EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup cannot fail.

There is exactly one implementation and it doesn't fail. Plus a cleanup
function that can fail is very bad manners; the caller has no choice but to
leak at that point.

Change-Id: I5b524617ef37bc7d92273472fa742416ea7dfd43
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3564
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

3 files changed, 4 insertions, 5 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/cipher/cipher.c b/crypto/cipher/cipher.c
index 4bb41960..4dccd974 100644
--- a/crypto/cipher/cipher.c
+++ b/crypto/cipher/cipher.c
@@ -94,8 +94,8 @@ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(void) {
 }
 
 int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c) {
-  if (c->cipher != NULL && c->cipher->cleanup && !c->cipher->cleanup(c)) {
-    return 0;
+  if (c->cipher != NULL && c->cipher->cleanup) {
+    c->cipher->cleanup(c);
   }
 
   if (c->cipher_data) {
diff --git a/crypto/cipher/e_aes.c b/crypto/cipher/e_aes.c
index e012c3dc..01c2d7da 100644
--- a/crypto/cipher/e_aes.c
+++ b/crypto/cipher/e_aes.c
@@ -445,13 +445,12 @@ static int aes_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
   return 1;
 }
 
-static int aes_gcm_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c) {
+static void aes_gcm_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c) {
   EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = c->cipher_data;
   OPENSSL_cleanse(&gctx->gcm, sizeof(gctx->gcm));
   if (gctx->iv != c->iv) {
     OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv);
   }
-  return 1;
 }
 
 /* increment counter (64-bit int) by 1 */
diff --git a/crypto/cipher/internal.h b/crypto/cipher/internal.h
index 2b8fb050..f28fd4c2 100644
--- a/crypto/cipher/internal.h
+++ b/crypto/cipher/internal.h
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ struct evp_cipher_st {
   int (*cipher)(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in,
                 size_t inl);
 
-  int (*cleanup)(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *);
+  void (*cleanup)(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *);
 
   int (*ctrl)(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int type, int arg, void *ptr);
 };