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Diffstat (limited to 'core/src/main/java/org/bouncycastle/crypto/tls/AlertDescription.java')
| -rw-r--r-- | core/src/main/java/org/bouncycastle/crypto/tls/AlertDescription.java | 216 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 216 deletions
diff --git a/core/src/main/java/org/bouncycastle/crypto/tls/AlertDescription.java b/core/src/main/java/org/bouncycastle/crypto/tls/AlertDescription.java deleted file mode 100644 index 91366be0..00000000 --- a/core/src/main/java/org/bouncycastle/crypto/tls/AlertDescription.java +++ /dev/null @@ -1,216 +0,0 @@ -package org.bouncycastle.crypto.tls; - -/** - * RFC 5246 7.2. - */ -public class AlertDescription -{ - /** - * This message notifies the recipient that the sender will not send any more messages on this - * connection. Note that as of TLS 1.1, failure to properly close a connection no longer - * requires that a session not be resumed. This is a change from TLS 1.0 ("The session becomes - * unresumable if any connection is terminated without proper close_notify messages with level - * equal to warning.") to conform with widespread implementation practice. - */ - public static final short close_notify = 0; - - /** - * An inappropriate message was received. This alert is always fatal and should never be - * observed in communication between proper implementations. - */ - public static final short unexpected_message = 10; - - /** - * This alert is returned if a record is received with an incorrect MAC. This alert also MUST be - * returned if an alert is sent because a TLSCiphertext decrypted in an invalid way: either it - * wasn't an even multiple of the block length, or its padding values, when checked, weren't - * correct. This message is always fatal and should never be observed in communication between - * proper implementations (except when messages were corrupted in the network). - */ - public static final short bad_record_mac = 20; - - /** - * This alert was used in some earlier versions of TLS, and may have permitted certain attacks - * against the CBC mode [CBCATT]. It MUST NOT be sent by compliant implementations. - */ - public static final short decryption_failed = 21; - - /** - * A TLSCiphertext record was received that had a length more than 2^14+2048 bytes, or a record - * decrypted to a TLSCompressed record with more than 2^14+1024 bytes. This message is always - * fatal and should never be observed in communication between proper implementations (except - * when messages were corrupted in the network). - */ - public static final short record_overflow = 22; - - /** - * The decompression function received improper input (e.g., data that would expand to excessive - * length). This message is always fatal and should never be observed in communication between - * proper implementations. - */ - public static final short decompression_failure = 30; - - /** - * Reception of a handshake_failure alert message indicates that the sender was unable to - * negotiate an acceptable set of security parameters given the options available. This is a - * fatal error. - */ - public static final short handshake_failure = 40; - - /** - * This alert was used in SSLv3 but not any version of TLS. It MUST NOT be sent by compliant - * implementations. - */ - public static final short no_certificate = 41; - - /** - * A certificate was corrupt, contained signatures that did not verify correctly, etc. - */ - public static final short bad_certificate = 42; - - /** - * A certificate was of an unsupported type. - */ - public static final short unsupported_certificate = 43; - - /** - * A certificate was revoked by its signer. - */ - public static final short certificate_revoked = 44; - - /** - * A certificate has expired or is not currently valid. - */ - public static final short certificate_expired = 45; - - /** - * Some other (unspecified) issue arose in processing the certificate, rendering it - * unacceptable. - */ - public static final short certificate_unknown = 46; - - /** - * A field in the handshake was out of range or inconsistent with other fields. This message is - * always fatal. - */ - public static final short illegal_parameter = 47; - - /** - * A valid certificate chain or partial chain was received, but the certificate was not accepted - * because the CA certificate could not be located or couldn't be matched with a known, trusted - * CA. This message is always fatal. - */ - public static final short unknown_ca = 48; - - /** - * A valid certificate was received, but when access control was applied, the sender decided not - * to proceed with negotiation. This message is always fatal. - */ - public static final short access_denied = 49; - - /** - * A message could not be decoded because some field was out of the specified range or the - * length of the message was incorrect. This message is always fatal and should never be - * observed in communication between proper implementations (except when messages were corrupted - * in the network). - */ - public static final short decode_error = 50; - - /** - * A handshake cryptographic operation failed, including being unable to correctly verify a - * signature or validate a Finished message. This message is always fatal. - */ - public static final short decrypt_error = 51; - - /** - * This alert was used in some earlier versions of TLS. It MUST NOT be sent by compliant - * implementations. - */ - public static final short export_restriction = 60; - - /** - * The protocol version the client has attempted to negotiate is recognized but not supported. - * (For example, old protocol versions might be avoided for security reasons.) This message is - * always fatal. - */ - public static final short protocol_version = 70; - - /** - * Returned instead of handshake_failure when a negotiation has failed specifically because the - * server requires ciphers more secure than those supported by the client. This message is - * always fatal. - */ - public static final short insufficient_security = 71; - - /** - * An internal error unrelated to the peer or the correctness of the protocol (such as a memory - * allocation failure) makes it impossible to continue. This message is always fatal. - */ - public static final short internal_error = 80; - - /** - * This handshake is being canceled for some reason unrelated to a protocol failure. If the user - * cancels an operation after the handshake is complete, just closing the connection by sending - * a close_notify is more appropriate. This alert should be followed by a close_notify. This - * message is generally a warning. - */ - public static final short user_canceled = 90; - - /** - * Sent by the client in response to a hello request or by the server in response to a client - * hello after initial handshaking. Either of these would normally lead to renegotiation; when - * that is not appropriate, the recipient should respond with this alert. At that point, the - * original requester can decide whether to proceed with the connection. One case where this - * would be appropriate is where a server has spawned a process to satisfy a request; the - * process might receive security parameters (key length, authentication, etc.) at startup, and - * it might be difficult to communicate changes to these parameters after that point. This - * message is always a warning. - */ - public static final short no_renegotiation = 100; - - /** - * Sent by clients that receive an extended server hello containing an extension that they did - * not put in the corresponding client hello. This message is always fatal. - */ - public static final short unsupported_extension = 110; - - /* - * RFC 3546 - */ - - /** - * This alert is sent by servers who are unable to retrieve a certificate chain from the URL - * supplied by the client (see Section 3.3). This message MAY be fatal - for example if client - * authentication is required by the server for the handshake to continue and the server is - * unable to retrieve the certificate chain, it may send a fatal alert. - */ - public static final short certificate_unobtainable = 111; - - /** - * This alert is sent by servers that receive a server_name extension request, but do not - * recognize the server name. This message MAY be fatal. - */ - public static final short unrecognized_name = 112; - - /** - * This alert is sent by clients that receive an invalid certificate status response (see - * Section 3.6). This message is always fatal. - */ - public static final short bad_certificate_status_response = 113; - - /** - * This alert is sent by servers when a certificate hash does not match a client provided - * certificate_hash. This message is always fatal. - */ - public static final short bad_certificate_hash_value = 114; - - /* - * RFC 4279 - */ - - /** - * If the server does not recognize the PSK identity, it MAY respond with an - * "unknown_psk_identity" alert message. - */ - public static final short unknown_psk_identity = 115; -} |