1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559
560
561
562
563
564
565
566
567
568
569
570
571
572
573
574
575
576
577
578
579
580
581
582
583
584
585
586
587
588
589
590
591
592
593
|
/*
* Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include "crypto/x509.h"
int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
{
int i;
const X509_CINF *ai, *bi;
if (b == NULL)
return a != NULL;
if (a == NULL)
return -1;
ai = &a->cert_info;
bi = &b->cert_info;
i = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(&ai->serialNumber, &bi->serialNumber);
if (i != 0)
return i < 0 ? -1 : 1;
return X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
{
unsigned long ret = 0;
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
unsigned char md[16];
char *f = NULL;
EVP_MD *digest = NULL;
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info.issuer, NULL, 0);
if (f == NULL)
goto err;
digest = EVP_MD_fetch(a->libctx, SN_md5, a->propq);
if (digest == NULL)
goto err;
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, digest, NULL))
goto err;
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f)))
goto err;
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate
(ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info.serialNumber.data,
(unsigned long)a->cert_info.serialNumber.length))
goto err;
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, &(md[0]), NULL))
goto err;
ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
) & 0xffffffffL;
err:
OPENSSL_free(f);
EVP_MD_free(digest);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
return ret;
}
#endif
int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
{
return X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.issuer, b->cert_info.issuer);
}
int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
{
return X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.subject, b->cert_info.subject);
}
int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
{
return X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl.issuer, b->crl.issuer);
}
int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
{
int rv;
if ((a->flags & EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT) == 0
&& (b->flags & EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT) == 0)
rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
else
return -2;
return rv < 0 ? -1 : rv > 0;
}
X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *a)
{
return a->cert_info.issuer;
}
unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x)
{
return X509_NAME_hash_ex(x->cert_info.issuer, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
{
return X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.issuer);
}
#endif
X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *a)
{
return a->cert_info.subject;
}
ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a)
{
return &a->cert_info.serialNumber;
}
const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *a)
{
return &a->cert_info.serialNumber;
}
unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
{
return X509_NAME_hash_ex(x->cert_info.subject, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
{
return X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.subject);
}
#endif
/*
* Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB:
* Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const"
* arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these
* operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
* certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the
* "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast.
*/
int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
{
int rv = 0;
if (a == b) /* for efficiency */
return 0;
/* attempt to compute cert hash */
(void)X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
(void)X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);
if ((a->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT) == 0
&& (b->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT) == 0)
rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
if (rv != 0)
return rv < 0 ? -1 : 1;
/* Check for match against stored encoding too */
if (!a->cert_info.enc.modified && !b->cert_info.enc.modified) {
if (a->cert_info.enc.len < b->cert_info.enc.len)
return -1;
if (a->cert_info.enc.len > b->cert_info.enc.len)
return 1;
rv = memcmp(a->cert_info.enc.enc,
b->cert_info.enc.enc, a->cert_info.enc.len);
}
return rv < 0 ? -1 : rv > 0;
}
int ossl_x509_add_cert_new(STACK_OF(X509) **p_sk, X509 *cert, int flags)
{
if (*p_sk == NULL && (*p_sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
return 0;
}
return X509_add_cert(*p_sk, cert, flags);
}
int X509_add_cert(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *cert, int flags)
{
if (sk == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return 0;
}
if ((flags & X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP) != 0) {
/*
* not using sk_X509_set_cmp_func() and sk_X509_find()
* because this re-orders the certs on the stack
*/
int i;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
if (X509_cmp(sk_X509_value(sk, i), cert) == 0)
return 1;
}
}
if ((flags & X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_SS) != 0) {
int ret = X509_self_signed(cert, 0);
if (ret != 0)
return ret > 0 ? 1 : 0;
}
if (!sk_X509_insert(sk, cert,
(flags & X509_ADD_FLAG_PREPEND) != 0 ? 0 : -1)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
return 0;
}
if ((flags & X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF) != 0)
(void)X509_up_ref(cert);
return 1;
}
int X509_add_certs(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, int flags)
/* compiler would allow 'const' for the certs, yet they may get up-ref'ed */
{
if (sk == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return 0;
}
return ossl_x509_add_certs_new(&sk, certs, flags);
}
int ossl_x509_add_certs_new(STACK_OF(X509) **p_sk, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
int flags)
/* compiler would allow 'const' for the certs, yet they may get up-ref'ed */
{
int n = sk_X509_num(certs /* may be NULL */);
int i;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
int j = (flags & X509_ADD_FLAG_PREPEND) == 0 ? i : n - 1 - i;
/* if prepend, add certs in reverse order to keep original order */
if (!ossl_x509_add_cert_new(p_sk, sk_X509_value(certs, j), flags))
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
{
int ret;
if (b == NULL)
return a != NULL;
if (a == NULL)
return -1;
/* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
if (a->canon_enc == NULL || a->modified) {
ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
if (ret < 0)
return -2;
}
if (b->canon_enc == NULL || b->modified) {
ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
if (ret < 0)
return -2;
}
ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
if (ret == 0 && a->canon_enclen == 0)
return 0;
if (a->canon_enc == NULL || b->canon_enc == NULL)
return -2;
if (ret == 0)
ret = memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret > 0;
}
unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_ex(const X509_NAME *x, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
const char *propq, int *ok)
{
unsigned long ret = 0;
unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
EVP_MD *sha1 = EVP_MD_fetch(libctx, "SHA1", propq);
/* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
if (ok != NULL)
*ok = 0;
if (sha1 != NULL
&& EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, sha1, NULL)) {
ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
) & 0xffffffffL;
if (ok != NULL)
*ok = 1;
}
EVP_MD_free(sha1);
return ret;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
/*
* I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding,
* this is reasonably efficient.
*/
unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(const X509_NAME *x)
{
EVP_MD *md5 = EVP_MD_fetch(NULL, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5, "-fips");
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
unsigned long ret = 0;
unsigned char md[16];
if (md5 == NULL || md_ctx == NULL)
goto end;
/* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, md5, NULL)
&& EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
&& EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL))
ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
) & 0xffffffffL;
end:
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
EVP_MD_free(md5);
return ret;
}
#endif
/* Search a stack of X509 for a match */
X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, const X509_NAME *name,
const ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
{
int i;
X509 x, *x509 = NULL;
if (!sk)
return NULL;
x.cert_info.serialNumber = *serial;
x.cert_info.issuer = (X509_NAME *)name; /* won't modify it */
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0)
return x509;
}
return NULL;
}
X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, const X509_NAME *name)
{
X509 *x509;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0)
return x509;
}
return NULL;
}
EVP_PKEY *X509_get0_pubkey(const X509 *x)
{
if (x == NULL)
return NULL;
return X509_PUBKEY_get0(x->cert_info.key);
}
EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
{
if (x == NULL)
return NULL;
return X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info.key);
}
int X509_check_private_key(const X509 *cert, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
const EVP_PKEY *xk = X509_get0_pubkey(cert);
if (xk == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
return 0;
}
return ossl_x509_check_private_key(xk, pkey);
}
int ossl_x509_check_private_key(const EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
if (x == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return 0;
}
switch (EVP_PKEY_eq(x, pkey)) {
case 1:
return 1;
case 0:
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
return 0;
case -1:
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
return 0;
case -2:
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
/* fall thru */
default:
return 0;
}
}
/*
* Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID
* of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a
* flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags.
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags)
{
char curve_name[80];
size_t curve_name_len;
int curve_nid;
if (pkey == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
if (!EVP_PKEY_get_group_name(pkey, curve_name, sizeof(curve_name),
&curve_name_len))
return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE;
curve_nid = OBJ_txt2nid(curve_name);
/* Check curve is consistent with LOS */
if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */
/*
* Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve.
*/
if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384)
return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS))
return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
/* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */
*pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY;
} else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) { /* P-256 */
if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY))
return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
} else {
return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE;
}
return X509_V_OK;
}
int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
unsigned long flags)
{
int rv, i, sign_nid;
EVP_PKEY *pk;
unsigned long tflags = flags;
if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
return X509_V_OK;
/* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */
if (x == NULL) {
x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
i = 1;
} else {
i = 0;
}
pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
/*
* With DANE-EE(3) success, or DANE-EE(3)/PKIX-EE(1) failure we don't build
* a chain all, just report trust success or failure, but must also report
* Suite-B errors if applicable. This is indicated via a NULL chain
* pointer. All we need to do is check the leaf key algorithm.
*/
if (chain == NULL)
return check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
if (X509_get_version(x) != X509_VERSION_3) {
rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
/* Correct error depth */
i = 0;
goto end;
}
/* Check EE key only */
rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
/* Correct error depth */
i = 0;
goto end;
}
for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
if (X509_get_version(x) != X509_VERSION_3) {
rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
goto end;
}
pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags);
if (rv != X509_V_OK)
goto end;
}
/* Final check: root CA signature */
rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags);
end:
if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
/* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */
if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
|| rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i)
i--;
/*
* If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384
* with P-256. Use more meaningful error.
*/
if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags)
rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256;
if (perror_depth)
*perror_depth = i;
}
return rv;
}
int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
{
int sign_nid;
if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
return X509_V_OK;
sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl.sig_alg.algorithm);
return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags);
}
#else
int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
unsigned long flags)
{
return 0;
}
int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
{
return 0;
}
#endif
/*
* Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference
* count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of
* each X509 structure.
*/
STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
{
STACK_OF(X509) *ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
int i;
if (ret == NULL)
return NULL;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) {
X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i);
if (!X509_up_ref(x))
goto err;
}
return ret;
err:
while (i-- > 0)
X509_free(sk_X509_value(ret, i));
sk_X509_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
|