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Since OPENSSL_malloc() and friends report ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, and
at least handle the file name and line number they are called from,
there's no need to report ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE where they are called
directly, or when SSLfatal() and RLAYERfatal() is used, the reason
`ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE` is changed to `ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB`.
There were a number of places where `ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE` was reported
even though it was a function from a different sub-system that was
called. Those places are changed to report ERR_R_{lib}_LIB, where
{lib} is the name of that sub-system.
Some of them are tricky to get right, as we have a lot of functions
that belong in the ASN1 sub-system, and all the `sk_` calls or from
the CRYPTO sub-system.
Some extra adaptation was necessary where there were custom OPENSSL_malloc()
wrappers, and some bugs are fixed alongside these changes.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19301)
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Also constify X509_REQ_get0_pubkey() and X509_REQ_check_private_key().
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18930)
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This is reproducible with my error injection patch.
The test vector has been validated on the 1.1.1 branch
but the issue is of course identical in all branches.
$ ERROR_INJECT=1653267699 ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./x509-test ./corpora/x509/5f4034ae85d6587dcad4da3e812e80f3d312894d
ERROR_INJECT=1653267699
#0 0x7fd485a6ad4f in __sanitizer_print_stack_trace ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_stack.cc:36
#1 0x55c12d268724 in my_malloc fuzz/test-corpus.c:114
#2 0x7fd484f51a75 in CRYPTO_zalloc crypto/mem.c:230
#3 0x7fd484ed778d in EVP_DigestInit_ex crypto/evp/digest.c:139
#4 0x7fd4850a9849 in X509_issuer_and_serial_hash crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c:44
#5 0x55c12d268951 in FuzzerTestOneInput fuzz/x509.c:44
#6 0x55c12d268239 in testfile fuzz/test-corpus.c:182
#7 0x55c12d267c7f in main fuzz/test-corpus.c:226
#8 0x7fd483a42082 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308
#9 0x55c12d267e5d in _start (/home/ed/OPCToolboxV5/Source/Core/OpenSSL/openssl/fuzz/x509-test+0x3e5d)
=================================================================
==1058475==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks
Direct leak of 268 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x7fd485a5dc3e in __interceptor_realloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:163
#1 0x7fd484d2eb9b in BUF_MEM_grow crypto/buffer/buffer.c:97
#2 0x7fd4850b2913 in X509_NAME_oneline crypto/x509/x509_obj.c:43
#3 0x7fd4850a982f in X509_issuer_and_serial_hash crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c:41
#4 0x55c12d268951 in FuzzerTestOneInput fuzz/x509.c:44
#5 0x55c12d268239 in testfile fuzz/test-corpus.c:182
#6 0x55c12d267c7f in main fuzz/test-corpus.c:226
#7 0x7fd483a42082 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 268 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s).
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18371)
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Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16976)
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Distinguish between not being able to extract a public key versus not knowing
the key's type.
Alternative to #15921
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15944)
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The X509 version APIs return the numerical values of the version
numbers, which are one off from the names. This is a bit confusing.
Where they don't get it wrong (accidentally making an "X509v4"
certificate), callers tend to try commenting every call site to explain
the mismatch, including in OpenSSL itself.
Define constants for these values, so code can be self-documenting and
callers are nudged towards the right values.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14549)
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We do not care whether canon_enc is NULL in this case.
Fixes #14813
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14832)
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Partially fixes #13837
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14474)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14589)
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This is a follow-up on #12615.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14436)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14039)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14039)
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The OpenSSL public API function X509_issuer_and_serial_hash() attempts
to create a unique hash value based on the issuer and serial number data
contained within an X509 certificate. However it fails to correctly
handle any errors that may occur while parsing the issuer field (which
might occur if the issuer field is maliciously constructed). This may
subsequently result in a NULL pointer deref and a crash leading to a
potential denial of service attack.
The function X509_issuer_and_serial_hash() is never directly called by
OpenSSL itself so applications are only vulnerable if they use this
function directly and they use it on certificates that may have been
obtained from untrusted sources.
CVE-2021-23841
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
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This simplifies many usages
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14040)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13999)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13139)
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Co-author: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Co-author: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13139)
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to invalid cert
This is the upstream fix for #13698 reported for v1.1.1
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13755)
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Deprecate X509_NAME_hash()
Document X509_NAME_hash_ex(), X509_NAME_hash(), X509_{subject,issuer}_name_hash()
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13762)
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The certificate path validation procedure specified in RFC 5280 does not
include checking the validity period of the trusted (root) certificate.
Still it is common good practice to perform this check.
Also OpenSSL did this until commit 0e7b1383e, which accidentally killed it.
The current commit restores the previous behavior.
It also removes the cause of that bug, namely counter-intuitive design
of the internal function check_issued(), which was complicated by checks
that actually belong to some other internal function, namely find_issuer().
Moreover, this commit adds a regression check and proper documentation of
the root cert validity period check feature, which had been missing so far.
Fixes #13427
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13590)
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This includes error reporting for libcrypto sub-libraries in surprising
places.
This was done using util/err-to-raise
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13318)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12781)
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with -2 for error
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12769)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12615)
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EVP_PKEY_parameters_eq()
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11953)
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... and only *define* them in the source files that need them.
Use DEFINE_OR_DECLARE which is set appropriately for internal builds
and not non-deprecated builds.
Deprecate stack-of-block
Better documentation
Move some ASN1 struct typedefs to types.h
Update ParseC to handle this. Most of all, ParseC needed to be more
consistent. The handlers are "recursive", in so far that they are called
again and again until they terminate, which depends entirely on what the
"massager" returns. There's a comment at the beginning of ParseC that
explains how that works. {Richard Levtte}
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10669)
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Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11386)
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in particular X509_NAME*, X509_STORE{,_CTX}*, and ASN1_INTEGER *,
also some result types of new functions, which does not break compatibility
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10504)
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Basically we use EXFLAG_INVALID for all kinds of out of memory and
all kinds of parse errors in x509v3_cache_extensions.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10755)
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This is a flag that has lost its relevance. The new mechanism to do
the same thing is to fetch the needed digest explicitly with "-fips"
as property query, i.e. we remove any requirement for that property to
be set when fetching, even if the default property query string
requires its presence.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10138)
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Currently, there are two different directories which contain internal
header files of libcrypto which are meant to be shared internally:
While header files in 'include/internal' are intended to be shared
between libcrypto and libssl, the files in 'crypto/include/internal'
are intended to be shared inside libcrypto only.
To make things complicated, the include search path is set up in such
a way that the directive #include "internal/file.h" could refer to
a file in either of these two directoroes. This makes it necessary
in some cases to add a '_int.h' suffix to some files to resolve this
ambiguity:
#include "internal/file.h" # located in 'include/internal'
#include "internal/file_int.h" # located in 'crypto/include/internal'
This commit moves the private crypto headers from
'crypto/include/internal' to 'include/crypto'
As a result, the include directives become unambiguous
#include "internal/file.h" # located in 'include/internal'
#include "crypto/file.h" # located in 'include/crypto'
hence the superfluous '_int.h' suffixes can be stripped.
The files 'store_int.h' and 'store.h' need to be treated specially;
they are joined into a single file.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9333)
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Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9614)
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[skip ci]
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7824)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6371)
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If the lengths of both names is 0 then don't attempt to do a memcmp.
Issue reported by Simon Friedberger, Robert Merget and Juraj Somorovsky.
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6291)
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Since return is inconsistent, I removed unnecessary parentheses and
unified them.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4541)
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return true for characters > 127. I.e. they are allowing extended ASCII
characters through which then cause problems. E.g. marking superscript '2' as
a number then causes the common (ch - '0') conversion to number to fail
miserably. Likewise letters with diacritical marks can also cause problems.
If a non-ASCII character set is being used (currently only EBCDIC), it is
adjusted for.
The implementation uses a single table with a bit for each of the defined
classes. These functions accept an int argument and fail for
values out of range or for characters outside of the ASCII set. They will
work for both signed and unsigned character inputs.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4102)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1367)
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Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1367)
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X509_REVOKED_get0_extensions
X509_check_private_key
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1300)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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The length is a long, so returning the difference does not quite work.
Thanks to Torbjörn Granlund for noticing.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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This was done by the following
find . -name '*.[ch]' | /tmp/pl
where /tmp/pl is the following three-line script:
print unless $. == 1 && m@/\* .*\.[ch] \*/@;
close ARGV if eof; # Close file to reset $.
And then some hand-editing of other files.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
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When DANE-EE(3) matches or either of DANE-EE/PKIX-EE fails, we don't
build a chain at all, but rather succeed or fail with just the leaf
certificate. In either case also check for Suite-B violations.
As unlikely as it may seem that anyone would enable both DANE and
Suite-B, we should do what the application asks.
Took the opportunity to eliminate the "cb" variables in x509_vfy.c,
just call ctx->verify_cb(ok, ctx)
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
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