diff options
author | David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> | 2014-07-05 01:20:20 +0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | Adam Langley <agl@google.com> | 2014-07-08 00:32:04 +0400 |
commit | 5468b2379719a56c245b78e00799874f6c56ca34 (patch) | |
tree | 323a14ece6beb2df1898533f64fc2b5de54799a0 | |
parent | 64f4c91b8954b1f13c2cf20faba15382dbc0462d (diff) |
Remove rest of DANE code.
We pulled in some of upstream's removal, but not the rest of it.
Change-Id: I8ea6681848f3c59955b7d2ce935c077d024245be
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1099
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
-rw-r--r-- | ssl/ssl.h | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | ssl/ssl_cert.c | 137 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | ssl/ssl_lib.c | 5 |
3 files changed, 0 insertions, 147 deletions
@@ -1529,11 +1529,6 @@ struct ssl_st /* fallback_scsv is non-zero iff we are sending the TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV * cipher suite value. Only applies to a client. */ char fallback_scsv; - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DANE - unsigned char *tlsa_record; - int tlsa_witness; -#endif }; #endif diff --git a/ssl/ssl_cert.c b/ssl/ssl_cert.c index 25b7b648..12ad094e 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_cert.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_cert.c @@ -665,138 +665,6 @@ int ssl_set_peer_cert_type(SESS_CERT *sc,int type) return(1); } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DANE -/* - * return value: - * -1: format or digest error - * 0: match - * 1: no match - */ -int tlsa_cmp(const X509 *cert, const unsigned char *tlsa_record, unsigned int reclen) -{ - const EVP_MD *md; - unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - unsigned int len, selector, matching_type; - int ret; - - if (reclen<3) return -1; - - selector = tlsa_record[1]; - matching_type = tlsa_record[2]; - tlsa_record += 3; - reclen -= 3; - - switch (matching_type) { - case 0: /* exact match */ - if (selector==0) { /* full certificate */ - ret = EVP_Digest(tlsa_record,reclen,digest,&len,EVP_sha1(),NULL); - return ret ? memcmp(cert->sha1_hash,digest,len)!=0 : -1; - } - else if (selector==1) { /* SubjectPublicKeyInfo */ - ASN1_BIT_STRING *key = X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(cert); - - if (key == NULL) return -1; - if (key->length != reclen) return 1; - - return memcmp(key->data,tlsa_record,reclen)!=0; - } - return -1; - - case 1: /* SHA256 */ - case 2: /* SHA512 */ - md = matching_type==1 ? EVP_sha256() : EVP_sha512(); - - if (reclen!=EVP_MD_size(md)) return -1; - - if (selector==0) { /* full certificate */ - ret = X509_digest(cert,md,digest,&len); - } - else if (selector==1) { /* SubjectPublicKeyInfo */ - ret = X509_pubkey_digest(cert,md,digest,&len); - } - else - return -1; - - return ret ? memcmp(tlsa_record,digest,len)!=0 : -1; - default: - return -1; - } -} - -int dane_verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) -{ - SSL *s = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx()); - int depth=X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx); - X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,depth); - unsigned int reclen, certificate_usage; - const unsigned char *tlsa_record = s->tlsa_record; - int tlsa_ret = -1; - - if (s->verify_callback) ok = s->verify_callback(ok,ctx); - - if (tlsa_record == NULL) return ok; - - if (tlsa_record == (void*)-1) { - ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; /* temporary code? */ - return 0; - } - - while ((reclen = *(unsigned int *)tlsa_record)) { - tlsa_record += sizeof(unsigned int); - - /* - * tlsa_record[0] Certificate Usage field - * tlsa_record[1] Selector field - * tlsa_record[2] Matching Type Field - * tlsa_record+3 Certificate Association data - */ - certificate_usage = tlsa_record[0]; - - if (depth==0 || certificate_usage==0 || certificate_usage==2) { - tlsa_ret = tlsa_cmp(cert,tlsa_record,reclen); - if (tlsa_ret==0) { - s->tlsa_witness = depth<<8|certificate_usage; - break; - } - else if (tlsa_ret==-1) - s->tlsa_witness = -1; /* something phishy? */ - } - - tlsa_record += reclen; - } - - if (depth==0) { - switch (s->tlsa_witness&0xff) { /* witnessed usage */ - case 0: /* CA constraint */ - if (s->tlsa_witness<0 && ctx->error==X509_V_OK) - ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; - return 0; - case 1: /* service certificate constraint */ - if (tlsa_ret!=0 && ctx->error==X509_V_OK) - ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED; - return 0; - case 2: /* trust anchor assertion */ - if ((s->tlsa_witness>>8)>0 && ctx->error==X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY) - ctx->error = X509_V_OK; - break; - case 3: /* domain-issued certificate */ - if (tlsa_ret==0) - ctx->error = X509_V_OK; /* override all errors? */ - break; - default:/* there were TLSA records, but something phishy happened */ - ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED; - return ok; - } - } - - /* - * returning 1 makes verify procedure traverse the whole chain, - * not actually approve it... - */ - return 1; -} -#endif - int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509) *sk) { X509 *x; @@ -838,13 +706,8 @@ int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509) *sk) */ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(&ctx), s->param); -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DANE - X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, dane_verify_callback); - s->tlsa_witness = -1; -#else if (s->verify_callback) X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, s->verify_callback); -#endif if (s->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL) #if 1 /* new with OpenSSL 0.9.7 */ diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c index 1e512cac..5cf67457 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c @@ -712,11 +712,6 @@ void SSL_free(SSL *s) if (s->srtp_profiles) sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(s->srtp_profiles); -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DANE - if (s->tlsa_record && s->tlsa_record!=(void *)-1) - OPENSSL_free(s->tlsa_record); -#endif - OPENSSL_free(s); } |