
- const char *name;
- for (int i = 0; (name = index234(st->host_wcs, i)) != NULL; i++)
- dlg_listbox_add(ctrl, dp, name);
- dlg_update_done(ctrl, dp);
- }
-}
-
-static void ca_wc_edit_handler(dlgcontrol *ctrl, dlgparam *dp,
- void *data, int event)
+static void ca_validity_handler(dlgcontrol *ctrl, dlgparam *dp,
+ void *data, int event)
{
struct ca_state *st = (struct ca_state *)ctrl->context.p;
if (event == EVENT_REFRESH) {
- dlg_editbox_set(ctrl, dp, st->wc);
+ dlg_editbox_set(ctrl, dp, st->validity);
} else if (event == EVENT_VALCHANGE) {
- sfree(st->wc);
- st->wc = dlg_editbox_get(ctrl, dp);
- }
-}
-
-static void ca_wc_add_handler(dlgcontrol *ctrl, dlgparam *dp,
- void *data, int event)
-{
- struct ca_state *st = (struct ca_state *)ctrl->context.p;
- if (event == EVENT_ACTION) {
- if (!st->wc) {
- dlg_beep(dp);
- return;
- }
-
- if (add234(st->host_wcs, st->wc) == st->wc) {
- dlg_refresh(st->ca_wclist, dp);
- } else {
- sfree(st->wc);
- }
-
- st->wc = dupstr("");
- dlg_refresh(st->ca_wc_edit, dp);
- }
-}
-
-static void ca_wc_rem_handler(dlgcontrol *ctrl, dlgparam *dp,
- void *data, int event)
-{
- struct ca_state *st = (struct ca_state *)ctrl->context.p;
- if (event == EVENT_ACTION) {
- int i = dlg_listbox_index(st->ca_wclist, dp);
- if (i < 0) {
- dlg_beep(dp);
- return;
- }
- char *wc = delpos234(st->host_wcs, i);
- if (!wc) {
- dlg_beep(dp);
- return;
- }
-
- sfree(st->wc);
- st->wc = wc;
- dlg_refresh(st->ca_wclist, dp);
- dlg_refresh(st->ca_wc_edit, dp);
+ sfree(st->validity);
+ st->validity = dlg_editbox_get(ctrl, dp);
}
}
@@ -454,8 +399,7 @@ void setup_ca_config_box(struct controlbox *b)
b, sizeof(struct ca_state), ca_state_free);
memset(st, 0, sizeof(*st));
st->ca_names = newtree234(ca_name_compare);
- st->host_wcs = newtree234(ca_name_compare);
- st->wc = dupstr("");
+ st->validity = dupstr("");
ca_refresh_name_list(st);
/* Initialise the settings to a default blank host_ca */
@@ -520,25 +464,9 @@ void setup_ca_config_box(struct controlbox *b)
s = ctrl_getset(b, "Main", "options", "What this CA is trusted to do");
- c = ctrl_listbox(s, "Hostname patterns this key is trusted to certify",
- NO_SHORTCUT, HELPCTX(no_help), ca_wclist_handler, P(st));
- c->listbox.height = 3;
- st->ca_wclist = c;
-
- ctrl_columns(s, 3, 70, 15, 15);
- c = ctrl_editbox(s, "Hostname pattern to add", 'h', 100,
- HELPCTX(no_help), ca_wc_edit_handler, P(st), P(NULL));
- c->column = 0;
- st->ca_wc_edit = c;
- c = ctrl_pushbutton(s, "Add", NO_SHORTCUT, HELPCTX(no_help),
- ca_wc_add_handler, P(st));
- c->align_next_to = st->ca_wc_edit;
- c->column = 1;
- c = ctrl_pushbutton(s, "Remove", NO_SHORTCUT, HELPCTX(no_help),
- ca_wc_rem_handler, P(st));
- c->align_next_to = st->ca_wc_edit;
- c->column = 2;
- ctrl_columns(s, 1, 100);
+ c = ctrl_editbox(s, "Valid hosts this key is trusted to certify", 'h', 100,
+ HELPCTX(no_help), ca_validity_handler, P(st), P(NULL));
+ st->ca_validity_edit = c;
ctrl_columns(s, 4, 44, 18, 18, 18);
c = ctrl_text(s, "Signature types (RSA keys only):", HELPCTX(no_help));
diff --git a/ssh/transport2.c b/ssh/transport2.c
index 1d30f240..4383bb98 100644
--- a/ssh/transport2.c
+++ b/ssh/transport2.c
@@ -690,16 +690,9 @@ static void ssh2_write_kexinit_lists(
if (!hca)
continue;
- bool match = false;
- for (size_t i = 0, e = hca->n_hostname_wildcards;
- i < e; i++) {
- if (wc_match(hca->hostname_wildcards[i], hk_host)) {
- match = true;
- break;
- }
- }
-
- if (match && hca->ca_public_key) {
+ if (hca->ca_public_key &&
+ cert_expr_match_str(hca->validity_expression,
+ hk_host, hk_port)) {
accept_certs = true;
add234(host_cas, hca);
} else {
diff --git a/storage.h b/storage.h
index f581256e..e9138f40 100644
--- a/storage.h
+++ b/storage.h
@@ -103,8 +103,7 @@ void store_host_key(const char *hostname, int port,
struct host_ca {
char *name;
strbuf *ca_public_key;
- char **hostname_wildcards;
- size_t n_hostname_wildcards;
+ char *validity_expression;
ca_options opts;
};
diff --git a/unix/storage.c b/unix/storage.c
index b18c5166..83e1c19c 100644
--- a/unix/storage.c
+++ b/unix/storage.c
@@ -646,8 +646,8 @@ host_ca *host_ca_load(const char *name)
host_ca *hca = host_ca_new();
hca->name = dupstr(name);
- size_t wcsize = 0;
char *line;
+ CertExprBuilder *eb = NULL;
while ( (line = fgetline(fp)) ) {
char *value = strchr(line, '=');
@@ -662,10 +662,12 @@ host_ca *host_ca_load(const char *name)
if (!strcmp(line, "PublicKey")) {
hca->ca_public_key = base64_decode_sb(ptrlen_from_asciz(value));
} else if (!strcmp(line, "MatchHosts")) {
- sgrowarray(hca->hostname_wildcards, wcsize,
- hca->n_hostname_wildcards);
- hca->hostname_wildcards[hca->n_hostname_wildcards++] =
- dupstr(value);
+ if (!eb)
+ eb = cert_expr_builder_new();
+ cert_expr_builder_add(eb, value);
+ } else if (!strcmp(line, "Validity")) {
+ hca->validity_expression = strbuf_to_str(
+ percent_decode_sb(ptrlen_from_asciz(value)));
} else if (!strcmp(line, "PermitRSASHA1")) {
hca->opts.permit_rsa_sha1 = atoi(value);
} else if (!strcmp(line, "PermitRSASHA256")) {
@@ -677,6 +679,13 @@ host_ca *host_ca_load(const char *name)
sfree(line);
}
+ if (eb) {
+ if (!hca->validity_expression) {
+ hca->validity_expression = cert_expr_expression(eb);
+ }
+ cert_expr_builder_free(eb);
+ }
+
return hca;
}
@@ -694,8 +703,9 @@ char *host_ca_save(host_ca *hca)
base64_encode_fp(fp, ptrlen_from_strbuf(hca->ca_public_key), 0);
fprintf(fp, "\n");
- for (size_t i = 0; i < hca->n_hostname_wildcards; i++)
- fprintf(fp, "MatchHosts=%s\n", hca->hostname_wildcards[i]);
+ fprintf(fp, "Validity=");
+ percent_encode_fp(fp, ptrlen_from_asciz(hca->validity_expression), NULL);
+ fprintf(fp, "\n");
fprintf(fp, "PermitRSASHA1=%d\n", (int)hca->opts.permit_rsa_sha1);
fprintf(fp, "PermitRSASHA256=%d\n", (int)hca->opts.permit_rsa_sha256);
diff --git a/utils/CMakeLists.txt b/utils/CMakeLists.txt
index 56cc3c1b..4f5479a6 100644
--- a/utils/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/utils/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ add_sources_from_current_dir(utils
bufchain.c
buildinfo.c
burnstr.c
+ cert-expr.c
chomp.c
cmdline_get_passwd_input_state_new.c
conf.c
diff --git a/utils/cert-expr.c b/utils/cert-expr.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..8fe8df7c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/utils/cert-expr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,967 @@
+/*
+ * Parser for the boolean expression language used to configure what
+ * host names an OpenSSH certificate will be trusted to sign for.
+ */
+
+/*
+
+Language specification
+======================
+
+Outer lexical layer: the input expression is broken up into tokens,
+with any whitespace between them discarded and ignored. The following
+tokens are special:
+
+ ( ) && || !
+
+and the remaining token type is an 'atom', which is any non-empty
+sequence of characters from the following set:
+
+ ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ
+ abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz
+ 0123456789
+ .-_*?[]/:
+
+Inner lexical layer: once the boundaries of an 'atom' token have been
+determined by the outer lex layer, each atom is further classified
+into one of the following subtypes:
+
+ - If it contains no ':' or '/', it's taken to be a wildcard matching
+ hostnames, e.g. "*.example.com".
+
+ - If it begins with 'port:' followed by digits, it's taken to be a
+ single port number specification, e.g. "port:22".
+
+ - If it begins with 'port:' followed by two digit sequences separated
+ by '-', it's taken to be a port number range, e.g. "port:0-1023".
+
+ - Any other atom is reserved for future expansion. (See Rationale.)
+
+Syntax layer: all of those types of atom are interpreted as predicates
+applied to the (hostname, port) data configured for the SSH connection
+for which the certificate is being validated.
+
+Wildcards are handled using the syntax in wildcard.c.
+
+More complex boolean expressions can be made by combining those
+predicates using the boolean operators and parentheses, in the obvious
+way: && and || are infix operators representing logical AND and OR, !
+is a prefix operator representing logical NOT, and parentheses
+indicate grouping.
+
+Each of && and || can associate freely with itself (that is, you can
+write "a && b && c" without having to parenthesise one or the other
+subexpression). But they are forbidden to associate with _each other_.
+That is, if you write "a && b || c" or "a || b && c", it's a syntax
+error, and you must add parentheses to indicate which operator was
+intended to have the higher priority.
+
+Rationale
+=========
+
+Atoms: restrictions
+-------------------
+
+The characters permitted in the 'atom' token don't include \, even
+though it's a special character defined by wildcard.c. That's because
+in this restricted context wildcards will never need it: no hostname
+contains a literal \, and neither does any hostname contain a literal
+instance of any of the wildcard characters that wildcard.c allows you
+to use \ to escape.
+
+Atoms: future extension
+-----------------------
+
+The specification of the 'atom' token is intended to leave space for
+more than one kind of future extension.
+
+Most obviously, additional special predicates similar to "port:", with
+different disambiguating prefixes. I don't know what things of that
+kind we might need, but space is left for them just in case.
+
+Also, the unused '/' in the permitted-characters spec is intended to
+leave open the possibility of allowing certificate acceptance to be
+based on IP address, because the usual CIDR syntax for specifying IP
+ranges (e.g. "192.168.1.0/24" or "2345:6789:abcd:ef01::/128") would be
+lexed as a single atom under these rules.
+
+For the moment, certificate acceptance rules based on IP address are
+not supported, because it's not clear what the semantics ought to be.
+There are two problems with using IP addresses for this purpose:
+
+ 1. Sometimes they come from the DNS, which means you can't trust
+ them. The whole idea of SSH is to end-to-end authenticate the host
+ key against only the input given _by the user_ to the client. Any
+ additional data provided by the network, such as the result of a
+ DNS lookup, is suspect.
+
+ On the other hand, sometimes the IP address *is* part of the user
+ input, because the user can provide an IP address rather than a
+ hostname as the intended connection destination. So there are two
+ kinds of IP address, and they should very likely be treated
+ differently.
+
+ 2. Sometimes the server's IP address is not even *known* by the
+ client, if you're connecting via a proxy and leaving DNS lookups
+ to the proxy.
+
+So, what should a boolean expression do if it's asked to accept or
+reject based on an IP address, and the IP address is unknown or
+untrustworthy? I'm not sure, and therefore, in the initial version of
+this expression system, I haven't implemented them at all.
+
+But the syntax is still available for a future extension to use, if we
+come up with good answers to these questions.
+
+(One possibility would be to evaluate the whole expression in Kleene
+three-valued logic, so that every subexpression has the possible
+answers TRUE, FALSE and UNKNOWN. If a definite IP address is not
+available, IP address predicates evaluate to UNKNOWN. Then, once the
+expression as a whole is evaluated, fail closed, by interpreting
+UNKNOWN as 'reject'. The effect would be that a positive _or_ negative
+constraint on the IP address would cause rejection if the IP address
+is not reliably known, because once the predicate itself has returned
+UNKNOWN, negating it still gives UNKNOWN. The only way you could still
+accept a certificate in that situation would be if the overall
+structure of the expression meant that the test of the IP address
+couldn't affect the result anyway, e.g. if it was ANDed with another
+subexpression that definitely evaluated to FALSE, or ORed with one
+that evaluated to TRUE. This system seems conceptually elegant to me,
+but the argument against it is that it's complicated and
+counterintuitive, which is not a property you want in something a user
+is writing for security purposes!)
+
+Operator precedence
+-------------------
+
+Why did I choose to make && and || refuse to associate with each
+other, instead of applying the usual C precedence rule that && beats
+||? Because I think the C precedence rule is essentially arbitrary, in
+the sense that when people are writing boolean expressions in practice
+based on predicates from the rest of their program, it's about equally
+common to want to nest an && within an || and vice versa. So the
+default precedence rule only gives the user what they actually wanted
+about 50% of the time, and leads to absent-minded errors about as
+often as it conveniently allows you to omit a pair of parens.
+
+With my mathematician hat on, it's not so arbitrary. I agree that if
+you're *going* to give || and && a relative priority then it makes
+more sense to make && the higher-priority one, because if you're
+thinking algebraically, && is more multiplicative and || is more
+additive. But the pure-maths contexts in which that's convenient have
+nothing to do with general boolean expressions in if statements.
+
+This boolean syntax is still close enough to that of C and its
+derivatives to allow easy enough expression interchange (not counting
+the fact that atoms would need rewriting). Any boolean expression
+structure accepted by this syntax is also legal C and means the same
+thing; any expression structure accepted by C is either legal and
+equivalent in this syntax, or will fail with an error. In no case is
+anything accepted but mapped to a different meaning.
+
+ */
+
+#include "putty.h"
+
+typedef enum Token {
+ TOK_LPAR, TOK_RPAR,
+ TOK_AND, TOK_OR, TOK_NOT,
+ TOK_ATOM,
+ TOK_END, TOK_ERROR
+} Token;
+
+static inline bool is_space(char c)
+{
+ return (c == ' ' || c == '\n' || c == '\r' || c == '\t' ||
+ c == '\f' || c == '\v');
+}
+
+static inline bool is_operator_char(char c)
+{
+ return (c == '(' || c == ')' || c == '&' || c == '|' || c == '!');
+}
+
+static inline bool is_atom_char(char c)
+{
+ return (('A' <= c && c <= 'Z') ||
+ ('a' <= c && c <= 'z') ||
+ ('0' <= c && c <= '9') ||
+ c == '.' || c == '-' || c == '_' || c == '*' || c == '?' ||
+ c == '[' || c == ']' || c == '/' || c == ':');
+}
+
+static Token lex(ptrlen *text, ptrlen *token, char **err)
+{
+ const char *p = text->ptr, *e = p + text->len;
+ Token type = TOK_ERROR;
+
+ /* Skip whitespace */
+ while (p < e && is_space(*p))
+ p++;
+
+ const char *start = p;
+
+ if (!(p < e)) {
+ type = TOK_END;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (is_operator_char(*p)) {
+ /* Match boolean-expression tokens */
+ static const struct operator {
+ ptrlen text;
+ Token type;
+ } operators[] = {
+ {PTRLEN_DECL_LITERAL("("), TOK_LPAR},
+ {PTRLEN_DECL_LITERAL(")"), TOK_RPAR},
+ {PTRLEN_DECL_LITERAL("&&"), TOK_AND},
+ {PTRLEN_DECL_LITERAL("||"), TOK_OR},
+ {PTRLEN_DECL_LITERAL("!"), TOK_NOT},
+ };
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < lenof(operators); i++) {
+ const struct operator *op = &operators[i];
+ if (e - p >= op->text.len &&
+ ptrlen_eq_ptrlen(op->text, make_ptrlen(p, op->text.len))) {
+ p += op->text.len;
+ type = op->type;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Report an error if one of the operator characters is used
+ * in a way that doesn't match something in that table (e.g. a
+ * single &).
+ */
+ p++;
+ type = TOK_ERROR;
+ *err = dupstr("unrecognised boolean operator");
+ goto out;
+ } else if (is_atom_char(*p)) {
+ /*
+ * Match an 'atom' token, which is any non-empty sequence of
+ * characters from the combined set that allows hostname
+ * wildcards, IP address ranges and special predicates like
+ * port numbers.
+ */
+ do {
+ p++;
+ } while (p < e && is_atom_char(*p));
+
+ type = TOK_ATOM;
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Otherwise, report an error.
+ */
+ p++;
+ type = TOK_ERROR;
+ *err = dupstr("unexpected character in expression");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ out:
+ *token = make_ptrlen(start, p - start);
+ text->ptr = p;
+ text->len = e - p;
+ return type;
+}
+
+typedef enum Operator {
+ OP_AND, OP_OR, OP_NOT,
+ OP_HOSTNAME_WC, OP_PORT_RANGE
+} Operator;
+
+typedef struct ExprNode ExprNode;
+struct ExprNode {
+ Operator op;
+ ptrlen text;
+ union {
+ struct {
+ /* OP_AND, OP_OR */
+ ExprNode **subexprs;
+ size_t nsubexprs;
+ };
+ struct {
+ /* OP_NOT */
+ ExprNode *subexpr;
+ };
+ struct {
+ /* OP_HOSTNAME_WC */
+ char *wc;
+ };
+ struct {
+ /* OP_PORT_RANGE */
+ unsigned lo, hi; /* both inclusive */
+ };
+ };
+};
+
+static ExprNode *exprnode_new(Operator op, ptrlen text)
+{
+ ExprNode *en = snew(ExprNode);
+ memset(en, 0, sizeof(*en));
+ en->op = op;
+ en->text = text;
+ return en;
+}
+
+static void exprnode_free(ExprNode *en)
+{
+ switch (en->op) {
+ case OP_AND:
+ case OP_OR:
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < en->nsubexprs; i++)
+ exprnode_free(en->subexprs[i]);
+ sfree(en->subexprs);
+ break;
+ case OP_NOT:
+ exprnode_free(en->subexpr);
+ break;
+ case OP_HOSTNAME_WC:
+ sfree(en->wc);
+ break;
+ case OP_PORT_RANGE:
+ break;
+ default:
+ unreachable("unhandled node type in exprnode_free");
+ }
+
+ sfree(en);
+}
+
+static unsigned ptrlen_to_port_number(ptrlen input)
+{
+ unsigned val = 0;
+ for (const char *p = input.ptr, *end = p + input.len; p < end; p++) {
+ assert('0' <= *p && *p <= '9'); /* expect parser to have checked */
+ val = 10 * val + (*p - '0');
+ if (val >= 65536)
+ val = 65536; /* normalise 'too large' to avoid integer overflow */
+ }
+ return val;
+}
+
+typedef struct ParserState ParserState;
+struct ParserState {
+ ptrlen currtext;
+ Token tok;
+ ptrlen toktext, lasttoktext;
+ char *err;
+ ptrlen errloc;
+};
+
+static void error(ParserState *ps, char *errtext, ptrlen errloc)
+{
+ if (!ps->err) {
+ ps->err = errtext;
+ ps->errloc = errloc;
+ } else {
+ sfree(errtext);
+ }
+}
+
+static void advance(ParserState *ps)
+{
+ char *err = NULL;
+ ps->lasttoktext = ps->toktext;
+ ps->tok = lex(&ps->currtext, &ps->toktext, &err);
+ if (ps->tok == TOK_ERROR)
+ error(ps, err, ps->toktext);
+}
+
+static ExprNode *parse_atom(ParserState *ps);
+static ExprNode *parse_expr(ParserState *ps);
+
+static bool atom_is_hostname_wc(ptrlen toktext)
+{
+ return !ptrlen_contains(toktext, ":/");
+}
+
+static ExprNode *parse_atom(ParserState *ps)
+{
+ if (ps->tok == TOK_LPAR) {
+ ptrlen openpar = ps->toktext;
+ advance(ps); /* eat the ( */
+
+ ExprNode *subexpr = parse_expr(ps);
+ if (!subexpr)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (ps->tok != TOK_RPAR) {
+ error(ps, dupstr("expected ')' after parenthesised subexpression"),
+ subexpr->text);
+ exprnode_free(subexpr);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ptrlen closepar = ps->toktext;
+ advance(ps); /* eat the ) */
+
+ /* We can reuse the existing AST node, but we need to extend
+ * its bounds within the input expression to include the
+ * parentheses */
+ subexpr->text = make_ptrlen_startend(
+ openpar.ptr, ptrlen_end(closepar));
+ return subexpr;
+ }
+
+ if (ps->tok == TOK_NOT) {
+ ptrlen notloc = ps->toktext;
+ advance(ps); /* eat the ! */
+
+ ExprNode *subexpr = parse_atom(ps);
+ if (!subexpr)
+ return NULL;
+
+ ExprNode *en = exprnode_new(
+ OP_NOT, make_ptrlen_startend(
+ notloc.ptr, ptrlen_end(subexpr->text)));
+ en->subexpr = subexpr;
+ return en;
+ }
+
+ if (ps->tok == TOK_ATOM) {
+ if (atom_is_hostname_wc(ps->toktext)) {
+ /* Hostname wildcard. */
+ ExprNode *en = exprnode_new(OP_HOSTNAME_WC, ps->toktext);
+ en->wc = mkstr(ps->toktext);
+ advance(ps);
+ return en;
+ }
+
+ ptrlen tail;
+ if (ptrlen_startswith(ps->toktext, PTRLEN_LITERAL("port:"), &tail)) {
+ /* Port number (single or range). */
+ unsigned lo, hi;
+ char *minus;
+ static const char DIGITS[] = "0123456789\0";
+ bool parse_ok = false;
+
+ if (tail.len > 0 && ptrlen_contains_only(tail, DIGITS)) {
+ lo = ptrlen_to_port_number(tail);
+ if (lo >= 65536) {
+ error(ps, dupstr("port number too large"), tail);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ hi = lo;
+ parse_ok = true;
+ } else if ((minus = memchr(tail.ptr, '-', tail.len)) != NULL) {
+ ptrlen pl_lo = make_ptrlen_startend(tail.ptr, minus);
+ ptrlen pl_hi = make_ptrlen_startend(minus+1, ptrlen_end(tail));
+ if (pl_lo.len > 0 && ptrlen_contains_only(pl_lo, DIGITS) &&
+ pl_hi.len > 0 && ptrlen_contains_only(pl_hi, DIGITS)) {
+
+ lo = ptrlen_to_port_number(pl_lo);
+ if (lo >= 65536) {
+ error(ps, dupstr("port number too large"), pl_lo);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ hi = ptrlen_to_port_number(pl_hi);
+ if (hi >= 65536) {
+ error(ps, dupstr("port number too large"), pl_hi);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (hi < lo) {
+ error(ps, dupstr("port number range is backwards"),
+ make_ptrlen_startend(pl_lo.ptr,
+ ptrlen_end(pl_hi)));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ parse_ok = true;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!parse_ok) {
+ error(ps, dupstr("unable to parse port number specification"),
+ ps->toktext);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+
+ ExprNode *en = exprnode_new(OP_PORT_RANGE, ps->toktext);
+ en->lo = lo;
+ en->hi = hi;
+ advance(ps);
+ return en;
+ }
+ }
+
+ error(ps, dupstr("expected a predicate or a parenthesised subexpression"),
+ ps->toktext);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static ExprNode *parse_expr(ParserState *ps)
+{
+ ExprNode *subexpr = parse_atom(ps);
+ if (!subexpr)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (ps->tok != TOK_AND && ps->tok != TOK_OR)
+ return subexpr;
+
+ Token operator = ps->tok;
+ ExprNode *en = exprnode_new(ps->tok == TOK_AND ? OP_AND : OP_OR,
+ subexpr->text);
+ size_t subexprs_size = 0;
+
+ sgrowarray(en->subexprs, subexprs_size, en->nsubexprs);
+ en->subexprs[en->nsubexprs++] = subexpr;
+
+ while (true) {
+ advance(ps); /* eat the operator */
+
+ subexpr = parse_atom(ps);
+ if (!subexpr) {
+ exprnode_free(en);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ sgrowarray(en->subexprs, subexprs_size, en->nsubexprs);
+ en->subexprs[en->nsubexprs++] = subexpr;
+ en->text = make_ptrlen_startend(
+ en->text.ptr, ptrlen_end(subexpr->text));
+
+ if (ps->tok != TOK_AND && ps->tok != TOK_OR)
+ return en;
+
+ if (ps->tok != operator) {
+ error(ps, dupstr("expected parentheses to disambiguate && and || "
+ "on either side of expression"), subexpr->text);
+ exprnode_free(en);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static ExprNode *parse(ptrlen expr, char **error_msg, ptrlen *error_loc)
+{
+ ParserState ps[1];
+ ps->currtext = expr;
+ ps->lasttoktext = make_ptrlen(ps->currtext.ptr, 0);
+ ps->err = NULL;
+ advance(ps);
+
+ ExprNode *en = parse_expr(ps);
+ if (en && ps->tok != TOK_END) {
+ error(ps, dupstr("unexpected text at end of expression"),
+ make_ptrlen_startend(ps->toktext.ptr, ptrlen_end(expr)));
+ exprnode_free(en);
+ en = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (!en) {
+ if (error_msg)
+ *error_msg = ps->err;
+ else
+ sfree(ps->err);
+ if (error_loc)
+ *error_loc = ps->errloc;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return en;
+}
+
+static bool eval(ExprNode *en, const char *hostname, unsigned port)
+{
+ switch (en->op) {
+ case OP_AND:
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < en->nsubexprs; i++)
+ if (!eval(en->subexprs[i], hostname, port))
+ return false;
+ return true;
+
+ case OP_OR:
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < en->nsubexprs; i++)
+ if (eval(en->subexprs[i], hostname, port))
+ return true;
+ return false;
+
+ case OP_NOT:
+ return !eval(en->subexpr, hostname, port);
+
+ case OP_HOSTNAME_WC:
+ return wc_match(en->wc, hostname);
+
+ case OP_PORT_RANGE:
+ return en->lo <= port && port <= en->hi;
+
+ default:
+ unreachable("unhandled node type in eval");
+ }
+}
+
+bool cert_expr_match_str(const char *expression,
+ const char *hostname, unsigned port)
+{
+ ExprNode *en = parse(ptrlen_from_asciz(expression), NULL, NULL);
+ if (!en)
+ return false;
+
+ bool matched = eval(en, hostname, port);
+ exprnode_free(en);
+ return matched;
+}
+
+bool cert_expr_valid(const char *expression,
+ char **error_msg, ptrlen *error_loc)
+{
+ ExprNode *en = parse(ptrlen_from_asciz(expression), error_msg, error_loc);
+ if (en) {
+ exprnode_free(en);
+ return true;
+ } else {
+ return false;
+ }
+}
+
+struct CertExprBuilder {
+ char **wcs;
+ size_t nwcs, wcsize;
+};
+
+CertExprBuilder *cert_expr_builder_new(void)
+{
+ CertExprBuilder *eb = snew(CertExprBuilder);
+ eb->wcs = NULL;
+ eb->nwcs = eb->wcsize = 0;
+ return eb;
+}
+
+void cert_expr_builder_free(CertExprBuilder *eb)
+{
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < eb->nwcs; i++)
+ sfree(eb->wcs[i]);
+ sfree(eb->wcs);
+ sfree(eb);
+}
+
+void cert_expr_builder_add(CertExprBuilder *eb, const char *wildcard)
+{
+ /* Check this wildcard is lexically valid as an atom */
+ ptrlen orig = ptrlen_from_asciz(wildcard), pl = orig;
+ ptrlen toktext;
+ char *err;
+ Token tok = lex(&pl, &toktext, &err);
+ if (!(tok == TOK_ATOM &&
+ toktext.ptr == orig.ptr &&
+ toktext.len == orig.len &&
+ atom_is_hostname_wc(toktext))) {
+ if (tok == TOK_ERROR)
+ sfree(err);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ sgrowarray(eb->wcs, eb->wcsize, eb->nwcs);
+ eb->wcs[eb->nwcs++] = mkstr(orig);
+}
+
+char *cert_expr_expression(CertExprBuilder *eb)
+{
+ strbuf *sb = strbuf_new();
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < eb->nwcs; i++) {
+ if (i)
+ put_dataz(sb, " || ");
+ put_dataz(sb, eb->wcs[i]);
+ }
+ return strbuf_to_str(sb);
+}
+
+#ifdef TEST
+
+void out_of_memory(void) { fprintf(stderr, "out of memory\n"); abort(); }
+
+static void exprnode_dump(BinarySink *bs, ExprNode *en, const char *origtext)
+{
+ put_fmt(bs, "(%zu:%zu ",
+ (size_t)((const char *)en->text.ptr - origtext),
+ (size_t)((const char *)ptrlen_end(en->text) - origtext));
+ switch (en->op) {
+ case OP_AND:
+ case OP_OR:
+ put_dataz(bs, en->op == OP_AND ? "and" : "or");
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < en->nsubexprs; i++) {
+ put_byte(bs, ' ');
+ exprnode_dump(bs, en->subexprs[i], origtext);
+ }
+ break;
+ case OP_NOT:
+ put_dataz(bs, "not ");
+ exprnode_dump(bs, en->subexpr, origtext);
+ break;
+ case OP_HOSTNAME_WC:
+ put_dataz(bs, "host-wc '");
+ put_dataz(bs, en->wc);
+ put_byte(bs, '\'');
+ break;
+ case OP_PORT_RANGE:
+ put_fmt(bs, "port-range %u %u", en->lo, en->hi);
+ break;
+ default:
+ unreachable("unhandled node type in exprnode_dump");
+ }
+ put_byte(bs, ')');
+}
+
+static const struct ParseTest {
+ const char *file;
+ int line;
+ const char *expr, *output;
+} parsetests[] = {
+#define T(expr_, output_) { \
+ .file=__FILE__, .line=__LINE__, .expr=expr_, .output=output_}
+
+ T("*.example.com", "(0:13 host-wc '*.example.com')"),
+ T("port:0", "(0:6 port-range 0 0)"),
+ T("port:22", "(0:7 port-range 22 22)"),
+ T("port:22-22", "(0:10 port-range 22 22)"),
+ T("port:65535", "(0:10 port-range 65535 65535)"),
+ T("port:0-1023", "(0:11 port-range 0 1023)"),
+
+ T("&", "ERR:0:1:unrecognised boolean operator"),
+ T("|", "ERR:0:1:unrecognised boolean operator"),
+ T(";", "ERR:0:1:unexpected character in expression"),
+ T("port:", "ERR:0:5:unable to parse port number specification"),
+ T("port:abc", "ERR:0:8:unable to parse port number specification"),
+ T("port:65536", "ERR:5:10:port number too large"),
+ T("port:65536-65537", "ERR:5:10:port number too large"),
+ T("port:0-65536", "ERR:7:12:port number too large"),
+ T("port:23-22", "ERR:5:10:port number range is backwards"),
+
+ T("a", "(0:1 host-wc 'a')"),
+ T("(a)", "(0:3 host-wc 'a')"),
+ T("((a))", "(0:5 host-wc 'a')"),
+ T(" (\n(\ra\t)\f)\v", "(1:10 host-wc 'a')"),
+ T("a&&b", "(0:4 and (0:1 host-wc 'a') (3:4 host-wc 'b'))"),
+ T("a||b", "(0:4 or (0:1 host-wc 'a') (3:4 host-wc 'b'))"),
+ T("a&&b&&c", "(0:7 and (0:1 host-wc 'a') (3:4 host-wc 'b') (6:7 host-wc 'c'))"),
+ T("a||b||c", "(0:7 or (0:1 host-wc 'a') (3:4 host-wc 'b') (6:7 host-wc 'c'))"),
+ T("a&&(b||c)", "(0:9 and (0:1 host-wc 'a') (3:9 or (4:5 host-wc 'b') (7:8 host-wc 'c')))"),
+ T("a||(b&&c)", "(0:9 or (0:1 host-wc 'a') (3:9 and (4:5 host-wc 'b') (7:8 host-wc 'c')))"),
+ T("(a&&b)||c", "(0:9 or (0:6 and (1:2 host-wc 'a') (4:5 host-wc 'b')) (8:9 host-wc 'c'))"),
+ T("(a||b)&&c", "(0:9 and (0:6 or (1:2 host-wc 'a') (4:5 host-wc 'b')) (8:9 host-wc 'c'))"),
+ T("!a&&b", "(0:5 and (0:2 not (1:2 host-wc 'a')) (4:5 host-wc 'b'))"),
+ T("a&&!b&&c", "(0:8 and (0:1 host-wc 'a') (3:5 not (4:5 host-wc 'b')) (7:8 host-wc 'c'))"),
+ T("!a||b", "(0:5 or (0:2 not (1:2 host-wc 'a')) (4:5 host-wc 'b'))"),
+ T("a||!b||c", "(0:8 or (0:1 host-wc 'a') (3:5 not (4:5 host-wc 'b')) (7:8 host-wc 'c'))"),
+
+ T("", "ERR:0:0:expected a predicate or a parenthesised subexpression"),
+ T("a &&", "ERR:4:4:expected a predicate or a parenthesised subexpression"),
+ T("a ||", "ERR:4:4:expected a predicate or a parenthesised subexpression"),
+ T("a b c d", "ERR:2:7:unexpected text at end of expression"),
+ T("(", "ERR:1:1:expected a predicate or a parenthesised subexpression"),
+ T("(a", "ERR:1:2:expected ')' after parenthesised subexpression"),
+ T("(a b", "ERR:1:2:expected ')' after parenthesised subexpression"),
+ T("a&&b&&c||d||e", "ERR:6:7:expected parentheses to disambiguate && and || on either side of expression"),
+ T("a||b||c&&d&&e", "ERR:6:7:expected parentheses to disambiguate && and || on either side of expression"),
+ T("!", "ERR:1:1:expected a predicate or a parenthesised subexpression"),
+
+ T("!a", "(0:2 not (1:2 host-wc 'a'))"),
+
+#undef T
+};
+
+static const struct EvalTest {
+ const char *file;
+ int line;
+ const char *expr;
+ const char *host;
+ unsigned port;
+ bool output;
+} evaltests[] = {
+#define T(expr_, host_, port_, output_) { \
+ .file=__FILE__, .line=__LINE__, \
+ .expr=expr_, .host=host_, .port=port_, .output=output_}
+
+ T("*.example.com", "hostname.example.com", 22, true),
+ T("*.example.com", "hostname.example.org", 22, false),
+ T("*.example.com && port:22", "hostname.example.com", 21, false),
+ T("*.example.com && port:22", "hostname.example.com", 22, true),
+ T("*.example.com && port:22", "hostname.example.com", 23, false),
+ T("*.example.com && port:22-24", "hostname.example.com", 21, false),
+ T("*.example.com && port:22-24", "hostname.example.com", 22, true),
+ T("*.example.com && port:22-24", "hostname.example.com", 23, true),
+ T("*.example.com && port:22-24", "hostname.example.com", 24, true),
+ T("*.example.com && port:22-24", "hostname.example.com", 25, false),
+
+ T("*a* && *b* && *c*", "", 22, false),
+ T("*a* && *b* && *c*", "a", 22, false),
+ T("*a* && *b* && *c*", "b", 22, false),
+ T("*a* && *b* && *c*", "c", 22, false),
+ T("*a* && *b* && *c*", "ab", 22, false),
+ T("*a* && *b* && *c*", "ac", 22, false),
+ T("*a* && *b* && *c*", "bc", 22, false),
+ T("*a* && *b* && *c*", "abc", 22, true),
+
+ T("*a* || *b* || *c*", "", 22, false),
+ T("*a* || *b* || *c*", "a", 22, true),
+ T("*a* || *b* || *c*", "b", 22, true),
+ T("*a* || *b* || *c*", "c", 22, true),
+ T("*a* || *b* || *c*", "ab", 22, true),
+ T("*a* || *b* || *c*", "ac", 22, true),
+ T("*a* || *b* || *c*", "bc", 22, true),
+ T("*a* || *b* || *c*", "abc", 22, true),
+
+ T("*a* && !*b* && *c*", "", 22, false),
+ T("*a* && !*b* && *c*", "a", 22, false),
+ T("*a* && !*b* && *c*", "b", 22, false),
+ T("*a* && !*b* && *c*", "c", 22, false),
+ T("*a* && !*b* && *c*", "ab", 22, false),
+ T("*a* && !*b* && *c*", "ac", 22, true),
+ T("*a* && !*b* && *c*", "bc", 22, false),
+ T("*a* && !*b* && *c*", "abc", 22, false),
+
+ T("*a* || !*b* || *c*", "", 22, true),
+ T("*a* || !*b* || *c*", "a", 22, true),
+ T("*a* || !*b* || *c*", "b", 22, false),
+ T("*a* || !*b* || *c*", "c", 22, true),
+ T("*a* || !*b* || *c*", "ab", 22, true),
+ T("*a* || !*b* || *c*", "ac", 22, true),
+ T("*a* || !*b* || *c*", "bc", 22, true),
+ T("*a* || !*b* || *c*", "abc", 22, true),
+
+#undef T
+};
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ if (argc > 1) {
+ /*
+ * Parse an expression from the command line.
+ */
+
+ ptrlen expr = ptrlen_from_asciz(argv[1]);
+ char *error_msg;
+ ptrlen error_loc;
+ ExprNode *en = parse(expr, &error_msg, &error_loc);
+ if (!en) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "ERR:%zu:%zu:%s\n",
+ (size_t)((const char *)error_loc.ptr - argv[1]),
+ (size_t)((const char *)ptrlen_end(error_loc) - argv[1]),
+ error_msg);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%.*s\n", PTRLEN_PRINTF(expr));
+ for (const char *p = expr.ptr, *e = error_loc.ptr; p<e; p++)
+ fputc(' ', stderr);
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < error_loc.len || i < 1; i++)
+ fputc('^', stderr);
+ fputc('\n', stderr);
+ sfree(error_msg);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (argc > 2) {
+ /*
+ * Test-evaluate against a host/port pair given on the
+ * command line.
+ */
+ const char *host = argv[2];
+ unsigned port = (argc > 3 ? strtoul(argv[3], NULL, 0) : 22);
+ bool result = eval(en, host, port);
+ printf("%s\n", result ? "accept" : "reject");
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Just dump the result of parsing the expression.
+ */
+ stdio_sink ss[1];
+ stdio_sink_init(ss, stdout);
+ exprnode_dump(BinarySink_UPCAST(ss), en, expr.ptr);
+ put_byte(ss, '\n');
+ }
+
+ exprnode_free(en);
+
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Run our automated tests.
+ */
+ size_t pass = 0, fail = 0;
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < lenof(parsetests); i++) {
+ const struct ParseTest *test = &parsetests[i];
+
+ ptrlen expr = ptrlen_from_asciz(test->expr);
+ char *error_msg;
+ ptrlen error_loc;
+ ExprNode *en = parse(expr, &error_msg, &error_loc);
+
+ strbuf *output = strbuf_new();
+ if (!en) {
+ put_fmt(output, "ERR:%zu:%zu:%s",
+ (size_t)((const char *)error_loc.ptr - test->expr),
+ (size_t)((const char *)ptrlen_end(error_loc) -
+ test->expr),
+ error_msg);
+ sfree(error_msg);
+ } else {
+ exprnode_dump(BinarySink_UPCAST(output), en, expr.ptr);
+ exprnode_free(en);
+ }
+
+ if (ptrlen_eq_ptrlen(ptrlen_from_strbuf(output),
+ ptrlen_from_asciz(test->output))) {
+ pass++;
+ } else {
+ fprintf(stderr, "FAIL: parsetests[%zu] @ %s:%d:\n"
+ " expression: %s\n"
+ " expected: %s\n"
+ " actual: %s\n",
+ i, test->file, test->line, test->expr,
+ test->output, output->s);
+ fail++;
+ }
+
+ strbuf_free(output);
+ }
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < lenof(evaltests); i++) {
+ const struct EvalTest *test = &evaltests[i];
+
+ ptrlen expr = ptrlen_from_asciz(test->expr);
+ char *error_msg;
+ ptrlen error_loc;
+ ExprNode *en = parse(expr, &error_msg, &error_loc);
+
+ if (!en) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "FAIL: evaltests[%zu] @ %s:%d:\n"
+ " expression: %s\n"
+ " parse error: %zu:%zu:%s\n",
+ i, test->file, test->line, test->expr,
+ (size_t)((const char *)error_loc.ptr - test->expr),
+ (size_t)((const char *)ptrlen_end(error_loc) -
+ test->expr),
+ error_msg);
+ sfree(error_msg);
+ } else {
+ bool output = eval(en, test->host, test->port);
+ if (output == test->output) {
+ pass++;
+ } else {
+ fprintf(stderr, "FAIL: evaltests[%zu] @ %s:%d:\n"
+ " expression: %s\n"
+ " host: %s\n"
+ " port: %u\n"
+ " expected: %s\n"
+ " actual: %s\n",
+ i, test->file, test->line, test->expr,
+ test->host, test->port,
+ test->output ? "accept" : "reject",
+ output ? "accept" : "reject");
+ fail++;
+ }
+ exprnode_free(en);
+ }
+ }
+
+ fprintf(stderr, "pass %zu fail %zu total %zu\n",
+ pass, fail, pass+fail);
+ return fail != 0;
+ }
+}
+
+#endif // TEST
diff --git a/utils/host_ca_new_free.c b/utils/host_ca_new_free.c
index 8ae158ba..4c91c320 100644
--- a/utils/host_ca_new_free.c
+++ b/utils/host_ca_new_free.c
@@ -15,10 +15,8 @@ host_ca *host_ca_new(void)
void host_ca_free(host_ca *hca)
{
sfree(hca->name);
+ sfree(hca->validity_expression);
if (hca->ca_public_key)
strbuf_free(hca->ca_public_key);
- for (size_t i = 0; i < hca->n_hostname_wildcards; i++)
- sfree(hca->hostname_wildcards[i]);
- sfree(hca->hostname_wildcards);
sfree(hca);
}
diff --git a/windows/storage.c b/windows/storage.c
index 6a48aee6..30147a45 100644
--- a/windows/storage.c
+++ b/windows/storage.c
@@ -432,19 +432,20 @@ host_ca *host_ca_load(const char *name)
if ((s = get_reg_sz(rkey, "PublicKey")) != NULL)
hca->ca_public_key = base64_decode_sb(ptrlen_from_asciz(s));
- if ((sb = get_reg_multi_sz(rkey, "MatchHosts")) != NULL) {
+ if ((s = get_reg_sz(rkey, "Validity")) != NULL) {
+ hca->validity_expression = strbuf_to_str(
+ percent_decode_sb(ptrlen_from_asciz(s)));
+ } else if ((sb = get_reg_multi_sz(rkey, "MatchHosts")) != NULL) {
BinarySource src[1];
BinarySource_BARE_INIT_PL(src, ptrlen_from_strbuf(sb));
+ CertExprBuilder *eb = cert_expr_builder_new();
const char *wc;
- size_t wcsize = 0;
- while (wc = get_asciz(src), !get_err(src)) {
- sgrowarray(hca->hostname_wildcards, wcsize,
- hca->n_hostname_wildcards);
- hca->hostname_wildcards[hca->n_hostname_wildcards++] = dupstr(wc);
- }
+ while (wc = get_asciz(src), !get_err(src))
+ cert_expr_builder_add(eb, wc);
- strbuf_free(sb);
+ hca->validity_expression = cert_expr_expression(eb);
+ cert_expr_builder_free(eb);
}
if (get_reg_dword(rkey, "PermitRSASHA1", &val))
@@ -479,11 +480,10 @@ char *host_ca_save(host_ca *hca)
put_reg_sz(rkey, "PublicKey", base64_pubkey->s);
strbuf_free(base64_pubkey);
- strbuf *wcs = strbuf_new();
- for (size_t i = 0; i < hca->n_hostname_wildcards; i++)
- put_asciz(wcs, hca->hostname_wildcards[i]);
- put_reg_multi_sz(rkey, "MatchHosts", wcs);
- strbuf_free(wcs);
+ strbuf *validity = percent_encode_sb(
+ ptrlen_from_asciz(hca->validity_expression), NULL);
+ put_reg_sz(rkey, "Validity", validity->s);
+ strbuf_free(validity);
put_reg_dword(rkey, "PermitRSASHA1", hca->opts.permit_rsa_sha1);
put_reg_dword(rkey, "PermitRSASHA256", hca->opts.permit_rsa_sha256);