Inital import.

Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta).

(This change contains substantial changes from the original and
effectively starts a new history.)

1 files changed, 1385 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/ssl/ssl_cert.c b/ssl/ssl_cert.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..4fa041b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssl/ssl_cert.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1385 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/obj.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+#include "../crypto/dh/internal.h"
+#include "../crypto/directory.h"
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void)
+	{
+	static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx= -1;
+	int got_write_lock = 0;
+
+	CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+
+	if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0)
+		{
+		CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+		got_write_lock = 1;
+		
+		if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0)
+			{
+			ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx=X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(
+				0,"SSL for verify callback",NULL,NULL,NULL);
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (got_write_lock)
+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+	else
+		CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+	
+	return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx;
+	}
+
+void ssl_cert_set_default_md(CERT *cert)
+	{
+	/* Set digest values to defaults */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+	cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+	cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
+	cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+	cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
+#endif
+	}
+
+CERT *ssl_cert_new(void)
+	{
+	CERT *ret;
+
+	ret=(CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
+	if (ret == NULL)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_new, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		return(NULL);
+		}
+	memset(ret,0,sizeof(CERT));
+
+	ret->key= &(ret->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
+	ret->references=1;
+	ssl_cert_set_default_md(ret);
+	return(ret);
+	}
+
+CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert)
+	{
+	CERT *ret;
+	int i;
+
+	ret = (CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
+	if (ret == NULL)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		return(NULL);
+		}
+
+	memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT));
+
+	ret->key = &ret->pkeys[cert->key - &cert->pkeys[0]];
+	/* or ret->key = ret->pkeys + (cert->key - cert->pkeys),
+	 * if you find that more readable */
+
+	ret->valid = cert->valid;
+	ret->mask_k = cert->mask_k;
+	ret->mask_a = cert->mask_a;
+	ret->export_mask_k = cert->export_mask_k;
+	ret->export_mask_a = cert->export_mask_a;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+	if (cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)
+		{
+		RSA_up_ref(cert->rsa_tmp);
+		ret->rsa_tmp = cert->rsa_tmp;
+		}
+	ret->rsa_tmp_cb = cert->rsa_tmp_cb;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+	if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL)
+		{
+		ret->dh_tmp = DHparams_dup(cert->dh_tmp);
+		if (ret->dh_tmp == NULL)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		if (cert->dh_tmp->priv_key)
+			{
+			BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->priv_key);
+			if (!b)
+				{
+				OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			ret->dh_tmp->priv_key = b;
+			}
+		if (cert->dh_tmp->pub_key)
+			{
+			BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->pub_key);
+			if (!b)
+				{
+				OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			ret->dh_tmp->pub_key = b;
+			}
+		}
+	ret->dh_tmp_cb = cert->dh_tmp_cb;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+	if (cert->ecdh_tmp)
+		{
+		ret->ecdh_tmp = EC_KEY_dup(cert->ecdh_tmp);
+		if (ret->ecdh_tmp == NULL)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+	ret->ecdh_tmp_cb = cert->ecdh_tmp_cb;
+	ret->ecdh_tmp_auto = cert->ecdh_tmp_auto;
+#endif
+
+	for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
+		{
+		CERT_PKEY *cpk = cert->pkeys + i;
+		CERT_PKEY *rpk = ret->pkeys + i;
+		if (cpk->x509 != NULL)
+			{
+			rpk->x509 = cpk->x509;
+			CRYPTO_add(&rpk->x509->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+			}
+		
+		if (cpk->privatekey != NULL)
+			{
+			rpk->privatekey = cpk->privatekey;
+			CRYPTO_add(&cpk->privatekey->references, 1,
+				CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
+
+			switch(i) 
+				{
+				/* If there was anything special to do for
+				 * certain types of keys, we'd do it here.
+				 * (Nothing at the moment, I think.) */
+
+			case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
+			case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
+				/* We have an RSA key. */
+				break;
+				
+			case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
+				/* We have a DSA key. */
+				break;
+				
+			case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
+			case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
+				/* We have a DH key. */
+				break;
+
+			case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
+				/* We have an ECC key */
+				break;
+
+			default:
+				/* Can't happen. */
+				OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
+				}
+			}
+
+		if (cpk->chain)
+			{
+			rpk->chain = X509_chain_up_ref(cpk->chain);
+			if (!rpk->chain)
+				{
+				OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			}
+		rpk->valid_flags = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+     if (cert->pkeys[i].authz != NULL)
+			{
+			/* Just copy everything. */
+			ret->pkeys[i].authz_length =
+				cert->pkeys[i].authz_length;
+			ret->pkeys[i].authz =
+				OPENSSL_malloc(ret->pkeys[i].authz_length);
+			if (ret->pkeys[i].authz == NULL)
+				{
+				OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+				return NULL;
+				}
+			memcpy(ret->pkeys[i].authz,
+			       cert->pkeys[i].authz,
+			       cert->pkeys[i].authz_length);
+			}
+
+		if (cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo != NULL)
+			{
+			/* Just copy everything. */
+			ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo =
+				OPENSSL_malloc(cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length);
+			if (ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo == NULL)
+				{
+				OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+				return NULL;
+				}
+			ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length =
+				cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length;
+			memcpy(ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo,
+			       cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo,
+			       cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length);
+			}
+#endif
+		}
+	
+	ret->references=1;
+	/* Set digests to defaults. NB: we don't copy existing values as they
+	 * will be set during handshake.
+	 */
+	ssl_cert_set_default_md(ret);
+	/* Peer sigalgs set to NULL as we get these from handshake too */
+	ret->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
+	ret->peer_sigalgslen = 0;
+	/* Configured sigalgs however we copy across */
+
+	if (cert->conf_sigalgs)
+		{
+		ret->conf_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->conf_sigalgslen);
+		if (!ret->conf_sigalgs)
+			goto err;
+		memcpy(ret->conf_sigalgs, cert->conf_sigalgs,
+						cert->conf_sigalgslen);
+		ret->conf_sigalgslen = cert->conf_sigalgslen;
+		}
+	else
+		ret->conf_sigalgs = NULL;
+
+	if (cert->client_sigalgs)
+		{
+		ret->client_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->client_sigalgslen);
+		if (!ret->client_sigalgs)
+			goto err;
+		memcpy(ret->client_sigalgs, cert->client_sigalgs,
+						cert->client_sigalgslen);
+		ret->client_sigalgslen = cert->client_sigalgslen;
+		}
+	else
+		ret->client_sigalgs = NULL;
+	/* Shared sigalgs also NULL */
+	ret->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
+	/* Copy any custom client certificate types */
+	if (cert->ctypes)
+		{
+		ret->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->ctype_num);
+		if (!ret->ctypes)
+			goto err;
+		memcpy(ret->ctypes, cert->ctypes, cert->ctype_num);
+		ret->ctype_num = cert->ctype_num;
+		}
+
+	ret->cert_flags = cert->cert_flags;
+
+	ret->cert_cb = cert->cert_cb;
+	ret->cert_cb_arg = cert->cert_cb_arg;
+
+	if (cert->verify_store)
+		{
+		CRYPTO_add(&cert->verify_store->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+		ret->verify_store = cert->verify_store;
+		}
+
+	if (cert->chain_store)
+		{
+		CRYPTO_add(&cert->chain_store->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+		ret->chain_store = cert->chain_store;
+		}
+
+	ret->ciphers_raw = NULL;
+
+	return(ret);
+	
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
+err:
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+	if (ret->rsa_tmp != NULL)
+		RSA_free(ret->rsa_tmp);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+	if (ret->dh_tmp != NULL)
+		DH_free(ret->dh_tmp);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+	if (ret->ecdh_tmp != NULL)
+		EC_KEY_free(ret->ecdh_tmp);
+#endif
+
+	ssl_cert_clear_certs(ret);
+
+	return NULL;
+	}
+
+/* Free up and clear all certificates and chains */
+
+void ssl_cert_clear_certs(CERT *c)
+	{
+	int i;
+	if (c == NULL)
+		return;
+	for (i = 0; i<SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
+		{
+		CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i;
+		if (cpk->x509)
+			{
+			X509_free(cpk->x509);
+			cpk->x509 = NULL;
+			}
+		if (cpk->privatekey)
+			{
+			EVP_PKEY_free(cpk->privatekey);
+			cpk->privatekey = NULL;
+			}
+		if (cpk->chain)
+			{
+			sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
+			cpk->chain = NULL;
+			}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+		if (cpk->authz)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_free(cpk->authz);
+			cpk->authz = NULL;
+			}
+		if (cpk->serverinfo)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_free(cpk->serverinfo);
+			cpk->serverinfo = NULL;
+			cpk->serverinfo_length = 0;
+			}
+#endif
+		/* Clear all flags apart from explicit sign */
+		cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
+		}
+	}
+
+void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c)
+	{
+	int i;
+
+	if(c == NULL)
+	    return;
+
+	i=CRYPTO_add(&c->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
+#ifdef REF_PRINT
+	REF_PRINT("CERT",c);
+#endif
+	if (i > 0) return;
+#ifdef REF_CHECK
+	if (i < 0)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr,"ssl_cert_free, bad reference count\n");
+		abort(); /* ok */
+		}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+	if (c->rsa_tmp) RSA_free(c->rsa_tmp);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+	if (c->dh_tmp) DH_free(c->dh_tmp);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+	if (c->ecdh_tmp) EC_KEY_free(c->ecdh_tmp);
+#endif
+
+	ssl_cert_clear_certs(c);
+	if (c->peer_sigalgs)
+		OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
+	if (c->conf_sigalgs)
+		OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
+	if (c->client_sigalgs)
+		OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
+	if (c->shared_sigalgs)
+		OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
+	if (c->ctypes)
+		OPENSSL_free(c->ctypes);
+	if (c->verify_store)
+		X509_STORE_free(c->verify_store);
+	if (c->chain_store)
+		X509_STORE_free(c->chain_store);
+	if (c->ciphers_raw)
+		OPENSSL_free(c->ciphers_raw);
+	OPENSSL_free(c);
+	}
+
+int ssl_cert_inst(CERT **o)
+	{
+	/* Create a CERT if there isn't already one
+	 * (which cannot really happen, as it is initially created in
+	 * SSL_CTX_new; but the earlier code usually allows for that one
+	 * being non-existant, so we follow that behaviour, as it might
+	 * turn out that there actually is a reason for it -- but I'm
+	 * not sure that *all* of the existing code could cope with
+	 * s->cert being NULL, otherwise we could do without the
+	 * initialization in SSL_CTX_new).
+	 */
+	
+	if (o == NULL) 
+		{
+		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_inst, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+		return(0);
+		}
+	if (*o == NULL)
+		{
+		if ((*o = ssl_cert_new()) == NULL)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_new, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			return(0);
+			}
+		}
+	return(1);
+	}
+
+int ssl_cert_set0_chain(CERT *c, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+	{
+	CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key;
+	if (!cpk)
+		return 0;
+	if (cpk->chain)
+		sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
+	cpk->chain = chain;
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+int ssl_cert_set1_chain(CERT *c, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+	{
+	STACK_OF(X509) *dchain;
+	if (!chain)
+		return ssl_cert_set0_chain(c, NULL);
+	dchain = X509_chain_up_ref(chain);
+	if (!dchain)
+		return 0;
+	if (!ssl_cert_set0_chain(c, dchain))
+		{
+		sk_X509_pop_free(dchain, X509_free);
+		return 0;
+		}
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+int ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x)
+	{
+	CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key;
+	if (!cpk)
+		return 0;
+	if (!cpk->chain)
+		cpk->chain = sk_X509_new_null();
+	if (!cpk->chain || !sk_X509_push(cpk->chain, x))
+		return 0;
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+int ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x)
+	{
+	if (!ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(c, x))
+		return 0;
+	CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+int ssl_cert_select_current(CERT *c, X509 *x)
+	{
+	int i;
+	if (x == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
+		{
+		if (c->pkeys[i].x509 == x)
+			{
+			c->key = &c->pkeys[i];
+			return 1;
+			}
+		}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
+		{
+		if (c->pkeys[i].x509 && !X509_cmp(c->pkeys[i].x509, x))
+			{
+			c->key = &c->pkeys[i];
+			return 1;
+			}
+		}
+	return 0;
+	}
+
+void ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(CERT *c, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg)
+	{
+	c->cert_cb = cb;
+	c->cert_cb_arg = arg;
+	}
+
+SESS_CERT *ssl_sess_cert_new(void)
+	{
+	SESS_CERT *ret;
+
+	ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *ret);
+	if (ret == NULL)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_sess_cert_new, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		return NULL;
+		}
+
+	memset(ret, 0 ,sizeof *ret);
+	ret->peer_key = &(ret->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
+	ret->references = 1;
+
+	return ret;
+	}
+
+void ssl_sess_cert_free(SESS_CERT *sc)
+	{
+	int i;
+
+	if (sc == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	i = CRYPTO_add(&sc->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESS_CERT);
+#ifdef REF_PRINT
+	REF_PRINT("SESS_CERT", sc);
+#endif
+	if (i > 0)
+		return;
+#ifdef REF_CHECK
+	if (i < 0)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr,"ssl_sess_cert_free, bad reference count\n");
+		abort(); /* ok */
+		}
+#endif
+
+	/* i == 0 */
+	if (sc->cert_chain != NULL)
+		sk_X509_pop_free(sc->cert_chain, X509_free);
+	for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
+		{
+		if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
+			X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
+#if 0 /* We don't have the peer's private key.  These lines are just
+	   * here as a reminder that we're still using a not-quite-appropriate
+	   * data structure. */
+		if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
+			EVP_PKEY_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].privatekey);
+#endif
+		}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+	if (sc->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
+		RSA_free(sc->peer_rsa_tmp);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+	if (sc->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
+		DH_free(sc->peer_dh_tmp);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+	if (sc->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL)
+		EC_KEY_free(sc->peer_ecdh_tmp);
+#endif
+
+	OPENSSL_free(sc);
+	}
+
+int ssl_set_peer_cert_type(SESS_CERT *sc,int type)
+	{
+	sc->peer_cert_type = type;
+	return(1);
+	}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DANE
+/*
+ * return value:
+ * -1:	format or digest error
+ *  0:	match
+ *  1:	no match
+ */
+int tlsa_cmp(const X509 *cert, const unsigned char *tlsa_record, unsigned int reclen)
+{
+	const EVP_MD *md;
+	unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+	unsigned int len, selector, matching_type;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (reclen<3) return -1;
+
+	selector      = tlsa_record[1];
+	matching_type = tlsa_record[2];
+	tlsa_record   += 3;
+	reclen        -= 3;
+
+	switch (matching_type) {
+	case 0:				/* exact match */
+		if (selector==0) {	/* full certificate */
+			ret = EVP_Digest(tlsa_record,reclen,digest,&len,EVP_sha1(),NULL);
+			return ret ? memcmp(cert->sha1_hash,digest,len)!=0 : -1;
+		}
+		else if (selector==1) {	/* SubjectPublicKeyInfo */
+			ASN1_BIT_STRING *key = X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(cert);
+
+			if (key == NULL) return -1;
+			if (key->length != reclen) return 1;
+
+			return memcmp(key->data,tlsa_record,reclen)!=0;
+		}
+		return -1;
+
+	case 1:				/* SHA256 */
+	case 2:				/* SHA512 */
+		md = matching_type==1 ? EVP_sha256() : EVP_sha512();
+
+		if (reclen!=EVP_MD_size(md)) return -1;
+
+		if (selector==0) {	/* full certificate */
+			ret = X509_digest(cert,md,digest,&len);
+		}
+		else if (selector==1) {	/* SubjectPublicKeyInfo */
+			ret = X509_pubkey_digest(cert,md,digest,&len);
+		}
+		else
+			return -1;
+
+		return ret ? memcmp(tlsa_record,digest,len)!=0 : -1;
+	default:
+		return -1;
+	}
+}
+
+int dane_verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+	SSL *s = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
+	int depth=X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
+	X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,depth);
+	unsigned int reclen, certificate_usage;
+	const unsigned char *tlsa_record = s->tlsa_record;
+	int tlsa_ret = -1;
+
+	if (s->verify_callback)	ok = s->verify_callback(ok,ctx);
+
+	if (tlsa_record == NULL) return ok;
+
+	if (tlsa_record == (void*)-1) {
+		ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;	/* temporary code? */
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	while ((reclen = *(unsigned int *)tlsa_record)) {
+		tlsa_record += sizeof(unsigned int);
+
+		/*
+		 * tlsa_record[0]	Certificate Usage field
+		 * tlsa_record[1]	Selector field
+		 * tlsa_record[2]	Matching Type Field
+		 * tlsa_record+3	Certificate Association data
+		 */
+		certificate_usage = tlsa_record[0];
+
+		if (depth==0 || certificate_usage==0 || certificate_usage==2) {
+			tlsa_ret = tlsa_cmp(cert,tlsa_record,reclen);
+			if (tlsa_ret==0) {
+				s->tlsa_witness = depth<<8|certificate_usage;
+				break;
+			}
+			else if (tlsa_ret==-1)
+				s->tlsa_witness = -1;	/* something phishy? */
+		}
+
+		tlsa_record += reclen;
+	}
+
+	if (depth==0) {
+		switch (s->tlsa_witness&0xff) {		/* witnessed usage */
+		case 0:	/* CA constraint */
+			if (s->tlsa_witness<0 && ctx->error==X509_V_OK)
+				ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
+			return 0;
+		case 1:	/* service certificate constraint */
+			if (tlsa_ret!=0 && ctx->error==X509_V_OK)
+				ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
+			return 0;
+		case 2:	/* trust anchor assertion */
+			if ((s->tlsa_witness>>8)>0 && ctx->error==X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY)
+				ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
+			break;
+		case 3:	/* domain-issued certificate */
+			if (tlsa_ret==0)
+				ctx->error = X509_V_OK; /* override all errors? */
+			break;
+		default:/* there were TLSA records, but something phishy happened */
+			ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
+			return ok;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * returning 1 makes verify procedure traverse the whole chain,
+	 * not actually approve it...
+	 */
+	return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
+	{
+	X509 *x;
+	int i;
+	X509_STORE *verify_store;
+	X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
+
+	if (s->cert->verify_store)
+		verify_store = s->cert->verify_store;
+	else
+		verify_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
+
+	if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_X509_num(sk) == 0))
+		return(0);
+
+	x=sk_X509_value(sk,0);
+	if(!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx,verify_store,x,sk))
+		{
+		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_verify_cert_chain, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+		return(0);
+		}
+	/* Set suite B flags if needed */
+	X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, tls1_suiteb(s));
+#if 0
+	if (SSL_get_verify_depth(s) >= 0)
+		X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(&ctx, SSL_get_verify_depth(s));
+#endif
+	X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(&ctx,SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(),s);
+
+	/* We need to inherit the verify parameters. These can be determined by
+	 * the context: if its a server it will verify SSL client certificates
+	 * or vice versa.
+	 */
+
+	X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(&ctx,
+				s->server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server");
+	/* Anything non-default in "param" should overwrite anything in the
+	 * ctx.
+	 */
+	X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(&ctx), s->param);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DANE
+	X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, dane_verify_callback);
+	s->tlsa_witness = -1;
+#else
+	if (s->verify_callback)
+		X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, s->verify_callback);
+#endif
+
+	if (s->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL)
+#if 1 /* new with OpenSSL 0.9.7 */
+		i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg); 
+#else
+		i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx); /* should pass app_verify_arg */
+#endif
+	else
+		{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_X509_VERIFY
+		i=X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
+#else
+		i=0;
+		ctx.error=X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION;
+		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_verify_cert_chain, SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_CALLBACK);
+#endif
+		}
+
+	s->verify_result=ctx.error;
+	X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+
+	return(i);
+	}
+
+static void set_client_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
+	{
+	if (*ca_list != NULL)
+		sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(*ca_list,X509_NAME_free);
+
+	*ca_list=name_list;
+	}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk)
+	{
+	int i;
+	STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret;
+	X509_NAME *name;
+
+	ret=sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
+	for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
+		{
+		name=X509_NAME_dup(sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i));
+		if ((name == NULL) || !sk_X509_NAME_push(ret,name))
+			{
+			sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret,X509_NAME_free);
+			return(NULL);
+			}
+		}
+	return(ret);
+	}
+
+void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
+	{
+	set_client_CA_list(&(s->client_CA),name_list);
+	}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
+	{
+	set_client_CA_list(&(ctx->client_CA),name_list);
+	}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	return(ctx->client_CA);
+	}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *s)
+	{
+	if (s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+		{ /* we are in the client */
+		if (((s->version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) &&
+			(s->s3 != NULL))
+			return(s->s3->tmp.ca_names);
+		else
+			return(NULL);
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		if (s->client_CA != NULL)
+			return(s->client_CA);
+		else
+			return(s->ctx->client_CA);
+		}
+	}
+
+static int add_client_CA(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **sk,X509 *x)
+	{
+	X509_NAME *name;
+
+	if (x == NULL) return(0);
+	if ((*sk == NULL) && ((*sk=sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL))
+		return(0);
+		
+	if ((name=X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_subject_name(x))) == NULL)
+		return(0);
+
+	if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(*sk,name))
+		{
+		X509_NAME_free(name);
+		return(0);
+		}
+	return(1);
+	}
+
+int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl,X509 *x)
+	{
+	return(add_client_CA(&(ssl->client_CA),x));
+	}
+
+int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx,X509 *x)
+	{
+	return(add_client_CA(&(ctx->client_CA),x));
+	}
+
+static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME **a, const X509_NAME **b)
+	{
+	return(X509_NAME_cmp(*a,*b));
+	}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+/*!
+ * Load CA certs from a file into a ::STACK. Note that it is somewhat misnamed;
+ * it doesn't really have anything to do with clients (except that a common use
+ * for a stack of CAs is to send it to the client). Actually, it doesn't have
+ * much to do with CAs, either, since it will load any old cert.
+ * \param file the file containing one or more certs.
+ * \return a ::STACK containing the certs.
+ */
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file)
+	{
+	BIO *in;
+	X509 *x=NULL;
+	X509_NAME *xn=NULL;
+	STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = NULL,*sk;
+
+	sk=sk_X509_NAME_new(xname_cmp);
+
+	in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+
+	if ((sk == NULL) || (in == NULL))
+		{
+		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_load_client_CA_file, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	
+	if (!BIO_read_filename(in,file))
+		goto err;
+
+	for (;;)
+		{
+		if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in,&x,NULL,NULL) == NULL)
+			break;
+		if (ret == NULL)
+			{
+			ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
+			if (ret == NULL)
+				{
+				OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_load_client_CA_file, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			}
+		if ((xn=X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL) goto err;
+		/* check for duplicates */
+		xn=X509_NAME_dup(xn);
+		if (xn == NULL) goto err;
+		if (sk_X509_NAME_find(sk, NULL, xn))
+			X509_NAME_free(xn);
+		else
+			{
+			sk_X509_NAME_push(sk,xn);
+			sk_X509_NAME_push(ret,xn);
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (0)
+		{
+err:
+		if (ret != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret,X509_NAME_free);
+		ret=NULL;
+		}
+	if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_free(sk);
+	if (in != NULL) BIO_free(in);
+	if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
+	if (ret != NULL)
+		ERR_clear_error();
+	return(ret);
+	}
+#endif
+
+/*!
+ * Add a file of certs to a stack.
+ * \param stack the stack to add to.
+ * \param file the file to add from. All certs in this file that are not
+ * already in the stack will be added.
+ * \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some
+ * certs may have been added to \c stack.
+ */
+
+int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
+					const char *file)
+	{
+	BIO *in;
+	X509 *x=NULL;
+	X509_NAME *xn=NULL;
+	int ret=1;
+	int (*oldcmp)(const X509_NAME **a, const X509_NAME **b);
+	
+	oldcmp=sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack,xname_cmp);
+	
+	in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+	
+	if (in == NULL)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	
+	if (!BIO_read_filename(in,file))
+		goto err;
+	
+	for (;;)
+		{
+		if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in,&x,NULL,NULL) == NULL)
+			break;
+		if ((xn=X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL) goto err;
+		xn=X509_NAME_dup(xn);
+		if (xn == NULL) goto err;
+		if (sk_X509_NAME_find(stack, NULL, xn))
+			X509_NAME_free(xn);
+		else
+			sk_X509_NAME_push(stack,xn);
+		}
+
+	ERR_clear_error();
+
+	if (0)
+		{
+err:
+		ret=0;
+		}
+	if(in != NULL)
+		BIO_free(in);
+	if(x != NULL)
+		X509_free(x);
+	
+	(void)sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack,oldcmp);
+
+	return ret;
+	}
+
+/*!
+ * Add a directory of certs to a stack.
+ * \param stack the stack to append to.
+ * \param dir the directory to append from. All files in this directory will be
+ * examined as potential certs. Any that are acceptable to
+ * SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack() that are not already in the stack will be
+ * included.
+ * \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some
+ * certs may have been added to \c stack.
+ */
+
+int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
+				       const char *dir)
+	{
+	OPENSSL_DIR_CTX *d = NULL;
+	const char *filename;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
+
+	/* Note that a side effect is that the CAs will be sorted by name */
+
+	while((filename = OPENSSL_DIR_read(&d, dir)))
+		{
+		char buf[1024];
+		int r;
+
+		if(strlen(dir)+strlen(filename)+2 > sizeof buf)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack, SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+		r = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%s%s",dir,filename);
+#else
+		r = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%s/%s",dir,filename);
+#endif
+		if (r <= 0 || r >= (int)sizeof(buf))
+			goto err;
+		if(!SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(stack,buf))
+			goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (errno)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+		ERR_add_error_data(3, "OPENSSL_DIR_read(&ctx, '", dir, "')");
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	ret = 1;
+
+err:
+	if (d) OPENSSL_DIR_end(&d);
+	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
+	return ret;
+	}
+
+/* Add a certificate to a BUF_MEM structure */
+
+static int ssl_add_cert_to_buf(BUF_MEM *buf, unsigned long *l, X509 *x)
+	{
+	int n;
+	unsigned char *p;
+
+	n=i2d_X509(x,NULL);
+	if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(int)(n+(*l)+3)))
+		{
+		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_cert_to_buf, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+		return 0;
+		}
+	p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[*l]);
+	l2n3(n,p);
+	i2d_X509(x,&p);
+	*l+=n+3;
+
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+/* Add certificate chain to internal SSL BUF_MEM strcuture */
+int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk, unsigned long *l)
+	{
+	BUF_MEM *buf = s->init_buf;
+	int no_chain;
+	int i;
+
+	X509 *x;
+	STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
+	X509_STORE *chain_store;
+
+	if (cpk)
+		x = cpk->x509;
+	else
+		x = NULL;
+
+	if (s->cert->chain_store)
+		chain_store = s->cert->chain_store;
+	else
+		chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
+
+	/* If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use
+	 * parent ctx.
+	 */
+	if (cpk && cpk->chain)
+		extra_certs = cpk->chain;
+	else
+		extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs;
+
+	if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs)
+		no_chain = 1;
+	else
+		no_chain = 0;
+
+	/* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */
+	if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,10))
+		{
+		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_cert_chain, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+		return 0;
+		}
+	if (x != NULL)
+		{
+		if (no_chain)
+			{
+			if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x))
+				return 0;
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
+
+			if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx,chain_store,x,NULL))
+				{
+				OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_cert_chain, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+				return(0);
+				}
+			X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
+			/* Don't leave errors in the queue */
+			ERR_clear_error();
+			for (i=0; i < sk_X509_num(xs_ctx.chain); i++)
+				{
+				x = sk_X509_value(xs_ctx.chain, i);
+
+				if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x))
+					{
+					X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+					return 0;
+					}
+				}
+			X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+			}
+		}
+	for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++)
+		{
+		x=sk_X509_value(extra_certs,i);
+		if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x))
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+/* Build a certificate chain for current certificate */
+int ssl_build_cert_chain(CERT *c, X509_STORE *chain_store, int flags)
+	{
+	CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key;
+	X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
+	STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL, *untrusted = NULL;
+	X509 *x;
+	int i;
+
+	if (!cpk->x509)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_build_cert_chain, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
+		return 0;
+		}
+
+	if (c->chain_store)
+		chain_store = c->chain_store;
+
+	if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_UNTRUSTED)
+		untrusted = cpk->chain;
+
+	if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx, chain_store, cpk->x509, untrusted))
+		{
+		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_build_cert_chain, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+		return 0;
+		}
+	/* Set suite B flags if needed */
+	X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&xs_ctx, c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS);
+
+	i = X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
+	if (i > 0)
+		chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&xs_ctx);
+	X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+	if (i <= 0)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_build_cert_chain, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
+		return 0;
+		}
+	if (cpk->chain)
+		sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
+	/* Remove EE certificate from chain */
+	x = sk_X509_shift(chain);
+	X509_free(x);
+	if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_NO_ROOT)
+		{
+		x = sk_X509_pop(chain);
+		X509_free(x);
+		}
+	cpk->chain = chain;
+
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+int ssl_cert_set_cert_store(CERT *c, X509_STORE *store, int chain, int ref)
+	{
+	X509_STORE **pstore;
+	if (chain)
+		pstore = &c->chain_store;
+	else
+		pstore = &c->verify_store;
+	if (*pstore)
+		X509_STORE_free(*pstore);
+	*pstore = store;
+	if (ref && store)
+		CRYPTO_add(&store->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+	return 1;
+	}
+