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Diffstat (limited to 'include/openssl/curve25519.h')
-rw-r--r--include/openssl/curve25519.h89
1 files changed, 85 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/include/openssl/curve25519.h b/include/openssl/curve25519.h
index c202575f..a9441cd4 100644
--- a/include/openssl/curve25519.h
+++ b/include/openssl/curve25519.h
@@ -29,10 +29,9 @@ extern "C" {
/* X25519.
*
- * Curve25519 is an elliptic curve. The same name is also sometimes used for
- * the Diffie-Hellman primitive built from it but “X25519” is a more precise
- * name for that, which is the one used here. See http://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html and
- * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7748. */
+ * X25519 is the Diffie-Hellman primitive built from curve25519. It is
+ * sometimes referred to as “curve25519”, but “X25519” is a more precise name.
+ * See http://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html and https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7748. */
/* X25519_keypair sets |out_public_value| and |out_private_key| to a freshly
* generated, public–private key pair. */
@@ -84,6 +83,88 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int ED25519_verify(const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
const uint8_t public_key[32]);
+/* SPAKE2.
+ *
+ * SPAKE2 is a password-authenticated key-exchange. It allows two parties,
+ * who share a low-entropy secret (i.e. password), to agree on a shared key.
+ * An attacker can only make one guess of the password per execution of the
+ * protocol.
+ *
+ * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-spake2-02. */
+
+/* spake2_role_t enumerates the different “roles” in SPAKE2. The protocol
+ * requires that the symmetry of the two parties be broken so one participant
+ * must be “Alice” and the other be “Bob”. */
+enum spake2_role_t {
+ spake2_role_alice,
+ spake2_role_bob,
+};
+
+/* SPAKE2_CTX_new creates a new |SPAKE2_CTX| (which can only be used for a
+ * single execution of the protocol). SPAKE2 requires the symmetry of the two
+ * parties to be broken which is indicated via |my_role| – each party must pass
+ * a different value for this argument.
+ *
+ * The |my_name| and |their_name| arguments allow optional, opaque names to be
+ * bound into the protocol. For example MAC addresses, hostnames, usernames
+ * etc. These values are not exposed and can avoid context-confusion attacks
+ * when a password is shared between several devices. */
+OPENSSL_EXPORT SPAKE2_CTX *SPAKE2_CTX_new(
+ enum spake2_role_t my_role,
+ const uint8_t *my_name, size_t my_name_len,
+ const uint8_t *their_name, size_t their_name_len);
+
+/* SPAKE2_CTX_free frees |ctx| and all the resources that it has allocated. */
+OPENSSL_EXPORT void SPAKE2_CTX_free(SPAKE2_CTX *ctx);
+
+/* SPAKE2_MAX_MSG_SIZE is the maximum size of a SPAKE2 message. */
+#define SPAKE2_MAX_MSG_SIZE 32
+
+/* SPAKE2_generate_msg generates a SPAKE2 message given |password|, writes
+ * it to |out| and sets |*out_len| to the number of bytes written.
+ *
+ * At most |max_out_len| bytes are written to |out| and, in order to ensure
+ * success, |max_out_len| should be at least |SPAKE2_MAX_MSG_SIZE| bytes.
+ *
+ * This function can only be called once for a given |SPAKE2_CTX|.
+ *
+ * It returns one on success and zero on error. */
+OPENSSL_EXPORT int SPAKE2_generate_msg(SPAKE2_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
+ size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len,
+ const uint8_t *password,
+ size_t password_len);
+
+/* SPAKE2_MAX_KEY_SIZE is the maximum amount of key material that SPAKE2 will
+ * produce. */
+#define SPAKE2_MAX_KEY_SIZE 64
+
+/* SPAKE2_process_msg completes the SPAKE2 exchange given the peer's message in
+ * |their_msg|, writes at most |max_out_key_len| bytes to |out_key| and sets
+ * |*out_key_len| to the number of bytes written.
+ *
+ * The resulting keying material is suitable for:
+ * a) Using directly in a key-confirmation step: i.e. each side could
+ * transmit a hash of their role, a channel-binding value and the key
+ * material to prove to the other side that they know the shared key.
+ * b) Using as input keying material to HKDF to generate a variety of subkeys
+ * for encryption etc.
+ *
+ * If |max_out_key_key| is smaller than the amount of key material generated
+ * then the key is silently truncated. If you want to ensure that no truncation
+ * occurs then |max_out_key| should be at least |SPAKE2_MAX_KEY_SIZE|.
+ *
+ * You must call |SPAKE2_generate_msg| on a given |SPAKE2_CTX| before calling
+ * this function. On successful return, |ctx| is complete and calling
+ * |SPAKE2_CTX_free| is the only acceptable operation on it.
+ *
+ * Returns one on success or zero on error. */
+OPENSSL_EXPORT int SPAKE2_process_msg(SPAKE2_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out_key,
+ size_t *out_key_len,
+ size_t max_out_key_len,
+ const uint8_t *their_msg,
+ size_t their_msg_len);
+
+
#if defined(__cplusplus)
} /* extern C */
#endif