Allow server to receive an hmac token with the client timestamp for auth

1 files changed, 66 insertions, 2 deletions

diff --git a/auth/extract_test.go b/auth/extract_test.go
index f2cc3f773..7d6df8fb0 100644
--- a/auth/extract_test.go
+++ b/auth/extract_test.go
@@ -2,7 +2,9 @@ package gitalyauth
 
 import (
 	"testing"
+	"time"
 
+	"github.com/grpc-ecosystem/go-grpc-middleware/util/metautils"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
 	"golang.org/x/net/context"
 	"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
@@ -11,7 +13,7 @@ import (
 	"google.golang.org/grpc/status"
 )
 
-func TestCheckToken(t *testing.T) {
+func TestCheckTokenV1(t *testing.T) {
 	secret := "secret 1234"
 
 	testCases := []struct {
@@ -44,13 +46,75 @@ func TestCheckToken(t *testing.T) {
 	for _, tc := range testCases {
 		t.Run(tc.desc, func(t *testing.T) {
 			ctx := metadata.NewIncomingContext(context.Background(), tc.md)
-			err := CheckToken(ctx, secret)
+			err := CheckToken(ctx, secret, time.Now())
 			require.Equal(t, tc.code, status.Code(err), "expected grpc code in error %v", err)
 		})
 	}
 
 }
 
+func TestCheckTokenV2(t *testing.T) {
+	targetTime := time.Unix(1535671600, 0)
+	secret := []byte("foo")
+
+	testCases := []struct {
+		desc   string
+		token  string
+		result error
+	}{
+		{
+			desc:   "Valid v2 secret, future time within threshold",
+			token:  "v2.3346cb25ecdb928defd368e7390522a86764bbdf1e8b21aaef27c4c23ec9c899.1535671615",
+			result: nil,
+		},
+		{
+			desc:   "Valid v2 secret, past time within threshold",
+			token:  "v2.b77158328e80be2984eaf08788419d25f3484eae484aec1297af6bdf1a456610.1535671585",
+			result: nil,
+		},
+		{
+			desc:   "Invalid secret, time within threshold",
+			token:  "v2.52a3b9016f46853c225c72b87617ac27109bba8a3068002069ab90e28253a911.1535671585",
+			result: errDenied,
+		},
+		{
+			desc:   "Valid secret, time too much in the future",
+			token:  "v2.ab9e7315aeecf6815fc0df585370157814131acab376f41797ad4ebc4d9a823c.1535671631",
+			result: errDenied,
+		},
+		{
+			desc:   "Valid secret, time too much in the past",
+			token:  "v2.f805bc69ca3aedd99e814b3fb1fc1e6a1094191691480b168a20fad7c2d24557.1535671569",
+			result: errDenied,
+		},
+		{
+			desc:   "Mismatching signed and clear message",
+			token:  "v2.319b96a3194c1cb2a2e6f1386161aca1c4cda13257fa9df8a328ab6769649bb0.1535671599",
+			result: errDenied,
+		},
+		{
+			desc:   "Invalid version",
+			token:  "v3.6fec98e8fe494284ce545c4b421799f02b9718b0eadfc3772d027e1ac5d6d569.1535671601",
+			result: errDenied,
+		},
+		{
+			desc:   "Empty token",
+			token:  "",
+			result: errDenied,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tc := range testCases {
+		t.Run(tc.desc, func(t *testing.T) {
+			md := metautils.NiceMD{}
+			md.Set("authorization", "Bearer "+tc.token)
+			result := CheckToken(md.ToIncoming(context.Background()), string(secret), targetTime)
+
+			require.Equal(t, tc.result, result)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
 func credsMD(t *testing.T, creds credentials.PerRPCCredentials) metadata.MD {
 	md, err := creds.GetRequestMetadata(context.Background())
 	require.NoError(t, err)