Welcome to mirror list, hosted at ThFree Co, Russian Federation.

github.com/mRemoteNG/PuTTYNG.git - Unnamed repository; edit this file 'description' to name the repository.
summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'UNIX/UXMISC.C')
-rw-r--r--UNIX/UXMISC.C371
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 371 deletions
diff --git a/UNIX/UXMISC.C b/UNIX/UXMISC.C
deleted file mode 100644
index 57df7b7a..00000000
--- a/UNIX/UXMISC.C
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,371 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * PuTTY miscellaneous Unix stuff
- */
-
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <assert.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <time.h>
-#include <sys/time.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <pwd.h>
-
-#include "putty.h"
-
-unsigned long getticks(void)
-{
- /*
- * We want to use milliseconds rather than the microseconds or
- * nanoseconds given by the underlying clock functions, because we
- * need a decent number of them to fit into a 32-bit word so it
- * can be used for keepalives.
- */
-#if defined HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME && defined HAVE_DECL_CLOCK_MONOTONIC
- {
- /* Use CLOCK_MONOTONIC if available, so as to be unconfused if
- * the system clock changes. */
- struct timespec ts;
- if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &ts) == 0)
- return ts.tv_sec * TICKSPERSEC +
- ts.tv_nsec / (1000000000 / TICKSPERSEC);
- }
-#endif
- {
- struct timeval tv;
- gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
- return tv.tv_sec * TICKSPERSEC + tv.tv_usec / (1000000 / TICKSPERSEC);
- }
-}
-
-Filename *filename_from_str(const char *str)
-{
- Filename *ret = snew(Filename);
- ret->path = dupstr(str);
- return ret;
-}
-
-Filename *filename_copy(const Filename *fn)
-{
- return filename_from_str(fn->path);
-}
-
-const char *filename_to_str(const Filename *fn)
-{
- return fn->path;
-}
-
-bool filename_equal(const Filename *f1, const Filename *f2)
-{
- return !strcmp(f1->path, f2->path);
-}
-
-bool filename_is_null(const Filename *fn)
-{
- return !fn->path[0];
-}
-
-void filename_free(Filename *fn)
-{
- sfree(fn->path);
- sfree(fn);
-}
-
-void filename_serialise(BinarySink *bs, const Filename *f)
-{
- put_asciz(bs, f->path);
-}
-Filename *filename_deserialise(BinarySource *src)
-{
- return filename_from_str(get_asciz(src));
-}
-
-char filename_char_sanitise(char c)
-{
- if (c == '/')
- return '.';
- return c;
-}
-
-#ifdef DEBUG
-static FILE *debug_fp = NULL;
-
-void dputs(const char *buf)
-{
- if (!debug_fp) {
- debug_fp = fopen("debug.log", "w");
- }
-
- if (write(1, buf, strlen(buf)) < 0) {} /* 'error check' to placate gcc */
-
- fputs(buf, debug_fp);
- fflush(debug_fp);
-}
-#endif
-
-char *get_username(void)
-{
- struct passwd *p;
- uid_t uid = getuid();
- char *user, *ret = NULL;
-
- /*
- * First, find who we think we are using getlogin. If this
- * agrees with our uid, we'll go along with it. This should
- * allow sharing of uids between several login names whilst
- * coping correctly with people who have su'ed.
- */
- user = getlogin();
-#if HAVE_SETPWENT
- setpwent();
-#endif
- if (user)
- p = getpwnam(user);
- else
- p = NULL;
- if (p && p->pw_uid == uid) {
- /*
- * The result of getlogin() really does correspond to
- * our uid. Fine.
- */
- ret = user;
- } else {
- /*
- * If that didn't work, for whatever reason, we'll do
- * the simpler version: look up our uid in the password
- * file and map it straight to a name.
- */
- p = getpwuid(uid);
- if (!p)
- return NULL;
- ret = p->pw_name;
- }
-#if HAVE_ENDPWENT
- endpwent();
-#endif
-
- return dupstr(ret);
-}
-
-/*
- * Display the fingerprints of the PGP Master Keys to the user.
- * (This is here rather than in uxcons because it's appropriate even for
- * Unix GUI apps.)
- */
-void pgp_fingerprints(void)
-{
- fputs("These are the fingerprints of the PuTTY PGP Master Keys. They can\n"
- "be used to establish a trust path from this executable to another\n"
- "one. See the manual for more information.\n"
- "(Note: these fingerprints have nothing to do with SSH!)\n"
- "\n"
- "PuTTY Master Key as of " PGP_MASTER_KEY_YEAR
- " (" PGP_MASTER_KEY_DETAILS "):\n"
- " " PGP_MASTER_KEY_FP "\n\n"
- "Previous Master Key (" PGP_PREV_MASTER_KEY_YEAR
- ", " PGP_PREV_MASTER_KEY_DETAILS "):\n"
- " " PGP_PREV_MASTER_KEY_FP "\n", stdout);
-}
-
-/*
- * Set and clear fcntl options on a file descriptor. We don't
- * realistically expect any of these operations to fail (the most
- * plausible error condition is EBADF, but we always believe ourselves
- * to be passing a valid fd so even that's an assertion-fail sort of
- * response), so we don't make any effort to return sensible error
- * codes to the caller - we just log to standard error and die
- * unceremoniously. However, nonblock and no_nonblock do return the
- * previous state of O_NONBLOCK.
- */
-void cloexec(int fd) {
- int fdflags;
-
- fdflags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFD);
- if (fdflags < 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%d: fcntl(F_GETFD): %s\n", fd, strerror(errno));
- exit(1);
- }
- if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, fdflags | FD_CLOEXEC) < 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%d: fcntl(F_SETFD): %s\n", fd, strerror(errno));
- exit(1);
- }
-}
-void noncloexec(int fd) {
- int fdflags;
-
- fdflags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFD);
- if (fdflags < 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%d: fcntl(F_GETFD): %s\n", fd, strerror(errno));
- exit(1);
- }
- if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, fdflags & ~FD_CLOEXEC) < 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%d: fcntl(F_SETFD): %s\n", fd, strerror(errno));
- exit(1);
- }
-}
-bool nonblock(int fd) {
- int fdflags;
-
- fdflags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL);
- if (fdflags < 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%d: fcntl(F_GETFL): %s\n", fd, strerror(errno));
- exit(1);
- }
- if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, fdflags | O_NONBLOCK) < 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%d: fcntl(F_SETFL): %s\n", fd, strerror(errno));
- exit(1);
- }
-
- return fdflags & O_NONBLOCK;
-}
-bool no_nonblock(int fd) {
- int fdflags;
-
- fdflags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL);
- if (fdflags < 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%d: fcntl(F_GETFL): %s\n", fd, strerror(errno));
- exit(1);
- }
- if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, fdflags & ~O_NONBLOCK) < 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%d: fcntl(F_SETFL): %s\n", fd, strerror(errno));
- exit(1);
- }
-
- return fdflags & O_NONBLOCK;
-}
-
-FILE *f_open(const Filename *filename, char const *mode, bool is_private)
-{
- if (!is_private) {
- return fopen(filename->path, mode);
- } else {
- int fd;
- assert(mode[0] == 'w'); /* is_private is meaningless for read,
- and tricky for append */
- fd = open(filename->path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600);
- if (fd < 0)
- return NULL;
- return fdopen(fd, mode);
- }
-}
-
-FontSpec *fontspec_new(const char *name)
-{
- FontSpec *f = snew(FontSpec);
- f->name = dupstr(name);
- return f;
-}
-FontSpec *fontspec_copy(const FontSpec *f)
-{
- return fontspec_new(f->name);
-}
-void fontspec_free(FontSpec *f)
-{
- sfree(f->name);
- sfree(f);
-}
-void fontspec_serialise(BinarySink *bs, FontSpec *f)
-{
- put_asciz(bs, f->name);
-}
-FontSpec *fontspec_deserialise(BinarySource *src)
-{
- return fontspec_new(get_asciz(src));
-}
-
-char *make_dir_and_check_ours(const char *dirname)
-{
- struct stat st;
-
- /*
- * Create the directory. We might have created it before, so
- * EEXIST is an OK error; but anything else is doom.
- */
- if (mkdir(dirname, 0700) < 0 && errno != EEXIST)
- return dupprintf("%s: mkdir: %s", dirname, strerror(errno));
-
- /*
- * Now check that that directory is _owned by us_ and not writable
- * by anybody else. This protects us against somebody else
- * previously having created the directory in a way that's
- * writable to us, and thus manipulating us into creating the
- * actual socket in a directory they can see so that they can
- * connect to it and use our authenticated SSH sessions.
- */
- if (stat(dirname, &st) < 0)
- return dupprintf("%s: stat: %s", dirname, strerror(errno));
- if (st.st_uid != getuid())
- return dupprintf("%s: directory owned by uid %d, not by us",
- dirname, st.st_uid);
- if ((st.st_mode & 077) != 0)
- return dupprintf("%s: directory has overgenerous permissions %03o"
- " (expected 700)", dirname, st.st_mode & 0777);
-
- return NULL;
-}
-
-char *make_dir_path(const char *path, mode_t mode)
-{
- int pos = 0;
- char *prefix;
-
- while (1) {
- pos += strcspn(path + pos, "/");
-
- if (pos > 0) {
- prefix = dupprintf("%.*s", pos, path);
-
- if (mkdir(prefix, mode) < 0 && errno != EEXIST) {
- char *ret = dupprintf("%s: mkdir: %s",
- prefix, strerror(errno));
- sfree(prefix);
- return ret;
- }
-
- sfree(prefix);
- }
-
- if (!path[pos])
- return NULL;
- pos += strspn(path + pos, "/");
- }
-}
-
-bool open_for_write_would_lose_data(const Filename *fn)
-{
- struct stat st;
-
- if (stat(fn->path, &st) < 0) {
- /*
- * If the file doesn't even exist, we obviously want to return
- * false. If we failed to stat it for any other reason,
- * ignoring the precise error code and returning false still
- * doesn't seem too unreasonable, because then we'll try to
- * open the file for writing and report _that_ error, which is
- * likely to be more to the point.
- */
- return false;
- }
-
- /*
- * OK, something exists at this pathname and we've found out
- * something about it. But an open-for-write will only
- * destructively truncate it if it's a regular file with nonzero
- * size. If it's empty, or some other kind of special thing like a
- * character device (e.g. /dev/tty) or a named pipe, then opening
- * it for write is already non-destructive and it's pointless and
- * annoying to warn about it just because the same file can be
- * opened for reading. (Indeed, if it's a named pipe, opening it
- * for reading actually _causes inconvenience_ in its own right,
- * even before the question of whether it gives misleading
- * information.)
- */
- if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) && st.st_size > 0) {
- return true;
- }
-
- return false;
-}