diff options
author | Bodo Möller <bodo@openssl.org> | 2002-11-04 16:17:22 +0300 |
---|---|---|
committer | Bodo Möller <bodo@openssl.org> | 2002-11-04 16:17:22 +0300 |
commit | b53e44e57259b2b015c54de8ecbcf4e06be23298 (patch) | |
tree | 4d06528db2e5e7d8ad1680fc59159a4c689c7b3c /crypto | |
parent | e5f4d8279dccad0f6dde324f52333291739dcca3 (diff) |
implement and use new macros BN_get_sign(), BN_set_sign()
Submitted by: Nils Larsch
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto')
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/asn1/a_enum.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/asn1/a_int.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/asn1/t_pkey.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/bn/bn.h | 62 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/ec/ec_mult.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/ec/ecp_nist.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/ec/ectest.c | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c | 6 |
13 files changed, 78 insertions, 48 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_enum.c b/crypto/asn1/a_enum.c index ad8f0ffd1a..68a525fb12 100644 --- a/crypto/asn1/a_enum.c +++ b/crypto/asn1/a_enum.c @@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ ASN1_ENUMERATED *BN_to_ASN1_ENUMERATED(BIGNUM *bn, ASN1_ENUMERATED *ai) ASN1err(ASN1_F_BN_TO_ASN1_ENUMERATED,ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } - if(bn->neg) ret->type = V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED; + if(BN_get_sign(bn)) ret->type = V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED; else ret->type=V_ASN1_ENUMERATED; j=BN_num_bits(bn); len=((j == 0)?0:((j/8)+1)); @@ -175,6 +175,6 @@ BIGNUM *ASN1_ENUMERATED_to_BN(ASN1_ENUMERATED *ai, BIGNUM *bn) if ((ret=BN_bin2bn(ai->data,ai->length,bn)) == NULL) ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ENUMERATED_TO_BN,ASN1_R_BN_LIB); - else if(ai->type == V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED) ret->neg = 1; + else if(ai->type == V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED) BN_set_sign(ret,1); return(ret); } diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_int.c b/crypto/asn1/a_int.c index edb243c021..78402cd985 100644 --- a/crypto/asn1/a_int.c +++ b/crypto/asn1/a_int.c @@ -393,7 +393,8 @@ ASN1_INTEGER *BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(BIGNUM *bn, ASN1_INTEGER *ai) ASN1err(ASN1_F_BN_TO_ASN1_INTEGER,ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } - if(bn->neg) ret->type = V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER; + if (BN_get_sign(bn)) + ret->type = V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER; else ret->type=V_ASN1_INTEGER; j=BN_num_bits(bn); len=((j == 0)?0:((j/8)+1)); @@ -426,7 +427,8 @@ BIGNUM *ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(ASN1_INTEGER *ai, BIGNUM *bn) if ((ret=BN_bin2bn(ai->data,ai->length,bn)) == NULL) ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_INTEGER_TO_BN,ASN1_R_BN_LIB); - else if(ai->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) ret->neg = 1; + else if(ai->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) + BN_set_sign(ret, 1); return(ret); } diff --git a/crypto/asn1/t_pkey.c b/crypto/asn1/t_pkey.c index 46fb86a3b9..e3e0739bbd 100644 --- a/crypto/asn1/t_pkey.c +++ b/crypto/asn1/t_pkey.c @@ -575,7 +575,7 @@ static int print(BIO *bp, const char *number, BIGNUM *num, unsigned char *buf, const char *neg; if (num == NULL) return(1); - neg=(num->neg)?"-":""; + neg = (BN_get_sign(num))?"-":""; if (off) { if (off > 128) off=128; diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn.h b/crypto/bn/bn.h index 4182dbfcc5..403add94b0 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/bn.h +++ b/crypto/bn/bn.h @@ -320,6 +320,11 @@ typedef struct bn_recp_ctx_st #define BN_one(a) (BN_set_word((a),1)) #define BN_zero(a) (BN_set_word((a),0)) +/* BN_set_sign(BIGNUM *, int) sets the sign of a BIGNUM + * (0 for a non-negative value, 1 for negative) */ +#define BN_set_sign(a,b) ((a)->neg = (b)) +/* BN_get_sign(BIGNUM *) returns the sign of the BIGNUM */ +#define BN_get_sign(a) ((a)->neg) /*#define BN_ascii2bn(a) BN_hex2bn(a) */ /*#define BN_bn2ascii(a) BN_bn2hex(a) */ @@ -470,37 +475,54 @@ int BN_div_recp(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m, /* Functions for arithmetic over binary polynomials represented by BIGNUMs. * - * The BIGNUM::neg property of BIGNUMs representing binary polynomials is ignored. + * The BIGNUM::neg property of BIGNUMs representing binary polynomials is + * ignored. * * Note that input arguments are not const so that their bit arrays can * be expanded to the appropriate size if needed. */ -int BN_GF2m_add(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b); /* r = a + b */ + +int BN_GF2m_add(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b); /*r = a + b*/ #define BN_GF2m_sub(r, a, b) BN_GF2m_add(r, a, b) -int BN_GF2m_mod(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p); /* r = a mod p */ -int BN_GF2m_mod_mul(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx); /* r = (a * b) mod p */ -int BN_GF2m_mod_sqr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx); /* r = (a * a) mod p */ -int BN_GF2m_mod_inv(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx); /* r = (1 / b) mod p */ -int BN_GF2m_mod_div(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx); /* r = (a / b) mod p */ -int BN_GF2m_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx); /* r = (a ^ b) mod p */ -int BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx); /* r = sqrt(a) mod p */ -int BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx); /* r^2 + r = a mod p */ +int BN_GF2m_mod(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p); /*r=a mod p*/ +int BN_GF2m_mod_mul(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, + const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx); /* r = (a * b) mod p */ +int BN_GF2m_mod_sqr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, + BN_CTX *ctx); /* r = (a * a) mod p */ +int BN_GF2m_mod_inv(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *p, + BN_CTX *ctx); /* r = (1 / b) mod p */ +int BN_GF2m_mod_div(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, + const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx); /* r = (a / b) mod p */ +int BN_GF2m_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, + const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx); /* r = (a ^ b) mod p */ +int BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, + BN_CTX *ctx); /* r = sqrt(a) mod p */ +int BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, + BN_CTX *ctx); /* r^2 + r = a mod p */ #define BN_GF2m_cmp(a, b) BN_ucmp((a), (b)) /* Some functions allow for representation of the irreducible polynomials * as an unsigned int[], say p. The irreducible f(t) is then of the form: * t^p[0] + t^p[1] + ... + t^p[k] * where m = p[0] > p[1] > ... > p[k] = 0. */ -int BN_GF2m_mod_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const unsigned int p[]); /* r = a mod p */ -int BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const unsigned int p[], BN_CTX *ctx); /* r = (a * b) mod p */ -int BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const unsigned int p[], BN_CTX *ctx); /* r = (a * a) mod p */ -int BN_GF2m_mod_inv_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *b, const unsigned int p[], BN_CTX *ctx); /* r = (1 / b) mod p */ -int BN_GF2m_mod_div_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const unsigned int p[], BN_CTX *ctx); /* r = (a / b) mod p */ -int BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const unsigned int p[], BN_CTX *ctx); /* r = (a ^ b) mod p */ -int BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const unsigned int p[], BN_CTX *ctx); /* r = sqrt(a) mod p */ -int BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const unsigned int p[], BN_CTX *ctx); /* r^2 + r = a mod p */ -int BN_GF2m_poly2arr(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned int p[], int max); -int BN_GF2m_arr2poly(const unsigned int p[], BIGNUM *a); +int BN_GF2m_mod_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const unsigned int p[]); + /* r = a mod p */ +int BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, + const unsigned int p[], BN_CTX *ctx); /* r = (a * b) mod p */ +int BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const unsigned int p[], + BN_CTX *ctx); /* r = (a * a) mod p */ +int BN_GF2m_mod_inv_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *b, const unsigned int p[], + BN_CTX *ctx); /* r = (1 / b) mod p */ +int BN_GF2m_mod_div_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, + const unsigned int p[], BN_CTX *ctx); /* r = (a / b) mod p */ +int BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, + const unsigned int p[], BN_CTX *ctx); /* r = (a ^ b) mod p */ +int BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, + const unsigned int p[], BN_CTX *ctx); /* r = sqrt(a) mod p */ +int BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, + const unsigned int p[], BN_CTX *ctx); /* r^2 + r = a mod p */ +int BN_GF2m_poly2arr(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned int p[], int max); +int BN_GF2m_arr2poly(const unsigned int p[], BIGNUM *a); /* faster mod functions for the 'NIST primes' * 0 <= a < p^2 */ diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c index 37dd5fc994..fc35dfe1f6 100644 --- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c +++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c @@ -246,12 +246,14 @@ static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, DSA_SIG *sig, BN_init(&u2); BN_init(&t1); - if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || sig->r->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0) + if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || BN_get_sign(sig->r) || + BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0) { ret = 0; goto err; } - if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || sig->s->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0) + if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || BN_get_sign(sig->s) || + BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0) { ret = 0; goto err; diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c b/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c index 09cf08a46c..3aef959354 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c +++ b/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c @@ -297,8 +297,8 @@ static int point_multiply(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scal } /* GF(2^m) field elements should always have BIGNUM::neg = 0 */ - r->X.neg = 0; - r->Y.neg = 0; + BN_set_sign(&r->X, 0); + BN_set_sign(&r->Y, 0); ret = 1; @@ -342,14 +342,16 @@ int ec_GF2m_mont_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, if (scalar) { if (!point_multiply(group, p, scalar, group->generator, ctx)) goto err; - if (scalar->neg) if (!group->meth->invert(group, p, ctx)) goto err; + if (BN_get_sign(scalar)) + if (!group->meth->invert(group, p, ctx)) goto err; if (!group->meth->add(group, r, r, p, ctx)) goto err; } for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { if (!point_multiply(group, p, scalars[i], points[i], ctx)) goto err; - if (scalars[i]->neg) if (!group->meth->invert(group, p, ctx)) goto err; + if (BN_get_sign(scalars[i])) + if (!group->meth->invert(group, p, ctx)) goto err; if (!group->meth->add(group, r, r, p, ctx)) goto err; } diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c b/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c index acf205597b..5e37bfaca7 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c +++ b/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c @@ -349,11 +349,11 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT } if (!BN_copy(&point->X, x)) goto err; - point->X.neg = 0; + BN_set_sign(&point->X, 0); if (!BN_copy(&point->Y, y)) goto err; - point->Y.neg = 0; + BN_set_sign(&point->Y, 0); if (!BN_copy(&point->Z, BN_value_one())) goto err; - point->Z.neg = 0; + BN_set_sign(&point->Z, 0); point->Z_is_one = 1; ret = 1; @@ -384,12 +384,12 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_point_get_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_ if (x != NULL) { if (!BN_copy(x, &point->X)) goto err; - x->neg = 0; + BN_set_sign(x, 0); } if (y != NULL) { if (!BN_copy(y, &point->Y)) goto err; - y->neg = 0; + BN_set_sign(y, 0); } ret = 1; diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c b/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c index 4978a54352..f5312aa23a 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c +++ b/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c @@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ static signed char *compute_wNAF(const BIGNUM *scalar, int w, size_t *ret_len) next_bit = bit << 1; /* at most 256 */ mask = next_bit - 1; /* at most 255 */ - if (scalar->neg) + if (BN_get_sign(scalar)) { sign = -1; } diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_nist.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_nist.c index 98401fe4bc..156bc54a07 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ecp_nist.c +++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_nist.c @@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ int ec_GFp_nist_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p, /* group->field */ if (!BN_copy(&group->field, p)) goto err; - group->field.neg = 0; + BN_set_sign(&group->field, 0); /* group->a */ if (!group->field_mod_func(&group->a, a, p, ctx)) goto err; diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c index 97ff8eb61a..ad95b03ba6 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c +++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c @@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *group, /* group->field */ if (!BN_copy(&group->field, p)) goto err; - group->field.neg = 0; + BN_set_sign(&group->field, 0); /* group->a */ if (!BN_nnmod(tmp_a, a, p, ctx)) goto err; diff --git a/crypto/ec/ectest.c b/crypto/ec/ectest.c index e32b231e8d..2553982644 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ectest.c +++ b/crypto/ec/ectest.c @@ -603,7 +603,7 @@ void prime_field_tests() if (!BN_pseudo_rand(y, BN_num_bits(y), 0, 0)) ABORT; if (!BN_add(z, z, y)) ABORT; - z->neg = 1; + BN_set_sign(z, 1); scalars[0] = y; scalars[1] = z; /* z = -(order + y) */ @@ -615,7 +615,7 @@ void prime_field_tests() if (!BN_pseudo_rand(x, BN_num_bits(y) - 1, 0, 0)) ABORT; if (!BN_add(z, x, y)) ABORT; - z->neg = 1; + BN_set_sign(z, 1); scalars[0] = x; scalars[1] = y; scalars[2] = z; /* z = -(x+y) */ @@ -1069,7 +1069,7 @@ void char2_field_tests() if (!BN_pseudo_rand(y, BN_num_bits(y), 0, 0)) ABORT; if (!BN_add(z, z, y)) ABORT; - z->neg = 1; + BN_set_sign(z, 1); scalars[0] = y; scalars[1] = z; /* z = -(order + y) */ @@ -1081,7 +1081,7 @@ void char2_field_tests() if (!BN_pseudo_rand(x, BN_num_bits(y) - 1, 0, 0)) ABORT; if (!BN_add(z, x, y)) ABORT; - z->neg = 1; + BN_set_sign(z, 1); scalars[0] = x; scalars[1] = y; scalars[2] = z; /* z = -(x+y) */ diff --git a/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c b/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c index a9814afe0b..215da3892a 100644 --- a/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c +++ b/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c @@ -353,13 +353,15 @@ static int ecdsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, goto err; } - if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || sig->r->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->r, order) >= 0) + if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || BN_get_sign(sig->r) || + BN_ucmp(sig->r, order) >= 0) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ECDSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); ret = 0; goto err; } - if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || sig->s->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->s, order) >= 0) + if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || BN_get_sign(sig->s) || + BN_ucmp(sig->s, order) >= 0) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ECDSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); ret = 0; diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c index 0eda816081..963c34a948 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c @@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa) if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,&m1)) goto err; /* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */ - if (r0->neg) + if (BN_get_sign(r0)) if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err; if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err; @@ -558,7 +558,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa) * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because * they ensure p > q [steve] */ - if (r0->neg) + if (BN_get_sign(r0)) if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err; if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_add(r0,&r1,&m1)) goto err; @@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa) * for absolute equality, just congruency. */ if (!BN_sub(&vrfy, &vrfy, I)) goto err; if (!BN_mod(&vrfy, &vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err; - if (vrfy.neg) + if (BN_get_sign(&vrfy)) if (!BN_add(&vrfy, &vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err; if (!BN_is_zero(&vrfy)) /* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak |