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authorJean-Marc Valin <jmvalin@jmvalin.ca>2017-08-18 02:02:59 +0300
committerJean-Marc Valin <jmvalin@jmvalin.ca>2017-08-20 04:16:59 +0300
commitca3cb3234181980ac9ccf2b49bc6a10255c219f4 (patch)
tree4bea1160958b6ab655f0bebdc7948ee252dbafb0 /doc
parentd772eb966a74bd02bfc0ee9e3f8f1b8124fff5d0 (diff)
More fixes for IESG
Diffstat (limited to 'doc')
-rw-r--r--doc/draft-ietf-codec-opus-update.xml33
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 23 deletions
diff --git a/doc/draft-ietf-codec-opus-update.xml b/doc/draft-ietf-codec-opus-update.xml
index 926c332f..e5f980c5 100644
--- a/doc/draft-ietf-codec-opus-update.xml
+++ b/doc/draft-ietf-codec-opus-update.xml
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
<?rfc inline="yes"?>
<?rfc compact="yes"?>
<?rfc subcompact="no"?>
-<rfc category="std" docName="draft-ietf-codec-opus-update-09"
+<rfc category="std" docName="draft-ietf-codec-opus-update-10"
ipr="trust200902" updates="6716">
<front>
<title abbrev="Opus Update">Updates to the Opus Audio Codec</title>
@@ -47,11 +47,11 @@
- <date day="17" month="August" year="2017" />
+ <date day="21" month="August" year="2017" />
<abstract>
<t>This document addresses minor issues that were found in the specification
- of the Opus audio codec in RFC 6716. It updates the nornative decoder implementation
+ of the Opus audio codec in RFC 6716. It updates the normative decoder implementation
included in the appendix of RFC 6716. The changes fixes real and potential security-related
issues, as well minor quality-related issues.</t>
</abstract>
@@ -174,11 +174,6 @@
data stored in it was actually twice the input batch size
(nSamplesIn&lt;&lt;1).</t>
</list></t>
- <t>
- The allocated buffers involved (buf and S->sFIR) are actually larger than they need to be for
- the batch size used, so no out-of-bounds read or write is possible. Therefore the bug cannot be
- exploited.
- </t>
<t>The code can be fixed by applying the following changes to line 78 of silk/resampler_private_IIR_FIR.c:
</t>
<figure>
@@ -245,9 +240,8 @@ RESAMPLER_ORDER_FIR_12 * sizeof( opus_int16 ) );
<t>
It was discovered through decoder fuzzing that some bitstreams could produce
integer values exceeding 32-bits in LPC_inverse_pred_gain_QA(), causing
- a wrap-around. Although the authors are not aware of any way to exploit the bug,
- the C standard considers
- the behavior as undefined. The following patch to line 87 of silk/LPC_inv_pred_gain.c
+ a wrap-around. The C standard considers
+ this behavior as undefined. The following patch to line 87 of silk/LPC_inv_pred_gain.c
detects values that do not fit in a 32-bit integer and considers the corresponding filters unstable:
</t>
<figure>
@@ -483,18 +477,11 @@ fd3d3a7b0dfbdab98d37ed9aa04b659b9fefbd18 testvector11m.dec
reference implementation in <xref target="RFC6716">RFC 6716</xref>: CVE-2013-0899
<eref target="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-0899"/>
and CVE-2017-0381 <eref target="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-0381"/>.
- CVE-2013-0899 is fixed by <xref target="padding"/> and
- could theoretically cause an information leak, but the
- leaked information would at the very least go through the decoder process before
- being accessible to the attacker. Also, the bug can only be triggered by Opus packets
- at least 24 MB in size. CVE-2017-0381 is fixed by Section 7 and can only result in a 16-bit
- out-of-bounds read to a fixed location 256 bytes before a constant
- table. That location would normally be part of an executable's read-only
- data segment, but if that is not the case, the bug could at worst
- results in either a crash or the leakage of 16 bits of information from
- that fixed memory location (if the attacker has access to the decoded
- output). Despite the claims of the CVE, the bug cannot results in
- arbitrary code execution.
+ CVE- 2013-0899 theoretically could have caused an information leak. The leaked
+ information would have gone through the decoder process before being accessible
+ to the attacker. It is fixed by <xref target="padding"/>.
+ CVE-2017-0381 could have resulted in a 16-bit out-of-bounds read from a fixed
+ location. It is fixed in <xref target="lsf_overflow"/>.
Beyond the two fixed CVEs, this document adds no new security considerations on top of
<xref target="RFC6716">RFC 6716</xref>.
</t>