Reformat the rest of ssl/.

Change-Id: I7dc264f7e29b3ba8be4c717583467edf71bf8dd9

1 files changed, 2608 insertions, 2823 deletions

diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index 170777b5..88f462b2 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -172,2857 +172,2642 @@
 #include "../crypto/internal.h"
 #include "../crypto/dh/internal.h"
 
+
 /* INITIAL_SNIFF_BUFFER_SIZE is the number of bytes read in the initial sniff
  * buffer. */
 #define INITIAL_SNIFF_BUFFER_SIZE 8
 
-int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
-	{
-	BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
-	unsigned long alg_a;
-	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
-	int ret= -1;
-	int new_state,state,skip=0;
-
-	assert(s->handshake_func == ssl3_accept);
-	assert(s->server);
-	assert(!SSL_IS_DTLS(s));
-
-	ERR_clear_error();
-	ERR_clear_system_error();
-
-	if (s->info_callback != NULL)
-		cb=s->info_callback;
-	else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
-		cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
-
-	s->in_handshake++;
-
-	if (s->cert == NULL)
-		{
-		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_accept, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
-		return(-1);
-		}
-
-	for (;;)
-		{
-		state=s->state;
-
-		switch (s->state)
-			{
-		case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
-			/* This state is the renegotiate entry point. It sends a
-			 * HelloRequest and nothing else. */
-			s->renegotiate = 1;
-
-			if (cb != NULL)
-				cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
-
-			if (s->init_buf == NULL)
-				{
-				buf = BUF_MEM_new();
-				if (!buf || !BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
-					{
-					ret = -1;
-					goto end;
-					}
-				s->init_buf = buf;
-				buf = NULL;
-				}
-			s->init_num = 0;
-
-			if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
-				{
-				ret = -1;
-				goto end;
-				}
-
-			if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
-				!(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
-				{
-				/* Server attempting to renegotiate with
-				 * client that doesn't support secure
-				 * renegotiation.
-				 */
-				OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_accept, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
-				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-				ret = -1;
-				goto end;
-				}
-
-			s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
-			s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
-
-			s->shutdown=0;
-			ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
-			s->init_num=0;
-
-			if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s))
-				{
-				OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_accept, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				ret = -1;
-				goto end;
-				}
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
-			s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
-		case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
-			/* This state is the entry point for the handshake
-			 * itself (initial and renegotiation).  */
-			if (cb != NULL)
-				cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
-
-			if (s->init_buf == NULL)
-				{
-				buf = BUF_MEM_new();
-				if (!buf || !BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
-					{
-					ret = -1;
-					goto end;
-					}
-				s->init_buf = buf;
-				buf = NULL;
-				}
-			s->init_num = 0;
-
-			if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s))
-				{
-				OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_accept, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				ret = -1;
-				goto end;
-				}
-
-			if (!s->s3->have_version)
-				{
-				/* This is the initial handshake. The record
-				 * layer has not been initialized yet. Sniff for
-				 * a V2ClientHello before reading a ClientHello
-				 * normally. */
-				assert(s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL);
-				assert(s->s3->wbuf.buf == NULL);
-				s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_INITIAL_BYTES;
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				/* Enable a write buffer. This groups handshake
-				 * messages within a flight into a single
-				 * write. */
-				if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s) ||
-					!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1))
-					{
-					ret = -1;
-					goto end;
-					}
-				s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
-				}
-			s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_INITIAL_BYTES:
-			ret = ssl3_get_initial_bytes(s);
-			if (ret <= 0)
-				goto end;
-			/* ssl3_get_initial_bytes sets s->state to one of
-			 * SSL3_ST_SR_V2_CLIENT_HELLO or SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
-			 * on success. */
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_V2_CLIENT_HELLO:
-			ret = ssl3_get_v2_client_hello(s);
-			if (ret <= 0)
-				goto end;
-			s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
-			s->shutdown=0;
-			ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
-			if (ret == PENDING_SESSION) {
-				s->rwstate = SSL_PENDING_SESSION;
-				goto end;
-			}
-			if (ret == CERTIFICATE_SELECTION_PENDING)
-				{
-				s->rwstate = SSL_CERTIFICATE_SELECTION_PENDING;
-				goto end;
-				}
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->renegotiate = 2;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
-			ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			if (s->hit)
-				{
-				if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
-					s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
-				else
-					s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
-				}
-			else
-				s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
-			s->init_num = 0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
-			if (ssl_cipher_has_server_public_key(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
-				{
-				ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
-				if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-				if (s->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected)
-					s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
-				else
-					s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				skip = 1;
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
-				}
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
-			alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-
-			/* Send a ServerKeyExchange message if:
-			 * - The key exchange is ephemeral or anonymous
-			 *   Diffie-Hellman.
-			 * - There is a PSK identity hint.
-			 *
-			 * TODO(davidben): This logic is currently duplicated
-			 * in d1_srvr.c. Fix this. In the meantime, keep them
-			 * in sync.
-			 */
-			if (ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ||
-			    ((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && s->psk_identity_hint))
-				{
-				ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
-				if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-				}
-			else
-				skip=1;
-
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
-			if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
-				!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
-				/* Don't request a certificate if an obc was presented */
-				((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER_IF_NO_OBC) &&
-				 s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) ||
-				/* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
-				 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
-				((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
-				 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
-				/* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
-				 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
-				 * and in RFC 2246): */
-				((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
-				 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
-				  * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
-				 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
-				/* With normal PSK Certificates and
-				 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
-				(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
-				{
-				/* no cert request */
-				skip=1;
-				s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
-				if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
-					if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, free_handshake_buffer))
-						return -1;
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
-				ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
-				if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) {
+  BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
+  unsigned long alg_a;
+  void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
+  int ret = -1;
+  int new_state, state, skip = 0;
+
+  assert(s->handshake_func == ssl3_accept);
+  assert(s->server);
+  assert(!SSL_IS_DTLS(s));
+
+  ERR_clear_error();
+  ERR_clear_system_error();
+
+  if (s->info_callback != NULL) {
+    cb = s->info_callback;
+  } else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) {
+    cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
+  }
+
+  s->in_handshake++;
+
+  if (s->cert == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_accept, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  for (;;) {
+    state = s->state;
+
+    switch (s->state) {
+      case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
+        /* This state is the renegotiate entry point. It sends a HelloRequest
+         * and nothing else. */
+        s->renegotiate = 1;
+
+        if (cb != NULL) {
+          cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
+        }
+
+        if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
+          buf = BUF_MEM_new();
+          if (!buf || !BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
+            ret = -1;
+            goto end;
+          }
+          s->init_buf = buf;
+          buf = NULL;
+        }
+        s->init_num = 0;
+
+        if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
+          ret = -1;
+          goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
+            !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
+          /* Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't support
+           * secure renegotiation. */
+          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_accept,
+                            SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+          ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+          ret = -1;
+          goto end;
+        }
+
+        s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
+        s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
+        break;
+
+      case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
+      case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
+        s->shutdown = 0;
+        ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
+        if (ret <= 0) {
+          goto end;
+        }
+        s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
+        s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+        s->init_num = 0;
+
+        if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
+          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_accept, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+          ret = -1;
+          goto end;
+        }
+        break;
+
+      case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
+        s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
+        break;
+
+      case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
+      case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
+        /* This state is the entry point for the handshake itself (initial and
+         * renegotiation).  */
+        if (cb != NULL) {
+          cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
+        }
+
+        if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
+          buf = BUF_MEM_new();
+          if (!buf || !BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
+            ret = -1;
+            goto end;
+          }
+          s->init_buf = buf;
+          buf = NULL;
+        }
+        s->init_num = 0;
+
+        if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
+          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_accept, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+          ret = -1;
+          goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (!s->s3->have_version) {
+          /* This is the initial handshake. The record layer has not been
+           * initialized yet. Sniff for a V2ClientHello before reading a
+           * ClientHello normally. */
+          assert(s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL);
+          assert(s->s3->wbuf.buf == NULL);
+          s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_INITIAL_BYTES;
+        } else {
+          /* Enable a write buffer. This groups handshake messages within a
+           * flight into a single write. */
+          if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s) || !ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
+            ret = -1;
+            goto end;
+          }
+          s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+        }
+        s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
+        break;
+
+      case SSL3_ST_SR_INITIAL_BYTES:
+        ret = ssl3_get_initial_bytes(s);
+        if (ret <= 0) {
+          goto end;
+        }
+        /* ssl3_get_initial_bytes sets s->state to one of
+         * SSL3_ST_SR_V2_CLIENT_HELLO or SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A on success. */
+        break;
+
+      case SSL3_ST_SR_V2_CLIENT_HELLO:
+        ret = ssl3_get_v2_client_hello(s);
+        if (ret <= 0) {
+          goto end;
+        }
+        s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+        break;
+
+      case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
+      case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
+      case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
+      case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
+        s->shutdown = 0;
+        ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
+        if (ret == PENDING_SESSION) {
+          s->rwstate = SSL_PENDING_SESSION;
+          goto end;
+        }
+        if (ret == CERTIFICATE_SELECTION_PENDING) {
+          s->rwstate = SSL_CERTIFICATE_SELECTION_PENDING;
+          goto end;
+        }
+        if (ret <= 0) {
+          goto end;
+        }
+        s->renegotiate = 2;
+        s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
+        s->init_num = 0;
+        break;
+
+      case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
+      case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
+        ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
+        if (ret <= 0) {
+          goto end;
+        }
+        if (s->hit) {
+          if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
+            s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+          } else {
+            s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+          }
+        } else {
+          s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
+        }
+        s->init_num = 0;
+        break;
+
+      case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
+      case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
+        if (ssl_cipher_has_server_public_key(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
+          ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
+          if (ret <= 0) {
+            goto end;
+          }
+          if (s->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected) {
+            s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
+          } else {
+            s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+          }
+        } else {
+          skip = 1;
+          s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+        }
+        s->init_num = 0;
+        break;
+
+      case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
+      case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
+        alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+
+        /* Send a ServerKeyExchange message if:
+         * - The key exchange is ephemeral or anonymous
+         *   Diffie-Hellman.
+         * - There is a PSK identity hint.
+         *
+         * TODO(davidben): This logic is currently duplicated in d1_srvr.c. Fix
+         * this. In the meantime, keep them in sync. */
+        if (ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ||
+            ((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && s->psk_identity_hint)) {
+          ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
+          if (ret <= 0)
+            goto end;
+        } else {
+          skip = 1;
+        }
+
+        s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
+        s->init_num = 0;
+        break;
+
+      case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
+      case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
+        if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
+            !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
+            /* Don't request a certificate if an obc was presented */
+            ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER_IF_NO_OBC) &&
+             s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) ||
+            /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
+             * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
+            ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
+             (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
+            /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
+             * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
+             * and in RFC 2246): */
+            ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
+             /* ... except when the application insists on verification
+              * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
+             !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
+            /* With normal PSK Certificates and
+             * Certificate Requests are omitted */
+            (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
+          /* no cert request */
+          skip = 1;
+          s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
+          s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
+          if (s->s3->handshake_buffer &&
+              !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, free_handshake_buffer)) {
+            return -1;
+          }
+        } else {
+          s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
+          ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
+          if (ret <= 0) {
+            goto end;
+          }
 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
+          s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
 #else
-				/* ServerHelloDone was already sent in the
-				 * previous record. */
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
-				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
-#endif
-				s->init_num=0;
-				}
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
-			ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-		
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
-
-			/* This code originally checked to see if
-			 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
-			 * and then flushed. This caused problems
-			 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
-			 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
-			 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
-			 * still exist. So instead we just flush
-			 * unconditionally.
-			 */
-
-			s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
-			if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
-				{
-				ret= -1;
-				goto end;
-				}
-			s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-
-			s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
-			if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
-				{
-				ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
-				if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-				}
-			s->init_num=0;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
-			ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
-			if (ret <= 0)
-				goto end;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
-			ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-
-			s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE: {
-			char next_proto_neg = 0;
-			char channel_id = 0;
-			next_proto_neg = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
-			channel_id = s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid;
-
-			/* At this point, the next message must be entirely
-			 * behind a ChangeCipherSpec. */
-			if (!ssl3_expect_change_cipher_spec(s))
-				{
-				ret = -1;
-				goto end;
-				}
-			if (next_proto_neg)
-				s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
-			else if (channel_id)
-				s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A;
-			else
-				s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-			break;
-		}
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
-			ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->init_num = 0;
-			if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid)
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A;
-			else
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_B:
-			ret=ssl3_get_channel_id(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->init_num = 0;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
-			ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
-				SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			if (s->hit)
-				s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
-			else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
-			else
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
-			/* If this is a full handshake with ChannelID then
-			 * record the hashshake hashes in |s->session| in case
-			 * we need them to verify a ChannelID signature on a
-			 * resumption of this session in the future. */
-			if (!s->hit && s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new)
-				{
-				ret = tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(s);
-				if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-				}
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
-			ret=ssl3_send_new_session_ticket(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-#if 0
-		// TODO(davidben): Implement OCSP stapling on the server.
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
-			ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
+          /* ServerHelloDone was already sent in the
+           * previous record. */
+          s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+          s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
 #endif
+          s->init_num = 0;
+        }
+        break;
+
+      case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
+      case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
+        ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
+        if (ret <= 0) {
+          goto end;
+        }
+        s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
+        s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+        s->init_num = 0;
+        break;
+
+      case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
+        /* This code originally checked to see if any data was pending using
+         * BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as documented
+         * in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
+         * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead
+         * we just flush unconditionally. */
+        s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
+        if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
+          ret = -1;
+          goto end;
+        }
+        s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+
+        s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
+        break;
+
+      case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
+      case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
+        if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
+          ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
+          if (ret <= 0) {
+            goto end;
+          }
+        }
+        s->init_num = 0;
+        s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+        break;
+
+      case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
+      case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
+        ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
+        if (ret <= 0) {
+          goto end;
+        }
+        s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
+        s->init_num = 0;
+        break;
+
+      case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
+      case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
+        ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
+        if (ret <= 0) {
+          goto end;
+        }
+
+        s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE;
+        s->init_num = 0;
+        break;
+
+      case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE: {
+        char next_proto_neg = 0;
+        char channel_id = 0;
+        next_proto_neg = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
+        channel_id = s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid;
+
+        /* At this point, the next message must be entirely behind a
+         * ChangeCipherSpec. */
+        if (!ssl3_expect_change_cipher_spec(s)) {
+          ret = -1;
+          goto end;
+        }
+        if (next_proto_neg) {
+          s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
+        } else if (channel_id) {
+          s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A;
+        } else {
+          s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+        }
+        break;
+      }
+
+      case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
+      case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
+        ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
+        if (ret <= 0) {
+          goto end;
+        }
+        s->init_num = 0;
+        if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
+          s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A;
+        } else {
+          s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+        }
+        break;
+
+      case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A:
+      case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_B:
+        ret = ssl3_get_channel_id(s);
+        if (ret <= 0) {
+          goto end;
+        }
+        s->init_num = 0;
+        s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+        break;
+
+      case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
+      case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
+        ret =
+            ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
+        if (ret <= 0) {
+          goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (s->hit) {
+          s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
+        } else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
+          s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+        } else {
+          s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+        }
+        /* If this is a full handshake with ChannelID then record the hashshake
+         * hashes in |s->session| in case we need them to verify a ChannelID
+         * signature on a resumption of this session in the future. */
+        if (!s->hit && s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new) {
+          ret = tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(s);
+          if (ret <= 0) {
+            goto end;
+          }
+        }
+        s->init_num = 0;
+        break;
+
+      case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
+      case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
+        ret = ssl3_send_new_session_ticket(s);
+        if (ret <= 0) {
+          goto end;
+        }
+        s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+        s->init_num = 0;
+        break;
+
+      case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
+      case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
+        s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
+        if (!s->enc_method->setup_key_block(s)) {
+          ret = -1;
+          goto end;
+        }
+
+        ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,
+                                           SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
+        if (ret <= 0) {
+          goto end;
+        }
+        s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
+        s->init_num = 0;
+
+        if (!s->enc_method->change_cipher_state(
+                s, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
+          ret = -1;
+          goto end;
+        }
+        break;
+
+      case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
+      case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
+        ret =
+            ssl3_send_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
+                               s->enc_method->server_finished_label,
+                               s->enc_method->server_finished_label_len);
+        if (ret <= 0) {
+          goto end;
+        }
+        s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+        if (s->hit) {
+          s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE;
+        } else {
+          s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
+        }
+        s->init_num = 0;
+        break;
+
+      case SSL_ST_OK:
+        /* clean a few things up */
+        ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
+
+        BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
+        s->init_buf = NULL;
+
+        /* remove buffering on output */
+        ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
+
+        s->init_num = 0;
+
+        /* If we aren't retaining peer certificates then we can discard it
+         * now. */
+        if (s->session->peer && s->ctx->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs) {
+          X509_free(s->session->peer);
+          s->session->peer = NULL;
+        }
+
+        if (s->renegotiate == 2) {
+          /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
+          s->renegotiate = 0;
+          s->new_session = 0;
+
+          ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
+
+          s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
+
+          if (cb != NULL) {
+            cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
+          }
+        }
+
+        ret = 1;
+        goto end;
+
+      default:
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_accept, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
+        ret = -1;
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip && cb != NULL && s->state != state) {
+      new_state = s->state;
+      s->state = state;
+      cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
+      s->state = new_state;
+    }
+    skip = 0;
+  }
 
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
-
-			s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
-			if (!s->enc_method->setup_key_block(s))
-				{ ret= -1; goto end; }
-
-			ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
-				SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
-
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-
-			if (!s->enc_method->change_cipher_state(s,
-				SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
-				{
-				ret= -1;
-				goto end;
-				}
-
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
-			ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
-				SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
-				s->enc_method->server_finished_label,
-				s->enc_method->server_finished_label_len);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
-			if (s->hit)
-				s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE;
-			else
-				s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL_ST_OK:
-			/* clean a few things up */
-			ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
-
-			BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
-			s->init_buf=NULL;
-
-			/* remove buffering on output */
-			ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
-
-			s->init_num=0;
-
-			/* If we aren't retaining peer certificates then we can
-			 * discard it now. */
-			if (s->session->peer && s->ctx->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs)
-				{
-				X509_free(s->session->peer);
-				s->session->peer = NULL;
-				}
-
-			if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
-				{
-				s->renegotiate=0;
-				s->new_session=0;
-				
-				ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
-				
-				s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
-				/* s->server=1; */
-
-				if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
-				}
-			
-			ret = 1;
-			goto end;
-			/* break; */
-
-		default:
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_accept, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
-			ret= -1;
-			goto end;
-			/* break; */
-			}
-		
-		if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
-			{
-			if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
-				{
-				new_state=s->state;
-				s->state=state;
-				cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
-				s->state=new_state;
-				}
-			}
-		skip=0;
-		}
 end:
-	/* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
-
-	s->in_handshake--;
-	if (buf != NULL)
-		BUF_MEM_free(buf);
-	if (cb != NULL)
-		cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-static int ssl3_read_sniff_buffer(SSL *s, size_t n)
-	{
-	if (s->s3->sniff_buffer == NULL)
-		{
-		s->s3->sniff_buffer = BUF_MEM_new();
-		}
-	if (s->s3->sniff_buffer == NULL ||
-		!BUF_MEM_grow(s->s3->sniff_buffer, n))
-		{
-		return -1;
-		}
-
-	while (s->s3->sniff_buffer_len < n)
-		{
-		int ret;
-
-		s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
-		ret = BIO_read(s->rbio,
-			s->s3->sniff_buffer->data + s->s3->sniff_buffer_len,
-			n - s->s3->sniff_buffer_len);
-		if (ret <= 0)
-			return ret;
-		s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
-		s->s3->sniff_buffer_len += ret;
-		}
-	return 1;
-	}
-
-int ssl3_get_initial_bytes(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int ret;
-	const uint8_t *p;
-
-	/* Read the first 8 bytes. To recognize a ClientHello or V2ClientHello
-	 * only needs the first 6 bytes, but 8 is needed to recognize CONNECT
-	 * below. */
-	ret = ssl3_read_sniff_buffer(s, INITIAL_SNIFF_BUFFER_SIZE);
-	if (ret <= 0)
-		return ret;
-	assert(s->s3->sniff_buffer_len >= INITIAL_SNIFF_BUFFER_SIZE);
-	p = (const uint8_t *)s->s3->sniff_buffer->data;
-
-	/* Some dedicated error codes for protocol mixups should the application
-	 * wish to interpret them differently. (These do not overlap with
-	 * ClientHello or V2ClientHello.) */
-	if (strncmp("GET ", (const char *)p, 4) == 0 ||
-		strncmp("POST ", (const char *)p, 5) == 0 ||
-		strncmp("HEAD ", (const char *)p, 5) == 0 ||
-		strncmp("PUT ", (const char *)p, 4) == 0)
-		{
-		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_initial_bytes, SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST);
-		return -1;
-		}
-	if (strncmp("CONNECT ", (const char *)p, 8) == 0)
-		{
-		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_initial_bytes, SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST);
-		return -1;
-		}
-
-	/* Determine if this is a ClientHello or V2ClientHello. */
-
-	if ((p[0] & 0x80) && p[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO &&
-		p[3] >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
-		{
-		/* This is a V2ClientHello. */
-		s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_V2_CLIENT_HELLO;
-		return 1;
-		}
-	if (p[0] == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && p[1] >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
-		p[5] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
-		{
-		/* This is a ClientHello. Initialize the record layer with the
-		 * already consumed data and continue the handshake. */
-		if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s) || !ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1))
-			{
-			return -1;
-			}
-		assert(s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_HEADER);
-		memcpy(s->s3->rbuf.buf, p, s->s3->sniff_buffer_len);
-		s->s3->rbuf.offset = 0;
-		s->s3->rbuf.left = s->s3->sniff_buffer_len;
-		s->packet_length = 0;
-
-		BUF_MEM_free(s->s3->sniff_buffer);
-		s->s3->sniff_buffer = NULL;
-		s->s3->sniff_buffer_len = 0;
-
-		s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
-		return 1;
-		}
-
-	OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_initial_bytes, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
-	return -1;
-	}
-
-int ssl3_get_v2_client_hello(SSL *s)
-	{
-	const uint8_t *p;
-	int ret;
-	CBS v2_client_hello, cipher_specs, session_id, challenge;
-	size_t msg_length, rand_len, len;
-	uint8_t msg_type;
-	uint16_t version, cipher_spec_length, session_id_length, challenge_length;
-	CBB client_hello, hello_body, cipher_suites;
-	uint8_t random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
-
-	/* Read the remainder of the V2ClientHello. We have previously read 8
-	 * bytes in ssl3_get_initial_bytes. */
-	assert(s->s3->sniff_buffer_len >= INITIAL_SNIFF_BUFFER_SIZE);
-	p = (const uint8_t *)s->s3->sniff_buffer->data;
-	msg_length = ((p[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | p[1];
-	if (msg_length > (1024 * 4))
-		{
-		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_v2_client_hello, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
-		return -1;
-		}
-	if (msg_length < INITIAL_SNIFF_BUFFER_SIZE - 2)
-		{
-		/* Reject lengths that are too short early. We have already read
-		 * 8 bytes, so we should not attempt to process an (invalid)
-		 * V2ClientHello which would be shorter than that. */
-		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_v2_client_hello, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-		return -1;
-		}
-
-	ret = ssl3_read_sniff_buffer(s, msg_length + 2);
-	if (ret <= 0)
-		return ret;
-	assert(s->s3->sniff_buffer_len == msg_length + 2);
-	CBS_init(&v2_client_hello,
-		(const uint8_t *)s->s3->sniff_buffer->data + 2, msg_length);
-
-	/* The V2ClientHello without the length is incorporated into the
-	 * Finished hash. */
-	ssl3_finish_mac(s, CBS_data(&v2_client_hello), CBS_len(&v2_client_hello));
-	if (s->msg_callback)
-		s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, CBS_data(&v2_client_hello),
-			CBS_len(&v2_client_hello), s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
-	if (!CBS_get_u8(&v2_client_hello, &msg_type) ||
-		!CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &version) ||
-		!CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &cipher_spec_length) ||
-		!CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &session_id_length) ||
-		!CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &challenge_length) ||
-		!CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &cipher_specs, cipher_spec_length) ||
-		!CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &session_id, session_id_length) ||
-		!CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &challenge, challenge_length) ||
-		CBS_len(&v2_client_hello) != 0)
-		{
-		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_v2_client_hello, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-		return -1;
-		}
-
-	/* msg_type has already been checked. */
-	assert(msg_type == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO);
-
-	/* The client_random is the V2ClientHello challenge. Truncate or
-	 * left-pad with zeros as needed. */
-	memset(random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-	rand_len = CBS_len(&challenge);
-	if (rand_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
-		rand_len = SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-	memcpy(random + (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - rand_len), CBS_data(&challenge), rand_len);
-
-	/* Write out an equivalent SSLv3 ClientHello. */
-	if (!CBB_init_fixed(&client_hello, (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_buf->max))
-		{
-		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_v2_client_hello, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		return -1;
-		}
-	if (!CBB_add_u8(&client_hello, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) ||
-		!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &hello_body) ||
-		!CBB_add_u16(&hello_body, version) ||
-		!CBB_add_bytes(&hello_body, random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
-		/* No session id. */
-		!CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) ||
-		!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&hello_body, &cipher_suites))
-		{
-		CBB_cleanup(&client_hello);
-		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_v2_client_hello, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-		return -1;
-		}
-
-	/* Copy the cipher suites. */
-	while (CBS_len(&cipher_specs) > 0)
-		{
-		uint32_t cipher_spec;
-		if (!CBS_get_u24(&cipher_specs, &cipher_spec))
-			{
-			CBB_cleanup(&client_hello);
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_v2_client_hello, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-			return -1;
-			}
-
-		/* Skip SSLv2 ciphers. */
-		if ((cipher_spec & 0xff0000) != 0)
-			continue;
-		if (!CBB_add_u16(&cipher_suites, cipher_spec))
-			{
-			CBB_cleanup(&client_hello);
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_v2_client_hello, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			return -1;
-			}
-		}
-
-	/* Add the null compression scheme and finish. */
-	if (!CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 1) ||
-		!CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) ||
-		!CBB_finish(&client_hello, NULL, &len))
-		{
-		CBB_cleanup(&client_hello);
-		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_v2_client_hello, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-		return -1;
-		}
-
-	/* Mark the message for "re"-use by the version-specific
-	 * method. */
-	s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
-	s->s3->tmp.message_type = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
-	/* The handshake message header is 4 bytes. */
-	s->s3->tmp.message_size = len - 4;
-
-	/* Initialize the record layer. */
-	if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s) || !ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1))
-		{
-		return -1;
-		}
-
-	/* Drop the sniff buffer. */
-	BUF_MEM_free(s->s3->sniff_buffer);
-	s->s3->sniff_buffer = NULL;
-	s->s3->sniff_buffer_len = 0;
-
-	return 1;
-	}
-
-int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
-	{
-
-	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
-		{
-		ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
-		s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
-		}
-
-	/* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
-	return ssl_do_write(s);
-	}
-
-int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int i,ok,al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,ret= -1;
-	long n;
-	const SSL_CIPHER *c;
-	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
-	struct ssl_early_callback_ctx early_ctx;
-	CBS client_hello;
-	uint16_t client_version;
-	CBS client_random, session_id, cipher_suites, compression_methods;
-
-	/* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
-	 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
-	 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
-	 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
-	 * TLSv1.
-	 */
-	switch (s->state) {
-	case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
-	case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
-		n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
-			SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A,
-			SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
-			SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
-			SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
-			SSL_GET_MESSAGE_HASH_MESSAGE,
-			&ok);
-
-		if (!ok) return((int)n);
-
-		/* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
-		 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
-		 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
-		 */
-		if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
-			{
-			uint8_t cookie_length;
-
-			CBS_init(&client_hello, s->init_msg, n);
-			if (!CBS_skip(&client_hello, 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
-				!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &session_id) ||
-				!CBS_get_u8(&client_hello, &cookie_length))
-				{
-				al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-				OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-
-			if (cookie_length == 0)
-				return 1;
-			}
-		s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
-		/* fallthrough */
-	case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
-	case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
-		/* We have previously parsed the ClientHello message,
-		 * and can't call ssl_get_message again without hashing
-		 * the message into the Finished digest again. */
-		n = s->init_num;
-
-		memset(&early_ctx, 0, sizeof(early_ctx));
-		early_ctx.ssl = s;
-		early_ctx.client_hello = s->init_msg;
-		early_ctx.client_hello_len = n;
-		if (!ssl_early_callback_init(&early_ctx))
-			{
-			al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_PARSE_FAILED);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-
-		if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C &&
-		    s->ctx->select_certificate_cb != NULL)
-			{
-			s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
-			switch (s->ctx->select_certificate_cb(&early_ctx))
-				{
-				case 0:
-					return CERTIFICATE_SELECTION_PENDING;
-				case -1:
-					/* Connection rejected. */
-					al = SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED;
-					OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_CONNECTION_REJECTED);
-					goto f_err;
-				default:
-					/* fallthrough */;
-				}
-			}
-		s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
-		break;
-	default:
-		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
-		return -1;
-	}
-
-	CBS_init(&client_hello, s->init_msg, n);
-	if (!CBS_get_u16(&client_hello, &client_version) ||
-		!CBS_get_bytes(&client_hello, &client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
-		!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &session_id) ||
-		CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)
-		{
-		al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-	/* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
-	 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
-	s->client_version = client_version;
-
-	/* Load the client random. */
-	memcpy(s->s3->client_random, CBS_data(&client_random), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-
-	if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
-		{
-		CBS cookie;
-
-		if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cookie) ||
-			CBS_len(&cookie) > DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH)
-			{
-			al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-
-		/* Verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
-		if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
-			CBS_len(&cookie) > 0)
-			{
-			if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
-				{
-				if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s,
-						CBS_data(&cookie), CBS_len(&cookie)) == 0)
-					{
-					al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-					OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
-					goto f_err;
-					}
-				/* else cookie verification succeeded */
-				}
-			else if (!CBS_mem_equal(&cookie, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len))
-				{
-				/* default verification */
-				al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-				OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-			/* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 and
-			 * don't send HelloVerifyRequest. */
-			ret = -2;
-			}
-		}
-
-	if (!s->s3->have_version)
-		{
-		/* Select version to use */
-		uint16_t version = ssl3_get_mutual_version(s, client_version);
-		if (version == 0)
-			{
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
-			s->version = s->client_version;
-			al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		s->version = version;
-		s->enc_method = ssl3_get_enc_method(version);
-		assert(s->enc_method != NULL);
-		/* At this point, the connection's version is known and
-		 * s->version is fixed. Begin enforcing the record-layer
-		 * version. */
-		s->s3->have_version = 1;
-		}
-	else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)  ?	(s->client_version > s->version)
-		                 :	(s->client_version < s->version))
-		{
-		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
-		al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-	s->hit=0;
-	/* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
-	 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
-	 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
-	 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
-	 * won't even compile against older library versions).
-	 *
-	 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
-	 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
-	 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
-	 * setting will be ignored.
-	 */
-	if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
-		{
-		if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
-			goto err;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &early_ctx);
-		if (i == PENDING_SESSION)
-			{
-			ret = PENDING_SESSION;
-			goto err;
-			}
-		else if (i == -1)
-			{
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		/* Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
-		 * version: most clients do not accept a mismatch. */
-		if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version)
-			{
-			s->hit = 1;
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			/* No session was found or it was unacceptable. */
-			if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
-				goto err;
-			}
-		}
-
-	if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cipher_suites) ||
-		!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &compression_methods) ||
-		CBS_len(&compression_methods) == 0)
-		{
-		al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-	/* TODO(davidben): Per spec, cipher_suites can never be empty
-	 * (specified at the ClientHello structure level). This logic
-	 * allows it to be empty if resuming a session. Can we always
-	 * require non-empty? If a client sends empty cipher_suites
-	 * because it's resuming a session, it could always fail to
-	 * resume a session, so it's unlikely to actually work. */
-	if (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) == 0 && CBS_len(&session_id) != 0)
-		{
-		/* We need a cipher if we are not resuming a session. */
-		al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-	ciphers = ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &cipher_suites);
-	if (ciphers == NULL)
-		{
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	/* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
-	if (s->hit && CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0)
-		{
-		size_t j;
-		int found_cipher = 0;
-		unsigned long id = s->session->cipher->id;
-
-		for (j = 0; j < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); j++)
-			{
-			c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, j);
-			if (c->id == id)
-				{
-				found_cipher = 1;
-				break;
-				}
-			}
-		if (!found_cipher)
-			{
-			/* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
-			 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
-			al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		}
-
-	/* Only null compression is supported. */
-	if (memchr(CBS_data(&compression_methods), 0,
-			CBS_len(&compression_methods)) == NULL)
-		{
-		al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-	/* TLS extensions*/
-	if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
-		{
-		if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &client_hello))
-			{
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		}
-
-        /* There should be nothing left over in the record. */
-	if (CBS_len(&client_hello) != 0)
-		{
-		/* wrong packet length */
-		al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-	/* Given ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher */
-	if (!s->hit)
-		{
-		if (ciphers == NULL)
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		/* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
-		if (s->cert->cert_cb)
-			{
-			int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
-			if (rv == 0)
-				{
-				al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-				OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-			if (rv < 0)
-				{
-				s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
-				goto err;
-				}
-			s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
-			}
-		c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, ssl_get_cipher_preferences(s));
-
-		if (c == NULL)
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		/* Session-id reuse */
-		s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
-		}
-
-	if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
-		{
-		if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, free_handshake_buffer))
-			goto f_err;
-		}
-	
-	/* we now have the following setup. 
-	 * client_random
-	 * cipher_list 		- our prefered list of ciphers
-	 * ciphers 		- the clients prefered list of ciphers
-	 * compression		- basically ignored right now
-	 * ssl version is set	- sslv3
-	 * s->session		- The ssl session has been setup.
-	 * s->hit		- session reuse flag
-	 * s->tmp.new_cipher	- the new cipher to use.
-	 */
-
-	if (ret < 0) ret=-ret;
-	if (0)
-		{
-f_err:
-		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
-		}
+  s->in_handshake--;
+  if (buf != NULL) {
+    BUF_MEM_free(buf);
+  }
+  if (cb != NULL) {
+    cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static int ssl3_read_sniff_buffer(SSL *s, size_t n) {
+  if (s->s3->sniff_buffer == NULL) {
+    s->s3->sniff_buffer = BUF_MEM_new();
+  }
+  if (s->s3->sniff_buffer == NULL || !BUF_MEM_grow(s->s3->sniff_buffer, n)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  while (s->s3->sniff_buffer_len < n) {
+    int ret;
+
+    s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+    ret = BIO_read(s->rbio, s->s3->sniff_buffer->data + s->s3->sniff_buffer_len,
+                   n - s->s3->sniff_buffer_len);
+    if (ret <= 0) {
+      return ret;
+    }
+    s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+    s->s3->sniff_buffer_len += ret;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_get_initial_bytes(SSL *s) {
+  int ret;
+  const uint8_t *p;
+
+  /* Read the first 8 bytes. To recognize a ClientHello or V2ClientHello only
+   * needs the first 6 bytes, but 8 is needed to recognize CONNECT below. */
+  ret = ssl3_read_sniff_buffer(s, INITIAL_SNIFF_BUFFER_SIZE);
+  if (ret <= 0) {
+    return ret;
+  }
+  assert(s->s3->sniff_buffer_len >= INITIAL_SNIFF_BUFFER_SIZE);
+  p = (const uint8_t *)s->s3->sniff_buffer->data;
+
+  /* Some dedicated error codes for protocol mixups should the application wish
+   * to interpret them differently. (These do not overlap with ClientHello or
+   * V2ClientHello.) */
+  if (strncmp("GET ", (const char *)p, 4) == 0 ||
+      strncmp("POST ", (const char *)p, 5) == 0 ||
+      strncmp("HEAD ", (const char *)p, 5) == 0 ||
+      strncmp("PUT ", (const char *)p, 4) == 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_initial_bytes, SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST);
+    return -1;
+  }
+  if (strncmp("CONNECT ", (const char *)p, 8) == 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_initial_bytes, SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  /* Determine if this is a ClientHello or V2ClientHello. */
+  if ((p[0] & 0x80) && p[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO &&
+      p[3] >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
+    /* This is a V2ClientHello. */
+    s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_V2_CLIENT_HELLO;
+    return 1;
+  }
+  if (p[0] == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && p[1] >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
+      p[5] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
+    /* This is a ClientHello. Initialize the record layer with the already
+     * consumed data and continue the handshake. */
+    if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s) || !ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
+      return -1;
+    }
+    assert(s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_HEADER);
+    memcpy(s->s3->rbuf.buf, p, s->s3->sniff_buffer_len);
+    s->s3->rbuf.offset = 0;
+    s->s3->rbuf.left = s->s3->sniff_buffer_len;
+    s->packet_length = 0;
+
+    BUF_MEM_free(s->s3->sniff_buffer);
+    s->s3->sniff_buffer = NULL;
+    s->s3->sniff_buffer_len = 0;
+
+    s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_initial_bytes, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
+  return -1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_get_v2_client_hello(SSL *s) {
+  const uint8_t *p;
+  int ret;
+  CBS v2_client_hello, cipher_specs, session_id, challenge;
+  size_t msg_length, rand_len, len;
+  uint8_t msg_type;
+  uint16_t version, cipher_spec_length, session_id_length, challenge_length;
+  CBB client_hello, hello_body, cipher_suites;
+  uint8_t random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
+
+  /* Read the remainder of the V2ClientHello. We have previously read 8 bytes
+   * in ssl3_get_initial_bytes. */
+  assert(s->s3->sniff_buffer_len >= INITIAL_SNIFF_BUFFER_SIZE);
+  p = (const uint8_t *)s->s3->sniff_buffer->data;
+  msg_length = ((p[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | p[1];
+  if (msg_length > (1024 * 4)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_v2_client_hello, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
+    return -1;
+  }
+  if (msg_length < INITIAL_SNIFF_BUFFER_SIZE - 2) {
+    /* Reject lengths that are too short early. We have already read 8 bytes,
+     * so we should not attempt to process an (invalid) V2ClientHello which
+     * would be shorter than that. */
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_v2_client_hello,
+                      SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  ret = ssl3_read_sniff_buffer(s, msg_length + 2);
+  if (ret <= 0) {
+    return ret;
+  }
+  assert(s->s3->sniff_buffer_len == msg_length + 2);
+  CBS_init(&v2_client_hello, (const uint8_t *)s->s3->sniff_buffer->data + 2,
+           msg_length);
+
+  /* The V2ClientHello without the length is incorporated into the Finished
+   * hash. */
+  ssl3_finish_mac(s, CBS_data(&v2_client_hello), CBS_len(&v2_client_hello));
+  if (s->msg_callback) {
+    s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, CBS_data(&v2_client_hello),
+                    CBS_len(&v2_client_hello), s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+  }
+
+  if (!CBS_get_u8(&v2_client_hello, &msg_type) ||
+      !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &version) ||
+      !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &cipher_spec_length) ||
+      !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &session_id_length) ||
+      !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &challenge_length) ||
+      !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &cipher_specs, cipher_spec_length) ||
+      !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &session_id, session_id_length) ||
+      !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &challenge, challenge_length) ||
+      CBS_len(&v2_client_hello) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_v2_client_hello, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  /* msg_type has already been checked. */
+  assert(msg_type == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO);
+
+  /* The client_random is the V2ClientHello challenge. Truncate or
+   * left-pad with zeros as needed. */
+  memset(random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+  rand_len = CBS_len(&challenge);
+  if (rand_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) {
+    rand_len = SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+  }
+  memcpy(random + (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - rand_len), CBS_data(&challenge),
+         rand_len);
+
+  /* Write out an equivalent SSLv3 ClientHello. */
+  if (!CBB_init_fixed(&client_hello, (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data,
+                      s->init_buf->max)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_v2_client_hello, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return -1;
+  }
+  if (!CBB_add_u8(&client_hello, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) ||
+      !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &hello_body) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(&hello_body, version) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&hello_body, random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
+      /* No session id. */
+      !CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&hello_body, &cipher_suites)) {
+    CBB_cleanup(&client_hello);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_v2_client_hello, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  /* Copy the cipher suites. */
+  while (CBS_len(&cipher_specs) > 0) {
+    uint32_t cipher_spec;
+    if (!CBS_get_u24(&cipher_specs, &cipher_spec)) {
+      CBB_cleanup(&client_hello);
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_v2_client_hello, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+      return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* Skip SSLv2 ciphers. */
+    if ((cipher_spec & 0xff0000) != 0) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (!CBB_add_u16(&cipher_suites, cipher_spec)) {
+      CBB_cleanup(&client_hello);
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_v2_client_hello, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return -1;
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* Add the null compression scheme and finish. */
+  if (!CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 1) || !CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) ||
+      !CBB_finish(&client_hello, NULL, &len)) {
+    CBB_cleanup(&client_hello);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_v2_client_hello, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  /* Mark the message for "re"-use by the version-specific method. */
+  s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+  s->s3->tmp.message_type = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
+  /* The handshake message header is 4 bytes. */
+  s->s3->tmp.message_size = len - 4;
+
+  /* Initialize the record layer. */
+  if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s) || !ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  /* Drop the sniff buffer. */
+  BUF_MEM_free(s->s3->sniff_buffer);
+  s->s3->sniff_buffer = NULL;
+  s->s3->sniff_buffer_len = 0;
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s) {
+  if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
+    ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
+    s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
+  }
+
+  /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
+  return ssl_do_write(s);
+}
+
+int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) {
+  int i, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1;
+  long n;
+  const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+  STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
+  struct ssl_early_callback_ctx early_ctx;
+  CBS client_hello;
+  uint16_t client_version;
+  CBS client_random, session_id, cipher_suites, compression_methods;
+
+  /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are TLSv1
+   * and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down switching should
+   * be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we will respond with
+   * SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1. */
+  switch (s->state) {
+    case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
+    case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
+      n = s->method->ssl_get_message(
+          s, SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
+          SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
+          SSL_GET_MESSAGE_HASH_MESSAGE, &ok);
+
+      if (!ok) {
+        return n;
+      }
+
+      /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
+       * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
+       * cookie length... */
+      if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) {
+        uint8_t cookie_length;
+
+        CBS_init(&client_hello, s->init_msg, n);
+        if (!CBS_skip(&client_hello, 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
+            !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &session_id) ||
+            !CBS_get_u8(&client_hello, &cookie_length)) {
+          al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+          goto f_err;
+        }
+
+        if (cookie_length == 0) {
+          return 1;
+        }
+      }
+      s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
+      /* fallthrough */
+    case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
+    case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
+      /* We have previously parsed the ClientHello message, and can't call
+       * ssl_get_message again without hashing the message into the Finished
+       * digest again. */
+      n = s->init_num;
+
+      memset(&early_ctx, 0, sizeof(early_ctx));
+      early_ctx.ssl = s;
+      early_ctx.client_hello = s->init_msg;
+      early_ctx.client_hello_len = n;
+      if (!ssl_early_callback_init(&early_ctx)) {
+        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello,
+                          SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_PARSE_FAILED);
+        goto f_err;
+      }
+
+      if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C &&
+          s->ctx->select_certificate_cb != NULL) {
+        s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
+        switch (s->ctx->select_certificate_cb(&early_ctx)) {
+          case 0:
+            return CERTIFICATE_SELECTION_PENDING;
+
+          case -1:
+            /* Connection rejected. */
+            al = SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED;
+            OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello,
+                              SSL_R_CONNECTION_REJECTED);
+            goto f_err;
+
+          default:
+            /* fallthrough */;
+        }
+      }
+      s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
+      break;
+
+    default:
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
+      return -1;
+  }
+
+  CBS_init(&client_hello, s->init_msg, n);
+  if (!CBS_get_u16(&client_hello, &client_version) ||
+      !CBS_get_bytes(&client_hello, &client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
+      !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &session_id) ||
+      CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
+    al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    goto f_err;
+  }
+
+  /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may differ:
+   * see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
+  s->client_version = client_version;
+
+  /* Load the client random. */
+  memcpy(s->s3->client_random, CBS_data(&client_random), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+
+  if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+    CBS cookie;
+
+    if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cookie) ||
+        CBS_len(&cookie) > DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH) {
+      al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    /* Verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
+    if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && CBS_len(&cookie) > 0) {
+      if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
+        if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, CBS_data(&cookie),
+                                         CBS_len(&cookie)) == 0) {
+          al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+          goto f_err;
+        }
+        /* else cookie verification succeeded */
+      } else if (!CBS_mem_equal(&cookie, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len)) {
+        /* default verification */
+        al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+        goto f_err;
+      }
+      /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 and don't send
+       * HelloVerifyRequest. */
+      ret = -2;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!s->s3->have_version) {
+    /* Select version to use */
+    uint16_t version = ssl3_get_mutual_version(s, client_version);
+    if (version == 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
+      s->version = s->client_version;
+      al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+    s->version = version;
+    s->enc_method = ssl3_get_enc_method(version);
+    assert(s->enc_method != NULL);
+    /* At this point, the connection's version is known and |s->version| is
+     * fixed. Begin enforcing the record-layer version. */
+    s->s3->have_version = 1;
+  } else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version)
+                            : (s->client_version < s->version)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+    al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+    goto f_err;
+  }
+
+  s->hit = 0;
+  /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
+   * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
+   * ignore resumption requests with flag
+   * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather than
+   * a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for
+   * security won't even compile against older library versions).
+   *
+   * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
+   * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
+   * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
+   * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored. */
+  if (s->new_session &&
+      (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)) {
+    if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  } else {
+    i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &early_ctx);
+    if (i == PENDING_SESSION) {
+      ret = PENDING_SESSION;
+      goto err;
+    } else if (i == -1) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated version:
+     * most clients do not accept a mismatch. */
+    if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
+      s->hit = 1;
+    } else {
+      /* No session was found or it was unacceptable. */
+      if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cipher_suites) ||
+      !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &compression_methods) ||
+      CBS_len(&compression_methods) == 0) {
+    al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    goto f_err;
+  }
+
+  /* TODO(davidben): Per spec, cipher_suites can never be empty (specified at
+   * the ClientHello structure level). This logic allows it to be empty if
+   * resuming a session. Can we always require non-empty? If a client sends
+   * empty cipher_suites because it's resuming a session, it could always fail
+   * to resume a session, so it's unlikely to actually work. */
+  if (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) == 0 && CBS_len(&session_id) != 0) {
+    /* We need a cipher if we are not resuming a session. */
+    al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
+    goto f_err;
+  }
+
+  ciphers = ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &cipher_suites);
+  if (ciphers == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. */
+  if (s->hit && CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0) {
+    size_t j;
+    int found_cipher = 0;
+    unsigned long id = s->session->cipher->id;
+
+    for (j = 0; j < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); j++) {
+      c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, j);
+      if (c->id == id) {
+        found_cipher = 1;
+        break;
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (!found_cipher) {
+      /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked to reuse
+       * it */
+      al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello,
+                        SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* Only null compression is supported. */
+  if (memchr(CBS_data(&compression_methods), 0,
+             CBS_len(&compression_methods)) == NULL) {
+    al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello,
+                      SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
+    goto f_err;
+  }
+
+  /* TLS extensions. */
+  if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION &&
+      !ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &client_hello)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* There should be nothing left over in the record. */
+  if (CBS_len(&client_hello) != 0) {
+    /* wrong packet length */
+    al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
+    goto f_err;
+  }
+
+  /* Given ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher */
+  if (!s->hit) {
+    if (ciphers == NULL) {
+      al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
+    if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
+      int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
+      if (rv == 0) {
+        al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
+        goto f_err;
+      }
+      if (rv < 0) {
+        s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+        goto err;
+      }
+      s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+    }
+    c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, ssl_get_cipher_preferences(s));
+
+    if (c == NULL) {
+      al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+    s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
+  } else {
+    /* Session-id reuse */
+    s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
+  }
+
+  if ((!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) &&
+      !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, free_handshake_buffer)) {
+    goto f_err;
+  }
+
+  /* we now have the following setup;
+   * client_random
+   * cipher_list        - our prefered list of ciphers
+   * ciphers            - the clients prefered list of ciphers
+   * compression        - basically ignored right now
+   * ssl version is set - sslv3
+   * s->session         - The ssl session has been setup.
+   * s->hit             - session reuse flag
+   * s->tmp.new_cipher  - the new cipher to use. */
+
+  if (ret < 0) {
+    ret = -ret;
+  }
+
+  if (0) {
+  f_err:
+    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+  }
+
 err:
-	if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
-	return ret;
-	}
-
-int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char *buf;
-	unsigned char *p,*d;
-	int sl;
-	unsigned long l;
-
-	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
-		{
-		/* We only accept ChannelIDs on connections with ECDHE in order
-		 * to avoid a known attack while we fix ChannelID itself. */
-		if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid &&
-		    (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kEECDH) == 0)
-			s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
-
-		/* If this is a resumption and the original handshake didn't
-		 * support ChannelID then we didn't record the original
-		 * handshake hashes in the session and so cannot resume with
-		 * ChannelIDs. */
-		if (s->hit &&
-		    s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new &&
-		    s->session->original_handshake_hash_len == 0)
-			s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
-
-		buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-		/* Do the message type and length last */
-		d=p= ssl_handshake_start(s);
-
-		*(p++)=s->version>>8;
-		*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
-
-		/* Random stuff */
-		if (!ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE))
-			{
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_hello, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			return -1;
-			}
-		memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-		p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-
-		/* There are several cases for the session ID to send
-		 * back in the server hello:
-		 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
-		 *   we send back the old session ID.
-		 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
-		 *   is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
-		 *   (which doesn't actually identify the session).
-		 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
-		 *   session ID.
-		 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
-		 *   we send back a 0-length session ID.
-		 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
-		 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
-		 * to send back.
-		 */
-		if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
-			&& !s->hit)
-			s->session->session_id_length=0;
-
-		sl=s->session->session_id_length;
-		if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
-			{
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_hello, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			return -1;
-			}
-		*(p++)=sl;
-		memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
-		p+=sl;
-
-		/* put the cipher */
-                s2n(ssl3_get_cipher_value(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), p);
-
-		/* put the compression method */
-			*(p++)=0;
-		if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
-			{
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_hello, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
-			return -1;
-			}
-		if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
-			{
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_hello, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			return -1;
-			}
-		/* do the header */
-		l=(p-d);
-		ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
-		s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
-		}
-
-	/* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
-	return ssl_do_write(s);
-	}
-
-int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
-	{
-
-	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
-		{
-		ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
-		s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
-		}
-
-	/* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
-	return ssl_do_write(s);
-	}
-
-int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
-	{
-	DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
-	EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
-	unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
-	int encodedlen = 0;
-	int curve_id = 0;
-	BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 
-	const char* psk_identity_hint = NULL;
-	size_t psk_identity_hint_len = 0;
-	EVP_PKEY *pkey;
-	unsigned char *p,*d;
-	int al,i;
-	unsigned long alg_k;
-	unsigned long alg_a;
-	int n;
-	CERT *cert;
-	BIGNUM *r[4];
-	int nr[4],kn;
-	BUF_MEM *buf;
-	EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
-
-	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
-	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
-		{
-		alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-		alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-		cert=s->cert;
-
-		buf=s->init_buf;
-
-		r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
-		n=0;
-		if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK)
-			{
-			/* size for PSK identity hint */
-			psk_identity_hint = s->psk_identity_hint;
-			if (psk_identity_hint)
-				psk_identity_hint_len = strlen(psk_identity_hint);
-			else
-				psk_identity_hint_len = 0;
-			n+=2+psk_identity_hint_len;
-			}
-		if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
-			{
-			dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
-			if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
-				dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
-			if (dhp == NULL)
-				{
-				al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-				OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-
-			if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
-				{
-				OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
-				{
-				OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
-			if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
-			     dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
-			     (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
-				{
-				if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
-				    {
-				    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
-				    goto err;
-				    }
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
-				dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
-				if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
-					(dh->priv_key == NULL))
-					{
-					OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
-					goto err;
-					}
-				}
-			r[0]=dh->p;
-			r[1]=dh->g;
-			r[2]=dh->pub_key;
-			}
-		else
-		if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
-			{
-			const EC_GROUP *group;
-
-			ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
-			if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
-				{
-				/* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
-				int nid = tls1_get_shared_curve(s);
-				if (nid != NID_undef)
-					ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
-				}
-			else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
-				{
-				ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
-				}
-			if (ecdhp == NULL)
-				{
-				al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-				OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-
-			if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
-				{
-				OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			/* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
-			if (ecdhp == NULL)
-				{
-				OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
-				ecdh = ecdhp;
-			else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
-				{
-				OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
-			if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
-			    (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
-			    (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
-				{
-				if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
-				    {
-				    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
-				    goto err;
-				    }
-				}
-
-			if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
-			    (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh)  == NULL) ||
-			    (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
-				{
-				OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			/* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
-			 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For 
-			 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
-			 */
-			if ((curve_id = 
-			    tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
-			    == 0)
-				{
-				OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			/* Encode the public key.
-			 * First check the size of encoding and
-			 * allocate memory accordingly.
-			 */
-			encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 
-			    EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
-			    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 
-			    NULL, 0, NULL);
-
-			encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) 
-			    OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char)); 
-			bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-			if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
-				{
-				OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-
-			encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 
-			    EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 
-			    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 
-			    encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
-
-			if (encodedlen == 0) 
-				{
-				OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);  bn_ctx=NULL;
-
-			/* XXX: For now, we only support named (not 
-			 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
-			 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
-			 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
-			 * structure. 
-			 */
-			n += 4 + encodedlen;
-
-			/* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
-			 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
-			 */
-			r[0]=NULL;
-			r[1]=NULL;
-			r[2]=NULL;
-			r[3]=NULL;
-			}
-		else
-		if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
-			{
-			nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
-			n+=2+nr[i];
-			}
-
-		if (ssl_cipher_has_server_public_key(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
-			{
-			if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
-				== NULL)
-				{
-				al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-			kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			pkey=NULL;
-			kn=0;
-			}
-
-		if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+kn))
-			{
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_LIB_BUF);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
-
-		for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
-			{
-			s2n(nr[i],p);
-			BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
-			p+=nr[i];
-			}
-
-/* Note: ECDHE PSK ciphersuites use SSL_kEECDH and SSL_aPSK.
- * When one of them is used, the server key exchange record needs to have both
- * the psk_identity_hint and the ServerECDHParams. */
-		if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK)
-			{
-			/* copy PSK identity hint (if provided) */
-			s2n(psk_identity_hint_len, p);
-			if (psk_identity_hint_len > 0)
-				{
-				memcpy(p, psk_identity_hint, psk_identity_hint_len);
-				p+=psk_identity_hint_len;
-				}
-			}
-
-		if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
-			{
-			/* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
-			 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
-			 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
-			 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
-			 * the actual encoded point itself
-			 */
-			*p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
-			p += 1;
-			*p = 0;
-			p += 1;
-			*p = curve_id;
-			p += 1;
-			*p = encodedlen;
-			p += 1;
-			memcpy((unsigned char*)p, 
-			    (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, 
-			    encodedlen);
-			OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
-			encodedPoint = NULL;
-			p += encodedlen;
-			}
-
-		/* not anonymous */
-		if (pkey != NULL)
-			{
-			/* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
-			 * and p points to the space at the end. */
-			const EVP_MD *md;
-			size_t sig_len = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
-
-			/* Determine signature algorithm. */
-			if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
-				{
-				md = tls1_choose_signing_digest(s, pkey);
-				if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
-					{
-					/* Should never happen */
-					al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-					OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-					goto f_err;
-					}
-				p+=2;
-				}
-			else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
-				{
-				md = EVP_md5_sha1();
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				md = EVP_sha1();
-				}
-
-			if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&md_ctx, NULL, md, NULL, pkey) ||
-				!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&md_ctx, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
-				!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&md_ctx, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
-				!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n) ||
-				!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&md_ctx, &p[2], &sig_len))
-				{
-				OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_LIB_EVP);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			s2n(sig_len, p);
-			n += sig_len + 2;
-			if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
-				n += 2;
-			}
-
-		ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
-		}
-
-	s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
-	return ssl_do_write(s);
+  if (ciphers != NULL) {
+    sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) {
+  uint8_t *buf;
+  uint8_t *p, *d;
+  int sl;
+  unsigned long l;
+
+  if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
+    /* We only accept ChannelIDs on connections with ECDHE in order to avoid a
+     * known attack while we fix ChannelID itself. */
+    if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid &&
+        (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kEECDH) == 0) {
+      s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
+    }
+
+    /* If this is a resumption and the original handshake didn't support
+     * ChannelID then we didn't record the original handshake hashes in the
+     * session and so cannot resume with ChannelIDs. */
+    if (s->hit && s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new &&
+        s->session->original_handshake_hash_len == 0) {
+      s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
+    }
+
+    buf = (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data;
+    /* Do the message type and length last */
+    d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
+
+    *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
+    *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
+
+    /* Random stuff */
+    if (!ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_hello, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return -1;
+    }
+    memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+    p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+    /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
+     * back in the server hello:
+     * - For session reuse from the session cache, we send back the old session
+     *   ID.
+     * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) is successful, we
+     *   send back the client's "session ID" (which doesn't actually identify
+     *   the session).
+     * - If it is a new session, we send back the new session ID.
+     * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, we send back a
+     *   0-length session ID.
+     * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, so the following
+     * won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed to send back. */
+    if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) && !s->hit) {
+      s->session->session_id_length = 0;
+    }
+
+    sl = s->session->session_id_length;
+    if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_hello, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return -1;
+    }
+    *(p++) = sl;
+    memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
+    p += sl;
+
+    /* put the cipher */
+    s2n(ssl3_get_cipher_value(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), p);
+
+    /* put the compression method */
+    *(p++) = 0;
+    if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_hello, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
+      return -1;
+    }
+    p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
+    if (p == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_hello, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* do the header */
+    l = (p - d);
+    ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
+    s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
+  }
+
+  /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
+  return ssl_do_write(s);
+}
+
+int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s) {
+  if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
+    ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
+    s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
+  }
+
+  /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
+  return ssl_do_write(s);
+}
+
+int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) {
+  DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
+  EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
+  uint8_t *encodedPoint = NULL;
+  int encodedlen = 0;
+  int curve_id = 0;
+  BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
+  const char *psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+  size_t psk_identity_hint_len = 0;
+  EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+  uint8_t *p, *d;
+  int al, i;
+  unsigned long alg_k;
+  unsigned long alg_a;
+  int n;
+  CERT *cert;
+  BIGNUM *r[4];
+  int nr[4], kn;
+  BUF_MEM *buf;
+  EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+
+  EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+  if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
+    alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+    alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+    cert = s->cert;
+
+    buf = s->init_buf;
+
+    r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
+    n = 0;
+    if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
+      /* size for PSK identity hint */
+      psk_identity_hint = s->psk_identity_hint;
+      if (psk_identity_hint) {
+        psk_identity_hint_len = strlen(psk_identity_hint);
+      } else {
+        psk_identity_hint_len = 0;
+      }
+      n += 2 + psk_identity_hint_len;
+    }
+
+    if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) {
+      dhp = cert->dh_tmp;
+      if (dhp == NULL && s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL) {
+        dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
+      }
+      if (dhp == NULL) {
+        al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange,
+                          SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
+        goto f_err;
+      }
+
+      if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange,
+                          ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+      }
+
+      dh = DHparams_dup(dhp);
+      if (dh == NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+        goto err;
+      }
+
+      s->s3->tmp.dh = dh;
+      if (dhp->pub_key == NULL || dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
+          (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)) {
+        if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
+          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+          goto err;
+        }
+      } else {
+        dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
+        dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
+        if (dh->pub_key == NULL || dh->priv_key == NULL) {
+          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+          goto err;
+        }
+      }
+
+      r[0] = dh->p;
+      r[1] = dh->g;
+      r[2] = dh->pub_key;
+    } else if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) {
+      const EC_GROUP *group;
+
+      ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
+      if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
+        /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
+        int nid = tls1_get_shared_curve(s);
+        if (nid != NID_undef) {
+          ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
+        }
+      } else if (ecdhp == NULL && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) {
+        ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
+      }
+      if (ecdhp == NULL) {
+        al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange,
+                          SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
+        goto f_err;
+      }
+
+      if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange,
+                          ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+      }
+
+      /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
+      if (ecdhp == NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+        goto err;
+      }
+
+      if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
+        ecdh = ecdhp;
+      } else {
+        ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp);
+        if (ecdh == NULL) {
+          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+          goto err;
+        }
+      }
+
+      s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
+      if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL ||
+          EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL ||
+          (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
+        if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
+          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+          goto err;
+        }
+      }
+
+      group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
+      if (group == NULL ||
+          EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL ||
+          EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+        goto err;
+      }
+
+      /* We only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named (not generic) curves.
+       * For supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero. */
+      curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group));
+      if (curve_id == 0) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange,
+                          SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
+        goto err;
+      }
+
+      /* Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and allocate
+       * memory accordingly. */
+      encodedlen =
+          EC_POINT_point2oct(group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
+                             POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+      encodedPoint = (uint8_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(uint8_t));
+      bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+      if (encodedPoint == NULL || bn_ctx == NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange,
+                          ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+      }
+
+      encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
+                                      POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+                                      encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
+
+      if (encodedlen == 0) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+        goto err;
+      }
+
+      BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+      bn_ctx = NULL;
+
+      /* We only support named (not generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key
+       * exchanges. In this situation, we need four additional bytes to encode
+       * the entire ServerECDHParams structure. */
+      n += 4 + encodedlen;
+
+      /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we can set
+       * these to NULLs */
+      r[0] = NULL;
+      r[1] = NULL;
+      r[2] = NULL;
+      r[3] = NULL;
+    } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
+      al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange,
+                        SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
+      nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
+      n += 2 + nr[i];
+    }
+
+    if (ssl_cipher_has_server_public_key(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
+      pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
+      if (pkey == NULL) {
+        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        goto f_err;
+      }
+      kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+    } else {
+      pkey = NULL;
+      kn = 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_LIB_BUF);
+      goto err;
+    }
+    d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
+      s2n(nr[i], p);
+      BN_bn2bin(r[i], p);
+      p += nr[i];
+    }
+
+    /* Note: ECDHE PSK ciphersuites use SSL_kEECDH and SSL_aPSK. When one of
+     * them is used, the server key exchange record needs to have both the
+     * psk_identity_hint and the ServerECDHParams. */
+    if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
+      /* copy PSK identity hint (if provided) */
+      s2n(psk_identity_hint_len, p);
+      if (psk_identity_hint_len > 0) {
+        memcpy(p, psk_identity_hint, psk_identity_hint_len);
+        p += psk_identity_hint_len;
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) {
+      /* We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
+       * serverKeyExchange message has:
+       * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
+       * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
+       * the actual encoded point itself. */
+      *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
+      p += 1;
+      *p = 0;
+      p += 1;
+      *p = curve_id;
+      p += 1;
+      *p = encodedlen;
+      p += 1;
+      memcpy((uint8_t *)p, (uint8_t *)encodedPoint, encodedlen);
+      OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+      encodedPoint = NULL;
+      p += encodedlen;
+    }
+
+    /* not anonymous */
+    if (pkey != NULL) {
+      /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p points to
+       * the space at the end. */
+      const EVP_MD *md;
+      size_t sig_len = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+
+      /* Determine signature algorithm. */
+      if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+        md = tls1_choose_signing_digest(s, pkey);
+        if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
+          /* Should never happen */
+          al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange,
+                            ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+          goto f_err;
+        }
+        p += 2;
+      } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+        md = EVP_md5_sha1();
+      } else {
+        md = EVP_sha1();
+      }
+
+      if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&md_ctx, NULL, md, NULL, pkey) ||
+          !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&md_ctx, s->s3->client_random,
+                                SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
+          !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&md_ctx, s->s3->server_random,
+                                SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
+          !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n) ||
+          !EVP_DigestSignFinal(&md_ctx, &p[2], &sig_len)) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_LIB_EVP);
+        goto err;
+      }
+
+      s2n(sig_len, p);
+      n += sig_len + 2;
+      if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+        n += 2;
+      }
+    }
+
+    ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
+  }
+
+  s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
+  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+  return ssl_do_write(s);
+
 f_err:
-	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+  ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
 err:
-	if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
-	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
-	return(-1);
-	}
-
-int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char *p,*d;
-	size_t i;
-	int j,nl,off,n;
-	STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
-	X509_NAME *name;
-	BUF_MEM *buf;
-
-	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
-		{
-		buf=s->init_buf;
-
-		d=p=ssl_handshake_start(s);
-
-		/* get the list of acceptable cert types */
-		p++;
-		n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
-		d[0]=n;
-		p+=n;
-		n++;
-
-		if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
-			{
-			const unsigned char *psigs;
-			nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
-			s2n(nl, p);
-			memcpy(p, psigs, nl);
-			p += nl;
-			n += nl + 2;
-			}
-
-		off=n;
-		p+=2;
-		n+=2;
-
-		sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
-		nl=0;
-		if (sk != NULL)
-			{
-			for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
-				{
-				name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
-				j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
-				if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+n+j+2))
-					{
-					OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_certificate_request, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
-					goto err;
-					}
-				p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
-				s2n(j,p);
-				i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
-				n+=2+j;
-				nl+=2+j;
-				}
-			}
-		/* else no CA names */
-		p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
-		s2n(nl,p);
-
-		ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
+  if (encodedPoint != NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+  }
+  BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+  return -1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) {
+  uint8_t *p, *d;
+  size_t i;
+  int j, nl, off, n;
+  STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
+  X509_NAME *name;
+  BUF_MEM *buf;
+
+  if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
+    buf = s->init_buf;
+
+    d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
+
+    /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
+    p++;
+    n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
+    d[0] = n;
+    p += n;
+    n++;
+
+    if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+      const uint8_t *psigs;
+      nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
+      s2n(nl, p);
+      memcpy(p, psigs, nl);
+      p += nl;
+      n += nl + 2;
+    }
+
+    off = n;
+    p += 2;
+    n += 2;
+
+    sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
+    nl = 0;
+    if (sk != NULL) {
+      for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
+        name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
+        j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
+        if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
+          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_certificate_request, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+          goto err;
+        }
+        p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
+        s2n(j, p);
+        i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
+        n += 2 + j;
+        nl += 2 + j;
+      }
+    }
+
+    /* else no CA names */
+    p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
+    s2n(nl, p);
+
+    ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
 
 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
-		if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
-			{
-			/* Prepare a ServerHelloDone in the same record. This is
-			 * to workaround a hang in Netscape. */
-			if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4))
-				{
-				OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_certificate_request, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
-			/* do the header */
-			*(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
-			*(p++)=0;
-			*(p++)=0;
-			*(p++)=0;
-			s->init_num += 4;
-			ssl3_finish_mac(s, p - 4, 4);
-			}
+    if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+      /* Prepare a ServerHelloDone in the same record. This is to workaround a
+       * hang in Netscape. */
+      if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_certificate_request, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        goto err;
+      }
+      p = (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
+      /* do the header */
+      *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
+      *(p++) = 0;
+      *(p++) = 0;
+      *(p++) = 0;
+      s->init_num += 4;
+      ssl3_finish_mac(s, p - 4, 4);
+    }
 #endif
 
-		s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
-		}
+    s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
+  }
+
+  /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
+  return ssl_do_write(s);
 
-	/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
-	return ssl_do_write(s);
 err:
-	return(-1);
-	}
-
-int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int al,ok;
-	long n;
-	CBS client_key_exchange;
-	unsigned long alg_k;
-	unsigned long alg_a;
-	uint8_t *premaster_secret = NULL;
-	size_t premaster_secret_len = 0;
-	RSA *rsa=NULL;
-	uint8_t *decrypt_buf = NULL;
-	EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
-	BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
-	DH *dh_srvr;
-
-	EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
-	EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
-	EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
-	BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
-	unsigned int psk_len = 0;
-	unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
-
-	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
-		SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
-		SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
-		SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-		2048, /* ??? */
-		SSL_GET_MESSAGE_HASH_MESSAGE,
-		&ok);
-
-	if (!ok) return((int)n);
-	CBS_init(&client_key_exchange, s->init_msg, n);
-
-	alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-	alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-
-	/* If using a PSK key exchange, prepare the pre-shared key. */
-	if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK)
-		{
-		CBS psk_identity;
-
-		/* If using PSK, the ClientKeyExchange contains a
-		 * psk_identity. If PSK, then this is the only field
-		 * in the message. */
-		if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange, &psk_identity) ||
-			((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0))
-			{
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-			al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-
-		if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
-			{
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
-			al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-
-		if (CBS_len(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN ||
-			CBS_contains_zero_byte(&psk_identity))
-			{
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
-			al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-
-		if (!CBS_strdup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity))
-			{
-			al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-
-		/* Look up the key for the identity. */
-		psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity, psk, sizeof(psk));
-		if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
-			{
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		else if (psk_len == 0)
-			{
-			/* PSK related to the given identity not found */
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
-			al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		}
-
-	/* Depending on the key exchange method, compute |premaster_secret| and
-	 * |premaster_secret_len|. */
-	if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
-		{
-		CBS encrypted_premaster_secret;
-		uint8_t rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
-		uint8_t good;
-		size_t rsa_size, decrypt_len, premaster_index, j;
-
-		pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
-		if (	(pkey == NULL) ||
-			(pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
-			(pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
-
-		/* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
-		if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
-			{
-			CBS copy = client_key_exchange;
-			if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange,
-					&encrypted_premaster_secret) ||
-				CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0)
-				{
-				if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
-					{
-					al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-					OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
-					goto f_err;
-					}
-				else
-					encrypted_premaster_secret = copy;
-				}
-			}
-		else
-			encrypted_premaster_secret = client_key_exchange;
-
-		/* Reject overly short RSA keys because we want to be sure that
-		 * the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire size
-		 * of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The actual
-		 * expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the bound is
-		 * sufficient to be safe. */
-		rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa);
-		if (rsa_size < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
-			{
-			al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-
-		/* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because
-		 * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see
-		 * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of
-		 * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the
-		 * case that the decrypt fails. See
-		 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */
-		if (!RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
-				sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)))
-			goto err;
-
-		/* Allocate a buffer large enough for an RSA decryption. */
-		decrypt_buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size);
-		if (decrypt_buf == NULL)
-			{
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		/* Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as
-		 * part of the timing-sensitive code below. */
-		if (!RSA_decrypt(rsa, &decrypt_len, decrypt_buf, rsa_size,
-				CBS_data(&encrypted_premaster_secret),
-				CBS_len(&encrypted_premaster_secret),
-				RSA_NO_PADDING))
-			{
-			goto err;
-			}
-		if (decrypt_len != rsa_size)
-			{
-			/* This should never happen, but do a check so we do not
-			 * read uninitialized memory. */
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		/* Remove the PKCS#1 padding and adjust |decrypt_len| as
-		 * appropriate. |good| will be 0xff if the premaster is
-		 * acceptable and zero otherwise. */
-		good = constant_time_eq_int_8(
-		    RSA_message_index_PKCS1_type_2(decrypt_buf, decrypt_len, &premaster_index), 1);
-		decrypt_len = decrypt_len - premaster_index;
-
-		/* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. */
-		good &= constant_time_eq_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
-
-		/* Copy over the unpadded premaster. Whatever the value of
-		 * |decrypt_good_mask|, copy as if the premaster were the right
-		 * length. It is important the memory access pattern be
-		 * constant. */
-		premaster_secret = BUF_memdup(
-			decrypt_buf + (rsa_size - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH),
-			SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
-		if (premaster_secret == NULL)
-			{
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		OPENSSL_free(decrypt_buf);
-		decrypt_buf = NULL;
-
-		/* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct
-		 * then version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
-		 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
-		 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
-		 * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks
-		 * are done in constant time and are treated like any other
-		 * decryption error. */
-		good &= constant_time_eq_8(premaster_secret[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version>>8));
-		good &= constant_time_eq_8(premaster_secret[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version&0xff));
-
-		/* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over premaster_secret using
-		 * decrypt_good_mask. */
-		for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++)
-			{
-			premaster_secret[j] = constant_time_select_8(good, premaster_secret[j], rand_premaster_secret[j]);
-			}
-
-		premaster_secret_len = sizeof(rand_premaster_secret);
-		}
-	else if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
-		{
-		CBS dh_Yc;
-		int dh_len;
-
-		if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange, &dh_Yc) ||
-			CBS_len(&dh_Yc) == 0 ||
-			CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0)
-			{
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
-			al = SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR;
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-
-		if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-                dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
-
-		pub = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_Yc), CBS_len(&dh_Yc), NULL);
-		if (pub == NULL)
-			{
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		/* Allocate a buffer for the premaster secret. */
-		premaster_secret = OPENSSL_malloc(DH_size(dh_srvr));
-		if (premaster_secret == NULL)
-			{
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		dh_len = DH_compute_key(premaster_secret, pub, dh_srvr);
-		if (dh_len <= 0)
-			{
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
-			BN_clear_free(pub);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
-		s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;
-		BN_clear_free(pub);
-		pub=NULL;
-
-		premaster_secret_len = dh_len;
-		}
-
-	else if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
-		{
-		int field_size = 0, ecdh_len;
-		const EC_KEY   *tkey;
-		const EC_GROUP *group;
-		const BIGNUM *priv_key;
-		CBS ecdh_Yc;
-
-		/* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
-		if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) 
-			{
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-                /* Use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
-                 * ServerKeyExchange msg. */
-                tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
-
-		group    = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
-		priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
-
-		if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
-		    !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
-			{
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		/* Let's get client's public key */
-		if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
-			{
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		/* Get client's public key from encoded point
-		 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
-		 */
-		if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange, &ecdh_Yc) ||
-			CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0)
-			{
-			al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-
-		if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
-			{
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint,
-				CBS_data(&ecdh_Yc), CBS_len(&ecdh_Yc), bn_ctx))
-			{
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		/* Allocate a buffer for both the secret and the PSK. */
-		field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
-		if (field_size <= 0)
-			{
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		ecdh_len = (field_size + 7) / 8;
-		premaster_secret = OPENSSL_malloc(ecdh_len);
-		if (premaster_secret == NULL)
-			{
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		/* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
-		ecdh_len = ECDH_compute_key(premaster_secret,
-			ecdh_len, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
-		if (ecdh_len <= 0)
-			{
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
-		clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
-		EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
-		clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
-		EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
-		srvr_ecdh = NULL;
-		BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
-		bn_ctx = NULL;
-		EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
-		s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
-
-		premaster_secret_len = ecdh_len;
-		}
-	else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
-		{
-		/* For plain PSK, other_secret is a block of 0s with the same
-		 * length as the pre-shared key. */
-		premaster_secret_len = psk_len;
-		premaster_secret = OPENSSL_malloc(premaster_secret_len);
-		if (premaster_secret == NULL)
-			{
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		memset(premaster_secret, 0, premaster_secret_len);
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-	/* For a PSK cipher suite, the actual pre-master secret is combined with
-	 * the pre-shared key. */
-	if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK)
-		{
-		CBB new_premaster, child;
-		uint8_t *new_data;
-		size_t new_len;
-
-		if (!CBB_init(&new_premaster, 2 + psk_len + 2 + premaster_secret_len))
-			{
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&new_premaster, &child) ||
-			!CBB_add_bytes(&child, premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len) ||
-			!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&new_premaster, &child) ||
-			!CBB_add_bytes(&child, psk, psk_len) ||
-			!CBB_finish(&new_premaster, &new_data, &new_len))
-			{
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			CBB_cleanup(&new_premaster);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len);
-		OPENSSL_free(premaster_secret);
-		premaster_secret = new_data;
-		premaster_secret_len = new_len;
-		}
-
-	/* Compute the master secret */
-	s->session->master_key_length = s->enc_method
-		->generate_master_secret(s,
-			s->session->master_key, premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len);
-	if (s->session->master_key_length == 0)
-		goto err;
-	s->session->extended_master_secret = s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret;
-
-	OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len);
-	OPENSSL_free(premaster_secret);
-	return 1;
+  return -1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) {
+  int al, ok;
+  long n;
+  CBS client_key_exchange;
+  unsigned long alg_k;
+  unsigned long alg_a;
+  uint8_t *premaster_secret = NULL;
+  size_t premaster_secret_len = 0;
+  RSA *rsa = NULL;
+  uint8_t *decrypt_buf = NULL;
+  EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+  BIGNUM *pub = NULL;
+  DH *dh_srvr;
+
+  EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
+  EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
+  EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
+  BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
+  unsigned int psk_len = 0;
+  uint8_t psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
+
+  n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
+                                 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
+                                 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, /* ??? */
+                                 SSL_GET_MESSAGE_HASH_MESSAGE, &ok);
+
+  if (!ok) {
+    return n;
+  }
+
+  CBS_init(&client_key_exchange, s->init_msg, n);
+
+  alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+  alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+
+  /* If using a PSK key exchange, prepare the pre-shared key. */
+  if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
+    CBS psk_identity;
+
+    /* If using PSK, the ClientKeyExchange contains a psk_identity. If PSK,
+     * then this is the only field in the message. */
+    if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange, &psk_identity) ||
+        ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+      al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange,
+                        SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
+      al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    if (CBS_len(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN ||
+        CBS_contains_zero_byte(&psk_identity)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange,
+                        SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+      al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    if (!CBS_strdup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
+      al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange,
+                        ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    /* Look up the key for the identity. */
+    psk_len =
+        s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity, psk, sizeof(psk));
+    if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange,
+                        ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+      goto f_err;
+    } else if (psk_len == 0) {
+      /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange,
+                        SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
+      al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* Depending on the key exchange method, compute |premaster_secret| and
+   * |premaster_secret_len|. */
+  if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
+    CBS encrypted_premaster_secret;
+    uint8_t rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+    uint8_t good;
+    size_t rsa_size, decrypt_len, premaster_index, j;
+
+    pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
+    if (pkey == NULL || pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA || pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL) {
+      al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange,
+                        SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+    rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
+
+    /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
+    if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
+      CBS copy = client_key_exchange;
+      if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange,
+                                       &encrypted_premaster_secret) ||
+          CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0) {
+        if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) {
+          al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange,
+                            SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
+          goto f_err;
+        } else {
+          encrypted_premaster_secret = copy;
+        }
+      }
+    } else {
+      encrypted_premaster_secret = client_key_exchange;
+    }
+
+    /* Reject overly short RSA keys because we want to be sure that the buffer
+     * size makes it safe to iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
+     * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The actual expected size is larger due to
+     * RSA padding, but the bound is sufficient to be safe. */
+    rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa);
+    if (rsa_size < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
+      al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange,
+                        SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    /* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
+     * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
+     * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
+     * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt fails.
+     * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */
+    if (!RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret))) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Allocate a buffer large enough for an RSA decryption. */
+    decrypt_buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size);
+    if (decrypt_buf == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange,
+                        ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of the
+     * timing-sensitive code below. */
+    if (!RSA_decrypt(rsa, &decrypt_len, decrypt_buf, rsa_size,
+                     CBS_data(&encrypted_premaster_secret),
+                     CBS_len(&encrypted_premaster_secret), RSA_NO_PADDING)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    if (decrypt_len != rsa_size) {
+      /* This should never happen, but do a check so we do not read
+       * uninitialized memory. */
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange,
+                        ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Remove the PKCS#1 padding and adjust |decrypt_len| as appropriate.
+     * |good| will be 0xff if the premaster is acceptable and zero otherwise.
+     * */
+    good =
+        constant_time_eq_int_8(RSA_message_index_PKCS1_type_2(
+                                   decrypt_buf, decrypt_len, &premaster_index),
+                               1);
+    decrypt_len = decrypt_len - premaster_index;
+
+    /* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. */
+    good &= constant_time_eq_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
+
+    /* Copy over the unpadded premaster. Whatever the value of
+     * |decrypt_good_mask|, copy as if the premaster were the right length. It
+     * is important the memory access pattern be constant. */
+    premaster_secret =
+        BUF_memdup(decrypt_buf + (rsa_size - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH),
+                   SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
+    if (premaster_secret == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange,
+                        ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      goto err;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(decrypt_buf);
+    decrypt_buf = NULL;
+
+    /* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
+     * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
+     * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
+     * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number check as
+     * a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in constant time
+     * and are treated like any other decryption error. */
+    good &= constant_time_eq_8(premaster_secret[0],
+                               (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
+    good &= constant_time_eq_8(premaster_secret[1],
+                               (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
+
+    /* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over premaster_secret using
+     * decrypt_good_mask. */
+    for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
+      premaster_secret[j] = constant_time_select_8(good, premaster_secret[j],
+                                                   rand_premaster_secret[j]);
+    }
+
+    premaster_secret_len = sizeof(rand_premaster_secret);
+  } else if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) {
+    CBS dh_Yc;
+    int dh_len;
+
+    if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange, &dh_Yc) ||
+        CBS_len(&dh_Yc) == 0 || CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange,
+                        SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
+      al = SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR;
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
+      al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange,
+                        SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+    dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
+
+    pub = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_Yc), CBS_len(&dh_Yc), NULL);
+    if (pub == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Allocate a buffer for the premaster secret. */
+    premaster_secret = OPENSSL_malloc(DH_size(dh_srvr));
+    if (premaster_secret == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange,
+                        ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    dh_len = DH_compute_key(premaster_secret, pub, dh_srvr);
+    if (dh_len <= 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+      BN_clear_free(pub);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
+    s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
+    BN_clear_free(pub);
+    pub = NULL;
+
+    premaster_secret_len = dh_len;
+  } else if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) {
+    int field_size = 0, ecdh_len;
+    const EC_KEY *tkey;
+    const EC_GROUP *group;
+    const BIGNUM *priv_key;
+    CBS ecdh_Yc;
+
+    /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
+    srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new();
+    if (srvr_ecdh == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange,
+                        ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the ServerKeyExchange
+     * msg. */
+    tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
+
+    group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
+    priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
+
+    if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
+        !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Let's get client's public key */
+    clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group);
+    if (clnt_ecpoint == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange,
+                        ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Get client's public key from encoded point in the ClientKeyExchange
+     * message. */
+    if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange, &ecdh_Yc) ||
+        CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0) {
+      al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+    if (bn_ctx == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange,
+                        ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, CBS_data(&ecdh_Yc),
+                            CBS_len(&ecdh_Yc), bn_ctx)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Allocate a buffer for both the secret and the PSK. */
+    field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
+    if (field_size <= 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    ecdh_len = (field_size + 7) / 8;
+    premaster_secret = OPENSSL_malloc(ecdh_len);
+    if (premaster_secret == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange,
+                        ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
+    ecdh_len = ECDH_compute_key(premaster_secret, ecdh_len, clnt_ecpoint,
+                                srvr_ecdh, NULL);
+    if (ecdh_len <= 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
+    clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
+    EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
+    clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
+    EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
+    srvr_ecdh = NULL;
+    BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+    bn_ctx = NULL;
+    EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
+    s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
+
+    premaster_secret_len = ecdh_len;
+  } else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
+    /* For plain PSK, other_secret is a block of 0s with the same length as the
+     * pre-shared key. */
+    premaster_secret_len = psk_len;
+    premaster_secret = OPENSSL_malloc(premaster_secret_len);
+    if (premaster_secret == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange,
+                        ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      goto err;
+    }
+    memset(premaster_secret, 0, premaster_secret_len);
+  } else {
+    al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange,
+                      SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
+    goto f_err;
+  }
+
+  /* For a PSK cipher suite, the actual pre-master secret is combined with the
+   * pre-shared key. */
+  if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
+    CBB new_premaster, child;
+    uint8_t *new_data;
+    size_t new_len;
+
+    if (!CBB_init(&new_premaster, 2 + psk_len + 2 + premaster_secret_len)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange,
+                        ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      goto err;
+    }
+    if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&new_premaster, &child) ||
+        !CBB_add_bytes(&child, premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len) ||
+        !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&new_premaster, &child) ||
+        !CBB_add_bytes(&child, psk, psk_len) ||
+        !CBB_finish(&new_premaster, &new_data, &new_len)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange,
+                        ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      CBB_cleanup(&new_premaster);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len);
+    OPENSSL_free(premaster_secret);
+    premaster_secret = new_data;
+    premaster_secret_len = new_len;
+  }
+
+  /* Compute the master secret */
+  s->session->master_key_length = s->enc_method->generate_master_secret(
+      s, s->session->master_key, premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len);
+  if (s->session->master_key_length == 0) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  s->session->extended_master_secret = s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret;
+
+  OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len);
+  OPENSSL_free(premaster_secret);
+  return 1;
+
 f_err:
-	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+  ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
 err:
-	if (premaster_secret)
-		{
-		if (premaster_secret_len)
-			OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len);
-		OPENSSL_free(premaster_secret);
-		}
-	if (decrypt_buf)
-		OPENSSL_free(decrypt_buf);
-	EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
-	EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
-	if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) 
-		EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
-	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
-	return(-1);
-	}
-
-int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int al,ok,ret=0;
-	long n;
-	CBS certificate_verify, signature;
-	X509 *peer = s->session->peer;
-	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-	const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
-	uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-	size_t digest_length;
-	EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
-
-	/* Only RSA and ECDSA client certificates are supported, so a
-	 * CertificateVerify is required if and only if there's a
-	 * client certificate. */
-	if (peer == NULL)
-		{
-		if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, free_handshake_buffer))
-			return -1;
-		return 1;
-		}
-
-	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
-		SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
-		SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
-		SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
-		SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
-		SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE,
-		&ok);
-
-	if (!ok)
-		return (int)n;
-
-	/* Filter out unsupported certificate types. */
-	pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
-	if (!(X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey) & EVP_PKT_SIGN) ||
-		(pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA && pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
-		{
-		al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
-		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_verify, SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-	CBS_init(&certificate_verify, s->init_msg, n);
-
-	/* Determine the digest type if needbe. */
-	if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
-		{
-		if (!tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, &al, s, &certificate_verify, pkey))
-			goto f_err;
-		}
-
-	/* Compute the digest. */
-	if (!ssl3_cert_verify_hash(s, digest, &digest_length, &md, pkey))
-		goto err;
-
-	/* The handshake buffer is no longer necessary, and we may hash the
-	 * current message.*/
-	if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, free_handshake_buffer))
-		goto err;
-	ssl3_hash_current_message(s);
-
-	/* Parse and verify the signature. */
-	if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&certificate_verify, &signature) ||
-		CBS_len(&certificate_verify) != 0)
-		{
-		al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_verify, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-	pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
-	if (pctx == NULL)
-		goto err;
-	if (!EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) ||
-		!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, md) ||
-		!EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, CBS_data(&signature), CBS_len(&signature),
-			digest, digest_length))
-		{
-		al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
-		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_verify, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-	ret = 1;
-	if (0)
-		{
-f_err:
-		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
-		}
+  if (premaster_secret) {
+    if (premaster_secret_len) {
+      OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len);
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(premaster_secret);
+  }
+  if (decrypt_buf) {
+    OPENSSL_free(decrypt_buf);
+  }
+  EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
+  EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
+  if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) {
+    EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
+  }
+  BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+
+  return -1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) {
+  int al, ok, ret = 0;
+  long n;
+  CBS certificate_verify, signature;
+  X509 *peer = s->session->peer;
+  EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+  const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+  uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  size_t digest_length;
+  EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
+
+  /* Only RSA and ECDSA client certificates are supported, so a
+   * CertificateVerify is required if and only if there's a client certificate.
+   * */
+  if (peer == NULL) {
+    if (s->s3->handshake_buffer &&
+        !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, free_handshake_buffer)) {
+      return -1;
+    }
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  n = s->method->ssl_get_message(
+      s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
+      SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
+      SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE, &ok);
+
+  if (!ok) {
+    return n;
+  }
+
+  /* Filter out unsupported certificate types. */
+  pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
+  if (!(X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey) & EVP_PKT_SIGN) ||
+      (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA && pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
+    al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_verify,
+                      SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+    goto f_err;
+  }
+
+  CBS_init(&certificate_verify, s->init_msg, n);
+
+  /* Determine the digest type if needbe. */
+  if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
+      !tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, &al, s, &certificate_verify, pkey)) {
+    goto f_err;
+  }
+
+  /* Compute the digest. */
+  if (!ssl3_cert_verify_hash(s, digest, &digest_length, &md, pkey)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* The handshake buffer is no longer necessary, and we may hash the current
+   * message.*/
+  if (s->s3->handshake_buffer &&
+      !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, free_handshake_buffer)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  ssl3_hash_current_message(s);
+
+  /* Parse and verify the signature. */
+  if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&certificate_verify, &signature) ||
+      CBS_len(&certificate_verify) != 0) {
+    al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_verify, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    goto f_err;
+  }
+
+  pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
+  if (pctx == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  if (!EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) ||
+      !EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, md) ||
+      !EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, CBS_data(&signature), CBS_len(&signature), digest,
+                       digest_length)) {
+    al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_verify, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+    goto f_err;
+  }
+
+  ret = 1;
+
+  if (0) {
+  f_err:
+    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+  }
+
 err:
-	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
-	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
-	X509 *x=NULL;
-	unsigned long n;
-	STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
-	SHA256_CTX sha256;
-	CBS certificate_msg, certificate_list;
-	int is_first_certificate = 1;
-
-	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
-		SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
-		SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
-		-1,
-		s->max_cert_list,
-		SSL_GET_MESSAGE_HASH_MESSAGE,
-		&ok);
-
-	if (!ok) return((int)n);
-
-	if	(s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
-		{
-		if (	(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
-			(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
-			{
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
-			al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		/* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
-		if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
-			{
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
-			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
-		return(1);
-		}
-
-	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-	CBS_init(&certificate_msg, s->init_msg, n);
-
-	if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
-		{
-		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_msg, &certificate_list) ||
-		CBS_len(&certificate_msg) != 0)
-		{
-		al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-	while (CBS_len(&certificate_list) > 0)
-		{
-		CBS certificate;
-		const uint8_t *data;
-
-		if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &certificate))
-			{
-			al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		if (is_first_certificate && s->ctx->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs)
-			{
-			/* If this is the first certificate, and we don't want
-			 * to keep peer certificates in memory, then we hash it
-			 * right away. */
-			SHA256_Init(&sha256);
-			SHA256_Update(&sha256, CBS_data(&certificate), CBS_len(&certificate));
-			SHA256_Final(s->session->peer_sha256, &sha256);
-			s->session->peer_sha256_valid = 1;
-			}
-		is_first_certificate = 0;
-		data = CBS_data(&certificate);
-		x = d2i_X509(NULL, &data, CBS_len(&certificate));
-		if (x == NULL)
-			{
-			al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		if (data != CBS_data(&certificate) + CBS_len(&certificate))
-			{
-			al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x))
-			{
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		x = NULL;
-		}
-
-	if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
-		{
-		/* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
-		if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		/* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
-		else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
-			 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
-			{
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
-			al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		/* No client certificate so digest cached records */
-		if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, free_handshake_buffer))
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
-		if (i <= 0)
-			{
-			al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		}
-
-	if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
-		X509_free(s->session->peer);
-	s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
-	s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
-
-	/* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
-	 * when we arrive here. */
-	if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
-		{
-		s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
-		if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
-			{
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		}
-	if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
-		sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
-	s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
-	/* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
-	 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
-
-	sk=NULL;
-
-	ret=1;
-	if (0)
-		{
-f_err:
-		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
-		}
+  EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+  EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) {
+  int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
+  X509 *x = NULL;
+  unsigned long n;
+  STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
+  SHA256_CTX sha256;
+  CBS certificate_msg, certificate_list;
+  int is_first_certificate = 1;
+
+  n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, -1,
+                                 s->max_cert_list, SSL_GET_MESSAGE_HASH_MESSAGE,
+                                 &ok);
+
+  if (!ok) {
+    return n;
+  }
+
+  if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
+    if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
+        (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate,
+                        SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
+      al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
+    if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate,
+                        SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
+      al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+    s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
+    al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate,
+                      SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
+    goto f_err;
+  }
+
+  CBS_init(&certificate_msg, s->init_msg, n);
+
+  sk = sk_X509_new_null();
+  if (sk == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_msg, &certificate_list) ||
+      CBS_len(&certificate_msg) != 0) {
+    al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    goto f_err;
+  }
+
+  while (CBS_len(&certificate_list) > 0) {
+    CBS certificate;
+    const uint8_t *data;
+
+    if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &certificate)) {
+      al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    if (is_first_certificate && s->ctx->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs) {
+      /* If this is the first certificate, and we don't want to keep peer
+       * certificates in memory, then we hash it right away. */
+      SHA256_Init(&sha256);
+      SHA256_Update(&sha256, CBS_data(&certificate), CBS_len(&certificate));
+      SHA256_Final(s->session->peer_sha256, &sha256);
+      s->session->peer_sha256_valid = 1;
+    }
+    is_first_certificate = 0;
+
+    data = CBS_data(&certificate);
+    x = d2i_X509(NULL, &data, CBS_len(&certificate));
+    if (x == NULL) {
+      al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+    if (data != CBS_data(&certificate) + CBS_len(&certificate)) {
+      al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate,
+                        SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+    if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      goto err;
+    }
+    x = NULL;
+  }
+
+  if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
+    /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
+    if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+      al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate,
+                        SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+    /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
+    else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
+             (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate,
+                        SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
+      al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+    /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
+    if (s->s3->handshake_buffer &&
+        !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, free_handshake_buffer)) {
+      al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+  } else {
+    i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
+    if (i <= 0) {
+      al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate,
+                        SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (s->session->peer != NULL) {
+    /* This should not be needed */
+    X509_free(s->session->peer);
+  }
+
+  s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
+  s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
+
+  /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we
+   * arrive here. */
+  if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
+    s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
+    if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+  if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL) {
+    sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
+  }
+  s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk;
+  /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
+   * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
+
+  sk = NULL;
+
+  ret = 1;
+
+  if (0) {
+  f_err:
+    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+  }
+
 err:
-	if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
-	if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
-	{
-	CERT_PKEY *cpk;
-
-	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
-		{
-		cpk=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
-		if (cpk == NULL)
-			{
-			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_certificate, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			return(0);
-			}
-
-		ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,cpk);
-		s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
-		}
-
-	/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
-	return ssl_do_write(s);
-	}
+  if (x != NULL) {
+    X509_free(x);
+  }
+  if (sk != NULL) {
+    sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) {
+  CERT_PKEY *cpk;
+
+  if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
+    cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
+    if (cpk == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_certificate,
+                        ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk);
+    s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
+  }
+
+  /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
+  return ssl_do_write(s);
+}
 
 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
-int ssl3_send_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
-	{
-	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
-		{
-		uint8_t *session;
-		size_t session_len;
-		uint8_t *p, *macstart;
-		int len;
-		unsigned int hlen;
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
-		HMAC_CTX hctx;
-		SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
-		unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
-		unsigned char key_name[16];
-		/* The maximum overhead of encrypting the session is 16 (key
-		 * name) + IV + one block of encryption overhead + HMAC.  */
-		const size_t max_ticket_overhead = 16 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
-			EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE;
-
-		/* Serialize the SSL_SESSION to be encoded into the ticket. */
-		if (!SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_for_ticket(s->session, &session,
-				&session_len))
-			{
-			return -1;
-			}
-
-		/* If the session is too long, emit a dummy value rather than
-		 * abort the connection. */
-		if (session_len > 0xFFFF - max_ticket_overhead)
-			{
-			const char kTicketPlaceholder[] = "TICKET TOO LARGE";
-			size_t placeholder_len = strlen(kTicketPlaceholder);
-
-			OPENSSL_free(session);
-
-			p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
-			/* Emit ticket_lifetime_hint. */
-			l2n(0, p);
-			/* Emit ticket. */
-			s2n(placeholder_len, p);
-			memcpy(p, kTicketPlaceholder, placeholder_len);
-			p += placeholder_len;
-
-			len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
-			ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
-			s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
-			return ssl_do_write(s);
-			}
-
-		/* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
-		 * follows: handshake_header_length +
- 		 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
-		 * max_ticket_overhead + * session_length */
-		if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
-				SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 6 +
-				max_ticket_overhead + session_len))
-			{
-			OPENSSL_free(session);
-			return -1;
-			}
-		p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
-		HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
-		/* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
-		 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
-		 * from parent ctx.
-		 */
-		if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
-			{
-			if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
-							 &hctx, 1) < 0)
-				{
-				OPENSSL_free(session);
-				EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-				HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
-				return -1;
-				}
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			if (!RAND_bytes(iv, 16) ||
-				!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv) ||
-				!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, tlsext_tick_md(), NULL))
-				{
-				OPENSSL_free(session);
-				EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-				HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
-				return -1;
-				}
-			memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
-			}
-
-		/* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
-		 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
-		 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
-		 * as their sessions. */
-		l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
-
-		/* Skip ticket length for now */
-		p += 2;
-		/* Output key name */
-		macstart = p;
-		memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
-		p += 16;
-		/* output IV */
-		memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
-		p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
-		/* Encrypt session data */
-		EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, session, session_len);
-		p += len;
-		EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ctx, p, &len);
-		p += len;
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-
-		HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
-		HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
-		HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
-
-		p += hlen;
-		/* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
-		/* Total length */
-		len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
-		/* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
-		p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
-		s2n(len - 6, p);
-		ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
-		s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
-		OPENSSL_free(session);
-		}
-
-	/* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
-	return ssl_do_write(s);
-	}
-
-#if 0
-int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
-	{
-	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
-		{
-		unsigned char *p;
-		/* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
- 		 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
- 		 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
- 		 * + (ocsp response)
- 		 */
-		if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
-			return -1;
-
-		p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-
-		/* do the header */
-		*(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
-		/* message length */
-		l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
-		/* status type */
-		*(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
-		/* length of OCSP response */
-		l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
-		/* actual response */
-		memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
-		/* number of bytes to write */
-		s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
-		s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
-		s->init_off = 0;
-		}
-
-	/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
-	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-	}
-#endif
+int ssl3_send_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) {
+  if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
+    uint8_t *session;
+    size_t session_len;
+    uint8_t *p, *macstart;
+    int len;
+    unsigned int hlen;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+    HMAC_CTX hctx;
+    SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
+    uint8_t iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+    uint8_t key_name[16];
+    /* The maximum overhead of encrypting the session is 16 (key name) + IV +
+     * one block of encryption overhead + HMAC.  */
+    const size_t max_ticket_overhead =
+        16 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE;
+
+    /* Serialize the SSL_SESSION to be encoded into the ticket. */
+    if (!SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_for_ticket(s->session, &session, &session_len)) {
+      return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* If the session is too long, emit a dummy value rather than abort the
+     * connection. */
+    if (session_len > 0xFFFF - max_ticket_overhead) {
+      static const char kTicketPlaceholder[] = "TICKET TOO LARGE";
+      const size_t placeholder_len = strlen(kTicketPlaceholder);
+
+      OPENSSL_free(session);
+
+      p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
+      /* Emit ticket_lifetime_hint. */
+      l2n(0, p);
+      /* Emit ticket. */
+      s2n(placeholder_len, p);
+      memcpy(p, kTicketPlaceholder, placeholder_len);
+      p += placeholder_len;
+
+      len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
+      ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
+      s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
+      return ssl_do_write(s);
+    }
+
+    /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as follows:
+     * handshake_header_length + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
+     * max_ticket_overhead + * session_length */
+    if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 6 +
+                                       max_ticket_overhead + session_len)) {
+      OPENSSL_free(session);
+      return -1;
+    }
+    p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+    HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
+    /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does all the
+     * work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. */
+    if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
+      if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, &hctx, 1) < 0) {
+        OPENSSL_free(session);
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+        HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+        return -1;
+      }
+    } else {
+      if (!RAND_bytes(iv, 16) ||
+          !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
+                              tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv) ||
+          !HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, tlsext_tick_md(),
+                        NULL)) {
+        OPENSSL_free(session);
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+        HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+        return -1;
+      }
+      memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
+    }
+
+    /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified for
+     * resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for new
+     * sessions will live as long as their sessions. */
+    l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
+
+    /* Skip ticket length for now */
+    p += 2;
+    /* Output key name */
+    macstart = p;
+    memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
+    p += 16;
+    /* output IV */
+    memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
+    p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
+    /* Encrypt session data */
+    EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, session, session_len);
+    p += len;
+    EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ctx, p, &len);
+    p += len;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+
+    HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
+    HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
+    HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+
+    p += hlen;
+    /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
+    /* Total length */
+    len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
+    /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
+    p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
+    s2n(len - 6, p);
+    ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
+    s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
+    OPENSSL_free(session);
+  }
+
+  /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
+  return ssl_do_write(s);
+}
 
 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
  * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
-int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int ok;
-	long n;
-	CBS next_protocol, selected_protocol, padding;
-
-	/* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
-	 * extension in their ClientHello */
-	if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
-		{
-		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_next_proto, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
-		return -1;
-		}
-
-	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
-		SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
-		SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
-		SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO,
-		514,  /* See the payload format below */
-		SSL_GET_MESSAGE_HASH_MESSAGE,
-		&ok);
-
-	if (!ok)
-		return((int)n);
-
-	/* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
-	 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
-	 * by ssl3_get_finished).
-	 * TODO(davidben): Is this check now redundant with
-	 * SSL3_FLAGS_EXPECT_CCS? */
-	if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
-		{
-		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_next_proto, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
-		return -1;
-		}
-
-	CBS_init(&next_protocol, s->init_msg, n);
-
-	/* The payload looks like:
-	 *   uint8 proto_len;
-	 *   uint8 proto[proto_len];
-	 *   uint8 padding_len;
-	 *   uint8 padding[padding_len];
-	 */
-	if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&next_protocol, &selected_protocol) ||
-		!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&next_protocol, &padding) ||
-		CBS_len(&next_protocol) != 0)
-		return 0;
-
-	if (!CBS_stow(&selected_protocol,
-			&s->next_proto_negotiated,
-			&s->next_proto_negotiated_len))
-		return 0;
-
-	return 1;
-	}
+int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s) {
+  int ok;
+  long n;
+  CBS next_protocol, selected_protocol, padding;
+
+  /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the extension
+   * in their ClientHello */
+  if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_next_proto,
+                      SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
+                                 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B, SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO,
+                                 514, /* See the payload format below */
+                                 SSL_GET_MESSAGE_HASH_MESSAGE, &ok);
+
+  if (!ok) {
+    return n;
+  }
+
+  /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
+   * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
+   * ssl3_get_finished).
+   *
+   * TODO(davidben): Is this check now redundant with
+   * SSL3_FLAGS_EXPECT_CCS? */
+  if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_next_proto,
+                      SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  CBS_init(&next_protocol, s->init_msg, n);
+
+  /* The payload looks like:
+   *   uint8 proto_len;
+   *   uint8 proto[proto_len];
+   *   uint8 padding_len;
+   *   uint8 padding[padding_len]; */
+  if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&next_protocol, &selected_protocol) ||
+      !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&next_protocol, &padding) ||
+      CBS_len(&next_protocol) != 0 ||
+      !CBS_stow(&selected_protocol, &s->next_proto_negotiated,
+                &s->next_proto_negotiated_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
 
 /* ssl3_get_channel_id reads and verifies a ClientID handshake message. */
-int ssl3_get_channel_id(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int ret = -1, ok;
-	long n;
-	EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
-	uint8_t channel_id_hash[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-	unsigned int channel_id_hash_len;
-	const uint8_t *p;
-	uint16_t extension_type, expected_extension_type;
-	EC_GROUP* p256 = NULL;
-	EC_KEY* key = NULL;
-	EC_POINT* point = NULL;
-	ECDSA_SIG sig;
-	BIGNUM x, y;
-	CBS encrypted_extensions, extension;
-
-	n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
-		SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A,
-		SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_B,
-		SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
-		2 + 2 + TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE,
-		SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE,
-		&ok);
-
-	if (!ok)
-		return((int)n);
-
-	/* Before incorporating the EncryptedExtensions message to the
-	 * handshake hash, compute the hash that should have been signed. */
-	channel_id_hash_len = sizeof(channel_id_hash);
-	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
-	if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_sha256(), NULL) ||
-		!tls1_channel_id_hash(&md_ctx, s) ||
-		!EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx, channel_id_hash, &channel_id_hash_len))
-		{
-		EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
-		return -1;
-		}
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
-	assert(channel_id_hash_len == SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-
-	ssl3_hash_current_message(s);
-
-	/* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
-	 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
-	 * by ssl3_get_finished).
-	 * TODO(davidben): Is this check now redundant with
-	 * SSL3_FLAGS_EXPECT_CCS? */
-	if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
-		{
-		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_channel_id, SSL_R_GOT_CHANNEL_ID_BEFORE_A_CCS);
-		return -1;
-		}
-
-	CBS_init(&encrypted_extensions, s->init_msg, n);
-
-	/* EncryptedExtensions could include multiple extensions, but
-	 * the only extension that could be negotiated is ChannelID,
-	 * so there can only be one entry.
-	 *
-	 * The payload looks like:
-	 *   uint16 extension_type
-	 *   uint16 extension_len;
-	 *   uint8 x[32];
-	 *   uint8 y[32];
-	 *   uint8 r[32];
-	 *   uint8 s[32];
-	 */
-	expected_extension_type = TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id;
-	if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new)
-		expected_extension_type = TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new;
-
-	if (!CBS_get_u16(&encrypted_extensions, &extension_type) ||
-		!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&encrypted_extensions, &extension) ||
-		CBS_len(&encrypted_extensions) != 0 ||
-		extension_type != expected_extension_type ||
-		CBS_len(&extension) != TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE)
-		{
-		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_channel_id, SSL_R_INVALID_MESSAGE);
-		return -1;
-		}
-
-	p256 = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
-	if (!p256)
-		{
-		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_channel_id, SSL_R_NO_P256_SUPPORT);
-		return -1;
-		}
-
-	BN_init(&x);
-	BN_init(&y);
-	sig.r = BN_new();
-	sig.s = BN_new();
-
-	p = CBS_data(&extension);
-	if (BN_bin2bn(p +  0, 32, &x) == NULL ||
-	    BN_bin2bn(p + 32, 32, &y) == NULL ||
-	    BN_bin2bn(p + 64, 32, sig.r) == NULL ||
-	    BN_bin2bn(p + 96, 32, sig.s) == NULL)
-		goto err;
-
-	point = EC_POINT_new(p256);
-	if (!point ||
-	    !EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(p256, point, &x, &y, NULL))
-		goto err;
-
-	key = EC_KEY_new();
-	if (!key ||
-	    !EC_KEY_set_group(key, p256) ||
-	    !EC_KEY_set_public_key(key, point))
-		goto err;
-
-	/* We stored the handshake hash in |tlsext_channel_id| the first time
-	 * that we were called. */
-	if (!ECDSA_do_verify(channel_id_hash, channel_id_hash_len, &sig, key))
-		{
-		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_channel_id, SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_SIGNATURE_INVALID);
-		s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_channel_id, p, 64);
-	ret = 1;
+int ssl3_get_channel_id(SSL *s) {
+  int ret = -1, ok;
+  long n;
+  EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+  uint8_t channel_id_hash[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+  unsigned int channel_id_hash_len;
+  const uint8_t *p;
+  uint16_t extension_type, expected_extension_type;
+  EC_GROUP *p256 = NULL;
+  EC_KEY *key = NULL;
+  EC_POINT *point = NULL;
+  ECDSA_SIG sig;
+  BIGNUM x, y;
+  CBS encrypted_extensions, extension;
+
+  n = s->method->ssl_get_message(
+      s, SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_B,
+      SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, 2 + 2 + TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE,
+      SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE, &ok);
+
+  if (!ok) {
+    return n;
+  }
+
+  /* Before incorporating the EncryptedExtensions message to the handshake
+   * hash, compute the hash that should have been signed. */
+  channel_id_hash_len = sizeof(channel_id_hash);
+  EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+  if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_sha256(), NULL) ||
+      !tls1_channel_id_hash(&md_ctx, s) ||
+      !EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx, channel_id_hash, &channel_id_hash_len)) {
+    EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+    return -1;
+  }
+  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+  assert(channel_id_hash_len == SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+
+  ssl3_hash_current_message(s);
+
+  /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
+   * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
+   * ssl3_get_finished).
+   *
+   * TODO(davidben): Is this check now redundant with SSL3_FLAGS_EXPECT_CCS? */
+  if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_channel_id,
+                      SSL_R_GOT_CHANNEL_ID_BEFORE_A_CCS);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  CBS_init(&encrypted_extensions, s->init_msg, n);
+
+  /* EncryptedExtensions could include multiple extensions, but the only
+   * extension that could be negotiated is ChannelID, so there can only be one
+   * entry.
+   *
+   * The payload looks like:
+   *   uint16 extension_type
+   *   uint16 extension_len;
+   *   uint8 x[32];
+   *   uint8 y[32];
+   *   uint8 r[32];
+   *   uint8 s[32]; */
+  expected_extension_type = TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id;
+  if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new) {
+    expected_extension_type = TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new;
+  }
+
+  if (!CBS_get_u16(&encrypted_extensions, &extension_type) ||
+      !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&encrypted_extensions, &extension) ||
+      CBS_len(&encrypted_extensions) != 0 ||
+      extension_type != expected_extension_type ||
+      CBS_len(&extension) != TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_channel_id, SSL_R_INVALID_MESSAGE);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  p256 = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
+  if (!p256) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_channel_id, SSL_R_NO_P256_SUPPORT);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  BN_init(&x);
+  BN_init(&y);
+  sig.r = BN_new();
+  sig.s = BN_new();
+
+  p = CBS_data(&extension);
+  if (BN_bin2bn(p + 0, 32, &x) == NULL ||
+      BN_bin2bn(p + 32, 32, &y) == NULL ||
+      BN_bin2bn(p + 64, 32, sig.r) == NULL ||
+      BN_bin2bn(p + 96, 32, sig.s) == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  point = EC_POINT_new(p256);
+  if (!point || !EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(p256, point, &x, &y, NULL)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  key = EC_KEY_new();
+  if (!key || !EC_KEY_set_group(key, p256) ||
+      !EC_KEY_set_public_key(key, point)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* We stored the handshake hash in |tlsext_channel_id| the first time that we
+   * were called. */
+  if (!ECDSA_do_verify(channel_id_hash, channel_id_hash_len, &sig, key)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_channel_id,
+                      SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_SIGNATURE_INVALID);
+    s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_channel_id, p, 64);
+  ret = 1;
 
 err:
-	BN_free(&x);
-	BN_free(&y);
-	BN_free(sig.r);
-	BN_free(sig.s);
-	if (key)
-		EC_KEY_free(key);
-	if (point)
-		EC_POINT_free(point);
-	if (p256)
-		EC_GROUP_free(p256);
-	return ret;
-	}
-
+  BN_free(&x);
+  BN_free(&y);
+  BN_free(sig.r);
+  BN_free(sig.s);
+  if (key) {
+    EC_KEY_free(key);
+  }
+  if (point) {
+    EC_POINT_free(point);
+  }
+  if (p256) {
+    EC_GROUP_free(p256);
+  }
+  return ret;
+}