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Diffstat (limited to 'keygen/rsa.c')
-rw-r--r--keygen/rsa.c292
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+/*
+ * RSA key generation.
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "sshkeygen.h"
+#include "mpint.h"
+
+#define RSA_EXPONENT 65537
+
+#define NFIRSTBITS 13
+static void invent_firstbits(unsigned *one, unsigned *two,
+ unsigned min_separation);
+
+typedef struct RSAPrimeDetails RSAPrimeDetails;
+struct RSAPrimeDetails {
+ bool strong;
+ int bits, bitsm1m1, bitsm1, bitsp1;
+ unsigned firstbits;
+ ProgressPhase phase_main, phase_m1m1, phase_m1, phase_p1;
+};
+
+#define STRONG_MARGIN (20 + NFIRSTBITS)
+
+static RSAPrimeDetails setup_rsa_prime(
+ int bits, bool strong, PrimeGenerationContext *pgc, ProgressReceiver *prog)
+{
+ RSAPrimeDetails pd;
+ pd.bits = bits;
+ if (strong) {
+ pd.bitsm1 = (bits - STRONG_MARGIN) / 2;
+ pd.bitsp1 = (bits - STRONG_MARGIN) - pd.bitsm1;
+ pd.bitsm1m1 = (pd.bitsm1 - STRONG_MARGIN) / 2;
+ if (pd.bitsm1m1 < STRONG_MARGIN) {
+ /* Absurdly small prime, but we should at least not crash. */
+ strong = false;
+ }
+ }
+ pd.strong = strong;
+
+ if (pd.strong) {
+ pd.phase_m1m1 = primegen_add_progress_phase(pgc, prog, pd.bitsm1m1);
+ pd.phase_m1 = primegen_add_progress_phase(pgc, prog, pd.bitsm1);
+ pd.phase_p1 = primegen_add_progress_phase(pgc, prog, pd.bitsp1);
+ }
+ pd.phase_main = primegen_add_progress_phase(pgc, prog, pd.bits);
+
+ return pd;
+}
+
+static mp_int *generate_rsa_prime(
+ RSAPrimeDetails pd, PrimeGenerationContext *pgc, ProgressReceiver *prog)
+{
+ mp_int *m1m1 = NULL, *m1 = NULL, *p1 = NULL, *p = NULL;
+ PrimeCandidateSource *pcs;
+
+ if (pd.strong) {
+ progress_start_phase(prog, pd.phase_m1m1);
+ pcs = pcs_new_with_firstbits(pd.bitsm1m1, pd.firstbits, NFIRSTBITS);
+ m1m1 = primegen_generate(pgc, pcs, prog);
+ progress_report_phase_complete(prog);
+
+ progress_start_phase(prog, pd.phase_m1);
+ pcs = pcs_new_with_firstbits(pd.bitsm1, pd.firstbits, NFIRSTBITS);
+ pcs_require_residue_1_mod_prime(pcs, m1m1);
+ m1 = primegen_generate(pgc, pcs, prog);
+ progress_report_phase_complete(prog);
+
+ progress_start_phase(prog, pd.phase_p1);
+ pcs = pcs_new_with_firstbits(pd.bitsp1, pd.firstbits, NFIRSTBITS);
+ p1 = primegen_generate(pgc, pcs, prog);
+ progress_report_phase_complete(prog);
+ }
+
+ progress_start_phase(prog, pd.phase_main);
+ pcs = pcs_new_with_firstbits(pd.bits, pd.firstbits, NFIRSTBITS);
+ pcs_avoid_residue_small(pcs, RSA_EXPONENT, 1);
+ if (pd.strong) {
+ pcs_require_residue_1_mod_prime(pcs, m1);
+ mp_int *p1_minus_1 = mp_copy(p1);
+ mp_sub_integer_into(p1_minus_1, p1, 1);
+ pcs_require_residue(pcs, p1, p1_minus_1);
+ mp_free(p1_minus_1);
+ }
+ p = primegen_generate(pgc, pcs, prog);
+ progress_report_phase_complete(prog);
+
+ if (m1m1)
+ mp_free(m1m1);
+ if (m1)
+ mp_free(m1);
+ if (p1)
+ mp_free(p1);
+
+ return p;
+}
+
+int rsa_generate(RSAKey *key, int bits, bool strong,
+ PrimeGenerationContext *pgc, ProgressReceiver *prog)
+{
+ key->sshk.vt = &ssh_rsa;
+
+ /*
+ * We don't generate e; we just use a standard one always.
+ */
+ mp_int *exponent = mp_from_integer(RSA_EXPONENT);
+
+ /*
+ * Generate p and q: primes with combined length `bits', not
+ * congruent to 1 modulo e. (Strictly speaking, we wanted (p-1)
+ * and e to be coprime, and (q-1) and e to be coprime, but in
+ * general that's slightly more fiddly to arrange. By choosing
+ * a prime e, we can simplify the criterion.)
+ *
+ * We give a min_separation of 2 to invent_firstbits(), ensuring
+ * that the two primes won't be very close to each other. (The
+ * chance of them being _dangerously_ close is negligible - even
+ * more so than an attacker guessing a whole 256-bit session key -
+ * but it doesn't cost much to make sure.)
+ */
+ int qbits = bits / 2;
+ int pbits = bits - qbits;
+ assert(pbits >= qbits);
+
+ RSAPrimeDetails pd = setup_rsa_prime(pbits, strong, pgc, prog);
+ RSAPrimeDetails qd = setup_rsa_prime(qbits, strong, pgc, prog);
+ progress_ready(prog);
+
+ invent_firstbits(&pd.firstbits, &qd.firstbits, 2);
+
+ mp_int *p = generate_rsa_prime(pd, pgc, prog);
+ mp_int *q = generate_rsa_prime(qd, pgc, prog);
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure p > q, by swapping them if not.
+ *
+ * We only need to do this if the two primes were generated with
+ * the same number of bits (i.e. if the requested key size is
+ * even) - otherwise it's already guaranteed!
+ */
+ if (pbits == qbits) {
+ mp_cond_swap(p, q, mp_cmp_hs(q, p));
+ } else {
+ assert(mp_cmp_hs(p, q));
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now we have p, q and e. All we need to do now is work out
+ * the other helpful quantities: n=pq, d=e^-1 mod (p-1)(q-1),
+ * and (q^-1 mod p).
+ */
+ mp_int *modulus = mp_mul(p, q);
+ mp_int *pm1 = mp_copy(p);
+ mp_sub_integer_into(pm1, pm1, 1);
+ mp_int *qm1 = mp_copy(q);
+ mp_sub_integer_into(qm1, qm1, 1);
+ mp_int *phi_n = mp_mul(pm1, qm1);
+ mp_free(pm1);
+ mp_free(qm1);
+ mp_int *private_exponent = mp_invert(exponent, phi_n);
+ mp_free(phi_n);
+ mp_int *iqmp = mp_invert(q, p);
+
+ /*
+ * Populate the returned structure.
+ */
+ key->modulus = modulus;
+ key->exponent = exponent;
+ key->private_exponent = private_exponent;
+ key->p = p;
+ key->q = q;
+ key->iqmp = iqmp;
+
+ key->bits = mp_get_nbits(modulus);
+ key->bytes = (key->bits + 7) / 8;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Invent a pair of values suitable for use as the 'firstbits' values
+ * for the two RSA primes, such that their product is at least 2, and
+ * such that their difference is also at least min_separation.
+ *
+ * This is used for generating RSA keys which have exactly the
+ * specified number of bits rather than one fewer - if you generate an
+ * a-bit and a b-bit number completely at random and multiply them
+ * together, you could end up with either an (ab-1)-bit number or an
+ * (ab)-bit number. The former happens log(2)*2-1 of the time (about
+ * 39%) and, though actually harmless, every time it occurs it has a
+ * non-zero probability of sparking a user email along the lines of
+ * 'Hey, I asked PuTTYgen for a 2048-bit key and I only got 2047 bits!
+ * Bug!'
+ */
+static inline unsigned firstbits_b_min(
+ unsigned a, unsigned lo, unsigned hi, unsigned min_separation)
+{
+ /* To get a large enough product, b must be at least this much */
+ unsigned b_min = (2*lo*lo + a - 1) / a;
+ /* Now enforce a<b, optionally with minimum separation */
+ if (b_min < a + min_separation)
+ b_min = a + min_separation;
+ /* And cap at the upper limit */
+ if (b_min > hi)
+ b_min = hi;
+ return b_min;
+}
+
+static void invent_firstbits(unsigned *one, unsigned *two,
+ unsigned min_separation)
+{
+ /*
+ * We'll pick 12 initial bits (number selected at random) for each
+ * prime, not counting the leading 1. So we want to return two
+ * values in the range [2^12,2^13) whose product is at least 2^25.
+ *
+ * Strategy: count up all the viable pairs, then select a random
+ * number in that range and use it to pick a pair.
+ *
+ * To keep things simple, we'll ensure a < b, and randomly swap
+ * them at the end.
+ */
+ const unsigned lo = 1<<12, hi = 1<<13, minproduct = 2*lo*lo;
+ unsigned a, b;
+
+ /*
+ * Count up the number of prefixes of b that would be valid for
+ * each prefix of a.
+ */
+ mp_int *total = mp_new(32);
+ for (a = lo; a < hi; a++) {
+ unsigned b_min = firstbits_b_min(a, lo, hi, min_separation);
+ mp_add_integer_into(total, total, hi - b_min);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Make up a random number in the range [0,2*total).
+ */
+ mp_int *mlo = mp_from_integer(0), *mhi = mp_new(32);
+ mp_lshift_fixed_into(mhi, total, 1);
+ mp_int *randval = mp_random_in_range(mlo, mhi);
+ mp_free(mlo);
+ mp_free(mhi);
+
+ /*
+ * Use the low bit of randval as our swap indicator, leaving the
+ * rest of it in the range [0,total).
+ */
+ unsigned swap = mp_get_bit(randval, 0);
+ mp_rshift_fixed_into(randval, randval, 1);
+
+ /*
+ * Now do the same counting loop again to make the actual choice.
+ */
+ a = b = 0;
+ for (unsigned a_candidate = lo; a_candidate < hi; a_candidate++) {
+ unsigned b_min = firstbits_b_min(a_candidate, lo, hi, min_separation);
+ unsigned limit = hi - b_min;
+
+ unsigned b_candidate = b_min + mp_get_integer(randval);
+ unsigned use_it = 1 ^ mp_hs_integer(randval, limit);
+ a ^= (a ^ a_candidate) & -use_it;
+ b ^= (b ^ b_candidate) & -use_it;
+
+ mp_sub_integer_into(randval, randval, limit);
+ }
+
+ mp_free(randval);
+ mp_free(total);
+
+ /*
+ * Check everything came out right.
+ */
+ assert(lo <= a);
+ assert(a < hi);
+ assert(lo <= b);
+ assert(b < hi);
+ assert(a * b >= minproduct);
+ assert(b >= a + min_separation);
+
+ /*
+ * Last-minute optional swap of a and b.
+ */
+ unsigned diff = (a ^ b) & (-swap);
+ a ^= diff;
+ b ^= diff;
+
+ *one = a;
+ *two = b;
+}