diff options
| author | Adam Langley <agl@imperialviolet.org> | 2014-06-07 01:44:20 +0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Adam Langley <agl@google.com> | 2014-08-08 01:09:12 +0400 |
| commit | 8506609ca38110eeda86d40416de7ebf3e6f9035 (patch) | |
| tree | d813a43a1add0d6f51e27ea025927adbb987a171 /ssl/d1_both.c | |
| parent | e951ff4fc3fe9582561f7f25ad793ab7e23da785 (diff) | |
Fix return code for truncated DTLS fragment.
Previously, a truncated DTLS fragment in
|dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message| would cause *ok to be cleared, but
the return value would still be the number of bytes read. This would
cause |dtls1_get_message| not to consider it an error and it would
continue processing as normal until the calling function noticed that
*ok was zero.
I can't see an exploit here because |dtls1_get_message| uses
|s->init_num| as the length, which will always be zero from what I can
see.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(Imported from upstream's aad61c0a57a3b6371496034db61675abcdb81811.)
Change-Id: I2fb0ea93b6e812e19723ada3351f842cc7b2fa91
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1436
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'ssl/d1_both.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | ssl/d1_both.c | 4 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c index e2fb70cb..a5a7aeb5 100644 --- a/ssl/d1_both.c +++ b/ssl/d1_both.c @@ -778,7 +778,9 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok) /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */ i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, frag->fragment,frag_len,0); - if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len) + if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len) + i = -1; + if (i<=0) goto err; } |