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Diffstat (limited to 'core/src/main/java/org/spongycastle/crypto/tls/TlsServerProtocol.java')
-rw-r--r--core/src/main/java/org/spongycastle/crypto/tls/TlsServerProtocol.java778
1 files changed, 778 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/core/src/main/java/org/spongycastle/crypto/tls/TlsServerProtocol.java b/core/src/main/java/org/spongycastle/crypto/tls/TlsServerProtocol.java
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b4e3b04c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/core/src/main/java/org/spongycastle/crypto/tls/TlsServerProtocol.java
@@ -0,0 +1,778 @@
+package org.spongycastle.crypto.tls;
+
+import java.io.ByteArrayInputStream;
+import java.io.IOException;
+import java.io.InputStream;
+import java.io.OutputStream;
+import java.security.SecureRandom;
+import java.util.Vector;
+
+import org.spongycastle.asn1.x509.SubjectPublicKeyInfo;
+import org.spongycastle.crypto.params.AsymmetricKeyParameter;
+import org.spongycastle.crypto.util.PublicKeyFactory;
+import org.spongycastle.util.Arrays;
+
+public class TlsServerProtocol
+ extends TlsProtocol
+{
+ protected TlsServer tlsServer = null;
+ protected TlsServerContextImpl tlsServerContext = null;
+
+ protected TlsKeyExchange keyExchange = null;
+ protected TlsCredentials serverCredentials = null;
+ protected CertificateRequest certificateRequest = null;
+
+ protected short clientCertificateType = -1;
+ protected TlsHandshakeHash prepareFinishHash = null;
+
+ public TlsServerProtocol(InputStream input, OutputStream output, SecureRandom secureRandom)
+ {
+ super(input, output, secureRandom);
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Receives a TLS handshake in the role of server
+ *
+ * @param tlsServer
+ * @throws IOException If handshake was not successful.
+ */
+ public void accept(TlsServer tlsServer)
+ throws IOException
+ {
+ if (tlsServer == null)
+ {
+ throw new IllegalArgumentException("'tlsServer' cannot be null");
+ }
+ if (this.tlsServer != null)
+ {
+ throw new IllegalStateException("'accept' can only be called once");
+ }
+
+ this.tlsServer = tlsServer;
+
+ this.securityParameters = new SecurityParameters();
+ this.securityParameters.entity = ConnectionEnd.server;
+
+ this.tlsServerContext = new TlsServerContextImpl(secureRandom, securityParameters);
+
+ this.securityParameters.serverRandom = createRandomBlock(tlsServer.shouldUseGMTUnixTime(),
+ tlsServerContext.getNonceRandomGenerator());
+
+ this.tlsServer.init(tlsServerContext);
+ this.recordStream.init(tlsServerContext);
+
+ this.recordStream.setRestrictReadVersion(false);
+
+ completeHandshake();
+ }
+
+ protected void cleanupHandshake()
+ {
+ super.cleanupHandshake();
+
+ this.keyExchange = null;
+ this.serverCredentials = null;
+ this.certificateRequest = null;
+ this.prepareFinishHash = null;
+ }
+
+ protected AbstractTlsContext getContext()
+ {
+ return tlsServerContext;
+ }
+
+ protected TlsPeer getPeer()
+ {
+ return tlsServer;
+ }
+
+ protected void handleHandshakeMessage(short type, byte[] data)
+ throws IOException
+ {
+ ByteArrayInputStream buf = new ByteArrayInputStream(data);
+
+ switch (type)
+ {
+ case HandshakeType.client_hello:
+ {
+ switch (this.connection_state)
+ {
+ case CS_START:
+ {
+ receiveClientHelloMessage(buf);
+ this.connection_state = CS_CLIENT_HELLO;
+
+ sendServerHelloMessage();
+ this.connection_state = CS_SERVER_HELLO;
+
+ Vector serverSupplementalData = tlsServer.getServerSupplementalData();
+ if (serverSupplementalData != null)
+ {
+ sendSupplementalDataMessage(serverSupplementalData);
+ }
+ this.connection_state = CS_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA;
+
+ this.keyExchange = tlsServer.getKeyExchange();
+ this.keyExchange.init(getContext());
+
+ this.serverCredentials = tlsServer.getCredentials();
+
+ Certificate serverCertificate = null;
+
+ if (this.serverCredentials == null)
+ {
+ this.keyExchange.skipServerCredentials();
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ this.keyExchange.processServerCredentials(this.serverCredentials);
+
+ serverCertificate = this.serverCredentials.getCertificate();
+ sendCertificateMessage(serverCertificate);
+ }
+ this.connection_state = CS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE;
+
+ // TODO[RFC 3546] Check whether empty certificates is possible, allowed, or excludes CertificateStatus
+ if (serverCertificate == null || serverCertificate.isEmpty())
+ {
+ this.allowCertificateStatus = false;
+ }
+
+ if (this.allowCertificateStatus)
+ {
+ CertificateStatus certificateStatus = tlsServer.getCertificateStatus();
+ if (certificateStatus != null)
+ {
+ sendCertificateStatusMessage(certificateStatus);
+ }
+ }
+
+ this.connection_state = CS_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
+
+ byte[] serverKeyExchange = this.keyExchange.generateServerKeyExchange();
+ if (serverKeyExchange != null)
+ {
+ sendServerKeyExchangeMessage(serverKeyExchange);
+ }
+ this.connection_state = CS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
+
+ if (this.serverCredentials != null)
+ {
+ this.certificateRequest = tlsServer.getCertificateRequest();
+ if (this.certificateRequest != null)
+ {
+ this.keyExchange.validateCertificateRequest(certificateRequest);
+
+ sendCertificateRequestMessage(certificateRequest);
+
+ TlsUtils.trackHashAlgorithms(this.recordStream.getHandshakeHash(),
+ this.certificateRequest.getSupportedSignatureAlgorithms());
+ }
+ }
+ this.connection_state = CS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
+
+ sendServerHelloDoneMessage();
+ this.connection_state = CS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE;
+
+ this.recordStream.getHandshakeHash().sealHashAlgorithms();
+
+ break;
+ }
+ default:
+ throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ case HandshakeType.supplemental_data:
+ {
+ switch (this.connection_state)
+ {
+ case CS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE:
+ {
+ tlsServer.processClientSupplementalData(readSupplementalDataMessage(buf));
+ this.connection_state = CS_CLIENT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA;
+ break;
+ }
+ default:
+ throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ case HandshakeType.certificate:
+ {
+ switch (this.connection_state)
+ {
+ case CS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE:
+ {
+ tlsServer.processClientSupplementalData(null);
+ // NB: Fall through to next case label
+ }
+ case CS_CLIENT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA:
+ {
+ if (this.certificateRequest == null)
+ {
+ throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
+ }
+ receiveCertificateMessage(buf);
+ this.connection_state = CS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE;
+ break;
+ }
+ default:
+ throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ case HandshakeType.client_key_exchange:
+ {
+ switch (this.connection_state)
+ {
+ case CS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE:
+ {
+ tlsServer.processClientSupplementalData(null);
+ // NB: Fall through to next case label
+ }
+ case CS_CLIENT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA:
+ {
+ if (this.certificateRequest == null)
+ {
+ this.keyExchange.skipClientCredentials();
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (TlsUtils.isTLSv12(getContext()))
+ {
+ /*
+ * RFC 5246 If no suitable certificate is available, the client MUST send a
+ * certificate message containing no certificates.
+ *
+ * NOTE: In previous RFCs, this was SHOULD instead of MUST.
+ */
+ throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
+ }
+ else if (TlsUtils.isSSL(getContext()))
+ {
+ if (this.peerCertificate == null)
+ {
+ throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ notifyClientCertificate(Certificate.EMPTY_CHAIN);
+ }
+ }
+ // NB: Fall through to next case label
+ }
+ case CS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE:
+ {
+ receiveClientKeyExchangeMessage(buf);
+ this.connection_state = CS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
+ break;
+ }
+ default:
+ throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ case HandshakeType.certificate_verify:
+ {
+ switch (this.connection_state)
+ {
+ case CS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE:
+ {
+ /*
+ * RFC 5246 7.4.8 This message is only sent following a client certificate that has
+ * signing capability (i.e., all certificates except those containing fixed
+ * Diffie-Hellman parameters).
+ */
+ if (!expectCertificateVerifyMessage())
+ {
+ throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
+ }
+
+ receiveCertificateVerifyMessage(buf);
+ this.connection_state = CS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
+
+ break;
+ }
+ default:
+ throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ case HandshakeType.finished:
+ {
+ switch (this.connection_state)
+ {
+ case CS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE:
+ {
+ if (expectCertificateVerifyMessage())
+ {
+ throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
+ }
+ // NB: Fall through to next case label
+ }
+ case CS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY:
+ {
+ processFinishedMessage(buf);
+ this.connection_state = CS_CLIENT_FINISHED;
+
+ if (this.expectSessionTicket)
+ {
+ sendNewSessionTicketMessage(tlsServer.getNewSessionTicket());
+ sendChangeCipherSpecMessage();
+ }
+ this.connection_state = CS_SERVER_SESSION_TICKET;
+
+ sendFinishedMessage();
+ this.connection_state = CS_SERVER_FINISHED;
+ this.connection_state = CS_END;
+ break;
+ }
+ default:
+ throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ case HandshakeType.hello_request:
+ case HandshakeType.hello_verify_request:
+ case HandshakeType.server_hello:
+ case HandshakeType.server_key_exchange:
+ case HandshakeType.certificate_request:
+ case HandshakeType.server_hello_done:
+ case HandshakeType.session_ticket:
+ default:
+ throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
+ }
+ }
+
+ protected void handleWarningMessage(short description)
+ throws IOException
+ {
+ switch (description)
+ {
+ case AlertDescription.no_certificate:
+ {
+ /*
+ * SSL 3.0 If the server has sent a certificate request Message, the client must send
+ * either the certificate message or a no_certificate alert.
+ */
+ if (TlsUtils.isSSL(getContext()) && certificateRequest != null)
+ {
+ notifyClientCertificate(Certificate.EMPTY_CHAIN);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ default:
+ {
+ super.handleWarningMessage(description);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ protected void notifyClientCertificate(Certificate clientCertificate)
+ throws IOException
+ {
+ if (certificateRequest == null)
+ {
+ throw new IllegalStateException();
+ }
+
+ if (this.peerCertificate != null)
+ {
+ throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
+ }
+
+ this.peerCertificate = clientCertificate;
+
+ if (clientCertificate.isEmpty())
+ {
+ this.keyExchange.skipClientCredentials();
+ }
+ else
+ {
+
+ /*
+ * TODO RFC 5246 7.4.6. If the certificate_authorities list in the certificate request
+ * message was non-empty, one of the certificates in the certificate chain SHOULD be
+ * issued by one of the listed CAs.
+ */
+
+ this.clientCertificateType = TlsUtils.getClientCertificateType(clientCertificate,
+ this.serverCredentials.getCertificate());
+
+ this.keyExchange.processClientCertificate(clientCertificate);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * RFC 5246 7.4.6. If the client does not send any certificates, the server MAY at its
+ * discretion either continue the handshake without client authentication, or respond with a
+ * fatal handshake_failure alert. Also, if some aspect of the certificate chain was
+ * unacceptable (e.g., it was not signed by a known, trusted CA), the server MAY at its
+ * discretion either continue the handshake (considering the client unauthenticated) or send
+ * a fatal alert.
+ */
+ this.tlsServer.notifyClientCertificate(clientCertificate);
+ }
+
+ protected void receiveCertificateMessage(ByteArrayInputStream buf)
+ throws IOException
+ {
+ Certificate clientCertificate = Certificate.parse(buf);
+
+ assertEmpty(buf);
+
+ notifyClientCertificate(clientCertificate);
+ }
+
+ protected void receiveCertificateVerifyMessage(ByteArrayInputStream buf)
+ throws IOException
+ {
+ DigitallySigned clientCertificateVerify = DigitallySigned.parse(getContext(), buf);
+
+ assertEmpty(buf);
+
+ // Verify the CertificateVerify message contains a correct signature.
+ boolean verified = false;
+ try
+ {
+ byte[] certificateVerifyHash;
+ if (TlsUtils.isTLSv12(getContext()))
+ {
+ certificateVerifyHash = prepareFinishHash.getFinalHash(clientCertificateVerify.getAlgorithm().getHash());
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ certificateVerifyHash = TlsProtocol.getCurrentPRFHash(getContext(), prepareFinishHash, null);
+ }
+
+ org.spongycastle.asn1.x509.Certificate x509Cert = this.peerCertificate.getCertificateAt(0);
+ SubjectPublicKeyInfo keyInfo = x509Cert.getSubjectPublicKeyInfo();
+ AsymmetricKeyParameter publicKey = PublicKeyFactory.createKey(keyInfo);
+
+ TlsSigner tlsSigner = TlsUtils.createTlsSigner(this.clientCertificateType);
+ tlsSigner.init(getContext());
+ verified = tlsSigner.verifyRawSignature(clientCertificateVerify.getAlgorithm(),
+ clientCertificateVerify.getSignature(), publicKey, certificateVerifyHash);
+ }
+ catch (Exception e)
+ {
+ }
+
+ if (!verified)
+ {
+ throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.decrypt_error);
+ }
+ }
+
+ protected void receiveClientHelloMessage(ByteArrayInputStream buf)
+ throws IOException
+ {
+ ProtocolVersion client_version = TlsUtils.readVersion(buf);
+ if (client_version.isDTLS())
+ {
+ throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
+ }
+
+ byte[] client_random = TlsUtils.readFully(32, buf);
+
+ /*
+ * TODO RFC 5077 3.4. If a ticket is presented by the client, the server MUST NOT attempt to
+ * use the Session ID in the ClientHello for stateful session resumption.
+ */
+ byte[] sessionID = TlsUtils.readOpaque8(buf);
+ if (sessionID.length > 32)
+ {
+ throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * TODO RFC 5246 7.4.1.2. If the session_id field is not empty (implying a session
+ * resumption request), this vector MUST include at least the cipher_suite from that
+ * session.
+ */
+ int cipher_suites_length = TlsUtils.readUint16(buf);
+ if (cipher_suites_length < 2 || (cipher_suites_length & 1) != 0)
+ {
+ throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.decode_error);
+ }
+ this.offeredCipherSuites = TlsUtils.readUint16Array(cipher_suites_length / 2, buf);
+
+ /*
+ * TODO RFC 5246 7.4.1.2. If the session_id field is not empty (implying a session
+ * resumption request), it MUST include the compression_method from that session.
+ */
+ int compression_methods_length = TlsUtils.readUint8(buf);
+ if (compression_methods_length < 1)
+ {
+ throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
+ }
+ this.offeredCompressionMethods = TlsUtils.readUint8Array(compression_methods_length, buf);
+
+ /*
+ * TODO RFC 3546 2.3 If [...] the older session is resumed, then the server MUST ignore
+ * extensions appearing in the client hello, and send a server hello containing no
+ * extensions.
+ */
+ this.clientExtensions = readExtensions(buf);
+
+ getContext().setClientVersion(client_version);
+
+ tlsServer.notifyClientVersion(client_version);
+
+ securityParameters.clientRandom = client_random;
+
+ tlsServer.notifyOfferedCipherSuites(offeredCipherSuites);
+ tlsServer.notifyOfferedCompressionMethods(offeredCompressionMethods);
+
+ /*
+ * RFC 5746 3.6. Server Behavior: Initial Handshake
+ */
+ {
+ /*
+ * RFC 5746 3.4. The client MUST include either an empty "renegotiation_info" extension,
+ * or the TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV signaling cipher suite value in the
+ * ClientHello. Including both is NOT RECOMMENDED.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * When a ClientHello is received, the server MUST check if it includes the
+ * TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV SCSV. If it does, set the secure_renegotiation flag
+ * to TRUE.
+ */
+ if (Arrays.contains(offeredCipherSuites, CipherSuite.TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV))
+ {
+ this.secure_renegotiation = true;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The server MUST check if the "renegotiation_info" extension is included in the
+ * ClientHello.
+ */
+ byte[] renegExtData = TlsUtils.getExtensionData(clientExtensions, EXT_RenegotiationInfo);
+ if (renegExtData != null)
+ {
+ /*
+ * If the extension is present, set secure_renegotiation flag to TRUE. The
+ * server MUST then verify that the length of the "renegotiated_connection"
+ * field is zero, and if it is not, MUST abort the handshake.
+ */
+ this.secure_renegotiation = true;
+
+ if (!Arrays.constantTimeAreEqual(renegExtData, createRenegotiationInfo(TlsUtils.EMPTY_BYTES)))
+ {
+ throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.handshake_failure);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ tlsServer.notifySecureRenegotiation(this.secure_renegotiation);
+
+ if (clientExtensions != null)
+ {
+ tlsServer.processClientExtensions(clientExtensions);
+ }
+ }
+
+ protected void receiveClientKeyExchangeMessage(ByteArrayInputStream buf)
+ throws IOException
+ {
+ this.keyExchange.processClientKeyExchange(buf);
+
+ assertEmpty(buf);
+
+ establishMasterSecret(getContext(), keyExchange);
+ recordStream.setPendingConnectionState(getPeer().getCompression(), getPeer().getCipher());
+
+ this.prepareFinishHash = recordStream.prepareToFinish();
+
+ if (!expectSessionTicket)
+ {
+ sendChangeCipherSpecMessage();
+ }
+ }
+
+ protected void sendCertificateRequestMessage(CertificateRequest certificateRequest)
+ throws IOException
+ {
+ HandshakeMessage message = new HandshakeMessage(HandshakeType.certificate_request);
+
+ certificateRequest.encode(message);
+
+ message.writeToRecordStream();
+ }
+
+ protected void sendCertificateStatusMessage(CertificateStatus certificateStatus)
+ throws IOException
+ {
+ HandshakeMessage message = new HandshakeMessage(HandshakeType.certificate_status);
+
+ certificateStatus.encode(message);
+
+ message.writeToRecordStream();
+ }
+
+ protected void sendNewSessionTicketMessage(NewSessionTicket newSessionTicket)
+ throws IOException
+ {
+ if (newSessionTicket == null)
+ {
+ throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.internal_error);
+ }
+
+ HandshakeMessage message = new HandshakeMessage(HandshakeType.session_ticket);
+
+ newSessionTicket.encode(message);
+
+ message.writeToRecordStream();
+ }
+
+ protected void sendServerHelloMessage()
+ throws IOException
+ {
+ HandshakeMessage message = new HandshakeMessage(HandshakeType.server_hello);
+
+ ProtocolVersion server_version = tlsServer.getServerVersion();
+ if (!server_version.isEqualOrEarlierVersionOf(getContext().getClientVersion()))
+ {
+ throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.internal_error);
+ }
+
+ recordStream.setReadVersion(server_version);
+ recordStream.setWriteVersion(server_version);
+ recordStream.setRestrictReadVersion(true);
+ getContext().setServerVersion(server_version);
+
+ TlsUtils.writeVersion(server_version, message);
+
+ message.write(this.securityParameters.serverRandom);
+
+ /*
+ * The server may return an empty session_id to indicate that the session will not be cached
+ * and therefore cannot be resumed.
+ */
+ TlsUtils.writeOpaque8(TlsUtils.EMPTY_BYTES, message);
+
+ int selectedCipherSuite = tlsServer.getSelectedCipherSuite();
+ if (!Arrays.contains(this.offeredCipherSuites, selectedCipherSuite)
+ || selectedCipherSuite == CipherSuite.TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL
+ || selectedCipherSuite == CipherSuite.TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV
+ || !TlsUtils.isValidCipherSuiteForVersion(selectedCipherSuite, server_version))
+ {
+ throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.internal_error);
+ }
+ securityParameters.cipherSuite = selectedCipherSuite;
+
+ short selectedCompressionMethod = tlsServer.getSelectedCompressionMethod();
+ if (!Arrays.contains(this.offeredCompressionMethods, selectedCompressionMethod))
+ {
+ throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.internal_error);
+ }
+ securityParameters.compressionAlgorithm = selectedCompressionMethod;
+
+ TlsUtils.writeUint16(selectedCipherSuite, message);
+ TlsUtils.writeUint8(selectedCompressionMethod, message);
+
+ this.serverExtensions = tlsServer.getServerExtensions();
+
+ /*
+ * RFC 5746 3.6. Server Behavior: Initial Handshake
+ */
+ if (this.secure_renegotiation)
+ {
+ byte[] renegExtData = TlsUtils.getExtensionData(this.serverExtensions, EXT_RenegotiationInfo);
+ boolean noRenegExt = (null == renegExtData);
+
+ if (noRenegExt)
+ {
+ /*
+ * Note that sending a "renegotiation_info" extension in response to a ClientHello
+ * containing only the SCSV is an explicit exception to the prohibition in RFC 5246,
+ * Section 7.4.1.4, on the server sending unsolicited extensions and is only allowed
+ * because the client is signaling its willingness to receive the extension via the
+ * TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV SCSV.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * If the secure_renegotiation flag is set to TRUE, the server MUST include an empty
+ * "renegotiation_info" extension in the ServerHello message.
+ */
+ this.serverExtensions = TlsExtensionsUtils.ensureExtensionsInitialised(this.serverExtensions);
+ this.serverExtensions.put(EXT_RenegotiationInfo, createRenegotiationInfo(TlsUtils.EMPTY_BYTES));
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * TODO RFC 3546 2.3 If [...] the older session is resumed, then the server MUST ignore
+ * extensions appearing in the client hello, and send a server hello containing no
+ * extensions.
+ */
+
+ if (this.serverExtensions != null)
+ {
+ this.securityParameters.encryptThenMAC = TlsExtensionsUtils.hasEncryptThenMACExtension(this.serverExtensions);
+
+ this.securityParameters.maxFragmentLength = processMaxFragmentLengthExtension(clientExtensions,
+ this.serverExtensions, AlertDescription.internal_error);
+
+ this.securityParameters.truncatedHMac = TlsExtensionsUtils.hasTruncatedHMacExtension(this.serverExtensions);
+
+ /*
+ * TODO It's surprising that there's no provision to allow a 'fresh' CertificateStatus to be sent in
+ * a session resumption handshake.
+ */
+ this.allowCertificateStatus = !this.resumedSession
+ && TlsUtils.hasExpectedEmptyExtensionData(this.serverExtensions, TlsExtensionsUtils.EXT_status_request,
+ AlertDescription.internal_error);
+
+ this.expectSessionTicket = !this.resumedSession
+ && TlsUtils.hasExpectedEmptyExtensionData(this.serverExtensions, TlsProtocol.EXT_SessionTicket,
+ AlertDescription.internal_error);
+
+ writeExtensions(message, this.serverExtensions);
+ }
+
+ if (this.securityParameters.maxFragmentLength >= 0)
+ {
+ int plainTextLimit = 1 << (8 + this.securityParameters.maxFragmentLength);
+ recordStream.setPlaintextLimit(plainTextLimit);
+ }
+
+ securityParameters.prfAlgorithm = getPRFAlgorithm(getContext(), securityParameters.getCipherSuite());
+
+ /*
+ * RFC 5264 7.4.9. Any cipher suite which does not explicitly specify verify_data_length has
+ * a verify_data_length equal to 12. This includes all existing cipher suites.
+ */
+ securityParameters.verifyDataLength = 12;
+
+ message.writeToRecordStream();
+
+ this.recordStream.notifyHelloComplete();
+ }
+
+ protected void sendServerHelloDoneMessage()
+ throws IOException
+ {
+ byte[] message = new byte[4];
+ TlsUtils.writeUint8(HandshakeType.server_hello_done, message, 0);
+ TlsUtils.writeUint24(0, message, 1);
+
+ writeHandshakeMessage(message, 0, message.length);
+ }
+
+ protected void sendServerKeyExchangeMessage(byte[] serverKeyExchange)
+ throws IOException
+ {
+ HandshakeMessage message = new HandshakeMessage(HandshakeType.server_key_exchange, serverKeyExchange.length);
+
+ message.write(serverKeyExchange);
+
+ message.writeToRecordStream();
+ }
+
+ protected boolean expectCertificateVerifyMessage()
+ {
+ return this.clientCertificateType >= 0 && TlsUtils.hasSigningCapability(this.clientCertificateType);
+ }
+}