diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'WINDOWS/winsecur.c')
-rw-r--r-- | WINDOWS/winsecur.c | 334 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 334 deletions
diff --git a/WINDOWS/winsecur.c b/WINDOWS/winsecur.c deleted file mode 100644 index a1164af5..00000000 --- a/WINDOWS/winsecur.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,334 +0,0 @@ -/* - * winsecur.c: implementation of winsecur.h. - */ - -#include <stdio.h> -#include <stdlib.h> - -#include "putty.h" - -#if !defined NO_SECURITY - -#include "winsecur.h" - -/* Initialised once, then kept around to reuse forever */ -static PSID worldsid, networksid, usersid; - -DEF_WINDOWS_FUNCTION(OpenProcessToken); -DEF_WINDOWS_FUNCTION(GetTokenInformation); -DEF_WINDOWS_FUNCTION(InitializeSecurityDescriptor); -DEF_WINDOWS_FUNCTION(SetSecurityDescriptorOwner); -DEF_WINDOWS_FUNCTION(GetSecurityInfo); -DEF_WINDOWS_FUNCTION(SetSecurityInfo); -DEF_WINDOWS_FUNCTION(SetEntriesInAclA); - -bool got_advapi(void) -{ - static bool attempted = false; - static bool successful; - static HMODULE advapi; - - if (!attempted) { - attempted = true; - advapi = load_system32_dll("advapi32.dll"); - successful = advapi && - GET_WINDOWS_FUNCTION(advapi, GetSecurityInfo) && - GET_WINDOWS_FUNCTION(advapi, SetSecurityInfo) && - GET_WINDOWS_FUNCTION(advapi, OpenProcessToken) && - GET_WINDOWS_FUNCTION(advapi, GetTokenInformation) && - GET_WINDOWS_FUNCTION(advapi, InitializeSecurityDescriptor) && - GET_WINDOWS_FUNCTION(advapi, SetSecurityDescriptorOwner) && - GET_WINDOWS_FUNCTION(advapi, SetEntriesInAclA); - } - return successful; -} - -PSID get_user_sid(void) -{ - HANDLE proc = NULL, tok = NULL; - TOKEN_USER *user = NULL; - DWORD toklen, sidlen; - PSID sid = NULL, ret = NULL; - - if (usersid) - return usersid; - - if (!got_advapi()) - goto cleanup; - - if ((proc = OpenProcess(MAXIMUM_ALLOWED, false, - GetCurrentProcessId())) == NULL) - goto cleanup; - - if (!p_OpenProcessToken(proc, TOKEN_QUERY, &tok)) - goto cleanup; - - if (!p_GetTokenInformation(tok, TokenUser, NULL, 0, &toklen) && - GetLastError() != ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER) - goto cleanup; - - if ((user = (TOKEN_USER *)LocalAlloc(LPTR, toklen)) == NULL) - goto cleanup; - - if (!p_GetTokenInformation(tok, TokenUser, user, toklen, &toklen)) - goto cleanup; - - sidlen = GetLengthSid(user->User.Sid); - - sid = (PSID)smalloc(sidlen); - - if (!CopySid(sidlen, sid, user->User.Sid)) - goto cleanup; - - /* Success. Move sid into the return value slot, and null it out - * to stop the cleanup code freeing it. */ - ret = usersid = sid; - sid = NULL; - - cleanup: - if (proc != NULL) - CloseHandle(proc); - if (tok != NULL) - CloseHandle(tok); - if (user != NULL) - LocalFree(user); - if (sid != NULL) - sfree(sid); - - return ret; -} - -static bool getsids(char **error) -{ -#ifdef __clang__ -#pragma clang diagnostic push -#pragma clang diagnostic ignored "-Wmissing-braces" -#endif - SID_IDENTIFIER_AUTHORITY world_auth = SECURITY_WORLD_SID_AUTHORITY; - SID_IDENTIFIER_AUTHORITY nt_auth = SECURITY_NT_AUTHORITY; -#ifdef __clang__ -#pragma clang diagnostic pop -#endif - - bool ret = false; - - *error = NULL; - - if (!usersid) { - if ((usersid = get_user_sid()) == NULL) { - *error = dupprintf("unable to construct SID for current user: %s", - win_strerror(GetLastError())); - goto cleanup; - } - } - - if (!worldsid) { - if (!AllocateAndInitializeSid(&world_auth, 1, SECURITY_WORLD_RID, - 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, &worldsid)) { - *error = dupprintf("unable to construct SID for world: %s", - win_strerror(GetLastError())); - goto cleanup; - } - } - - if (!networksid) { - if (!AllocateAndInitializeSid(&nt_auth, 1, SECURITY_NETWORK_RID, - 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, &networksid)) { - *error = dupprintf("unable to construct SID for " - "local same-user access only: %s", - win_strerror(GetLastError())); - goto cleanup; - } - } - - ret = true; - - cleanup: - return ret; -} - - -bool make_private_security_descriptor(DWORD permissions, - PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR *psd, - PACL *acl, - char **error) -{ - EXPLICIT_ACCESS ea[3]; - int acl_err; - bool ret = false; - - - *psd = NULL; - *acl = NULL; - *error = NULL; - - if (!getsids(error)) - goto cleanup; - - memset(ea, 0, sizeof(ea)); - ea[0].grfAccessPermissions = permissions; - ea[0].grfAccessMode = REVOKE_ACCESS; - ea[0].grfInheritance = NO_INHERITANCE; - ea[0].Trustee.TrusteeForm = TRUSTEE_IS_SID; - ea[0].Trustee.ptstrName = (LPTSTR)worldsid; - ea[1].grfAccessPermissions = permissions; - ea[1].grfAccessMode = GRANT_ACCESS; - ea[1].grfInheritance = NO_INHERITANCE; - ea[1].Trustee.TrusteeForm = TRUSTEE_IS_SID; - ea[1].Trustee.ptstrName = (LPTSTR)usersid; - ea[2].grfAccessPermissions = permissions; - ea[2].grfAccessMode = REVOKE_ACCESS; - ea[2].grfInheritance = NO_INHERITANCE; - ea[2].Trustee.TrusteeForm = TRUSTEE_IS_SID; - ea[2].Trustee.ptstrName = (LPTSTR)networksid; - - acl_err = p_SetEntriesInAclA(3, ea, NULL, acl); - if (acl_err != ERROR_SUCCESS || *acl == NULL) { - *error = dupprintf("unable to construct ACL: %s", - win_strerror(acl_err)); - goto cleanup; - } - - *psd = (PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR) - LocalAlloc(LPTR, SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_MIN_LENGTH); - if (!*psd) { - *error = dupprintf("unable to allocate security descriptor: %s", - win_strerror(GetLastError())); - goto cleanup; - } - - if (!InitializeSecurityDescriptor(*psd, SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_REVISION)) { - *error = dupprintf("unable to initialise security descriptor: %s", - win_strerror(GetLastError())); - goto cleanup; - } - - if (!SetSecurityDescriptorOwner(*psd, usersid, false)) { - *error = dupprintf("unable to set owner in security descriptor: %s", - win_strerror(GetLastError())); - goto cleanup; - } - - if (!SetSecurityDescriptorDacl(*psd, true, *acl, false)) { - *error = dupprintf("unable to set DACL in security descriptor: %s", - win_strerror(GetLastError())); - goto cleanup; - } - - ret = true; - - cleanup: - if (!ret) { - if (*psd) { - LocalFree(*psd); - *psd = NULL; - } - if (*acl) { - LocalFree(*acl); - *acl = NULL; - } - } else { - sfree(*error); - *error = NULL; - } - return ret; -} - -static bool acl_restricted = false; -bool restricted_acl(void) { return acl_restricted; } - -static bool really_restrict_process_acl(char **error) -{ - EXPLICIT_ACCESS ea[2]; - int acl_err; - bool ret = false; - PACL acl = NULL; - - static const DWORD nastyace=WRITE_DAC | WRITE_OWNER | - PROCESS_CREATE_PROCESS | PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD | - PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE | - PROCESS_SET_QUOTA | PROCESS_SET_INFORMATION | - PROCESS_VM_OPERATION | PROCESS_VM_READ | PROCESS_VM_WRITE | - PROCESS_SUSPEND_RESUME; - - if (!getsids(error)) - goto cleanup; - - memset(ea, 0, sizeof(ea)); - - /* Everyone: deny */ - ea[0].grfAccessPermissions = nastyace; - ea[0].grfAccessMode = DENY_ACCESS; - ea[0].grfInheritance = SUB_CONTAINERS_AND_OBJECTS_INHERIT; - ea[0].Trustee.TrusteeForm = TRUSTEE_IS_SID; - ea[0].Trustee.ptstrName = (LPTSTR)worldsid; - - /* User: user ace */ - ea[1].grfAccessPermissions = ~nastyace & 0x1fff; - ea[1].grfAccessMode = GRANT_ACCESS; - ea[1].grfInheritance = SUB_CONTAINERS_AND_OBJECTS_INHERIT; - ea[1].Trustee.TrusteeForm = TRUSTEE_IS_SID; - ea[1].Trustee.ptstrName = (LPTSTR)usersid; - - acl_err = p_SetEntriesInAclA(2, ea, NULL, &acl); - - if (acl_err != ERROR_SUCCESS || acl == NULL) { - *error = dupprintf("unable to construct ACL: %s", - win_strerror(acl_err)); - goto cleanup; - } - - if (ERROR_SUCCESS != p_SetSecurityInfo - (GetCurrentProcess(), SE_KERNEL_OBJECT, - OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION | DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION, - usersid, NULL, acl, NULL)) { - *error = dupprintf("Unable to set process ACL: %s", - win_strerror(GetLastError())); - goto cleanup; - } - - acl_restricted = true; - ret=true; - - cleanup: - if (!ret) { - if (acl) { - LocalFree(acl); - acl = NULL; - } - } - return ret; -} -#endif /* !defined NO_SECURITY */ - -/* - * Lock down our process's ACL, to present an obstacle to malware - * trying to write into its memory. This can't be a full defence, - * because well timed malware could attack us before this code runs - - * even if it was unconditionally run at the very start of main(), - * which we wouldn't want to do anyway because it turns out in practie - * that interfering with other processes in this way has significant - * non-infringing uses on Windows (e.g. screen reader software). - * - * If we've been requested to do this and are unsuccessful, bomb out - * via modalfatalbox rather than continue in a less protected mode. - * - * This function is intentionally outside the #ifndef NO_SECURITY that - * covers the rest of this file, because when PuTTY is compiled - * without the ability to restrict its ACL, we don't want it to - * silently pretend to honour the instruction to do so. - */ -void restrict_process_acl(void) -{ - char *error = NULL; - bool ret; - -#if !defined NO_SECURITY - ret = really_restrict_process_acl(&error); -#else - ret = false; - error = dupstr("ACL restrictions not compiled into this binary"); -#endif - if (!ret) - modalfatalbox("Could not restrict process ACL: %s", error); -} |