diff options
author | David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> | 2014-07-14 00:24:27 +0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | Adam Langley <agl@google.com> | 2014-07-25 01:08:34 +0400 |
commit | 072334d943ef81d45f75d97cd722b46f1293f773 (patch) | |
tree | 10561b081a8059ff274a491de031baa8bae5c33b /ssl/t1_lib.c | |
parent | f3ec83dee05cfadf540dd66f44b4b99ae4f19b93 (diff) |
Consistently use uint16_t for curve IDs.
Don't retain curve IDs in serialized form; serialization only happens when
writing and reading from the wire. The internal representation is a uint16_t
which matches the range of the value and avoids all the checks for the first
byte being 0.
This also fixes a bug in tls1_check_ec_tmp_key's suite B logic; the || should
have been &&, though now it's gone.
This doesn't relieve some of the other assumptions about curve IDs:
tls1_set_curves still assumes that all curve IDs are under 32, and
tls1_ec_curve_id2nid still assumes 0 is not a valid curve ID. Add a
compile-time assert and a comment to document this. We're up to 28 now, so this
may well need to be revised sooner or later.
Remove SSL_get_shared_curve as it's new and unused API, using it in a loop is
O(N^3), and lets us simplify a function.
Change-Id: I82778cb82648d82f7b5de8c5341e0e1febdf5611
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1256
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'ssl/t1_lib.c')
-rw-r--r-- | ssl/t1_lib.c | 509 |
1 files changed, 194 insertions, 315 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c index bc885400..ffadd220 100644 --- a/ssl/t1_lib.c +++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c @@ -423,150 +423,92 @@ static int nid_list[] = NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ }; - -static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = +static const uint8_t ecformats_default[] = { TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed, }; -static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = +static const uint16_t eccurves_default[] = { - 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */ - 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */ - 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */ + 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */ + 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */ + 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */ }; -static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = +static const uint16_t suiteb_curves[] = { - 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256, - 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384 + TLSEXT_curve_P_256, + TLSEXT_curve_P_384, }; -int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id) +int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(uint16_t curve_id) { /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */ - if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > - sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]))) - return 0; + if (curve_id < 1 || curve_id > sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])) + return OBJ_undef; return nid_list[curve_id-1]; } -int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid) +uint16_t tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid) { - /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */ - switch (nid) + size_t i; + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]); i++) { - case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */ - return 1; - case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */ - return 2; - case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */ - return 3; - case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ - return 4; - case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ - return 5; - case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */ - return 6; - case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ - return 7; - case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ - return 8; - case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */ - return 9; - case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ - return 10; - case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ - return 11; - case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */ - return 12; - case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ - return 13; - case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ - return 14; - case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */ - return 15; - case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ - return 16; - case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ - return 17; - case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */ - return 18; - case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ - return 19; - case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ - return 20; - case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */ - return 21; - case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ - return 22; - case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ - return 23; - case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */ - return 24; - case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */ - return 25; - case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ - return 26; - case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ - return 27; - case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ - return 28; - default: - return 0; + /* nid_list[i] stores the NID corresponding to curve ID i+1. */ + if (nid == nid_list[i]) + return i + 1; } + /* Use 0 for non-existent curve ID. Note: this assumes that curve ID 0 + * will never be allocated. */ + return 0; } -/* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise - * preferred list - */ -static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess, - const unsigned char **pcurves, - size_t *pcurveslen) + +/* tls1_get_curvelist sets |*out_curve_ids| and |*out_curve_ids_len| to the list + * of allowed curve IDs. If |get_client_curves| is non-zero, return the client + * curve list. Otherwise, return the preferred list. */ +static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int get_client_curves, + const uint16_t **out_curve_ids, size_t *out_curve_ids_len) { - if (sess) + if (get_client_curves) { - *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; - *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; + *out_curve_ids = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; + *out_curve_ids_len = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; return; } /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */ switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) { case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS: - *pcurves = suiteb_curves; - *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves); + *out_curve_ids = suiteb_curves; + *out_curve_ids_len = sizeof(suiteb_curves); break; case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY: - *pcurves = suiteb_curves; - *pcurveslen = 2; + *out_curve_ids = suiteb_curves; + *out_curve_ids_len = 1; break; case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS: - *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2; - *pcurveslen = 2; + *out_curve_ids = suiteb_curves + 1; + *out_curve_ids_len = 1; break; default: - *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; - *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; + *out_curve_ids = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; + *out_curve_ids_len = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; } - if (!*pcurves) + if (!*out_curve_ids) { - *pcurves = eccurves_default; - *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default); + *out_curve_ids = eccurves_default; + *out_curve_ids_len = sizeof(eccurves_default); } } -/* tls1_check_curve parses ECParameters out of |cbs|, modifying it. It - * checks the curve is one of our preferences and writes the - * NamedCurve value to |*out_curve_id|. It returns one on success and - * zero on error. */ int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, uint16_t *out_curve_id) { uint8_t curve_type; uint16_t curve_id; - const unsigned char *curves; - size_t curveslen, i; + const uint16_t *curves; + size_t curves_len, i; /* Only support named curves. */ if (!CBS_get_u8(cbs, &curve_type) || @@ -591,13 +533,10 @@ int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, uint16_t *out_curve_id) else /* Should never happen */ return 0; } - /* TODO(davidben): tls1_get_curvelist should return a list of - * uint16_t rather than make the caller care about - * endianness. */ - tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen); - for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2) + tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curves_len); + for (i = 0; i < curves_len; i++) { - if (curve_id == (curves[0] << 8 | curves[1])) + if (curve_id == curves[i]) { *out_curve_id = curve_id; return 1; @@ -606,222 +545,144 @@ int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, uint16_t *out_curve_id) return 0; } -/* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of - * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for - * an EC tmp key. - */ - -int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch) +int tls1_get_shared_curve(SSL *s) { - const unsigned char *pref, *supp; + const uint16_t *pref, *supp; size_t preflen, supplen, i, j; - int k; + /* Can't do anything on client side */ if (s->server == 0) - return -1; - if (nmatch == -2) + return NID_undef; + + if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { - if (tls1_suiteb(s)) - { - /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we - * already know these are acceptable due to previous - * checks. - */ - unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id; - if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) - return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */ - if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) - return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */ - /* Should never happen */ - return NID_undef; - } - /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */ - nmatch = 0; + /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we + * already know these are acceptable due to previous + * checks. + */ + unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id; + if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) + return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */ + if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) + return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */ + /* Should never happen */ + return NID_undef; } + + /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */ tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &supp, &supplen); tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, &preflen); - preflen /= 2; - supplen /= 2; - k = 0; - for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2) + for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++) { - const unsigned char *tsupp = supp; - for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2) + for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++) { - if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) - { - if (nmatch == k) - { - int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1]; - return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id); - } - k++; - } + if (pref[i] == supp[j]) + return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(pref[i]); } } - if (nmatch == -1) - return k; - return 0; + return NID_undef; } -int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, - int *curves, size_t ncurves) +/* NOTE: tls1_ec_curve_id2nid and tls1_set_curves assume that + * + * (a) 0 is not a valid curve ID. + * + * (b) The largest curve ID is 31. + * + * Those implementations must be revised before adding support for curve IDs + * that break these assumptions. */ +OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT( + (sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])) < 32, small_curve_ids); + +int tls1_set_curves(uint16_t **out_curve_ids, size_t *out_curve_ids_len, + const int *curves, size_t ncurves) { - unsigned char *clist, *p; + uint16_t *curve_ids; size_t i; /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works * while curve ids < 32 */ - unsigned long dup_list = 0; - clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2); - if (!clist) + uint32_t dup_list = 0; + curve_ids = (uint16_t*)OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * sizeof(uint16_t)); + if (!curve_ids) return 0; - for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) + for (i = 0; i < ncurves; i++) { - unsigned long idmask; - int id; + uint32_t idmask; + uint16_t id; id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]); - idmask = 1L << id; + idmask = ((uint32_t)1) << id; if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) { - OPENSSL_free(clist); + OPENSSL_free(curve_ids); return 0; } dup_list |= idmask; - s2n(id, p); + curve_ids[i] = id; } - if (*pext) - OPENSSL_free(*pext); - *pext = clist; - *pextlen = ncurves * 2; + if (*out_curve_ids) + OPENSSL_free(*out_curve_ids); + *out_curve_ids = curve_ids; + *out_curve_ids_len = ncurves; return 1; } -/* TODO(fork): remove */ -#if 0 -#define MAX_CURVELIST 28 - -typedef struct - { - size_t nidcnt; - int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST]; - } nid_cb_st; - -static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg) +/* tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key sets |*out_curve_id| and |*out_comp_id| to the + * TLS curve ID and point format, respectively, for |ec|. It returns one on + * success and zero on failure. */ +static int tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(uint16_t *out_curve_id, uint8_t *out_comp_id, EC_KEY *ec) { - nid_cb_st *narg = arg; - size_t i; int nid; - char etmp[20]; - if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST) - return 0; - if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1)) - return 0; - memcpy(etmp, elem, len); - etmp[len] = 0; - nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp); - if (nid == NID_undef) - nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp); - if (nid == NID_undef) - nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp); - if (nid == NID_undef) - return 0; - for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++) - if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid) - return 0; - narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid; - return 1; - } -/* Set curves based on a colon separate list */ -int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, - const char *str) - { - nid_cb_st ncb; - ncb.nidcnt = 0; - if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb)) - return 0; - if (pext == NULL) - return 1; - return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt); - } -#endif - -/* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */ -static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id, - EC_KEY *ec) - { - int is_prime = 1, id; + uint16_t id; const EC_GROUP *grp; if (!ec) return 0; - /* TODO(fork): remove. All curves are prime now. */ grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec); if (!grp) return 0; -#if 0 - /* Determine if it is a prime field */ - meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp); - if (!meth) - return 0; - if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field) - is_prime = 1; - else - is_prime = 0; -#endif /* Determine curve ID */ - id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp); - id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id); - /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */ - if (id) - { - curve_id[0] = 0; - curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id; - } - else - { - curve_id[0] = 0xff; - if (is_prime) - curve_id[1] = 0x01; - else - curve_id[1] = 0x02; - } - if (comp_id) + nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp); + id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid); + if (!id) + return 0; + + /* Set the named curve ID. Arbitrary explicit curves are not + * supported. */ + *out_curve_id = id; + + if (out_comp_id) { if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL) return 0; if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) - { - if (is_prime) - *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; - else - *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; - } + *out_comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; else - *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; + *out_comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; } return 1; } + /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */ static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s, - unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id) + const uint16_t *curve_id, const uint8_t *comp_id) { - const unsigned char *p; - size_t plen, i; + const uint16_t *curves; + size_t curves_len, i; int j; /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything * is supported (see RFC4492). */ if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { - p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; - plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; - for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++) + uint8_t *p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; + size_t plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; + for (i = 0; i < plen; i++) { - if (*comp_id == *p) + if (*comp_id == p[i]) break; } if (i == plen) @@ -832,13 +693,13 @@ static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s, /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */ for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) { - tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen); - for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2) + tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &curves, &curves_len); + for (i = 0; i < curves_len; i++) { - if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1]) + if (curves[i] == *curve_id) break; } - if (i == plen) + if (i == curves_len) return 0; /* For clients can only check sent curve list */ if (!s->server) @@ -873,7 +734,8 @@ static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats, */ static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md) { - unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2]; + uint8_t comp_id; + uint16_t curve_id; EVP_PKEY *pkey; int rv; pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); @@ -885,14 +747,14 @@ static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md) EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); return 1; } - rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec); + rv = tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(&curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); if (!rv) return 0; /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a * supported curves extension. */ - rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id); + rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? &curve_id : NULL, &comp_id); if (!rv) return 0; /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or @@ -903,12 +765,10 @@ static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md) int check_md; size_t i; CERT *c = s->cert; - if (curve_id[0]) - return 0; /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */ - if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) + if (curve_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256; - else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) + else if (curve_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384; else return 0; /* Should never happen */ @@ -930,7 +790,7 @@ static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md) /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */ int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid) { - unsigned char curve_id[2]; + uint16_t curve_id; EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp; #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */ @@ -944,14 +804,13 @@ int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid) { /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */ if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) - curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256; + curve_id = TLSEXT_curve_P_256; else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) - curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384; + curve_id = TLSEXT_curve_P_384; else return 0; - curve_id[0] = 0; /* Check this curve is acceptable */ - if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL)) + if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, &curve_id, NULL)) return 0; /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */ if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) @@ -959,12 +818,12 @@ int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid) /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */ else { - unsigned char curve_tmp[2]; + uint16_t curve_tmp; if (!ec) return 0; - if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec)) + if (!tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(&curve_tmp, NULL, ec)) return 0; - if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1]) + if (curve_tmp == curve_id) return 1; return 0; } @@ -973,9 +832,7 @@ int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid) if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) { /* Need a shared curve */ - if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0)) - return 1; - else return 0; + return tls1_get_shared_curve(s) != NID_undef; } if (!ec) { @@ -984,13 +841,13 @@ int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid) else return 0; } - if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec)) + if (!tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(&curve_id, NULL, ec)) return 0; /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */ #if 0 return 1; #else - return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL); + return tls1_check_ec_key(s, &curve_id, NULL); #endif } @@ -1122,14 +979,15 @@ int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **out_md, int *out_alert, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { - unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id; + uint16_t curve_id; + uint8_t comp_id; /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */ - if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec)) + if (!tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(&curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec)) { *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } - if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) + if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, &curve_id, &comp_id)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; @@ -1138,12 +996,7 @@ int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **out_md, int *out_alert, /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */ if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { - if (curve_id[0]) - { - *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - return 0; - } - if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) + if (curve_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) { if (hash != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) { @@ -1152,7 +1005,7 @@ int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **out_md, int *out_alert, return 0; } } - else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) + else if (curve_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) { if (hash != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) { @@ -1536,48 +1389,50 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned c { /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */ long lenmax; - const unsigned char *plist; - size_t plistlen; + const uint8_t *formats; + const uint16_t *curves; + size_t formats_len, curves_len, i; - tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen); + tls1_get_formatlist(s, &formats, &formats_len); if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; - if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL; - if (plistlen > 255) + if (formats_len > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL; + if (formats_len > 255) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return NULL; } s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret); - s2n(plistlen + 1,ret); - *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ; - memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen); - ret+=plistlen; + s2n(formats_len + 1,ret); + *(ret++) = (unsigned char)formats_len; + memcpy(ret, formats, formats_len); + ret+=formats_len; /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */ - plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; - tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen); + tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curves_len); if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL; - if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL; - if (plistlen > 65532) + if ((curves_len * 2) > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL; + if ((curves_len * 2) > 65532) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return NULL; } s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret); - s2n(plistlen + 2, ret); + s2n((curves_len * 2) + 2, ret); /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes. * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html * resolves this to two bytes. */ - s2n(plistlen, ret); - memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen); - ret+=plistlen; + s2n(curves_len * 2, ret); + for (i = 0; i < curves_len; i++) + { + s2n(curves[i], ret); + } } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ @@ -2053,8 +1908,11 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, int *out_alert) else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) { CBS elliptic_curve_list; + size_t i, num_curves; if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extension, &elliptic_curve_list) || + CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0 || + (CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) & 1) != 0 || CBS_len(&extension) != 0) { *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; @@ -2063,13 +1921,34 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, int *out_alert) if (!s->hit) { - if (!CBS_stow(&elliptic_curve_list, - &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, - &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) + if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) + { + OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); + s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; + } + s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = + (uint16_t*)OPENSSL_malloc(CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list)); + if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist == NULL) + { + *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; + } + num_curves = CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) / 2; + for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++) + { + if (!CBS_get_u16(&elliptic_curve_list, + &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist[i])) + { + *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; + } + } + if (CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) != 0) { *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } + s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = num_curves; } } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ @@ -2352,7 +2231,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs) return 0; } return 1; -} + } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No |