diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'ssl/s3_srvr.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | ssl/s3_srvr.c | 2272 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 2272 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c deleted file mode 100644 index ae709dc3..00000000 --- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2272 +0,0 @@ -/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) - * All rights reserved. - * - * This package is an SSL implementation written - * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). - * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * - * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as - * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions - * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, - * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation - * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms - * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in - * the code are not to be removed. - * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution - * as the author of the parts of the library used. - * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or - * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software - * must display the following acknowledgement: - * "This product includes cryptographic software written by - * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" - * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library - * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from - * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: - * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or - * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be - * copied and put under another distribution licence - * [including the GNU Public Licence.] - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * openssl-core@openssl.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. - * - * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by - * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. - * - * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source - * license provided above. - * - * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by - * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. - * - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. - * - * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by - * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source - * license. - * - * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of - * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites - * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. - * - * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in - * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received - * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. - * - * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not - * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third - * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights - * to make use of the Contribution. - * - * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN - * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA - * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY - * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR - * OTHERWISE. */ - -#include <openssl/ssl.h> - -#include <assert.h> -#include <stdio.h> -#include <string.h> - -#include <openssl/bn.h> -#include <openssl/buf.h> -#include <openssl/bytestring.h> -#include <openssl/cipher.h> -#include <openssl/dh.h> -#include <openssl/ec.h> -#include <openssl/ecdsa.h> -#include <openssl/err.h> -#include <openssl/evp.h> -#include <openssl/hmac.h> -#include <openssl/md5.h> -#include <openssl/mem.h> -#include <openssl/obj.h> -#include <openssl/rand.h> -#include <openssl/sha.h> -#include <openssl/x509.h> - -#include "internal.h" -#include "../crypto/internal.h" -#include "../crypto/dh/internal.h" - - -int ssl3_accept(SSL *ssl) { - BUF_MEM *buf = NULL; - uint32_t alg_a; - void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int value) = NULL; - int ret = -1; - int new_state, state, skip = 0; - - assert(ssl->handshake_func == ssl3_accept); - assert(ssl->server); - assert(!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)); - - ERR_clear_error(); - ERR_clear_system_error(); - - if (ssl->info_callback != NULL) { - cb = ssl->info_callback; - } else if (ssl->ctx->info_callback != NULL) { - cb = ssl->ctx->info_callback; - } - - ssl->in_handshake++; - - if (ssl->cert == NULL) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); - return -1; - } - - for (;;) { - state = ssl->state; - - switch (ssl->state) { - case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: - if (cb != NULL) { - cb(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1); - } - - if (ssl->init_buf == NULL) { - buf = BUF_MEM_new(); - if (!buf || !BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { - ret = -1; - goto end; - } - ssl->init_buf = buf; - buf = NULL; - } - ssl->init_num = 0; - - /* Enable a write buffer. This groups handshake messages within a flight - * into a single write. */ - if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(ssl, 1)) { - ret = -1; - goto end; - } - - if (!ssl3_init_handshake_buffer(ssl)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ret = -1; - goto end; - } - - if (!ssl->s3->have_version) { - ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_INITIAL_BYTES; - } else { - ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; - } - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SR_INITIAL_BYTES: - ret = ssl3_get_initial_bytes(ssl); - if (ret <= 0) { - goto end; - } - /* ssl3_get_initial_bytes sets ssl->state to one of - * SSL3_ST_SR_V2_CLIENT_HELLO or SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A on success. */ - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SR_V2_CLIENT_HELLO: - ret = ssl3_get_v2_client_hello(ssl); - if (ret <= 0) { - goto end; - } - ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: - case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: - case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: - case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D: - ssl->shutdown = 0; - ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(ssl); - if (ret <= 0) { - goto end; - } - ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; - ssl->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: - ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(ssl); - if (ret <= 0) { - goto end; - } - if (ssl->hit) { - if (ssl->tlsext_ticket_expected) { - ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; - } else { - ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; - } - } else { - ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; - } - ssl->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: - if (ssl_cipher_has_server_public_key(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { - ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(ssl); - if (ret <= 0) { - goto end; - } - if (ssl->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected) { - ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; - } else { - ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; - } - } else { - skip = 1; - ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; - } - ssl->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: - ret = ssl3_send_certificate_status(ssl); - if (ret <= 0) { - goto end; - } - ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; - ssl->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: - case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_C: - alg_a = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; - - /* Send a ServerKeyExchange message if: - * - The key exchange is ephemeral or anonymous - * Diffie-Hellman. - * - There is a PSK identity hint. - * - * TODO(davidben): This logic is currently duplicated in d1_srvr.c. Fix - * this. In the meantime, keep them in sync. */ - if (ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher) || - ((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && ssl->psk_identity_hint)) { - ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(ssl); - if (ret <= 0) { - goto end; - } - } else { - skip = 1; - } - - ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; - ssl->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: - if (ssl->s3->tmp.cert_request) { - ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(ssl); - if (ret <= 0) { - goto end; - } - } else { - skip = 1; - } - ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; - ssl->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: - ret = ssl3_send_server_done(ssl); - if (ret <= 0) { - goto end; - } - ssl->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; - ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; - ssl->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: - /* This code originally checked to see if any data was pending using - * BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as documented - * in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely resolve this issue - * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead - * we just flush unconditionally. */ - ssl->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; - if (BIO_flush(ssl->wbio) <= 0) { - ret = -1; - goto end; - } - ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; - - ssl->state = ssl->s3->tmp.next_state; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: - case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: - if (ssl->s3->tmp.cert_request) { - ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(ssl); - if (ret <= 0) { - goto end; - } - } - ssl->init_num = 0; - ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: - case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: - case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_C: - ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(ssl); - if (ret <= 0) { - goto end; - } - ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; - ssl->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: - case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: - ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(ssl); - if (ret <= 0) { - goto end; - } - - ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE; - ssl->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE: - ret = ssl->method->ssl_read_change_cipher_spec(ssl); - if (ret <= 0) { - goto end; - } - - if (!tls1_change_cipher_state(ssl, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { - ret = -1; - goto end; - } - - if (ssl->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) { - ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; - } else if (ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) { - ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A; - } else { - ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; - } - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A: - case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B: - ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(ssl); - if (ret <= 0) { - goto end; - } - ssl->init_num = 0; - if (ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) { - ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A; - } else { - ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; - } - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A: - case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_B: - ret = ssl3_get_channel_id(ssl); - if (ret <= 0) { - goto end; - } - ssl->init_num = 0; - ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: - case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: - ret = ssl3_get_finished(ssl, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, - SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); - if (ret <= 0) { - goto end; - } - - if (ssl->hit) { - ssl->state = SSL_ST_OK; - } else if (ssl->tlsext_ticket_expected) { - ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; - } else { - ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; - } - /* If this is a full handshake with ChannelID then record the hashshake - * hashes in |ssl->session| in case we need them to verify a ChannelID - * signature on a resumption of this session in the future. */ - if (!ssl->hit && ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) { - ret = tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(ssl); - if (ret <= 0) { - goto end; - } - } - ssl->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: - ret = ssl3_send_new_session_ticket(ssl); - if (ret <= 0) { - goto end; - } - ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; - ssl->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: - ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(ssl, SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A, - SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B); - if (ret <= 0) { - goto end; - } - ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A; - ssl->init_num = 0; - - if (!tls1_change_cipher_state(ssl, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) { - ret = -1; - goto end; - } - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: - ret = ssl3_send_finished(ssl, SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A, - SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B); - if (ret <= 0) { - goto end; - } - ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; - if (ssl->hit) { - ssl->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE; - } else { - ssl->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK; - } - ssl->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL_ST_OK: - /* clean a few things up */ - ssl3_cleanup_key_block(ssl); - - BUF_MEM_free(ssl->init_buf); - ssl->init_buf = NULL; - - /* remove buffering on output */ - ssl_free_wbio_buffer(ssl); - - ssl->init_num = 0; - - /* If we aren't retaining peer certificates then we can discard it - * now. */ - if (ssl->ctx->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs) { - X509_free(ssl->session->peer); - ssl->session->peer = NULL; - sk_X509_pop_free(ssl->session->cert_chain, X509_free); - ssl->session->cert_chain = NULL; - } - - ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete = 1; - - ssl_update_cache(ssl, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); - - if (cb != NULL) { - cb(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); - } - - ret = 1; - goto end; - - default: - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); - ret = -1; - goto end; - } - - if (!ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip && cb != NULL && - ssl->state != state) { - new_state = ssl->state; - ssl->state = state; - cb(ssl, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1); - ssl->state = new_state; - } - skip = 0; - } - -end: - ssl->in_handshake--; - BUF_MEM_free(buf); - if (cb != NULL) { - cb(ssl, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret); - } - return ret; -} - -int ssl3_get_initial_bytes(SSL *ssl) { - /* Read the first 5 bytes, the size of the TLS record header. This is - * sufficient to detect a V2ClientHello and ensures that we never read beyond - * the first record. */ - int ret = ssl_read_buffer_extend_to(ssl, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH); - if (ret <= 0) { - return ret; - } - assert(ssl_read_buffer_len(ssl) == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH); - const uint8_t *p = ssl_read_buffer(ssl); - - /* Some dedicated error codes for protocol mixups should the application wish - * to interpret them differently. (These do not overlap with ClientHello or - * V2ClientHello.) */ - if (strncmp("GET ", (const char *)p, 4) == 0 || - strncmp("POST ", (const char *)p, 5) == 0 || - strncmp("HEAD ", (const char *)p, 5) == 0 || - strncmp("PUT ", (const char *)p, 4) == 0) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST); - return -1; - } - if (strncmp("CONNE", (const char *)p, 5) == 0) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST); - return -1; - } - - /* Determine if this is a V2ClientHello. */ - if ((p[0] & 0x80) && p[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO && - p[3] >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) { - /* This is a V2ClientHello. */ - ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_V2_CLIENT_HELLO; - return 1; - } - - /* Fall through to the standard logic. */ - ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; - return 1; -} - -int ssl3_get_v2_client_hello(SSL *ssl) { - const uint8_t *p; - int ret; - CBS v2_client_hello, cipher_specs, session_id, challenge; - size_t msg_length, rand_len, len; - uint8_t msg_type; - uint16_t version, cipher_spec_length, session_id_length, challenge_length; - CBB client_hello, hello_body, cipher_suites; - uint8_t random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE]; - - /* Determine the length of the V2ClientHello. */ - assert(ssl_read_buffer_len(ssl) >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH); - p = ssl_read_buffer(ssl); - msg_length = ((p[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | p[1]; - if (msg_length > (1024 * 4)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE); - return -1; - } - if (msg_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - 2) { - /* Reject lengths that are too short early. We have already read - * |SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH| bytes, so we should not attempt to process an - * (invalid) V2ClientHello which would be shorter than that. */ - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - return -1; - } - - /* Read the remainder of the V2ClientHello. */ - ret = ssl_read_buffer_extend_to(ssl, 2 + msg_length); - if (ret <= 0) { - return ret; - } - assert(ssl_read_buffer_len(ssl) == msg_length + 2); - CBS_init(&v2_client_hello, ssl_read_buffer(ssl) + 2, msg_length); - - /* The V2ClientHello without the length is incorporated into the handshake - * hash. */ - if (!ssl3_update_handshake_hash(ssl, CBS_data(&v2_client_hello), - CBS_len(&v2_client_hello))) { - return -1; - } - if (ssl->msg_callback) { - ssl->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, CBS_data(&v2_client_hello), - CBS_len(&v2_client_hello), ssl, ssl->msg_callback_arg); - } - - if (!CBS_get_u8(&v2_client_hello, &msg_type) || - !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &version) || - !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &cipher_spec_length) || - !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &session_id_length) || - !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &challenge_length) || - !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &cipher_specs, cipher_spec_length) || - !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &session_id, session_id_length) || - !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &challenge, challenge_length) || - CBS_len(&v2_client_hello) != 0) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); - return -1; - } - - /* msg_type has already been checked. */ - assert(msg_type == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO); - - /* The client_random is the V2ClientHello challenge. Truncate or - * left-pad with zeros as needed. */ - memset(random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - rand_len = CBS_len(&challenge); - if (rand_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) { - rand_len = SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; - } - memcpy(random + (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - rand_len), CBS_data(&challenge), - rand_len); - - /* Write out an equivalent SSLv3 ClientHello. */ - CBB_zero(&client_hello); - if (!CBB_init_fixed(&client_hello, (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data, - ssl->init_buf->max) || - !CBB_add_u8(&client_hello, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) || - !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &hello_body) || - !CBB_add_u16(&hello_body, version) || - !CBB_add_bytes(&hello_body, random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || - /* No session id. */ - !CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) || - !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&hello_body, &cipher_suites)) { - CBB_cleanup(&client_hello); - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return -1; - } - - /* Copy the cipher suites. */ - while (CBS_len(&cipher_specs) > 0) { - uint32_t cipher_spec; - if (!CBS_get_u24(&cipher_specs, &cipher_spec)) { - CBB_cleanup(&client_hello); - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); - return -1; - } - - /* Skip SSLv2 ciphers. */ - if ((cipher_spec & 0xff0000) != 0) { - continue; - } - if (!CBB_add_u16(&cipher_suites, cipher_spec)) { - CBB_cleanup(&client_hello); - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return -1; - } - } - - /* Add the null compression scheme and finish. */ - if (!CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 1) || !CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) || - !CBB_finish(&client_hello, NULL, &len)) { - CBB_cleanup(&client_hello); - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return -1; - } - - /* Mark the message for "re"-use by the version-specific method. */ - ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; - ssl->s3->tmp.message_type = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO; - /* The handshake message header is 4 bytes. */ - ssl->s3->tmp.message_size = len - 4; - - /* Consume and discard the V2ClientHello. */ - ssl_read_buffer_consume(ssl, 2 + msg_length); - ssl_read_buffer_discard(ssl); - - return 1; -} - -int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *ssl) { - int ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1; - long n; - const SSL_CIPHER *c; - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL; - struct ssl_early_callback_ctx early_ctx; - CBS client_hello; - uint16_t client_version; - CBS client_random, session_id, cipher_suites, compression_methods; - SSL_SESSION *session = NULL; - - /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are TLSv1 - * and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down switching should - * be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we will respond with - * SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1. */ - switch (ssl->state) { - case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: - case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: - n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message( - ssl, SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, - SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, - ssl_hash_message, &ok); - - if (!ok) { - return n; - } - - ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C; - /* fallthrough */ - case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: - case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D: - /* We have previously parsed the ClientHello message, and can't call - * ssl_get_message again without hashing the message into the Finished - * digest again. */ - n = ssl->init_num; - - memset(&early_ctx, 0, sizeof(early_ctx)); - early_ctx.ssl = ssl; - early_ctx.client_hello = ssl->init_msg; - early_ctx.client_hello_len = n; - if (!ssl_early_callback_init(&early_ctx)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_PARSE_FAILED); - goto f_err; - } - - if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && - ssl->ctx->select_certificate_cb != NULL) { - ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D; - switch (ssl->ctx->select_certificate_cb(&early_ctx)) { - case 0: - ssl->rwstate = SSL_CERTIFICATE_SELECTION_PENDING; - goto err; - - case -1: - /* Connection rejected. */ - al = SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CONNECTION_REJECTED); - goto f_err; - - default: - /* fallthrough */; - } - } - ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D; - break; - - default: - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); - return -1; - } - - CBS_init(&client_hello, ssl->init_msg, n); - if (!CBS_get_u16(&client_hello, &client_version) || - !CBS_get_bytes(&client_hello, &client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || - !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &session_id) || - CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); - goto f_err; - } - - /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may differ: - * see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */ - ssl->client_version = client_version; - - /* Load the client random. */ - memcpy(ssl->s3->client_random, CBS_data(&client_random), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) { - CBS cookie; - - if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cookie) || - CBS_len(&cookie) > DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); - goto f_err; - } - } - - /* Note: This codepath may run twice if |ssl_get_prev_session| completes - * asynchronously. - * - * TODO(davidben): Clean up the order of events around ClientHello - * processing. */ - if (!ssl->s3->have_version) { - /* Select version to use */ - uint16_t version = ssl3_get_mutual_version(ssl, client_version); - if (version == 0) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); - ssl->version = ssl->client_version; - al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - goto f_err; - } - ssl->version = version; - ssl->s3->enc_method = ssl3_get_enc_method(version); - assert(ssl->s3->enc_method != NULL); - /* At this point, the connection's version is known and |ssl->version| is - * fixed. Begin enforcing the record-layer version. */ - ssl->s3->have_version = 1; - } else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl) ? (ssl->client_version > ssl->version) - : (ssl->client_version < ssl->version)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); - al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - goto f_err; - } - - ssl->hit = 0; - int send_new_ticket = 0; - switch (ssl_get_prev_session(ssl, &session, &send_new_ticket, &early_ctx)) { - case ssl_session_success: - break; - case ssl_session_error: - goto err; - case ssl_session_retry: - ssl->rwstate = SSL_PENDING_SESSION; - goto err; - } - ssl->tlsext_ticket_expected = send_new_ticket; - - /* The EMS state is needed when making the resumption decision, but - * extensions are not normally parsed until later. This detects the EMS - * extension for the resumption decision and it's checked against the result - * of the normal parse later in this function. */ - const uint8_t *ems_data; - size_t ems_len; - int have_extended_master_secret = - ssl->version != SSL3_VERSION && - SSL_early_callback_ctx_extension_get(&early_ctx, - TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, - &ems_data, &ems_len) && - ems_len == 0; - - if (session != NULL) { - if (session->extended_master_secret && - !have_extended_master_secret) { - /* A ClientHello without EMS that attempts to resume a session with EMS - * is fatal to the connection. */ - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RESUMED_EMS_SESSION_WITHOUT_EMS_EXTENSION); - goto f_err; - } - - ssl->hit = - /* Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated version: - * most clients do not accept a mismatch. */ - ssl->version == session->ssl_version && - /* If the client offers the EMS extension, but the previous session - * didn't use it, then negotiate a new session. */ - have_extended_master_secret == session->extended_master_secret; - } - - if (ssl->hit) { - /* Use the new session. */ - SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->session); - ssl->session = session; - session = NULL; - - ssl->verify_result = ssl->session->verify_result; - } else { - if (!ssl_get_new_session(ssl, 1 /* server */)) { - goto err; - } - - /* Clear the session ID if we want the session to be single-use. */ - if (!(ssl->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)) { - ssl->session->session_id_length = 0; - } - } - - if (ssl->ctx->dos_protection_cb != NULL && - ssl->ctx->dos_protection_cb(&early_ctx) == 0) { - /* Connection rejected for DOS reasons. */ - al = SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CONNECTION_REJECTED); - goto f_err; - } - - if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cipher_suites) || - CBS_len(&cipher_suites) == 0 || - CBS_len(&cipher_suites) % 2 != 0 || - !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &compression_methods) || - CBS_len(&compression_methods) == 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); - goto f_err; - } - - ciphers = ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(ssl, &cipher_suites); - if (ciphers == NULL) { - goto err; - } - - /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. */ - if (ssl->hit) { - size_t j; - int found_cipher = 0; - uint32_t id = ssl->session->cipher->id; - - for (j = 0; j < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); j++) { - c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, j); - if (c->id == id) { - found_cipher = 1; - break; - } - } - - if (!found_cipher) { - /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked to reuse - * it */ - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); - goto f_err; - } - } - - /* Only null compression is supported. */ - if (memchr(CBS_data(&compression_methods), 0, - CBS_len(&compression_methods)) == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); - goto f_err; - } - - /* TLS extensions. */ - if (ssl->version >= SSL3_VERSION && - !ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(ssl, &client_hello)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); - goto err; - } - - /* There should be nothing left over in the record. */ - if (CBS_len(&client_hello) != 0) { - /* wrong packet length */ - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); - goto f_err; - } - - if (have_extended_master_secret != ssl->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EMS_STATE_INCONSISTENT); - goto f_err; - } - - /* Given ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher */ - if (!ssl->hit) { - if (ciphers == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED); - goto f_err; - } - - /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */ - if (ssl->cert->cert_cb) { - int rv = ssl->cert->cert_cb(ssl, ssl->cert->cert_cb_arg); - if (rv == 0) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR); - goto f_err; - } - if (rv < 0) { - ssl->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; - goto err; - } - ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; - } - c = ssl3_choose_cipher(ssl, ciphers, ssl_get_cipher_preferences(ssl)); - - if (c == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); - goto f_err; - } - ssl->session->cipher = c; - ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c; - - /* Determine whether to request a client certificate. */ - ssl->s3->tmp.cert_request = !!(ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER); - /* Only request a certificate if Channel ID isn't negotiated. */ - if ((ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER_IF_NO_OBC) && - ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) { - ssl->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; - } - /* Plain PSK forbids Certificate and CertificateRequest. */ - if (ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK) { - ssl->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; - } - } else { - /* Session-id reuse */ - ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ssl->session->cipher; - ssl->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; - } - - /* Now that the cipher is known, initialize the handshake hash. */ - if (!ssl3_init_handshake_hash(ssl)) { - goto f_err; - } - - /* In TLS 1.2, client authentication requires hashing the handshake transcript - * under a different hash. Otherwise, release the handshake buffer. */ - if (!ssl->s3->tmp.cert_request || - ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_2_VERSION) { - ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(ssl); - } - - /* we now have the following setup; - * client_random - * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers - * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers - * compression - basically ignored right now - * ssl version is set - sslv3 - * ssl->session - The ssl session has been setup. - * ssl->hit - session reuse flag - * ssl->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. */ - - ret = 1; - - if (0) { - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - } - -err: - sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); - SSL_SESSION_free(session); - return ret; -} - -int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *ssl) { - if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B) { - return ssl_do_write(ssl); - } - - assert(ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A); - - /* We only accept ChannelIDs on connections with ECDHE in order to avoid a - * known attack while we fix ChannelID itself. */ - if (ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid && - (ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kECDHE) == 0) { - ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0; - } - - /* If this is a resumption and the original handshake didn't support - * ChannelID then we didn't record the original handshake hashes in the - * session and so cannot resume with ChannelIDs. */ - if (ssl->hit && ssl->session->original_handshake_hash_len == 0) { - ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0; - } - - if (!ssl_fill_hello_random(ssl->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, - 1 /* server */)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return -1; - } - - CBB cbb, session_id; - size_t length; - CBB_zero(&cbb); - if (!CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, ssl_handshake_start(ssl), - ssl->init_buf->max - SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl)) || - !CBB_add_u16(&cbb, ssl->version) || - !CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, ssl->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || - !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&cbb, &session_id) || - !CBB_add_bytes(&session_id, ssl->session->session_id, - ssl->session->session_id_length) || - !CBB_add_u16(&cbb, ssl_cipher_get_value(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) || - !CBB_add_u8(&cbb, 0 /* no compression */) || - !ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(ssl, &cbb) || - !CBB_finish(&cbb, NULL, &length) || - !ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, length)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - CBB_cleanup(&cbb); - return -1; - } - - ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B; - return ssl_do_write(ssl); -} - -int ssl3_send_certificate_status(SSL *ssl) { - if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) { - CBB out, ocsp_response; - size_t length; - - CBB_zero(&out); - if (!CBB_init_fixed(&out, ssl_handshake_start(ssl), - ssl->init_buf->max - SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl)) || - !CBB_add_u8(&out, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) || - !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&out, &ocsp_response) || - !CBB_add_bytes(&ocsp_response, ssl->ctx->ocsp_response, - ssl->ctx->ocsp_response_length) || - !CBB_finish(&out, NULL, &length) || - !ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, length)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - CBB_cleanup(&out); - return -1; - } - - ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B; - } - - /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ - return ssl_do_write(ssl); -} - -int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *ssl) { - if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) { - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0)) { - return -1; - } - ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B; - } - - /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */ - return ssl_do_write(ssl); -} - -int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *ssl) { - if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_C) { - return ssl_do_write(ssl); - } - - CBB cbb, child; - if (!CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, ssl_handshake_start(ssl), - ssl->init_buf->max - SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl))) { - goto err; - } - - if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) { - /* This is the first iteration, so write parameters. */ - uint32_t alg_k = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - uint32_t alg_a = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; - - /* PSK ciphers begin with an identity hint. */ - if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) { - size_t len = - (ssl->psk_identity_hint == NULL) ? 0 : strlen(ssl->psk_identity_hint); - if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) || - !CBB_add_bytes(&child, (const uint8_t *)ssl->psk_identity_hint, - len)) { - goto err; - } - } - - if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) { - /* Determine the group to use. */ - DH *params = ssl->cert->dh_tmp; - if (params == NULL && ssl->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL) { - params = ssl->cert->dh_tmp_cb(ssl, 0, 1024); - } - if (params == NULL) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); - ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - ssl->session->key_exchange_info = DH_num_bits(params); - - /* Set up DH, generate a key, and emit the public half. */ - DH *dh = DHparams_dup(params); - if (dh == NULL) { - goto err; - } - - SSL_ECDH_CTX_init_for_dhe(&ssl->s3->tmp.ecdh_ctx, dh); - if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) || - !BN_bn2cbb_padded(&child, BN_num_bytes(params->p), params->p) || - !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) || - !BN_bn2cbb_padded(&child, BN_num_bytes(params->g), params->g) || - !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) || - !SSL_ECDH_CTX_generate_keypair(&ssl->s3->tmp.ecdh_ctx, &child)) { - goto err; - } - } else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) { - /* Determine the curve to use. */ - uint16_t curve_id; - if (!tls1_get_shared_curve(ssl, &curve_id)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); - ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - ssl->session->key_exchange_info = curve_id; - - /* Set up ECDH, generate a key, and emit the public half. */ - if (!SSL_ECDH_CTX_init(&ssl->s3->tmp.ecdh_ctx, curve_id) || - !CBB_add_u8(&cbb, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) || - !CBB_add_u16(&cbb, curve_id) || - !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) || - !SSL_ECDH_CTX_generate_keypair(&ssl->s3->tmp.ecdh_ctx, &child)) { - goto err; - } - } else { - assert(alg_k & SSL_kPSK); - } - - /* Otherwise, restore |cbb| from the previous iteration. - * TODO(davidben): When |ssl->init_buf| is gone, come up with a simpler - * pattern. Probably keep the |CBB| around in the handshake state. */ - } else if (!CBB_did_write(&cbb, ssl->init_num - SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl))) { - goto err; - } - - /* Add a signature. */ - if (ssl_cipher_has_server_public_key(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { - if (!ssl_has_private_key(ssl)) { - ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - const size_t max_sig_len = ssl_private_key_max_signature_len(ssl); - size_t sig_len; - enum ssl_private_key_result_t sign_result; - if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) { - /* This is the first iteration, so set up the signature. Sample the - * parameter length before adding a signature algorithm. */ - if (!CBB_flush(&cbb)) { - goto err; - } - size_t params_len = CBB_len(&cbb); - - /* Determine signature algorithm. */ - const EVP_MD *md; - if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { - md = tls1_choose_signing_digest(ssl); - if (!tls12_add_sigandhash(ssl, &cbb, md)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - } else if (ssl_private_key_type(ssl) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { - md = EVP_md5_sha1(); - } else { - md = EVP_sha1(); - } - - /* Compute the digest and sign it. */ - uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - unsigned digest_len = 0; - EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; - EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); - int digest_ret = - EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL) && - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) && - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, ssl->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) && - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, CBB_data(&cbb), params_len) && - EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, digest, &digest_len); - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); - uint8_t *ptr; - if (!digest_ret || - !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) || - !CBB_reserve(&child, &ptr, max_sig_len)) { - goto err; - } - sign_result = ssl_private_key_sign(ssl, ptr, &sig_len, max_sig_len, md, - digest, digest_len); - } else { - assert(ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B); - - /* Retry the signature. */ - uint8_t *ptr; - if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) || - !CBB_reserve(&child, &ptr, max_sig_len)) { - goto err; - } - sign_result = - ssl_private_key_sign_complete(ssl, ptr, &sig_len, max_sig_len); - } - - switch (sign_result) { - case ssl_private_key_success: - ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; - if (!CBB_did_write(&child, sig_len)) { - goto err; - } - break; - case ssl_private_key_failure: - ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; - goto err; - case ssl_private_key_retry: - /* Discard the unfinished signature and save the state of |cbb| for the - * next iteration. */ - CBB_discard_child(&cbb); - ssl->init_num = SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl) + CBB_len(&cbb); - ssl->rwstate = SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION; - ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B; - goto err; - } - } - - size_t length; - if (!CBB_finish(&cbb, NULL, &length) || - !ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, length)) { - goto err; - } - ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_C; - return ssl_do_write(ssl); - -err: - CBB_cleanup(&cbb); - return -1; -} - -int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *ssl) { - uint8_t *p, *d; - size_t i; - int j, nl, off, n; - STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL; - X509_NAME *name; - BUF_MEM *buf; - - if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) { - buf = ssl->init_buf; - - d = p = ssl_handshake_start(ssl); - - /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ - p++; - n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(ssl, p); - d[0] = n; - p += n; - n++; - - if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { - const uint8_t *psigs; - nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(ssl, &psigs); - s2n(nl, p); - memcpy(p, psigs, nl); - p += nl; - n += nl + 2; - } - - off = n; - p += 2; - n += 2; - - sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(ssl); - nl = 0; - if (sk != NULL) { - for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { - name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i); - j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL); - if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl) + n + j + 2)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); - goto err; - } - p = ssl_handshake_start(ssl) + n; - s2n(j, p); - i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p); - n += 2 + j; - nl += 2 + j; - } - } - - /* else no CA names */ - p = ssl_handshake_start(ssl) + off; - s2n(nl, p); - - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n)) { - goto err; - } - ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; - } - - /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ - return ssl_do_write(ssl); - -err: - return -1; -} - -int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *ssl) { - int al; - CBS client_key_exchange; - uint32_t alg_k; - uint32_t alg_a; - uint8_t *premaster_secret = NULL; - size_t premaster_secret_len = 0; - uint8_t *decrypt_buf = NULL; - - unsigned psk_len = 0; - uint8_t psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; - - if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A || - ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B) { - int ok; - const long n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message( - ssl, SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A, SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, - SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048 /* ??? */, ssl_hash_message, &ok); - if (!ok) { - return n; - } - } - - CBS_init(&client_key_exchange, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num); - alg_k = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - alg_a = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; - - /* If using a PSK key exchange, prepare the pre-shared key. */ - if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) { - CBS psk_identity; - - /* If using PSK, the ClientKeyExchange contains a psk_identity. If PSK, - * then this is the only field in the message. */ - if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange, &psk_identity) || - ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - - if (ssl->psk_server_callback == NULL) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - - if (CBS_len(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN || - CBS_contains_zero_byte(&psk_identity)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - goto f_err; - } - - if (!CBS_strdup(&psk_identity, &ssl->session->psk_identity)) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto f_err; - } - - /* Look up the key for the identity. */ - psk_len = ssl->psk_server_callback(ssl, ssl->session->psk_identity, psk, - sizeof(psk)); - if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } else if (psk_len == 0) { - /* PSK related to the given identity not found */ - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); - al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; - goto f_err; - } - } - - /* Depending on the key exchange method, compute |premaster_secret| and - * |premaster_secret_len|. */ - if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { - /* Allocate a buffer large enough for an RSA decryption. */ - const size_t rsa_size = ssl_private_key_max_signature_len(ssl); - decrypt_buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size); - if (decrypt_buf == NULL) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - enum ssl_private_key_result_t decrypt_result; - size_t decrypt_len; - if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B) { - if (!ssl_has_private_key(ssl) || - ssl_private_key_type(ssl) != EVP_PKEY_RSA) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); - goto f_err; - } - CBS encrypted_premaster_secret; - if (ssl->version > SSL3_VERSION) { - if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange, - &encrypted_premaster_secret) || - CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, - SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); - goto f_err; - } - } else { - encrypted_premaster_secret = client_key_exchange; - } - - /* Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of the - * timing-sensitive code below. */ - decrypt_result = ssl_private_key_decrypt( - ssl, decrypt_buf, &decrypt_len, rsa_size, - CBS_data(&encrypted_premaster_secret), - CBS_len(&encrypted_premaster_secret)); - } else { - assert(ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_C); - /* Complete async decrypt. */ - decrypt_result = ssl_private_key_decrypt_complete( - ssl, decrypt_buf, &decrypt_len, rsa_size); - } - - switch (decrypt_result) { - case ssl_private_key_success: - ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; - break; - case ssl_private_key_failure: - ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; - goto err; - case ssl_private_key_retry: - ssl->rwstate = SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION; - ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_C; - goto err; - } - - assert(decrypt_len == rsa_size); - - /* Prepare a random premaster, to be used on invalid padding. See RFC 5246, - * section 7.4.7.1. */ - premaster_secret_len = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; - premaster_secret = OPENSSL_malloc(premaster_secret_len); - if (premaster_secret == NULL) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - if (!RAND_bytes(premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len)) { - goto err; - } - - /* The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys are - * publicly invalid. */ - if (decrypt_len < 11 + premaster_secret_len) { - al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); - goto f_err; - } - - /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */ - size_t padding_len = decrypt_len - premaster_secret_len; - uint8_t good = constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_buf[0], 0) & - constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_buf[1], 2); - size_t i; - for (i = 2; i < padding_len - 1; i++) { - good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(decrypt_buf[i]); - } - good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(decrypt_buf[padding_len - 1]); - - /* The premaster secret must begin with |client_version|. This too must be - * checked in constant time (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/). */ - good &= constant_time_eq_8(decrypt_buf[padding_len], - (unsigned)(ssl->client_version >> 8)); - good &= constant_time_eq_8(decrypt_buf[padding_len + 1], - (unsigned)(ssl->client_version & 0xff)); - - /* Select, in constant time, either the decrypted premaster or the random - * premaster based on |good|. */ - for (i = 0; i < premaster_secret_len; i++) { - premaster_secret[i] = constant_time_select_8( - good, decrypt_buf[padding_len + i], premaster_secret[i]); - } - - OPENSSL_free(decrypt_buf); - decrypt_buf = NULL; - } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kDHE)) { - /* Parse the ClientKeyExchange. ECDHE uses a u8 length prefix while DHE uses - * u16. */ - CBS peer_key; - int peer_key_ok; - if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) { - peer_key_ok = CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange, &peer_key); - } else { - peer_key_ok = - CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange, &peer_key); - } - - if (!peer_key_ok || CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); - goto f_err; - } - - /* Compute the premaster. */ - uint8_t alert; - if (!SSL_ECDH_CTX_compute_secret(&ssl->s3->tmp.ecdh_ctx, &premaster_secret, - &premaster_secret_len, &alert, - CBS_data(&peer_key), CBS_len(&peer_key))) { - al = alert; - goto f_err; - } - - /* The key exchange state may now be discarded. */ - SSL_ECDH_CTX_cleanup(&ssl->s3->tmp.ecdh_ctx); - } else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { - /* For plain PSK, other_secret is a block of 0s with the same length as the - * pre-shared key. */ - premaster_secret_len = psk_len; - premaster_secret = OPENSSL_malloc(premaster_secret_len); - if (premaster_secret == NULL) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - memset(premaster_secret, 0, premaster_secret_len); - } else { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); - goto f_err; - } - - /* For a PSK cipher suite, the actual pre-master secret is combined with the - * pre-shared key. */ - if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) { - CBB new_premaster, child; - uint8_t *new_data; - size_t new_len; - - CBB_zero(&new_premaster); - if (!CBB_init(&new_premaster, 2 + psk_len + 2 + premaster_secret_len) || - !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&new_premaster, &child) || - !CBB_add_bytes(&child, premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len) || - !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&new_premaster, &child) || - !CBB_add_bytes(&child, psk, psk_len) || - !CBB_finish(&new_premaster, &new_data, &new_len)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - CBB_cleanup(&new_premaster); - goto err; - } - - OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len); - OPENSSL_free(premaster_secret); - premaster_secret = new_data; - premaster_secret_len = new_len; - } - - /* Compute the master secret */ - ssl->session->master_key_length = tls1_generate_master_secret( - ssl, ssl->session->master_key, premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len); - if (ssl->session->master_key_length == 0) { - goto err; - } - ssl->session->extended_master_secret = ssl->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret; - - OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len); - OPENSSL_free(premaster_secret); - return 1; - -f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); -err: - if (premaster_secret != NULL) { - OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len); - OPENSSL_free(premaster_secret); - } - OPENSSL_free(decrypt_buf); - - return -1; -} - -int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *ssl) { - int al, ok, ret = 0; - long n; - CBS certificate_verify, signature; - X509 *peer = ssl->session->peer; - EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; - const EVP_MD *md = NULL; - uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - size_t digest_length; - EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; - - /* Only RSA and ECDSA client certificates are supported, so a - * CertificateVerify is required if and only if there's a client certificate. - * */ - if (peer == NULL) { - ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(ssl); - return 1; - } - - n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message( - ssl, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, - SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, - ssl_dont_hash_message, &ok); - - if (!ok) { - return n; - } - - /* Filter out unsupported certificate types. */ - pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer); - if (pkey == NULL) { - goto err; - } - if (!(X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey) & EVP_PKT_SIGN) || - (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA && pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) { - al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); - goto f_err; - } - - CBS_init(&certificate_verify, ssl->init_msg, n); - - /* Determine the digest type if needbe. */ - if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { - uint8_t hash, signature_type; - if (!CBS_get_u8(&certificate_verify, &hash) || - !CBS_get_u8(&certificate_verify, &signature_type)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); - goto f_err; - } - if (!tls12_check_peer_sigalg(ssl, &md, &al, hash, signature_type, pkey)) { - goto f_err; - } - } - - /* Compute the digest. */ - if (!ssl3_cert_verify_hash(ssl, digest, &digest_length, &md, pkey->type)) { - goto err; - } - - /* The handshake buffer is no longer necessary, and we may hash the current - * message.*/ - ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(ssl); - if (!ssl3_hash_current_message(ssl)) { - goto err; - } - - /* Parse and verify the signature. */ - if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&certificate_verify, &signature) || - CBS_len(&certificate_verify) != 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); - goto f_err; - } - - pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); - if (pctx == NULL) { - goto err; - } - if (!EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) || - !EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, md) || - !EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, CBS_data(&signature), CBS_len(&signature), digest, - digest_length)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); - goto f_err; - } - - ret = 1; - - if (0) { - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - } - -err: - EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - - return ret; -} - -int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *ssl) { - int i, ok, al, ret = -1; - X509 *x = NULL; - unsigned long n; - STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; - SHA256_CTX sha256; - CBS certificate_msg, certificate_list; - int is_first_certificate = 1; - - n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, - -1, (long)ssl->max_cert_list, - ssl_hash_message, &ok); - - if (!ok) { - return n; - } - - if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { - if ((ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && - (ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - goto f_err; - } - - /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */ - if (ssl->version > SSL3_VERSION && ssl->s3->tmp.cert_request) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, - SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST); - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - goto f_err; - } - ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; - - return 1; - } - - if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); - goto f_err; - } - - CBS_init(&certificate_msg, ssl->init_msg, n); - - sk = sk_X509_new_null(); - if (sk == NULL) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_msg, &certificate_list) || - CBS_len(&certificate_msg) != 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); - goto f_err; - } - - while (CBS_len(&certificate_list) > 0) { - CBS certificate; - const uint8_t *data; - - if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &certificate)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); - goto f_err; - } - - if (is_first_certificate && ssl->ctx->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs) { - /* If this is the first certificate, and we don't want to keep peer - * certificates in memory, then we hash it right away. */ - SHA256_Init(&sha256); - SHA256_Update(&sha256, CBS_data(&certificate), CBS_len(&certificate)); - SHA256_Final(ssl->session->peer_sha256, &sha256); - ssl->session->peer_sha256_valid = 1; - } - is_first_certificate = 0; - - /* A u24 length cannot overflow a long. */ - data = CBS_data(&certificate); - x = d2i_X509(NULL, &data, (long)CBS_len(&certificate)); - if (x == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); - goto f_err; - } - if (data != CBS_data(&certificate) + CBS_len(&certificate)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - x = NULL; - } - - if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) { - /* No client certificate so the handshake buffer may be discarded. */ - ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(ssl); - - /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ - if (ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); - goto f_err; - } else if ((ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && - (ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { - /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - goto f_err; - } - } else { - i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(ssl, sk); - if (i <= 0) { - al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(ssl->verify_result); - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); - goto f_err; - } - } - - X509_free(ssl->session->peer); - ssl->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk); - ssl->session->verify_result = ssl->verify_result; - - sk_X509_pop_free(ssl->session->cert_chain, X509_free); - ssl->session->cert_chain = sk; - /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own - * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */ - - sk = NULL; - - ret = 1; - - if (0) { - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - } - -err: - X509_free(x); - sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); - return ret; -} - -int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *ssl) { - if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) { - if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(ssl)) { - return 0; - } - ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; - } - - /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ - return ssl_do_write(ssl); -} - -/* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */ -int ssl3_send_new_session_ticket(SSL *ssl) { - int ret = -1; - uint8_t *session = NULL; - size_t session_len; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; - HMAC_CTX hctx; - - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); - HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); - - if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) { - uint8_t *p, *macstart; - int len; - unsigned int hlen; - SSL_CTX *tctx = ssl->initial_ctx; - uint8_t iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; - uint8_t key_name[16]; - /* The maximum overhead of encrypting the session is 16 (key name) + IV + - * one block of encryption overhead + HMAC. */ - const size_t max_ticket_overhead = - 16 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE; - - /* Serialize the SSL_SESSION to be encoded into the ticket. */ - if (!SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_for_ticket(ssl->session, &session, - &session_len)) { - goto err; - } - - /* If the session is too long, emit a dummy value rather than abort the - * connection. */ - if (session_len > 0xFFFF - max_ticket_overhead) { - static const char kTicketPlaceholder[] = "TICKET TOO LARGE"; - const size_t placeholder_len = strlen(kTicketPlaceholder); - - OPENSSL_free(session); - session = NULL; - - p = ssl_handshake_start(ssl); - /* Emit ticket_lifetime_hint. */ - l2n(0, p); - /* Emit ticket. */ - s2n(placeholder_len, p); - memcpy(p, kTicketPlaceholder, placeholder_len); - p += placeholder_len; - - len = p - ssl_handshake_start(ssl); - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len)) { - goto err; - } - ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; - return ssl_do_write(ssl); - } - - /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as follows: - * handshake_header_length + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + - * max_ticket_overhead + * session_length */ - if (!BUF_MEM_grow(ssl->init_buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl) + 6 + - max_ticket_overhead + session_len)) { - goto err; - } - p = ssl_handshake_start(ssl); - /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does all the - * work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. */ - if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { - if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(ssl, key_name, iv, &ctx, &hctx, - 1 /* encrypt */) < 0) { - goto err; - } - } else { - if (!RAND_bytes(iv, 16) || - !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, - tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv) || - !HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, tlsext_tick_md(), - NULL)) { - goto err; - } - memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); - } - - /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified for - * resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for new - * sessions will live as long as their sessions. */ - l2n(ssl->hit ? 0 : ssl->session->timeout, p); - - /* Skip ticket length for now */ - p += 2; - /* Output key name */ - macstart = p; - memcpy(p, key_name, 16); - p += 16; - /* output IV */ - memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)); - p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); - /* Encrypt session data */ - if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, session, session_len)) { - goto err; - } - p += len; - if (!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ctx, p, &len)) { - goto err; - } - p += len; - - if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart) || - !HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen)) { - goto err; - } - - p += hlen; - /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ - /* Total length */ - len = p - ssl_handshake_start(ssl); - /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */ - p = ssl_handshake_start(ssl) + 4; - s2n(len - 6, p); - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len)) { - goto err; - } - ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; - } - - /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ - ret = ssl_do_write(ssl); - -err: - OPENSSL_free(session); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); - return ret; -} - -/* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It - * sets the next_proto member in s if found */ -int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *ssl) { - int ok; - long n; - CBS next_protocol, selected_protocol, padding; - - /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the extension - * in their ClientHello */ - if (!ssl->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION); - return -1; - } - - n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A, - SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B, SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, - 514, /* See the payload format below */ - ssl_hash_message, &ok); - - if (!ok) { - return n; - } - - CBS_init(&next_protocol, ssl->init_msg, n); - - /* The payload looks like: - * uint8 proto_len; - * uint8 proto[proto_len]; - * uint8 padding_len; - * uint8 padding[padding_len]; */ - if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&next_protocol, &selected_protocol) || - !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&next_protocol, &padding) || - CBS_len(&next_protocol) != 0 || - !CBS_stow(&selected_protocol, &ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated, - &ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated_len)) { - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -/* ssl3_get_channel_id reads and verifies a ClientID handshake message. */ -int ssl3_get_channel_id(SSL *ssl) { - int ret = -1, ok; - long n; - uint8_t channel_id_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - size_t channel_id_hash_len; - const uint8_t *p; - uint16_t extension_type; - EC_GROUP *p256 = NULL; - EC_KEY *key = NULL; - EC_POINT *point = NULL; - ECDSA_SIG sig; - BIGNUM x, y; - CBS encrypted_extensions, extension; - - n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message( - ssl, SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_B, - SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, 2 + 2 + TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE, - ssl_dont_hash_message, &ok); - - if (!ok) { - return n; - } - - /* Before incorporating the EncryptedExtensions message to the handshake - * hash, compute the hash that should have been signed. */ - if (!tls1_channel_id_hash(ssl, channel_id_hash, &channel_id_hash_len)) { - return -1; - } - assert(channel_id_hash_len == SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH); - - if (!ssl3_hash_current_message(ssl)) { - return -1; - } - - CBS_init(&encrypted_extensions, ssl->init_msg, n); - - /* EncryptedExtensions could include multiple extensions, but the only - * extension that could be negotiated is ChannelID, so there can only be one - * entry. - * - * The payload looks like: - * uint16 extension_type - * uint16 extension_len; - * uint8 x[32]; - * uint8 y[32]; - * uint8 r[32]; - * uint8 s[32]; */ - - if (!CBS_get_u16(&encrypted_extensions, &extension_type) || - !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&encrypted_extensions, &extension) || - CBS_len(&encrypted_extensions) != 0 || - extension_type != TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id || - CBS_len(&extension) != TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_MESSAGE); - return -1; - } - - p256 = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1); - if (!p256) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_P256_SUPPORT); - return -1; - } - - BN_init(&x); - BN_init(&y); - sig.r = BN_new(); - sig.s = BN_new(); - if (sig.r == NULL || sig.s == NULL) { - goto err; - } - - p = CBS_data(&extension); - if (BN_bin2bn(p + 0, 32, &x) == NULL || - BN_bin2bn(p + 32, 32, &y) == NULL || - BN_bin2bn(p + 64, 32, sig.r) == NULL || - BN_bin2bn(p + 96, 32, sig.s) == NULL) { - goto err; - } - - point = EC_POINT_new(p256); - if (!point || - !EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(p256, point, &x, &y, NULL)) { - goto err; - } - - key = EC_KEY_new(); - if (!key || !EC_KEY_set_group(key, p256) || - !EC_KEY_set_public_key(key, point)) { - goto err; - } - - /* We stored the handshake hash in |tlsext_channel_id| the first time that we - * were called. */ - if (!ECDSA_do_verify(channel_id_hash, channel_id_hash_len, &sig, key)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_SIGNATURE_INVALID); - ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0; - goto err; - } - - memcpy(ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id, p, 64); - ret = 1; - -err: - BN_free(&x); - BN_free(&y); - BN_free(sig.r); - BN_free(sig.s); - EC_KEY_free(key); - EC_POINT_free(point); - EC_GROUP_free(p256); - return ret; -} |